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articles in english

1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Rebecca Glass

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In this essay, I discuss the Chinese attitude towards caring for people within family first, using law only as a back-up. I demonstrate this both through negative/corrective applications of law, such as penal law, and positive/protective applications of law, such as those that protect human rights. I do not necessarily have a right to what is most beneficial to me, nor do I or the community necessarily benefit from the most fair punishment. In both cases, law protects fairness, while a different kind of social care rooted in a smaller community enables a richer healing and nourishing of the person and community. With reference to Confucian philosophy and present scholarship, I address some differences between possessed rights and seeking a right way to care for people in situ, and between fairness and human potential. Instead of trying to show how the Chinese perspective has the seeds of a modern Western conception, I highlight a perpendicular value.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Myeong-seok Kim

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According to Mencius, human nature is good because human beings are endowed with four sprouts of virtues, namely benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and humans can become fully virtuous by growing these four ethical sprouts. Mencius believed that these four sprouts exist in the human mind mainly in the form of emotion or emotional sensibility, and they are sometimes translated in English as compassion, sense of honor, respect, and feeling of approval and disapproval. What I want to do in this paper is to delineate Mencius’s view of emotion by analyzing his first sprout, which is often referred to by the Chinese term “cèyǐn zhī xīn” 惻隱之心. Previous scholars usually translate “cèyǐn zhī xīn” as “compassion,” “sympathy,” or “commiseration,” in the sense of thepainful feeling one feels at the misfortune of others. My goal in this paper is to clarify the nature of this painful feeling, and specifically I will show that 1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic concern, and that 2) the painfulness of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from this concern-based construal of the object of one’s compassion. Toward the end of my paper, I will also show the connection between Mencius’s view of cèyǐn zhī xīn and thecontemporary ethical discourse on emotions, by arguing that in Mencius emotions like compassion provide an important but only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Larry Lai

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In this paper, I want to ascertain whether there is an interest-based moral position to claim in Confucian ethics. This is crucial to a further ascertainment of moral human rights in Confucianism, because a moral position to claim is a necessary condition to a moral right. Upon careful textual analysis of some of the passages in Mencius, I argued that such moral position to claim is implicit but actually available in Confucian ethics. In a review of the Punishment of the Outcast in Mencius 1B:8, I argued that Mencius not only agrees that people should revolt against the despots, but also that their doing so signifies what Joel Feinberg calls “the activity of claiming.” In other words, it is Mencius’ point of view that when things come to a person’s vital interests, namely one’s own life in this case, it is morally justified for one to act thus claim on one’s interests. I conclude that while an interest-based moral position to claim is found present in Confucian ethics, this does not necessarily mean that a Confucian moral rights discourse is ready. While such position to claim is no doubt crucial to a ‘rights-engineering’ in Confucianethics, attempts to ascertain other elements of a moral right, namely a claim-against and a moral duty are required.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Hee-jae Lee

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5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Chenyang Li

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There is an inner thoroughness spirit in traditional Chinese learning of classics—the so-called "Guoxue" in Chinese. Only on this foundation of "thoroughness" spirit can academics show its vigorous culture life and spiritual life, which makes traditional Chinese learning of classics pursue the transcendence of heaven and man and can’t be divided into a religion. Our traditional Chinese values and its original significance exist in our traditional academic system and the enlightenment of propriety and music. As for the self—identification, because of the lost of the "thoroughness" spirit and original significance foundation, the traditional Chinese learning of classics concealed their academic specialties that make the reconstruction of modern Chinese culture lack a solid foundation. Currently, various colleges, institutes and centers of traditional Chinese learning have been set up in many universities, but “Guoxue” should not be taken as one special subject far from the other disciplines, and we should make efforts to reconstruct the traditional Chinese learning of classics ("Guoxue") as a primitive significance-adding foundation or “academic home”.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Gerardo Lopez

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Confucius proposes the view of human beings as moral agents that have to behave according to their own individual thinking and reflection. In Analects, I, 4, one of his disciples says: “Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?” And in Analects, XIII, 23, Confucius says: “The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo.” That is, when one agrees with others it is because using his (today we will say “his or her”) own understanding he (or she) has arrived at the same conclusions. In Analects, XV, 16, he is quite explicit: “When a man is not in the habit of saying: What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this? I can indeed do nothing with him.” In this sense it is clear that he believes in moral autonomy and in human equality. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, he is not a communitarian thinker; he is a philosopher who wants people to think by themselves. From this early time in the History of China he was proposing what Socrates defended in Athens; the importance of an internal moral conscience. So, if we can speak about Enlightenment in the Greek world, we cansay that Confucius was an enlightenment figure in the Chinese world. In this sense I believe we can conclude that Confucius is not a good example to argue for “Asian Values”. On the contrary, Confucius presents a universalistic theory that strengthens the position of the individual and of his or her self-cultivation. And if one of the objectives of education is that individuals can think by themselves, don’t we have to conclude that the political implication of this theory for the modern world is democracy?
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Maja Milcinski

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The Buddhist and Daoist influences on the origins of the Taijitu and their influences on T’oegye’s philosophy are discussed. The notion of ji (tranquillity) is taken as an example on which the Neo-Confucianism debate and the limits of verbal representations are shown. T'oegye adherence to Zhu Xi in relying to the doctrine of mindfulness is taken into consideration as one of the central ones in the Ten diagrams, in contrast to Zhou Dunyi's emphasis on tranquillity. He followed the Zhu Xi's line in a direction of commenting the commentaries or a form. He strongly relayed on words, although as a supplement to the diagrams. By this hediminished the force of the cartography of spirit so central in Chinese Song Neo-Confucianism. In T’oegye is not calm and tranquillity per se, but a conscious and wakeful state of absolute mental quiescence - one of the polar conditions of consciousness.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Doyoung Park

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This essay explores the sudden emergence of Neo-Confucianism as an independent intellectual and professional calling, and its adoption by both scholars and political leaders as the dominant intellectual and epistemological discourse in early modern Japan (1600-1868). I shall do this by examining two of the mostimportant early Neo-Confucian converts from Zen Buddhism, Fujiwara Seika and Hayashi Razan during the late 16th and the early 17th centuries. Their conversions were initially separate events, each prompted by personal circumstances and choices. But these converts later sparked the appearance of other exclusive Neo-Confucianists, and eventually to the new intellectual mainstream of a Neo-Confucianism independent of Buddhism, during the Tokugawa period. Previous scholars have approached the issue of these converts from Zen to Neo-Confucianism through the lens of a philosophical shift. However, this is a hasty conclusion which ignores socio-intellectual factors surrounding these converts’ life and situation. My preliminary research reveals that Neo-Confucianconversion was not the result of philosophical change; rather, it was propelled by practical and utilitarian motivation. They abandoned Buddhism to locate themselves as ‘professional’ Neo-Confucianists, and this strategy successfully served their purpose.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Leonid E. Yangutov

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The article is devoted to the correlations of Buddhism with Confucianism and Taoism in Wei (221-265) and both Jin (265-420) periods. The philosophical principles of these three doctrines, their general and peculiarities in three doctrines philosophical principles which defined the forming in China own Buddhist schools have been showed there. The new view to the correlations between Buddhism and Taoism has been showed, the new conception that the correlations between Buddhism and Taoism in period of Wei are the correlations of Prajna-paramita and liu jia qi zong. It is showed, that also Confucianism in periods of Wei and Jin saved its political and social positions in Chinese society and deeply influenced on the forming Buddhism on the earliest period of its spreading in China.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Jia-Cai Zhang

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As the first dictionary of philosophy in East Asia, Neo-Confucian Terms Explained constructed for the first time a category system of Neo-Confucianism and incorporated annotation methods as an important part of it. The book contains two volumes: Volume I is the learning toward inward sagehood, including the Mind-and-Heart Theory and the Theory of Morality (or the Theory of Method); Volume II is the learning of governing, including the theory of Neo-Confucian Principles, the theory of Education and criticism against heresy. In terms of the interpretation of categorical relations, the discussions in this book range from the boundary and connections between different categories and the complicated categorical relations.

articles in russian

11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Vladimir Doljenko

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- Vibrations of light, a sound, a smell, taste, heat and volume transfer energy information (sense) of physical object to consciousness of the person. - Change of physical parameters of object is perceived by the person in time as event. - Event is the information on current of "invisible" process of transfer of energy between cooperating objects. - Process this ordered movement of energy from one object to other object, changing their physical parameters. - Phases of a condition of processes on the Earth describe laws of dialectics. - The-certain alternation of phases of development of process shows the order of movement of energy incooperating objects (paper pic. N3) - Laws of dialectics it is laws of harmony of succession of events. - Harmony of development of process (movement of energy) is financially(material) perceived by the person as development of event. - A sign on great limit (taiczi) philosophy Dao are graphic expression of laws of dialectics. - Energy of the Sun gives rise to all processes on the Earth. - The INFORMATION is a part of energy reflected or rediated by object written down in memory of the person, a material, space.

articles in chinese

12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Li Weiwu

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In the development since two thousand years, Chinese Confucian doctrine had been keeping its relatively independent form and presenting the different thoughtbarycenter and theoretical form. From the early Qin Dynasty to the late Qing Dynasty, Confucian doctrines developed one after another the Confucian doctrine of human life, the Confucian doctrine of society, the Confucian doctrine of politics, the Confucian doctrine of metaphysics and the Confucian doctrine of critique. In the beginning of 20th century, facing the serious crisis of above traditional Confucian doctrines, modern Neo-Confucian began to rebuild Confucian doctrines. They first as the conservatism founded the Confucian doctrine of culture in probing into the problems of the outlet in Chinese culture, and then tried to rebuildontology and formed the Confucian doctrine with modern content, which made the modern Neo-Confucian doctrine have great influence in 20th century, but there were no any great achievement in the Confucian doctrine of human life, also absent of systematical contribution in the Confucian doctrine of society and of politics. Summarizing the historical development of the Confucian doctrines, it clearly shows that the future of Confucian doctrine in 21st century lies in rebuilding the Confucian doctrine of human life by the characters of Confucian doctrine and the changes of Chinese life world, and further developing the Confucian doctrine of culture and of metaphysic and softly realizing the resource transformation of the Confucian doctrines of society and politics.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Qi Si

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Yi-He is universal symbol of Chinese philosophy, it contains two thoughts of “Yi” and “He”. Thought of “Yi” represents idea of change in Chinese philosophy,thought of “He” represents idea of harmony in Chinese philosophy. “Philosophy of Yi-He” is dialectical synthesis of thought of “Yi” and thought of “He”, as well as the unique nature of Chinese philosophy thought. It embodies the deep structure of Chinese cultural spirit and the innovative pattern of Chinese philosophy thought. At present, “philosophy of Yi-He” conforms to the topic of the age, i.e. developing in all-round and coordinating way and constructing harmonious society. It constitutes Chinese philosophy idea which reflects and criticizes modern civilization and creating viewpoint on harmonious development. “Philosophy of Yi-He” calls on harmonious world and constructs harmonious development idea in the relationship between human being and nature, human being and society, human being and themselves, human being and civilization. The viewpoint on harmonious development of Chinese philosophy aims at creating an ideal of harmonious world.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Caigang Yao

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Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy of mind brings about some abuses with its spread, such as despising moral cultivation and upholding mysteries, which cause the school to be degenerated in the later Ming dynasty. Some scholars, who are worried about the situation, starting from the abuses, retrospect and rectify the theoretical defects in the doctrine of Wang Yang-ming and his disciples. The article reviews the rectifying movement of Wang’s school during the later Mingdynasty and the early Qing dynasty, and reflects the relation between personality emancipation and moral rational spirit, hsin-hsing (mind-nature) and social achievements.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Zhou Hai-chun

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It has limitations to understand “fidelity” of the Analects of Confucius in the thinking pattern of subject-object. The interpretation patterns of self-other and private-public ethics can’t also completely explain the philosophical meaning of “fidelity” in the Analects of Confucius. “Fidelity”, in Confucian theory and practice, has important place, therefore, the paper will try to explore the philosophical meaning of “fidelity” of Confucius from the following suppositions in order to find a new way of philosophical explanation. The suppositions are as the following: First of all, “fidelity” can’t be understood, in Chinese, as a verb which means “faithful to sb”. It is a noun or a gerund. Basing on the distinction of “material world” and “meaning world”, the paper holds that the connotation of “fidelity” has its inner regulation and its meaning is, first of all, regulated not by the material world but by the other contextual logic categories, in this way, it has the characteristic of independence and transcendence. The core meaning of “fidelity” is “center”, the paper calls it as “the centric wisdom” from the epistemological perspective. Wesuppose that Confucius has presupposed that every life has enough wisdom to know what the affirmative value is. For Confucius, his philosophical thinking on “fidelity” has both traditional heritage and personal innovation. We should pay attention to the latter. Basing on the understanding that takes “fidelity ”as “the centric wisdom”, the paper holds that one of the meanings of “fidelity”, as an ethical concept, in the Analects of Confucius, is personal ethics which includes thereorganization of individual values. One part of the individual value is to recognize and practice the value which is independent of social value. Another part of the value is to practice and exhibit the wisdom of “fidelity” in personal speech and behavior including the spiritual activities. The “fidelity” of the Analects of Confucius, as an ethical concept, has another meaning, i.e. the inter-personal relationship which shows the affirmative value under the guidance of wisdom. The inter-personal relationship under the guidance of wisdom can exhibit the affirmative value and can be called as the “ethical” relation. The main requirements are as the following: we have to bring the reflective factor of “wisdom” into inter-personal relation and, under the guidance of wisdom, try to take our social responsibilities required by the social role, or to abide by the public or the professional ethics. We have to maintain positive value direction in the verticalinter-personal relation which means supervision so as to realize the political affirmation. In the horizontal interpersonal relationship, basing on the individual wisdom, we have to keep the keen feeling of morality so as to realize our affirmative values. The understanding of these meanings concerning the word of “fidelity” is naturally resulted from our concern for the inner logic relation in the Analects of Confucius and for the form of idea-expressing of Confucius.

articles in korean

16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Heejae Lee

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A Li (禮) means a rituals that was expressed to outside, differ from Li (理) expressed inner mind. A Li (禮) as a rituals is not enforce law but it need inside devout attitude. 19 century in Korea rapidly changed political situation, typical Confucian value challenged by western religion and practical learning. Though this crisis, Chuzu scholars keeps their philosophy as a absolute value. They faught against westernization and also protect Confucian rituals such as community and family rituals. In the wedding rituals, they take a serious view of spouse’s personality than what one’s wealth. They worried about free sex and desire for material life. If they lost traditional value, then they must be a barbarous animal life. The morning rituals case, they estimated righteous death is better then injustice life. They think that righteous death for nation and people is a true scholar. 19 century many Chuzu scholars faught against Japanese invasion, they called themselves ‘wyijeong cheoksa (衛正斥邪) protection of right and expose of wrong) Chuzu scholars in 19 century in Korea made a typical teachers Kim, Jang-sang and Song, Si-yeol. They believe absolutely traditional Chuzu learning is a perfect and also traditional rituals is unchangeable manners contains Li (禮).
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Eun-Young Cho

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For any inquiry into Tasan (茶山)'s philosophy, it is absolutely necessary to investigate its relationship with Neo-Confucianism. Out of the many notions of his philosophy, the Kung-fu theory (工夫論) is considered to be important. Therefore, the comparison between Chu-hui 's (朱熹) system of Neo-Confucianism and Tasan's theory on Kung-fu is expected to offer clues that help us understand Tasan's philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate Tasan’s viewpoints on the notion of ‘having not yet arisen,’ especially in regards to his issues of 'the mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion (心知思慮),' as presented in his Kung-fu theory. Tasan insists that the statement that "The joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure have not yet arisen." differs from the statement that "The mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion (心知思慮) have not yet arisen." In this paper, the author will inquire into Tasan's assertions on the meaning, contents, subject, and significance of ‘the mind, intelligence, consideration, and discretion,’ which he emphasizes. In addition, the author will make clear that the above assertion is related to the following: 1) Tasan’s recognition of Cheon (天), 2) his assertion on the capability of the mind to make decisions by itself (心自主權), and 3) his emphasis on the actualization of morality.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Young-Jin Choi

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Joseon neo-Confucianism critically reviewed Chinese Chu Zi Studies and transformed it as Joseon seonglihak through intense debates occurred in the process of trying to settle down the problems raised in the contemporary Joseon society. The representative theories of Joseon seonglihak includes sadanchiljeongron(四端七情論, the theory of the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings), inmulseongdongiron (人物性同異論, the theory of whether human nature and animal nature are the same or different), seongbeomsimdongbudongron (聖凡心同不同論, the theory of whether the mind of the nobler man and that of the inferior man arethe same or different), mibalon (未發論, the theory of not-yet-aroused). Among these, this article traces the originality of Joseon seonglihak by means of comparing the sadanchiljeongron of Lee Hwang(Toegye, 1501-1570) with the mibalon of Lee Gan (Oeam, 1677-1727). The clause that 'the nature is li [性卽理]' is the central proposition in Chu Zi Studies, whereas the clause that 'the Four Beginnings are the arousal of li [四端理之發]' is the central proposition in Lee Hwang's theory. The clauses that 'the nature is identified with the mind [心性一致]', that 'the nobler man takes li to be the mind', and that 'the mind is the nature and the nature is the mind' are the main claims made by Lee Gan. Chu Hsi takes the nature (the original nature) to be li, Lee Hwang takes the feeling (the Four Beginnings) to be li, and Lee Gan takes the mind (the original mind) to be li. These claims made by Lee Hwang and Lee Gan are fundamentally different from Chu Hsi's theory of mind and nature.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Chaehyun Chong

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The purpose of this paper is to show one way how the Mencian internalism of morality can be justified. Since previous studies of Mencius's internalism have paid too much attention to explaining or training it, they have failed to disclose the difficulties of and the importance of justifying it. In this study, I claim that Mencian internalism is a full development of Confucius' spirit of subjectivity and so can be justified in the same practical way as Kant used in justifying morality.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 9
Jung-Geun Hong

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The great academic disputation of Ho-rak had been made for about 200 years since it began in 1709. An argument that the human nature and the nature of things are same or different was one of the main subjects for the great academic disputation. Gan Lee (李柬, 1677-1727) and Wonjin Han (韓元震, 1682-1751) were leading discussants of the argument. After Lee and Han, Neo-Confucian scholars in Joseon dynasty attempted comprehensively to synthesize their two views. But such Scholars as Seong-ju Lim (任聖周, 1711-1788) and Jeongjin Ki (奇正鎭, 1798-1879) criticized a reformulation of One Principle and Many Differentiations. Lim argued that there was not only One Principle but also one vital breath as well as Many Differentiations of vital breath as well as One Principle. His idea of One Principle is relevant for a similarity between the natures of humans and things, and his idea of Many Differentiations is relevant for a difference between the natures of humans and things. Lim grasped that all the natures of things had two aspects of similarity and difference. But Gi criticized that their discussants were too narrowly specific in arguing this issue. He argued that One principle and Many Differences entailed each other. Like Lim's idea, his idea confirmed the sides of both, too. The nature of original substance is equivalent to the nature of existence. It seems to me that such a fruitful result of Korean philosophy, which an argument between the natures of humans and things had been distinctly made, for the future, will be an area of being made a deeper exploration from various aspects.