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1. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Carlos João Correia

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artigos

2. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Mafalda Blanc

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Se a crise da racionalidade é uma constante da sua história e uma implicação natural do carácter fragmentário e conjectural do conhecimento, já a sua derrapagem céptica se afigura mais preocupante e insana, sobretudo quando oriunda daqueles sectores da cultura que, por inerência e vocação, mais deveriam velar pela preservação da validade de critérios cognitivos e mora is de indiscutível interesse social. É este, a nosso ver, um estado de coisas que pode e deve ser combatido pelo retorno às fontes intuitivas e onto lógicas da racionalidade. Tal é, pelo menos a breve trecho, a tese que neste artigo se defende em uníssono com a fenomenologia. Assim, após revisitar as concepções clássica e moderna de verdade e relevar de vários modos a natureza auto-refutante do relativismo, o presente texto advoga a normatividad e da razão alegando que a verdade, na sua formalidade, se dá a pensar não apenas como índice de si própria mas ainda da estrutura do próprio ser na sua aprioridade transcendente e ideal.
3. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Sergio Rodero

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El problema “biología e inteligencia”, considerado filosóficamente, forma parte de un problema más amplio, que provisionalmente podría denominarse “organismo y psiquismo” y debería ser tratado desde très puntos de vista distintos, mas estrechamente entrelazados: el de las acciones, el de la habitud-actividad y el de las estructuras. El terreno de los actos es el más aparente y se refiere a todo el enorme campo de las acciones del hombre - no distinguimos aquí entre actos y acciones- , que tejen la vida del ser humano; el terreno de las habitudes, y con él el de la actividad, es más profundo y alude al modo esencial de habérselas el ser humano consigo mismo y con lo que le circunda en las acciones que realiza; finalmente, el terre no de las estructuras es todavia más profundo - tan sólo en el sentido de más radical- y alude a aquellas realidades, de la índole que sean, por las que el hombre posee modos específicos de habérselas con las cosas y puede realizar determinadas acciones. En este trabajo nos vamos a ceñir lo más posible al problema “biologia e inteligencia” y al solar de las acciones y de las habitudes, dejando para otra ocasión el problema de las estructuras, que nos conduciría al planteamiento más englobante de “psique y organismo”. Por la unidad de los tres niveles y por la unidad de lo que es el ser humano y de lo que es su actividad, en ocasiones tocaremos aspectos que desbordan la “ inteligencia” y que desbordan también el nivel de las acciones y de la habitud.
4. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Nuno P. Castanheira

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This paper intends to give a critical reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s treatment of inter-consciousness relationship as presented in his work L'être et le néant, namely in the chapter L'existence d'autrui. Our main objective is to understand the treatment Sartre gave the referred issue in that particular work, but also to show that his theoretical standpoint falls short on a true determination of the meaning of the experience of Otherness for consciousness. Our method for approaching Sartre’s views stands on a detailed reading of the author’s own analyses, trying to show their limited scope and providing a different, less conflictual treatment and interpretation for the presented data. In Sartre’s view, consciousness (the Pour-soi, as he calls it, i.e., non-positional consciousness) is not inhabited by an ego, that is, it doesn’t have an ego until one becomes an object to it, similar to the remaining objects of the world, which occurs with the Other’s entry in the world. That being, Sartre’s fundamental problem is to know how is it possible for consciousness to constitute an ego as an object - as an object among other objects, but whose experience is, for consciousness, different from the one it makes of all other objects - , and, on a second step, to state its identity with that ego, i.e., to be that ego, without loosing, in the process, its subjective spontaneity and freedom. Taken as a subject/object kind of relation, as Sartre affirms it, the inter-consciousness relationship is condemned to failure, doomed to be a permanent struggle for domination of one over an other. Our analysis of the sartrian data as put forward in L'Être et le néant will show that Sartre’s thesis about inter-consciousness relationship is one-sided and that a more comprehensive interpretation of the above-mentioned relationship is possible, an interpretation based in the view that envisaging the Other as an object is founded on an anticipation of its subjectivity and of consciousness’ own subjectivity, that is, on a founding intersubjective relationship. According to our viewpoint, if it is true that an ego can be an object, it is already as a degraded ego and not as the ego properly said, born out of a relationship between subjects. The experience of Othemess shows consciousness, originally and immediately, what it can and should be, and that being has a positivity that remains an other for a concrete, knowable ego. That founding experience, which takes place at an affective level, has the meaning of an experience of the limits which, when surpassed, will allow consciousness to reach a higher dignity of being. Therefore it is as anticipation and project, as desire, as afectivity, that the relationship to an other takes place, as a pure relationality without masks, and not as a dialectical conflict, as Sartre intends to show with his occasionally convincing arguments.
5. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Sara Margarida de Matos Roma Fernandes

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This article has the double goal of reflecting on the concept of narrative identity in Paul Ricoeur’s Thinking and of evaluating its contribution to the resolution of the general problem of personal identity. Accordingly, this article will develop the following thesis: 1) narrative identity results from a permanent dialectic between character (sameness, Idem) and selfhood (constancy, Ipse), that is, between subject’s power to relate continuously to himself during all his life through narrative mediation and subject’s psychological and physical traits; 2) personal identity is the continuous ethical and aesthetical (self)recreation and narrative identity brings perfectly together these two domains.

ensaios

6. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
André Santos Campos

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Modern political philosophy, especially since Machiavelli, intends to uncover what politics actually is, and in order to achieve this it often needs to penetrate into disciplines not immediately related to politics and assimilate for itself additional concepts and methodologies. Thus, it appears to be interdisciplinary in the manipulation of specific conceptual instruments. Since there is a methodological shift in modernity imposing the individual person as a basic starting-point of political philosophy, which is expressed in a language of rights, the birth of this juridical-political interdisciplinarity is to be found in a table of concepts established in the science of law and applicable to political philosophy. In order to further understand this, the origins of Grotius’s definitions of ius must be sought out, since they set the background for the bridge he architected between law and political philosophy to be crossed by subsequent modern political philosophers. The solidity of this theoretical basis for interdisciplinary political philosophy depends upon the simultaneity of all of Grotius’s different meanings of ius: it is from this foundation that seventeenth-century political philosophy can begin from.

leituras

7. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Montserrat Bartolomé Luises

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recensões

8. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Ana Rita de Almeida Ferreira

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9. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Marta Mendonça

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10. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Antonino Russo

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dissertações

11. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
José Quaresma

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12. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
José Maria Santana Caseias

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13. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Irene Pinto Pardelha

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14. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Maria Margarida Francisco Madureira

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15. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Maria Manuela Morais Ferreira

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16. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33
Igor Caldeira

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17. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33

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18. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 33

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