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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Konstantinos Boudouris

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2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
William L. McBride

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3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Zhabaikhan Abdildin

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Three major phases can be distinguished in the history of the development of science. During the first phase, science had almost no link with production, craft, existed within philosophy and was considered to be elite activity. The radical change in the development of science occurs in the new time, when science having separated from philosophy becomes an independent area of knowledge. Science of new time not only discovers the laws of nature, it exists in close relation with production, and to some extent represents a basis for production. In this respect, the machine based production had a major impact. The next radical change in the development of science and its relations with production starts with technical revolution, which is of principal significance for both development of a man and for the understanding of the nature and concept of science. The most important value of technical revolution consists in its substantive impact on the nature of science and the change of its essential definitions and characteristics. In the context of technical revolution, a radical change occurs in the relation between science and production. In the modern automated production, science as a concentrated expression of laws directly merges with production, i.e. science itself becomes a direct productive force. A radical change occurs also in the nature of science. In the context of technical revolution, science transforms from a form of knowledge into the unity of science and activity, and an organic merger of science and production occurs.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Inês Lacerda Araújo

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With “epistemology” between quotation marks I intend in this paper to show that Rorty’s conception is a critical one. His claims in favor of a culture where epistemology is not central are justified in a historicist and pragmatic point of view. There is no sense in looking for permanent criteria of knowledge (from the ideas for Plato to a priori transcendental categories for Kant). In a culture of freedom and solidarity epistemology would give place to hermeneutics, to practices of understanding. There are specific roles for proofs and experimentation in certain contexts like the one of science; one may require objectivity in argumentation; proofs are necessary in a trial. In epistemology, however, rules, constraints of a transcendental rationality, permanent categories all these are metaphors of mind representing reality. Without necessary and universal guidelines of knowledge, cultures would be more free, conversation and understanding would be practices preferable to permanent rules for truth. History shows what men did mainly in the name of truth was violence and dogmatism. Pragmatism is not utilitarianism, it is the vision of action in context, practices that can modify undesirable conditions of humanity, instead of one and only true theory (or knowledge conception, or religion faith).
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Valentin Balanovskiy

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The concept of ‘transcendental reflection’ has been under-studied despite its crucial significance for Kant’s philosophical system. Kant’s transcendental reflection is an instrument inherent in our consciousness. Without this instrument, one would be unable to distinguish between representations/ fantasies and the reality; to have self-consciousness; to identify the functions of the human soul; to distinguish between the effects of the senses, the understanding, and reason within these functions, including identifying the a priori forms of the senses, the understanding, and reason; and to classify representations by the faculty of cognition to which they belong. This study aims to reconstruct the main features of Kant’s ideas of transcendental reflection and to define this notion through analysing the Critique of Pure Reason and the other fundamental works of Kant.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
José Barrientos Rastrojo

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Experiential reason is a kind of reason born on experiences. It includes reasons that subjects discover in its crucial experiences like giving birth to a child, to attend a relative’s death or to recover from a serious illness. Those experiences create a specific knowledge, for instance people understand the essence of the miracle of life or the mystery of our finitude. So, that specific knowledge is not just a theoretical and/or cognitive one. It embraces theoretical information but we can see how a lively awareness is open inside his agent. He will become a new person after living those experiences. This experience, and this knowledge created by it, will transform in an ontological way. A new understanding-light will be got. That one is not opposed to critical or analytical knowledge because ‘experiential understanding’ needs theoretical (critical and analytical) information to be performed. However, ‘experiential knowledge’ is beyond it. Furthermore, it is near to, so called by tradition, wisdom. This paper aims to define experiential reason. It will differentiate it from religious wisdom and from false wisdoms and it will explain how a person can get it. To carry out it, we will be guided by some hermeneutical and metaphysical approaches (Beuchot, Dilthey, Gadamer, Zambrano, Spranger, Ortega, Marías). Our paper will finish with an application of our discoveries to an emergent philosophical discipline: Philosophical Practice.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Mustafa I. Bilalov

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In modern spiritual, educational and scientific life the subjective character of cognitive activity and its cultural conditionality become more and more obvious. Remarkable is, that cognitive culture cannot be reduced to purely cognitive aspects of knowledge, but includes representations of social factors of collective life. Philosophical components of this culture are the general methods, principles and other basic grounds of science and knowledge. Religious and ethnic in cognitive culture also concerns ways and receptions, levels and steps, purposes and ideals of cognitive activity, developing historically in religious and ethnic traditions. No matter what form do the conducting determinants of cognitive culture take nowadays - scientific norms, philosophical methods, ethnic mentality features, religious traditions or methodological innovations - they demonstrate the amplifying subjective character of cognitive activity and its growing cultural conditionality.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Siraprapa Chavanayarn

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Most epistemologists agree that testimony is an important source of knowledge. However, they fundamentally disagree whether it is a basic source as perception or not. The reductionist standpoint concerning testimony holds that, testimony is not a basic source of knowledge, so hearers cannot justify about what they are told simply on the basis of the testimony of speakers. The justification of testimony comes from other basic sources such as perception, reason and consciousness. However, in this article, I will propose a problem of some reductionist arguments. That is, although the arguments can reject testimony as a basic source of knowledge, other sources which are generally accepted as basic sources of knowledge are rejected as well.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Simone Cheli

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The aim of this study is to propose an integration of the epistemological traditions of constructivism and systemics, and of the contemporary theorizations of physics and complex system models. All these theoretical viewpoints subsume a revolutionary construction of truth and reality, that supports and expands the concept of emergence. I hypothesise they issue three main challenges we must face with: (I) a radical construct of the observed reality as the autopoietic space of an observer; (II) a systemic integration of any observer and relationship through the proposed formulation of comergence; (III) an assumption of irreversibility in the construction of any process and state.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ruery-Lin Chen

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There are two levels in the problem about the justification of testimony. The first level is about justification of testimony in general: Is testimony as a source or type of knowledge reliable and independent? Two opposite positions have been proposed in philosophical literature: reductionism and non-reductionism. For to this level, I propose a communitarian non-reductionism in contrast to traditional or individualist non-reductionism. It is also a restricted non-reductionism. The second level is about the justification of testimony in particular: How do we justify our acceptance of testimonial beliefs? Do we justify them in a direct way as we do in the cases of perception, introspection and memory, or, in an inferential way? The former position is known as fundamentalism and the latter inferentialism. For the particular level, I develop a position of virtue fundamentalism. I understand the meaning of intellectual virtues based on the view of virtue responsibilism. In summary, I call the communitarian non-reductionism and virtue fundamentalism in the sense of virtue responsibilism together a virtue account of the justification of testimony.
11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Murray Clarke

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In this paper, I seek an account of the nature of epistemic intuition. Given the resources of Dual-Process Theory in Psychology, I argue that the intuitions of elite epistemologists, such as Fred Dretske, are not a priori, pre-theoretic, insights. Instead, they are a posteriori insights into the phenomena of knowledge, not the concept of knowledge. Dretske intuitions are technical, modal intuitions about hypothetical counterfactual cases using System II reflections. Such intuitions depended on thinking about the implications of laws of nature in particular circumstances and were used to defend Dretske’s reliable indicator account of knowledge. That account suggested that one must have conclusive reasons when one has empirical knowledge that P.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
A. Kadir Çüçen

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Kant and previous philosophers in the modern philosophy have inquired into the limit of human knowledge, so the limitation of knowledge is the result of a basic view of the Critical philosophy. According to most of the modern philosophers, before one wants to attempt to know God, the essence of being, etc., he or she must first investigate the capacity of knowledge itself in order to see whether it is able to accomplish such an attempt. Hegel criticizes this view in the Encyclopedia, section 10. He claims that the task to examine knowledge before using it is based on a false analogy with tools. If one does not want to fool oneself with words, it is easy to see that other instruments can be investigated and criticized without using them in the particular work for which they were designed. But the investigation of knowledge can only be performed by an act of knowledge.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Mustafa M. Dagli

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Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are still important for thinking humans; but computers, TV, telephones or automobiles were not existing in their age. For the sake of elasticity in my tripartite subject, a pseudo-philosopher E.G. (“eye-glasser”) and his friends supplied presentation assistance. Mosaic of facts can transpire in their conversation, I think. In a nutshell, a search towards roots and nature of ‘virtual reality’ is conducted first. Then, the role of imagination on knowledge is discussed somehow. Connections and interactions among life, mind and artifacts are touched on thereafter. ‘Mirroring’ metaphor is mentioned as useful. A distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘human knowledge’ seemed hopeful, in this quasi-essay inquiry. Wisdom is distinguished from abundance/crowdedness of ‘knowledge’. Effects of ‘virtual reality’ on society is questioned. Some properties of ‘human knowledge’ are stated, then: Knowledge needs to be learnt, understood, and interiorized/internalized. In its circumstances, an aspect of human knowledge is relevance, in addition to “truth + belief + justification”. And also, ‘truth’ is important for human knowledge; it may come to light first or last (as in the Socrates-case).
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
John Economides

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Interaction and motion produce change. Change produces time (past–future) relation. Changes and interchanges develop differences (effects). Changes and differences unite and divide the two frames of time the past and the future, in the present. The relational effect of change in time is expressed in motion and in the information it produces. The time relation develops in patterns which are alternations (interchanges) and repetitions (replications). Alternations (interchanges) produce external conditions. Replications (reproductions) produce internal conditions. The alternating and recurring patterns of change, the respective external and internal conditions they develop and the information they produce configures evolution inorganic, organic, biological and human. Using this information the human mind converts sensory actions to motor reactions (kinetics) and so manages human interactions. Human interactions, kinetics and derivative information organize the human mind, develop intelligence and determine human logic (reason) and psychology (emotion). Information is extended into communication (language) and organized into knowledge. Knowledge develops into technology and economy which are used by human beings for the management and organization of their interactions and the development of personal and community life, culture and civilization.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Vladimir S. Funtusov

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This paper analyzes the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity in the context of global trends of the modern civilization and scientific cognition, with special emphasis placed on the axiological character of the nature of this principle. Structural elements of this principle are identified and their profound connection with the axiological world of the man is described. It is demonstrated that the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity representatively accumulates in itself both super-complex natural composition of the Universum in the unity of hologramity and matricity properties and spiritual components: faith, hope, love. In such understanding, the conceptual principle of all-encompassing unity is such symphonic ensemble of the developing man’s cognitive and spiritual practices in the cosmic and natural Universum in which his ethical essential fundamentals and fragile complexity of varying-quality substantive nature reveal themselves most fully. From this point of view, faith, hope and love are defined as the man’s spiritual vectors in his temporal (the past, the present and the future) life environment, implicitly entwined into the principle and its supporting goal-motivated benchmarks.
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Carlos A. Garzón

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In the paper, I present the basis for a pragmatic, contextualist and inferentialist strategy for understanding the concept of degrees of justification. I argue that each context has certain inferential criteria in order to do correct assertions, and that there are different standards of justification for an assertion to be regarded as highly, moderately or poorly justified in that context. What is a high, medium or low standard of justification is relative to the community in which certain inferential practices take place. Finally, I identify the methods of justification that in every social context confer different degrees of justification to certain assertions.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Amihud Gilead

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This paper defends the view that the primary necessary ontological conditions for any existents and for their knowledge are individual pure (“mere”) possibilities. As being such conditions, pure possibilities exist absolutely independently of actualities, possible worlds, or minds. Pure possibilities are exempt from spatiotemporal and causal restrictions or conditions, whereas any actuality is inescapably subject to them. Each actuality is an actualization of an individual pure possibility, which also serves as its identity. The existence of individual pure possibilities is necessary because it is ontologically indispensable for the existence of anything, possible or actual, and because there are some existents instead of nothing. Ignoring or not acknowledging relevant pure possibilities may result in overlooking their actualities without recognizing or identifying them and, thus, this has hindered the progress of science and knowledge. Hence, the knowledge of actual possibilities, too, depends on their pure possibilities.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Steven Hales

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Virtue epistemologists like Ernest Sosa and John Greco have attempted to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In this talk I demonstrate that both of their accounts fail so profoundly that it is difficult to see how virtue epistemology alone contains the resources to explain the value of knowledge. According to the virtue theoretic approach, knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Knowledge constitutes a competent epistemic performance, and some performances are better than others; not better because they are more accurate, but better because they exhibit the skill of the performer. It is in this way that the performance of knowledge is better than the lucky success of mere true belief. I will show that the Sosa/Greco model entails the false result that the blind review of scholarship should be abolished. This entailment is, by modus tollens, a counterexample to their view. Since it is often held that a comprehensive theory of knowledge ought to explain the value question, the failure of virtue epistemology to do so is a black mark against the virtue approach altogether.
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Priyedarshi Jetli

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First, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge’ is imprecise but Gettier is explicit that ‘know’ is analysed as the definiendum is ‘S knows that P’. Second, Gettier does not misrepresent (a) as Plato’s definition as the expressions used are ‘Plato considers’ and ‘seems to accept’. Third, Gettier is not mistaken to apply Plato’s definition to propositions since propositional knowledge is a species of Plato’s definition. Fourth, for Plato true belief temporally precedes an account. ‘Jones owns a Ford’ is never a true opinion, hence no account for it can be given. The counterexample is reconstructed with temporality built into it. Fifth, Gettier does not fail to establish the equivalence of ‘believe’, ‘accepts’ and ‘sure’ in the three versions as this is implicitly established in the shifts made in the paper. Sixth, ‘entails’ logically is used only when the entailing proposition is true, but in the counterexamples a false proposition is taken to imply a true one. ‘Entail’ is to be taken in the ordinary sense of implies. Seventh, in Case I, the implication is preserved with the proper representation: (Gj & Tj) → (y)[Gy ↔ (y=j)], which implies ($x){(Gx & Tx) → (y)[Gy ↔ (y=x)]}’. Eighth, the counterexample is reworked to avoid the objection that justification for p and justification for q may not be sufficient justification for ‘p & q’.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ilya Kasavin

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Social epistemology presents now a multiplicity of approaches, more or less closely connected with philosophical analysis of knowledge. Taken as primarily philosophical approach, it seeks at least general definition. I suppose that socio-epistemological analysis essentially consists in contextualizing problems and problematizing contexts. No other manifestations of cognition but problems deserve philosophical attention. And it is context that endows a problem with meaning. At the same time different context theories in the social sciences and humanities demonstrate two polar trends – an explanatory power of context and endless regress of contextual explanation. Further I will dwell upon this main challenge for social epistemology, which even justifying the autonomy of its own, cannot ignore these scientific developments.