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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Nijolė Aukštuolytė

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The paper analyses the two paradigms of epistemological research in language of science which were dominating in the 20th century. Different explanations of this relationship allow the analyses of the cognitive value of logical modeling of the language of science and the studies of its functioning variety. The aim of this work is to discuss the relationship of these paradigms to L. Wittgenstein’s ideas. The essential idea of the work is that L. Wittgenstein’s ideas and their development characterize different paradigms of epistemological research of the language as well as their transformations. While in Tractatus the philosopher seeks to substantiate the structural unity of different scientific theories and the logical uniformity of different areas of science, in Philosophical Investigations; however, he expands the content of the notion ‘language of science’ and rehabilitates the cognitive value of different linguistic worldwide reconstructions. The conception of relativity of boundar-ies and principles of science and the emphasis on theoretical conventionality of the language, too, rejects the possibility of the autonomous language of science and presents the problem of ‘understanding one another’ among in-comparable theories. The paper is focused on these questions.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Janina Buczkowska

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The assumption that language is an element of the cognitive system, fulfilling specified information collection and processing functions, bears consequences for the understanding of meaning. The paper demonstrates that we should rather speak of a beam of informational functions fulfilled by meaning, rather than of a single meaning, the same one in all situations of ex-pression use. Each of the functions identified in the paper provides a different input into the final meaning assigned to each individual expression use. The proposed solution helps understand that meaning has both conventional and contextual meaning, is both universal and individual, is both structural infor-mation and information acquired via current processes, without falling into the trap of traditional contradictions.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Juliano Gustavo dos Santos Ozga

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In the first part, will be presented the Austin’s distinction between constative/descriptive and performative statements. In the second part, will be presented the definition of felicity conditions of speech acts, being this is a condition of performative statement, that must be made so as the action of the speech act will be performed, being labeled the statement as successful and happy or unsuccessful and unhappy. In the third part will be discussed the Austin’s speech acts theory, divided into locutionary act (act of pronouncing the statement); illocutionary act (act performed when pronouncing the state-ment), and perlocutionary act (act referring to the realized action and the re-sulting consequence when pronouncing the statement). In the fourth part will be presented the contribution of Searle for the speech acts, classifying them in five (5) categories: 1. Representative Act, 2. Direct Act, 3. Commissive Act, 4. Expressive Act and 5. Declarative Act, closing this restricted approach about the contribution of Austin and Searle to pragmatics and language, exposing not only the language as a description of the world, but as an active-performative entity before the physical world, in other words, a performative entity.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Eli Dresner

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In the first section of this paper I consider the practice of volume-measurement in baking, and I distinguish between two measurement schemes that can be extracted from this practice. In the second section I argue that (i) the ascription of propositional content to utterances (and mental states) bears intuitive affinity to one of these schemes, that (ii) extant accounts of propositions are in the mold of the other scheme, and that therefore (iii) an alternative conception of propositions is called for.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Guangwu Feng

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This paper is intended to reveal the deeper aspects of the unity’ between Grice’s fundamental notion of intention and his other notions of signification, cancellability. We emphasize that the total signification of an ut-terance is ultimately determined by the speaker’s intention and therefore both what is said and what is implicated are hard to cancel without rendering the whole utterance self-contradictory. We suggest that any intention-based account of meaning be ontologically clear about whose intention we are really invoking, and consequently capture the metaphysics of meaning in order to remove the fallacy “that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation” (Barwise and Perry 1983: 34).
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Luis Fernández Moreno

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This paper aims to propose a version of the description theory of reference –for short, descriptivism– on natural kind terms. This version is grounded on some proposals of descriptivists, such as Searle and Strawson, about proper names, which will be extended to natural kind terms. According to Searle and Strawson the reference of a proper name is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that speakers associate with the name, but among the sorts of descriptions admitted by these authors are those in which the average speaker defers the reference of a term to other speakers. In this regard, descriptivism can accept Putnam’s thesis of the division of linguistic labour and claim that some of the descriptions associated by non-experts have the function of deferring the reference of natural kind terms to their reference in the use by experts. Thus, descriptivism can maintain that the reference of a natural kind term is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that (present) experts concerning a natural kind associate with the term. I will argue that this version of descriptivism, which grants more weight to social links than to historical links, can explain better than Kripke’s theory the reference of the use of natural kind terms by the average speaker.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Claudio Ferreira-Costa

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My aim in this paper is to briefly present the essentials of my reformulation of the old cluster theory of proper names. Essential to this reformulation is the introduction of a meta-descriptivist rule which establishes a cluster’s main descriptions and the manner in which they must be satisfied in order to allow the application of a proper name. Using this rule, we can explain the informative content of proper names, understand why they are rigid, in contrast to descriptions, and give more detailed answers to the counterexamples to descriptivism.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Rodolfo Gaeta, Nélida Gentile

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To explain how theoretical terms can acquire and maintain ref-erence, Kitcher introduces the concepts of “mode of reference” and “reference potential”. The reference potential of an expression-type would be a function of the two basic modes of reference, the descriptive and the baptismal. Kitcher puts forward an argument: modes of reference correspond individually to each token and not to the expression-type, whereas the reference potential of a type is a compendium of modes of reference of its tokens. Different tokens of the same expression-type may be associated with different modes of reference and, therefore, some tokens of the same type could refer whereas others do not. We argue that a series of marks or of sounds became tokens of an expression-type precisely because they are instantiations of a type, and not the other way around, as Kitcher suggests. We argue that Kitcher’s main resource, to primarily link the reference to tokens rather than to expression-types, is based on a conflation that seems to have been passed over by his critics. So, both the descriptive and the baptismal basic ways of providing reference to general terms are useless to Kitcher’s theory on referring and we conclude that it is far from solving the problems it intended to overcome.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Heimir Geirsson

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Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Manjulika Ghosh

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This paper wishes to look into the relationship between J. L.Austin’s methodological notion of linguistic phenomenology and continental phenomenology. Austin himself did not offer an explicit elaboration or examination of linguistic phenomenology; nor did he follow its implication and significance for phenomenology practiced in the continent. However, a number of philosophers have argued that Austin’s methodology has important bearing for continental phenomenology, specifically, Husserl’s version of it. Austin was not simply calling attention to the utility of drawing fine distinctions in ordinary language, he was also recommending an examination of what we should say when; what words should we use in what situations. For him, the distinctions discernible in language mark distinctions in the world. Austin’s proposal to prise off words from the world and to look at them without linguistic blinkers has been compared to Husserl’s epoché. His repeated reference to ‘context’ and ‘situation’ is understood as concerned not only with words but also with the phenomena of everyday life – the concrete life-world in Husserl’s terminology. This paper does not intend to overlook the distinctions between the two ways of doing philosophy. Rather it considers it rewarding to interpret Austin’s suggestions as affording a bridge between Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and continental phenomenology.
11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Junpei Harada

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Many writers have contributed to a great variety of different studies concerning the theory of truth. Deflationism can be seen as a current mainstream philosophical theory on “truth”. Although there are the various types of deflationism which are motivated by distinct concerns and differ in their details, the core tenet shared by all deflationism is that truth is essentially trivial. Paul Horwich’s “minimalism” has an essential commitment to ideas that truth is a single primitive property that is logical and that the concept of truth is not used to explain other concepts. In this paper, I criticize Horwich’s “minimalism” and show two ways that “truth” can be used in that Horwich misses. I begin by briefly outlining Horwich’s argument on truth before introducing my own criticisms and arguments. I then show that it is possible for truth to be multivocal, that is, that truth is not only a logical property but also a substantive property. Horwich seems not to have considered this possibility. Finally, I demonstrate that the concept of assertion can be explained in terms of the concept of truth.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Jussi Haukioja

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This paper will look at three closely interrelated questions about necessary a posteriori identities, in particular concerning natural kinds. First-ly, what is the semantic phenomenon responsible for a posteriori necessities in general, and theoretical identity statements concerning natural kinds in particular? I will argue that (contrary to what is often assumed) rigidity, as it is usually defined, cannot do the job for theoretical identity statements. Rather, a posteriori necessities are grounded in a (meta)semantic phenomenon that I have in earlier work called actuality-dependence. Secondly, what is the basis for this semantic phenomenon? In other words, what makes a given expression actuality-dependent, and thereby fit for appearing in a posteriori necessities? I will argue that actuality-dependence is grounded in our linguistic patterns and dispositions of application and interpretation. Thirdly and finally, what does this tell us about what essences are, and how we possess knowledge of them? I will claim that the view I am proposing gives direct support to a conferralist view of essences, at least when it comes to natural kinds. Moreover, the explanation of a posteriori necessities does not rely on independent essentialist premises; however, it does rely on essentialist beliefs or expectations on the part of ordinary speakers.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Renato Huarte Cuellar

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Martin Buber has a very particular way of understanding language. He stands at a “crossroad”. He enables a mystic answer to Fritz Mauthner’s problems related to language. On the other hand, he uses Wilhelm Dilthey’s idea of “inner experience” in order to do that. We will try to show how his answer to both authors is the basis for his dialogical philosophy. Two aspects of Buber’s philosophy will be taken into account in order to see his “Philosophy of Language” in action: Buber’s rhetoric, according to P. Mendes-Flohr, and his own hermeneutics according to S. D. Kepnes.
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Daqiang Li

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Is the statue made of copper identical with the piece of copper from which it is made? This question was argued for years since Allan Gibbard published Contingent Identity in 1975. Before arguing for or against identity, I try to clarify different usages of the word “identity” and the conditions under which Leibniz’s Law is effective. In our language, there are four concepts of identity, and Leibniz’s Law works differently in each case. Both monist and pluralists fail to distinguish the four concepts. However, monist could be right.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Hong Li

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It is well known that pragmatics was traditionally attributed to empirical subject, but Karl-Otto Apel tries to argue the possibility of transcendental pragmatics, which is to focus on conditions of the possibility of knowledge in the context of the contemporary philosophy of language, to make a semiotic transformation of transcendental Kantian philosophy, to seek the normative justification and the transcendental foundation for the valid claim, and to provide another philosophical paradigm of integrating analytic philosophy and hermeneutics. Then how is it possible?
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Rekha Mishra

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My intention in this paper is to put light on the cultural contacts and their impacts on Hindi literature. The term culture embraces all the intellectual developments of humanity ranging from religion and philosophy to art, social customs and conventions. Depending upon its geographical setting and level of intellectual development, every society has a distinct culture of its own. Sometimes, as in India, there is a country with different communities or social groups each with its own cultural identity, in which case, the culture of that nation would be the sum total of all the component cultures put together. A culture of this nature is generally known as ‘composite culture’ and there exist some very strong common ties among all these divergent components. Centrifugal forces tend to develop from within and break up the very structure of the unity and integrity of that nation. Here the emphasis is on vaishvanite philosophers of Tamil Nadu, Ramananda’s contribution, contribution of Islam and Sufism, the influence of Sikhism and Punjab, influence of salvism and saktism is also highlighted. Methodology of this research paper is based on secondary sources.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Sergi Oms

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Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness that wants to preserve the Law of Excluded Middle (which is seen as a basic law of thought) and, consequently, claims Horwich, the Principle of Bivalence. He defends, thus, that vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable of knowing. Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall present what they call ‘Semantic Epistemicism’ (SE), an application of Horwich’s account of vagueness to the Liar paradox within the frame of Minimalism; according to SE the Liar is either true or false, but we cannot know its truth value; in this sense, says Horwich, the Liar is (epistemically) indeterminate. I want to argue that Horwich’s theory of truth cannot include all the non-paradoxical instances of the T-schema, which is what he claims that can be done. Some liar-like propositions built with indeterminate sentences show that some non-paradoxical propositions are not to be included in Horwich’s theory of truth.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Sushobhona Pal

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This paper attempts to analyse Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of thought or Gedanke. Wittgenstein represented a watershed phase in the history of analytic philosophy. By virtue of his insight into the philosopphy of language, he offered an analysis that records the transition from hidden psychologism to an exclusively non-psychological interpretation of thought. The early Wittgensteinian thought is shown in relation to two realms, language and facts, with an underlying psychologism as mentioned in the famous letter to Russell. This evolves to show that there is nothing psychological in thought which is related to everyday human activities. This goes against the general notion of thoughts as abstract entities inhabiting minds and may be regarded as the swim against the tide. Wittgenstein’s early position concerning thought appears to be ambivalent. This is clearly defined by Wittgenstein in his later works. The final analysis shows the ambivalent psychologism which was portrayed with subtlety in the early period is completely lost in the later one. Wittgenstein ultimately offers an exclusively non-psychological interpretation of thought which is all pervasive with nothing hidden and clearly shows what thought is not.
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Emmanuel Perakis

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The subject of this paper is the question whether proper names have sense as well as reference. The reference of a name is the object to which this name refers to, whereas the sense of a name is the way that this name re-fers to that object. Various theories (Millian, descriptive, ‘cluster’ and causal) have been offered to answer this question. According to J. S. Mill’s account, a proper name is purely referential. According to Gottlob Frege’s descriptivist account, the sense as well as the reference of a proper name can be practically determined by a definite description. Commensurate with the ‘cluster’ account (J. Searle), the sense and the reference of the names can be practically determined by a cluster of descriptions. There is also the causal account of proper names (Kripke, Evans) with its variations, which is a kind of return to the Millian account, for which proper names are purely referential. According to the causal account, there must be a (known or unknown) causal chain between the name and the object it refers to without neglecting the social aspect of meaning. Though not complete in themselves, these accounts are helpful in order to determine the meaning of proper names.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Evangelos Plithas

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This paper sketches an interpretation of Russell’s view of the vexed issue of negative facts in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. It also briefly outlines a wider context, neutral between the analytic and pre-analytic logical tradition, for the treatment of such questions. It suggests that the problem of negative facts can be further treated alongside other, e.g. Fregean or more traditional such problems.