NTU Philosophical Review

lfhe Lao Tzu has the distinction of having lots of directives and metaphors. This paper will make some modern analyses of these directives and metaphors. We will use theory of speech acts and moderm theory of metaphors to do this study. We hope these analyses will help us a better understanding to the Lao Tzu.

This paper attempts to study the Aesthetics of Wang Pi (王粥) . He was known as an outstanding young philosopher during Tsau-Wei (曹魏) period. He died at the earlyage of 24. He went beyond the realms of names and froms to ultimate reality, namely, original non-being (pen-wu 本無).This paper contents are:I . Discussion of yan (吉) and yih (意)II . The function of new philosophical method (the method of “Der yih wan yan" 得意志、吉)III. Propositional analys'is of“Der yih wan shiang" (得意志、象)and“Der shiang wan yan" (得象忘盲)Finally, we .discover the deepest meaning of Wang Pi's Aesthetics.

Confucius, being regarded as the greatest teacher in Chinese hisfory, is well-known for his teaching method, such as "to teach according to student's talent", “to teach without classification," etc. What really matters, however, is the substance of his teaching, and this inevitably leads one to consider his philosoophy.The present article, by connecting Confucius' philosophy and his teaching method, intends to describe the stages and qualifications in Confucius educational scheme. Four steps can thus be discerned, they are: 1) to establish a positive self-esteem and life goal; 2) to cooperate with others in following the path of goodness; 3) to properly and wisely deal with all kinds of situation; and 4) to rest with oneself in a peaceful and elegant way. Each step draws sufficient supports from the “Analects" and finds a correspondent place in the philosophical system of Confucius.

在本篇論文中，我們將論述那些所謂的亞洲馬克思主義者，言之鑿鑿奉行的「主義J '在事實上，只不過是一個口號。這些 亞洲共產主義的領導者並不是真正採取馬克思的觀點，而是向列 寧或史達林那邊靠攏。對他們來說，辯證法不意謂著無產階級的 發展邏輯，而是用來摧毀反對力量(包括保守主義、反對主義、或修正主義等等)的有效工其。因此， 「揚棄」 (Aufhebung) (不論以普遍階級或無產階級作為形式)只存在烏托邦論者的空 想中。這樣的一種「揚棄」是不能被實現的。因為，在亞洲所企 盼的任何實現，不論其外在或內在條件都是不充足和不成熟的。

In giving lectures on the course of metaphysics, we can make use of the combined use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method as an effective approach.The Historical Reduction as introduced by Edmund Husserl is an investigstion into the various sets of metaphysics as appeared in history in different periods so as to evaluate their rationalities as well as their irrationalities. Whereas, the Transcendental Method as expounded by Transcendental Thomism is a method based on Kantian transcendental reflection into one's cognitional structure so as to determine how far our study in metaphysics can go.If we combine the use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method, we can have a deeper insight into the achievements as well as the weaknesses of various great metaphysicians in history such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Marechal, Whitehead, Heidegger, and Coreth. And, we can be in a better position to retain the good points as handed down by our predecessors while avoiding the pitfalls they had traversed before.

本文要指出， <孟子〉在討論道德實踐時，心不是最後的存有 學基礎，它尚需莫基於天，因此本文認為，心在道德實踐時不是 自足的。但是，當代的孟子哲學詮釋者大都認為心是自足的。對 於這種主張，我稱為心靈自足論。本文首先介紹這種理論的源 起，再提出三個論証來指，出它在理論上的困難。跟著，我提出以 天為道德實踐的存有學基礎，並嘗試以這個主張來詮釋孟子的道 德實踐理論。對於這種詮釋，我稱之為「以天為基礎的詮釋」 。 最後，我發現這種詮釋能避免心靈自足論所導致的困難，且又一 致於〈孟子〉的語吉。所以，我認為這種詮釋是更妥當的。

This article presents the arguments for and against liberalism concerning the justice and differences of cultures or social groups.Contemporary liberalism has been criticized by many theorists on its insensitivity to differences between cultures. and social groups. The topic concerning the demand for recognition by minority cultures and disadvantaged groups is one of the major concerns of both liberal and anti-liberal camps. According to anti-liberal theorists (mainly Marion Young in this article), the liberal conception of justice is inadequate in dealing with cultural minorities and marginalized groups. In order to accommdate non-liberal ways of life, some special rights attached to cultures or groups collectively should be recognized in addition to the equal rights accorded to each individual in a liberal state. To meet this challenge, many liberals (Joseph Raz, William Galston, and Will Kymlicka) try to argue that the so-called collective rights can be justified within a modified liberal theory of justice. Liberalism, therefore, can accommodate cultural minorities fully. Liberals' answer, however, does not satisfy Nancy Fraser. She tries to find a new way to solve the problem posed by the politics of recognition.

Max Weber is, as Leo Strauss puts it, “the greatest social scientist of our century". Regardless whethere he thought himself primarily as a politician or a scientist, he was at any rate a scientist in the modern meaning of the word. That Max Weber is a Scientist par excellence is no question. What is nowadays still controversial is his conception of science (Wissenschaft), especially his conception of the so-called “verstehende Sociologie".“Modern Science" is for Max Weber a product of modern cultural epoch. It can be properly characterized as the “disenchanted science in a disenchanted world". But he wasobviously against the widespread “positivist view of social sciences" and endeavoured to develop an alternative called “verstehende Sociologie". Why he must do that? What “more" can such a conception achieve than the positivist conception of social sciences? Is his conception of “verstehende Sociologie" a “science of man" (Wissenschaft vom Menschen)? And finally, what can such a conception mean for a scientist like Max Weber and for the “total life of mankind"? These questions should be discussed systematically.

在路易斯 (C.I. Lewis) 的知識論中，感知 (qualia) 被視 為直接的直覺及與生俱來的察覺O他非常明確的區分感知及布洛 得 (C.D. Broad) 和羅素 (Bertrand Russell) 所認為的感覺材料 (Sensa-data) 對於布洛得和羅素顯然容許的「未 感覺到」、「未完全感覺到J '或「不正確感覺到」之感覺材料 (Sense-data) 的可能性， 路易斯卻視感知 (qualia) 為必定會被感覺到、且不可能感覺錯的。他認為布洛得一羅素的觀點不可 思議，並說如此解說感覺材料是荒謬的。我論證布洛得一羅素的觀點至少是與路易斯的同樣合理。事 實上，要適切的描繪及解說心理現象，去區分意識的現象層面 (phenomenal aspect of consciousness) 和意識的進入使用功 能 (accessing function of consciousness) 或許是需要的。在論 證此區分的合理性中，我援用了認知科學及現象學的研究。我還 論證原則上，由實驗而得的證據可以決定布洛得一羅素和路易斯 的觀點何者正確。在結論部分，我提出了這一觀點對路易斯的知 識論發展之影響的看法。

In the last two decades, Searle has mounted two fronts of attack upon cognitive science. In the 80' s, Searle contended with his well-known “Chinese Room Argument" that a computer capable of producing the right answers to questions in Chinese did not really understand Chinese, whereas in the 90's, he took issue with the alleged mental reality of “unconscious rules of inference," the description of which is thought to define the main task of cognitive scientists. Suspecting that cognitive scientists borrow the idea of unconscious mentality only to saveguard the mental status of those rules of cognition, Searle imposes a constraint upon the notion of unconscious mentality, namely that unconscious mentality must be potentially conscious. This is the so-called “connection principle." The aim of this paper is to analyze and evaluate this constraint for unconscious mentality.In the paper, I contend that the connection principle is poorly argued for the following two reasons. First, it assumes implicitly a more fundamental principle, what I call the “intentionality/ consciousness principle" (IC), which implies that occurrent intentional states are necessarily conscious and which thereby excludes the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious. However, Searle does not provide any explicit argument for this key premise at all. Second, as far as the notion of the unconscious it explicitly preserves, i.e. the rather uninteresting case of unconscious dispositions such as the sleeping believer's belief about God , the alleged connection between unconscious mentality and consciousness wouldn't hold either unless we assumed (IC) beforeha:td. Hence, the key factor lies in (IC). I thereby take up the hidden issue and introduce the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious as a counter-exarnple against (IC). In the end, I return to Searle's original concern with cognitive science and conclude that the connection principle can't succeed in excluding the “cognitive unconscious," which may have to find further support in a somewhat controversial notion of “subdoxastic intentionality."Though sympathetic with Searle's intuition about the specialness of human mind, I find his notion of consciousness too narrow to capture a wide variety of “consciousness." Perhaps, the attempt to preserve the specialness of human mind can only be realized when we can successfully disentangle various notions of consciousness, intentionality, and subjectivity.