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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Ricardo Mena

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Some assertions that are not about the meanings of the words used can transmit information about those meanings. In Mena (2022) I offered an explanation of that phenomenon purely in semantic terms. The novelty of that theory consists in including interpretations of language in circumstances of evaluation: the parameters relative to which we evaluate the contents of linguistic expressions. In this paper I argue that assertions of sentences containing indexicals can communicate information about the context of use, even though those sentences are not about contexts. Given this, I offer an extension of my theory of metalinguistic effects to model indexicals in an analogous way. Also, I discuss the many ways in which the theory presented here differs from other two-dimensional semantics.
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Chao Ding, Chuang Liu

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Kripke has taken the Gödel case as a counterexample for reference descriptivism. Machery et al. question the validity of Kripke’s case and had conducted empirical studies to show its inadequacy. Experimental data suggest intuitions on this matter vary both across and within cultures. However, there is a descriptive ambiguity, we argue, in Kripke’s Gödel case, for people associate different types of descriptions with proper names, such as the description of brute facts and the description of social facts. We argue in this paper with experimental data that the descriptive ambiguity exists and affects the actual ratio of Kripkeans in reference. This result flaws Machery et al.’s interpretation on empirical research, but does not challenge their claim on cross-cultural divergence. In fact, there are more East Asian descriptivists than Machery et al. expected.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Laura Danón

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Camp (2009) distinguishes two varieties of conceptual recombination. One of them is full-blown or (as I prefer to call it) spontaneous recombination. The other is causal-counterfactual recombination. She suggests that while human animals recombine their concepts in a full-blown way, many non-human animals are capable of conceptual recombination but only of the causal-counterfactual kind. In this paper, I argue that there is conceptual space to draw further sub-distinctions on how various animal species may recombine their concepts. Specifically, I propose to differentiate between: a) narrow causal-counterfactual recombination, b) broad causal- counterfactual recombination, c) lean spontaneous recombination, and d) robust spontaneous recombination. Afterwards, I focus on how these distinctions relate to several previous philosophical ideas on the representational capacities of non-human animals. Finally, I provide several empirical examples suggesting that different animal species display one or another of these four ways of recombining concepts, at least in some contexts.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Anyerson Stiths Gómez-Tabares

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Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) hold that there are two cognitive mind-reading systems. System 1(S1) is fast, automatic and inflexible, whereas system 2 (S2) is reflective, flexible and slow. This paper presents and discusses two central assumptions of this theory: the independence of S1 and S2 and the encapsulation of S1. It is argued that findings on longitudinal trajectories in infancy on the false belief test and visual perspective taking undermine the two-system theory in three respects: (1) S1 is not encapsulated, (2) S1 is not entirely automatic processing, and (3) S2 cognitive processes can be fast and efficient. The paper concludes that mindreading operates through different socio-cognitive processes that are gradually and continuously enriched during development, which eliminates the need for a two-system characterization.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Ángel Rivera-Novoa

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The aim of this paper is to offer an explanation of the legitimacy of certain ad hominem arguments by appealing to virtue epistemology. The main thesis is that there are ad hominem arguments that are acceptable if they are conceived as inductive arguments, whose soundness is given by a fair appeal to the interlocutor’s epistemic vices. It is argued that some abusive ad hominem arguments are acceptable if they rest on a fair pointing out of the interlocutor’s lack of agential intellectual virtues. Likewise, some circumstantial ad hominem arguments would be acceptable if they rest on a fair pointing out of the interlocutor’s lack of non-agential intellectual virtues. The paper exposes some problems of other attempts to vindicate ad hominem arguments.
6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3
Pablo García-Barranquero, Marta Bertolaso

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The possibility of curing aging is currently generating hopes and concerns among entrepreneurs, experts, and the general public. This article aims to clarify some of the key assumptions of the Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence agenda, one of the most prominent paradigms for rejuvenation. To do this, we present the three fundamental claims of this research program: (1) aging can be repaired; (2) rejuvenation is possible through the reversal of all molecular damage; (3) and the human organism is a sophisticated machine. Secondly, we argue that this agenda fits with a machine conception of the organism (described by Daniel Nicholson); we show that, if aging is understood from this philosophical approach, there is an internal confusion in the research program between what is repair and what is rejuvenation. Finally, we state that this theoretical viewpoint connects with scientific criticism and reinforces the idea that there are limits to the aspirations to live indefinitely young.

7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3

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8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 3

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articles

9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Valerio Buonomo, Giuliano Torrengo Orcid-ID

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According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, Wasserman (2016) argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by (or in virtue of) having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has led to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimensions of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”.
10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Alessandra Buccella Orcid-ID

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Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers when interpreting such science. On the other hand, I will show how perceptual science often relies on another assumption, which I call the ‘Measuring instrument conception’ of sensory systems, which philosophers of perception should clearly reject. Given these two symmetric lines of argument, I will finally suggest that we ought to think differently about the relationship between perceptual science and the philosophy of perception.
11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Marta Cabrera Orcid-ID

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In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed in the debate on expressive action, we do not have good reasons to exclude facial and bodily expressions of emotion such as smiling or frowning from the category of actions. For this purpose, I will compare facial and bodily expressions of emotion with simple expressive actions, such as jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame. I will try to show that simple expressive actions cannot be presented as actions while excluding facial and bodily expressions of emotion from this condition. My contention will then be that either both sorts of behaviour are to be identified as actions or neither is. The latter sounds rather implausible, though, as we would have to assimilate jumping for joy or covering one’s face in shame to spasms, which conflicts with the way we relate to such behaviours. My conclusion will then be that both simple expressive actions and facial and bodily expressions of emotion should be included within the category of actions, at least on the basis of the main assumptions in the current debate on expressive action.
12. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Markus Dressel Orcid-ID

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The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.
13. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Lorenzo Baravalle, Orcid-ID Victor J. Luque Orcid-ID

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The Price equation is currently considered one of the fundamental equations —or even the fundamental equation— of evolution. In this article, we explore the role of this equation within cultural evolutionary theory. More specifically, we use it to account for the explanatory power and the theoretical structure of a certain generalised version of dual-inheritance theory. First, we argue that, in spite of not having a definite empirical content, the Price equation offers a suitable formalisation of the processes of cultural evolution, and provides a powerful heuristic device for discovering the actual causes of cultural change and accumulation. Second, we argue that, as a consequence of this, a certain version of the Price equation is the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary theory. In order to support this claim, we sketch the ideal structure of dual-inheritance theory and we stress the unificatory role that the Price equation plays in it.
14. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Santiago Ginnobili Orcid-ID

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One of the most important things that the Darwinian revolution affected is the previous teleological thinking. In particular, the attribution of functions to various entities of the natural world with explanatory pretensions. In this change, his theory of natural selection played an important role. We all agree on that, but the diversity and heterogeneity of the answers that try to explain what Darwin did exactly with functional biology are overwhelming. In this paper I will try to show how Darwin modified previous functional biology. Pre-Darwinian naturalists did not hesitate to attribute functions in which, for example, the traits of one species were in the service of other species. I will try to show that this has consequences on the discussion regarding the nature of functional language, since the main approaches, the systemic and the etiological, do not adequately account for these changes and therefore do not account for the way functional biology regulates the kind of legitimate functions. I will outline a possible new solution to this problem: appropriate functional attributions in Darwinian functional biology could be regulated by a theory or a set of laws that provide the criteria for determining its fundamental concepts.
15. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Mirco Sambrotta Orcid-ID

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book reviews

16. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Scott Soames

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17. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2

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monographic section

18. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Marc Artiga, Orcid-ID Javier González de Prado Orcid-ID

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19. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
James Woodward

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This paper discusses some procedures developed in recent work in machine learning for inferring causal direction from observational data. The role of independence and invariance assumptions is emphasized. Several familiar examples, including Hempel’s flagpole, problem are explored in the light of these ideas. The framework is then applied to problems having to do with explanatory direction in non-causal explanation.
20. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Katrina Elliott, Orcid-ID Marc Lange Orcid-ID

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Does smoke cause fire or does fire cause smoke? James Woodward’s “Flagpoles anyone? Causal and explanatory asymmetries” argues that various statistical independence relations not only help us to uncover the directions of causal and explanatory relations in our world, but also are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions. We raise questions about Woodward’s envisioned epistemology, but our primary focus is on his metaphysics. We argue that any alleged connection between statistical (in)dependence and causal/explanatory direction is contingent, at best. The directions of causal/explanatory relations in our world seem not to depend on the statistical (in)dependence relations in our world (conceived of either as frequency patterns or as relations among chances). Thus, we doubt that statistical (in)dependence relations are the worldly basis of causal and explanatory directions.