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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Agnieszka Jaworska

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In his work on internality, identification, and caring, Harry Frankfurt attempts to delineate the organization of agency peculiar to human beings, while avoiding the traditional overintellectualized emphasis on the human capacity to reason about action. The focal point of Frankfurt’s alternative picture is our capacity to make our own motivation the object of reflection. Building upon the observation that marginal agents (such as young children and Alzheimer’s patients) are capable of caring, I show that neither caring nor internality need to depend on the phenomena of reflectiveness. I develop alternative interlocking accounts of caring and internality that are independent of both reflectiveness and evaluation, but that can still do justice to the central role of carings in the organization of agency characteristic of human persons.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Donald P. Smith

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Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Andrei Marmor

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4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Robert Hopkins

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Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Berit Brogaard

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The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestionthat properties are the semantic values of predicates.

symposium

6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Robert Brandom

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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Jerry Fodor, Ernie Lepore

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book symposia

8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Joseph L. Camp, Jr.

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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
John MacFarlane

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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Mark Wilson

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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Howard Wettstein

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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Richard Fumerton

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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Genoveva Marti

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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Marga Reimer

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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Barry Stroud

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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Howard Wettstein

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review essay

17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Ralph Wedgwood

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critical notices

18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3
Gopal Sreenivasan

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contents

19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 3

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articles

20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Eric Wiland

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Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism -- the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU also fall prey to the paradox of utilitarianism, while the stronger versions of IU violate an overwhelmingly plausible moral principle, the principle that one ought to V only if one can V intentionally.