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series introduction

1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Ioanna Kuçuradi

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volume introduction

2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Stephen Voss

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section: the human reality

3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Nickolay Omelchenko

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4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Mieczysław P. Migoń

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By analysis of the connection between the "lower" man and the "higher" man within the human person, I have endeavored to show their "coincidence" in the unfolding of the novum or a good conscience. I have also endeavored to show that it can be aroused by the discovery of "homo absconditus" or of "Deus Absconditus." In this way we become able to approach the Divine. Moreover, in each infrastructure there appears the tendency towards "personalization" by "right" of its reality or existence within the personal human being.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Vyacheslav Kudashov

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Nowadays the real threat has appeared: "thinking man" will disappear from the planet, and his place will be taken by "information consuming man." The rapidly evolving spiritually dependent consumer will turn into a completely controlled human being. A value orientation that we did not create will entirely determine all our choices and dominate our attention. Both the values and the products of mass culture are being spread among consumers as extensively as possible by mechanisms of culture manufacture, in accord with the technological opportunities of the modern culture industry, connected in many ways with the mass media, and are being consumed on the same level as other products offered in the modern market. It becomes clear that the ecology of consciousness, along with the ecology of human life, is the most urgent and the most current problem of contemporary society.The main tasks of a global ecology of consciousness are to understand the conditional character of the external system of values and the radical reorientation that is appropriate to it; to create a culture of life as the realization of the original boundlessly disclosing free spirit, manifested in the encounter of man and world; and to return from captivity to imaginary things to life as dialogue with the world. First of all it is necessary to advance to a deep ecological understanding of the world—an understanding of nature, completed in the "noosphere," as the unique and perfect home of human consciousness. When a human being recognizes "the internal eco-crisis" and discovers the chaos and senselessness behind the imaginary clarity, he inevitably realizes the necessity for radical changes. His activity is initiated by the deepest satisfaction accompanying the expansion of the bounds of perception. We are speaking about the integral human being, personifying in himself both nature and civilization at the point of their intersection, removing the contradictions between the physical and the spiritual, between naturalness and technological progress.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Çetin Veysal

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Die Liebe ist auf der einen Seite die erste Stufe des menschlichen Handelns, auf der anderen Seite ist sie die Letzte. Die Liebe ist bei jeder Periode der Emanzipation des Individuums dabei und führt ihre Existenz parallel zum Entwicklungsgrad des Bewusstsein fort. Die Emanzipation findet da statt, wo das Individuum und der Andere zusammen sind. Waehrend das "Ich" seine Emanzipation verwirklicht, traegt es auch die Emanzipation des Anderen in sich. Das kritische Bewusstsein des Individuums über Fakten, Begriffe und Phaenomene startet beim Individuum seine Emanzipation, weil das kritische Bewusstsein eine dem Daseienden gegenüber unterschiedliche autonome und originelle individuelle Haltung verschafft und über sich und andere Bewusstsein bildet. Das zeigt, dass das philosophische Bewusstsein, das mit der Hoffnung begonnen hatte, sich im Emanzipationsabenteuer des Menschen zu einem höheren Niveau entfaltet. Die dritte Phase der Emanzipation est die Phase der Selbstverwirklichung des Individuums. Diese Phase bedeutet, dass das Individuum in Situationen, die ihn betreffen, nach freien Willen entscheiden kann und sich nicht der Macht eines anderen Willens beugt, dass es seine eigenen Begabungen, Fertigkeiten oder Faehigkeiten nach eigenen Willen verwirklicht

section: learning from history

7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
William F. Vallicella

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This paper examines a famous argument for the Buddhist doctrine of anatta ("no self) according to which nothing possesses self-nature or substantial reality. The argument unfolds during a debate between the monk Nagasena and King Milinda (Menandros). Nagasena's challenge to the King is that he demonstrate the substantial reality of the chariot in which he arrived at their meeting when said chariot is (i) not identical to any one of its proper parts, (ii) not identical to the mereological sum of its proper parts, and (iii) not identical to anything wholly distinct from its parts. After presenting the argument and defending it against a plausible objection, I argue that it cannot be taken to show that persons lack self-nature.
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Christian Helmut Wenzel

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The main ideas in this paper can be summarized in the following three points. (1) Openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity are elements of both Kant's aesthetics and Wittgenstein's notion of language games. (2) These elements are essential to what makes a person. They are necessary in processes of decision-making and in the development of a person. (3) Such aspects were in the center of discussion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, especially in the tradition of the so-called Bildungsroman. Unfortunately, they tend to be forgotten nowadays.
9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Rafael García Pavón

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En este articulo se pretende mostrar la idea de Kierkegaard del individuo singular, desde las estructuras de libertad y temporalidad. La libertad entendida no como liberaciön o libre arbitrio, sino como el devenir de la historicidad humana en relaciön a las cosas y la comunidad, de tal forma que el individuo singular en Kierkegaard no es ningün individualista o solipsista, sino que desde ella se puede recuperar la dimension de unidad personal tan anulada por los sucesos actuales de violaciön a los derechos humanos. La temporalidad, se trata como la dimension humana, ontolögica y hermeneutica, donde la sintesis que es el individuo singular se desarrolla, de tal manera que temporalidad y libertad en Kierkegaard son la dimension misma del devenir humano. La libertad se trata en relaciön con la angustia, la desesperaciön y la pasiön de vivir. La temporalidad se diferencia del tiempo, del tiempo abstracto y del instante. El articulo hace una lectura horizontal de las obras pseudönimas de Kierkegaard como: El Concepto de la Angustia, La Enfermedad Mortal, La Alternativa, Temor y Temblor.
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Şener Aktürk

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This paper compares and contrasts Nietzsche's conceptualization of the "artistic Socrates" with Kierkegaard's vision of the "knight of faith". The paper argues that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard attempted to transcend the rational-ethical sphere of human action in favor of a more spontaneous, yet deeper understanding of the universe. Nietzsche believes that the thread of causality and the principle of sufficient reason, embodied as they are in the personality of Socrates, are not capable of explaining our existence in its entirety. Hence he suggests the tragic insight and the subsequent artistic worldview as a remedy. Nietzsche's vision is encapsulated in his eulogy of madness and humor as manifestations of an artistic worldview with the tragic insight. The paper argues that Kierkegaard deals with the same problem that Nietzsche faces in that he also wants to incorporate the recognition of the world beyond rational comprehension into our understanding of the Universe. Hence, both philosophers are attempting to comprehend what is beyond human comprehension. The paper claims that Kierkegaard is more successful in this endeavour because he introduces the virtue of the absurd as an organizing principle of the irrational space (space beyond the Grenzenpunkte). With a movement of infinite resignation the knight of faith renounces the world and moves beyond the Grenzenpunkte, but then with a movement of faith he embraces back the world he renounced. The theme that captures the condition of the knight of faith is anxiety and fear, rather than madness and humor as it was with Nietzsche. The paper concludes by emphasizing Kierkegaard's vision for offering a more comprehensive understanding of the Universe and of the human agency and action operating within it.
11. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Victor Manuel Idoate García

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Lain (antropölogo, filösofo e historiador de la medicina) define como relaciön amistosa una serie de actividades que en esencia son: desear el bien del amigo por el amigo mismo, igualdad entre los amigos, comunalidad y comunicaciön entre los amigos y consideraciön de una relaciön entre personas. De la misma forma establece que una vez producido el encuentro, para que exista la amistad, deben cumplirse una serie de reglas, tales como el respeto, la liberalidad, la franqueza, la imaginaciön y el discernimiento afectivo. Entre las patologias de la amistad se encuentran: la consideraciön del otro como objeto, alteraciones derivadas de la relaciön (estatus o niveles sociales), alteraciones entre los fines, los grados de amistad y de las propiedades de la relaciön amistosa, y que habitualmente se manifiestan como alteraciones en el respeto, la igualdad, la confidencia y la convivencia. Las alteraciones producidas en la relaciön amistosa pueden superarse si existe respeto, igualdad, franqueza, consideraciön de ambos como personas, liberalidad, ... Todos los fenömenos que se han presentado en esta comunicaciön tienen como caracteristicas la alteraciön de alguna de estas reglas de mantenimiento de la amistad.
12. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Magdalena Michalik-Jeżowska

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The aim of my paper is to represent Zygmunt Bauman's formulation of personal identity and to present its cultural weight today. Bauman defines a post-modern personal identity as opposed to the modern personal identity. These conceptions of identity express views of man and the world held in two different periods—modernity and postmodernity. In modernity man is perceived as a being who in accordance with his "volitions" and "ideas" creates (and controls) the world and himself. In post-modernity man is seen as a being who in the face of the defeat of the modern project refuses to create himself, in other words refuses to create his personal identity. This paper presents the poor structural integration of personal identity in the context of its creation. The author of this paper perceives philosophical considerations relating to personal identity as parallel to philosophical investigations relating to the nature of truth.

section: contributions to the theory of value

13. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Hans Lenk

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Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions.
14. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Joaquín Jareño Alarcón

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One of the most influential ideas in recent discussions in political philosophy and philosophy of values has been Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Given that different ways of living embody different applications of values, it is really difficult to talk about objectivity in the domain of morals. But if we reject the existence of criteria that allow us to judge among different moral proposals, we are led to recognize the prejudiced character of our convictions: their ethnocentric character. In my opinion, this weakens our commitment to those convictions, to the extent that we are not obliged to follow them. At the same time, if that incommensurability is at the root of any interpretation of values, we cannot choose between different ways of understanding pluralism and we cannot evaluate the pluralistic model itself. Saying that some sort of pluralism is good for us if, for us, some sort of pluralism is good, is only proposing an empty tautology. In the end I will argue that we can accept the existence of a sort of moral equilibrium that can allow us to talk of moral progress.
15. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Abdullah Kaygi

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In the human world if there is knowledge about something, if this knowledge is true, then there must be a connection between the epistemological object and the judgment that gives us knowledge about this object. It seems that there is a universal consensus about that.But when the issue is knowledge about value and values, judgments about the value of something and about values are not considered to be genuine. This is a typical prejudice of our age about value and values. It is true that so-called value-judgments, i.e. judgments in which people call things good or bad, are not genuine judgments, because they don't possess any epistemological object. But propositions about values, which are also called 'judgments', as well as 'statements' or 'assertions', are not the same as value-judgments, because this kind of knowledge, too, is about something that is independent of the person who puts forward such a judgment, something that has its own ontical specificity. Judgments or propositions or statements about values are knowledge, and can provide knowledge, while value-judgments are not knowledge and cannot provide any knowledge. Knowledge about the value of something and about values do seem to be judgments, but this cannot justify the confusion of such a judgment with a value-judgment. To dispel such confusion, first of all we have to clarify the terms we use.
16. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

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Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential account of supervenience by R. M. Hare is problematic in that it only expresses the latter but not the former intuition. Two solutions to this problem are outlined, one of which ought to be endorsable by a prescriptivist such as Hare.
17. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Armando Cíntora

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I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will allow the characterization of ideal goals as rational.

section: contributions to the theory of action

18. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
John J. Tilley

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This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.
19. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Renée Bilodeau

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According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a beliefdesire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of them is conclusive. To sustain my claim, I first discuss some of the main differentiating functions commonly attributed to intentions. Contrary to the dominant view, I show that many of these functions, especially those attributed to distal intentions, have little to do with the causal character of action theory. I also maintain that many of the allegedly specific functions of intentions can be ascribed to the preeminent motive of the agent. Finally, I argue that the intention thesis cannot be reconciled with the motivational strength thesis, and that the latter is a decisive reason to forsake the former.
20. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Zheng Yujian

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This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, and the name "quasi-rational" is legitimated for the type of actions this example represents. Last, but not least, the paper demonstrates that an implication of the argument is the falsity of one well-known principle in Davidson's action theory, i.e., the principle claiming that the (primary) reason for an action is also its cause.