Cover of Forum Philosophicum
>> Go to Current Issue

Forum Philosophicum

Volume 27, Issue 2, Autumn 2022
Selected Phenomenological Studies

Table of Contents

Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents


articles

1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Witold Płotka Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary rather than opposite, and in the course of defending this claim enters into discussion with Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. It is asserted that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of the phenomenological method to be arrived at, one must take into consideration, especially, Husserl’s B III 10 manuscripts. By referring to these, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both approaches to inquiry. Moreover, he claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method stems from Husserl’s inquiries into the concept of consciousness, as defined in Ideas I.
2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Guilhem Causse Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The transmission of the craft and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder have in common that they involve a relationship of act to act between the master and the apprentice on the one hand, and between the therapist and the patient on the other. Phenomenology has from the outset considered movement as inherent to the flesh: Hardy thus hypothesises that the origin of the flesh is a gesture. For all that, his description remains largely dependent on a flesh that is primarily perceptive: this gesture can thus be qualified as an aesthetic gesture. But if the flesh is as much mobile as it is perceptive, would there not be another gesture that generates the flesh in movement that is not linked to perception? Housset takes a step in this direction and allows us to hypothesize the kinesic gesture which, alone, allows us to account for the two experiences mentioned above.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Adriana Warmbier Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper considers the problem of various different forms of pre-cognitive affective appraisal and their role in the process of gaining self-knowledge. According to the phenomenological approach, if we are to understand our inner states (our emotional experiences), these cannot be extracted from the context within which they arise. Emotions not only refer to the inner states of the subject, but also to the outer world to which they are a form of response. Brentano, Husserl and Scheler claimed that emotions are directed towards values. It is to this essential feature of emotional experience that I would like to turn. I shall therefore re-examine Sartre’s views concerning affectivity (i.e. the capacity to reveal evaluatively significant qualities of one’s environment), as well as the dual-aspect theory of (reflective and non-reflective) consciousness. The main argument of this paper is that a plausible account of the essential role of affectivity in the emotions may be provided on the basis of a phenomenological theory of pre-reflective consciousness and its relation to reflexivity. I will focus on three different claims about pre-reflective (affective) consciousness. According to the first of these, a large part of cognition is of a prelinguistic (pre-reflective) nature; I argue that the evaluative content of emotion is not only conceptually determined, but may also take a non-conceptual form (as affective appraisal). The second claim refers to the notion of affect, which ought to be distinguished from (unintentional) bodily sensations. The third conceives of the relation between pre-reflective (affective) consciousness and reflective consciousness (propositional attitudes) as normative (rather than causal). I aim to demonstrate that a plausible view of emotional affectivity must appeal to a phenomenological account of the pre-reflective aspect of consciousness.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Jarosław Jakubowski Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article starts with the hypothesis that the measure of first-person experience of initiative is not, as it has been customary to believe, the present moment. Jean Nabert’s philosophy (and especially his early work titled L’expérience intérieure de la liberté) provides tools that make it clear that the sense of initiating action that one has in the present moment carries the stigma of illusoriness. If I experience initiative in the present moment, it means that I have taken part in an activity initiated before. Therefore, even though the very moment of initiating action remains unavailable to me, the measure of initiative experience should be sought not in the present but in the past. To this end, one needs to consider the genesis of motives propelling my action. In line with Nabert’s conception, these motives—manifesting themselves as some kind of representations—are grounded in actions that I have not completed. However, the fact that the initiative I demonstrate is conditioned by these unfinished actions does not imply that my actions so far make up, by definition, a harmonious arrangement. Nevertheless, all these actions coalesce in one history, embracing my “desire to be” that constitutes my existence.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Szczepan Urbaniak Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, we analyse the relation of philosophy and theology in the work of Jean-Luc Marion in order to be able to see not only how the phenomenology of givenness can serve as a “new apologetics” for theology, but also how Marion’s phenomenology itself, in its historical development and in its core principle and method, is influenced and changed by theological phenomena. We present three ways of describing the relation, tension, mutual influence and separation of philosophy and theology: firstly, in line with Pascal’s distinction between the orders of reason and of the heart; secondly, in phenomenology, in terms of indications to the effect that there can be a phenomenon of revelation in the mode of possibility that is distinguished from the phenomenon of Revelation in theology in the mode of historicity; and thirdly, by analogy with Christian apologetics. In particular, we analyse this third dimension, putting forward the thesis that Marion’s phenomenology itself has some characteristics of the Christian apologetics he describes. We try to demonstrate this interpretation of his phenomenology in its key dimensions, such as the counter-method and descriptions of the phenomena of love and revelation, which constitute the culmination of the phenomenology of givenness, although at the same time, as it were, its limit, crossing over into the theological order.
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Kozak Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity?

articles on other subjects

7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Wojciech Szczerba Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article analyzes the notion of apokatastasis, first as it appears in the Greek philosophical tradition and then in the context of Christian thought. It shows how the cosmic theory of eternal return unfolded within early currents of Hellenic philosophy, and subsequently how the personal dimension of apokatastasis grew out of those traditions, where questions about the fate of humanity became primary. The article then points to the fundamental philosophical assumptions of apokatastasis in its cosmic and personal forms. Christian thought, in the process of its evolution, made significant use of Greek methodology and concepts. One of the theories transferred to the Christian context concerned the notion of universal salvation (apokatastasis). Such thinkers as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and John Scotus Eriugena developed the concept into its mature form. Although apokatastasis has been condemned on numerous occasions, it has survived in Christian teaching. From a secular perspective, it can be regarded as a symbol of the equity of all people, beckoning us in the direction of the notion of religious inclusion. As such, it ought to be construed as translating into respect and care for the other person sic et nunc.
8. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Alicja Pietras Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Hans Wagner (1917–2000), using the achievements of German transcendental philosophy, gives a transcendental argument for the idea of human dignity. He claims that to ground the validity of human thinking and all its products (e.g. culture), we must accept the validity of the idea of human dignity. The structure of my paper is as follows: First, I consider what it means to give a transcendental justification of something. I reconstruct the neo-Kantian’s understanding of transcendental method. Then I argue that Wagner’s idea of human dignity as a foundation of every ethics and law is nothing other than a fruitful interpretation and continuation, perhaps only making explicit Kant’s main ethical ideas. To make this more clear I present the relation between Kant’s ethics and the material ethics of values and, following Wagner, I argue that grounding ethics on the idea of self-determination of human will does not necessarily lead to formalism in the form in which it was criticised by the representatives of the material ethics of values. Finally, I reconstruct Wagner’s argument for the claim that the idea of human dignity is a transcendental condition for the possibility of ethics and law in general.

book reviews

9. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Marta Ples-Bęben Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

10. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

11. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by