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series introduction

1. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Ioanna Kuçuradi

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volume introduction

2. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Harun Tepe

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section: epistemological questions of ethics

3. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Andrew B. Schoedinger

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This paper argues that Nonreductive ethical naturalism is a viable approach to normative ethical theory. Central to Nonreductive ethical naturalism is the identification of moral properties with natural ones. Natural properties are objective and pertain to facts. It follows that moral properties are factual in nature. In the proposed theory pain and harm are the natural properties that are also moral in nature. Pain and harm are not identical. Pain is the chief indicator of harm. The concept of harm entails injury. Injury to an individual is both a factual and moral issue. The well-being of individuals constitutes the foundation of morality. Consequently, that which runs counter to an individual's well-being is what we mean by evil. It follows that injury is evil and its intentional infliction upon other people is morally evil. The factual nature of ethical properties provides the basis for universal agreement on which forms of behavior are evil. As such, acceptance of this theory would go a long way in resolving many of the global problems that confront us all at the onset of the 2 1 s t century.
4. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Halil Turan

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The principle that values cannot be derived from facts, though first explicitly formulated by David Hume, does not seem to be consistent with Hume's assertions that value becomes intelligible through experience, and that the will is determined by pleasure and pain. Moral reasoning involving pleasures and pains in the context of the peculiarities of human existence in society must be more complicated than reasoning involving ordinary, i.e. natural, pleasures and pains. Nevertheless, all pains and pleasures must be sensations. Hence Hume's moral philosophy becomes an example of an ethics in which facts, namely pleasures and pains, are related to values. However, many philosophers have argued that values must have a transcendental origin. Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments concerning ethics and aesthetics constitute an interesting contemporary example of such transcendental conceptions of value. For Wittgenstein, the voice of conscience is God; the will can affect the subject at the limits of the world, and not things in the world; therefore, ethics must be transcendental (not expressible in the way facts in the world are). It seems that this attitude in ethics and aesthetics rules out any empirical discourse on values, which can hardly be called totally fruitless. An example of such discourse may even be one describable in Wittgensteinian terms: values can be defined through facts as modifications in the limits of the world, and through facts as things "in the world". If such descriptions are possible and expressible, a reference to a transcendental realm to account for the existence of conscience would become redundant.
5. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
W. J. Korab-Karpowicz

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Our way of seeing things depends upon the state of our minds. We can look at the world through the lenses of love, hate or indifference. What remains largely unquestioned about science is its essence. Scientific objectivity is not free from subjectivity. I argue that objective, scientific knowledge is a partial knowledge based on indifference, the state of mind that constitutes the scientific attitude. Hate does not produce knowledge at all, but reinforces our prejudices. However, love gives the possibility of knowing someone or something fully, and not only as an object. Once we accept that our experiences, thoughts, and feelings are not incommunicable, we can arrive at inter-subjective and non-objective moral knowledge which results from our recognition of others as persons and our affective engagement with the world.
6. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Mary Tjiattas

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Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.
7. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Harun Tepe

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Contemporary ethics has often faced questions concerning its epistemological foundations. Thus epistemological problems of ethics have become a main interest in ethics, and ethics has begun to be considered mainly as meta-ethics or analytical ethics, mainly dealing with the foundation of ethical propositions or norms. However questions raised about the foundation of ethics have mostly ended in dilemmas. Today, moral dilemmas or epistemological dilemmas of ethics pose a challenge to contemporary ethics in the form of questions like "Is ethics normative?", "Is there any ethical knowledge?", "Are the statements of ethics bearers of truth-values? (these questions relate to what 1 call the Normativity Dilemma); and questions like "Are ethical judgements objective?", "Are values part of the world, out there, in the way that physical objects are?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Objectivity Dilemma); and questions like "Is there any criterion to see which principles are correct?", "Do we have good reasons to do what is right?", "Can acting ethical ever be justified?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Justification Dilemma). Are these dilemmas that are said to be epistemological genuine dilemmas, or are they only supposed to be so? In this paper I will tackle the epistemological foundations of these dilemmas and try to demonstrate that there are fallacies involved in them.
8. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Ulrich F. Wodarzik

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Der lebendige Mensch befindet sich immer zwischen Erfahrung und Metaphysik, er ist Natur und Freiheit zugleich. Anders gesagt erfährt sich der von Welt umgebende Mensch als ein freiheitliches Wesen, das unter einem bedingungslosen moralischen Sollensanspruch steht, der an keine Kontingenz geknüpft ist. Betrachten wir die moralische Dimension genauer, so erkennen wir moralischen Pflichten gegenüber uns selbst und anderen als Gebote Gottes.1 Das bewusste Leben selbst gibt uns Zwecke, die wir weder theoretisch noch praktisch auf den Begriff bringen können.2 Kant spricht vom Leben als ein Vermögen, dass einen inneren selbst-bestimmten Anstoß zum praktischen Handeln im Sinne einer inneren Kausalität darstellt. Wir müssen ein naturgemäßes Leben von einem guten Leben unterscheiden. Idealiter gesehen oder im Zustand der Glückseligkeit ist das natürliche und das moralisch gute Leben ein und das selbe.3 Ein natürliches und ein gutes Leben soll der Mensch führen, denn die Natur ermöglicht sittliches Handeln und sittliches Handeln macht natürliches Leben lebenswerter. Kant hat in seiner epochalen Kritik der Urteilkraft ein für alle mal gezeigt, dass nur der Mensch unbedingter Endzweck der Schöpfung ist, nicht als natürliches sondern als ein moralisches Wesen betrachtet, denn »im Menschen, aber auch in diesem nur als Subjekte der Moralität, ist die unbedingte Gesetzgebung in Ansehung der Zwecke anzutreffen, welche ihn also allein fähig macht, ein Endzweck zu sein, dem die ganze Natur teleologisch untergeordnet ist.4« So gesehen ist der Mensch sich eines physikotheologischen Verhältnisses bewusst und muss es aushalten, und es fragt sich wie der Hiatus zwischen Natur und Freiheit zu denken ist.

section: main concepts of ethics

9. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Karoly Kokai

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The problem of justice lies at the heart of the philosophy of jurisprudence. Then what justice does, the purpose for which a legal system exists, the central principle of jurisprudence, is to provide, for concrete cases, a basis for decisions as to what is just. In the lecture I will first of all deal with Kant's ideas about justice, as shown in his works. They can also be seen as examples of a concept of justice from a previous epoch. The magnitude of these distances will become apparent when one bears in mind what Kant meant, and in what context, when he used this concept. At the same time Kant is the thinker who is most often mentioned in the contemporary discourse on justice. This is for two reasons. Firstly, Kant's position is exemplary for that position that holds that justice is the trancendental centre of any theory of jurisprudence; secondly, Kant is seen as the most significant thinker of that epoch, which is seen as the starting point for the present: the modern European Enlightenment. Finally I would like to contrast the concept of justice which has been developed in this way with the concept that seems fitting for the concrete situation of the Istanbul Congress of 2003.
10. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Taşkiner Ketenci

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In der aktuellen Diskussion werden die Begriffe "Vernunft" und "Rationalität" in Frage gestellt. Mit der "Rationalität" einer Handlung, einer Haltung oder einer Organisation bezeichnet man im Allgemeinen den Erfolg bei der Verwirklichung eines bestimmten Zweckes. Die "instrumentale Rationalität" als Grundlage einer Ethik, für die das Nachdenken über den Wert der Zwecke ohne Belang ist, wurde seit jeher heftig kritisiert. Kant verwendet das Wort "rational" in Bezug auf die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens. Nach Kant sind die Bestimmungsgründe des Willens entweder „subjektiv und empirisch" oder „objektiv und rational". Wenn der Wille "rational" bestimmt wird, so hat dies zur Folge, dass die Personen andere Personen nicht nur als Mittel, sondern auch als Zweck behandeln. Also in der Kantische Ethik weist das Wort "rational" auf ein Wesen hin, das selbst ein Zweck ist und deshalb als solcher behandelt werden soll. Schließlich bedeutet in der Kantischen Ethik das Wort "rational" eine "Rationalität" der Zwecke.
11. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Xinyan Jiang

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An important question about the nature of courage is whether it is a form of self-control. In this paper I argue that there are different kinds of courage and therefore the question whether courage is a form of self-control cannot be given a uniform answer. Courage exhibited in all cases may be classified as either spontaneous or deliberative courage. Spontaneous courage is not a form of self-control and usually is called for in emergency situations. It results from long-term moral cultivation, not a mindless impulse. Deliberative courage is usually shown in nonemergency situations. It may or may not involve self-control. In general, other things being equal, courage without exercising self-control is morally preferable. The absence of self-control is a necessary condition for ideal courage but ordinary courage is always accompanied by the exercise of will power.
12. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Per Bauhn

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In this paper I intend to present two concepts of courage, with the purpose of introducing two different ways in which the classical virtue of courage may serve goals of personal achievement and goals of collective flourishing respectively. The two forms of courage that I will distinguish are the courage of creativity and the courage of conviction, respectively. The courage of creativity is the ability to confront the fear of failure, this ability being directed by the agent's will to achieve, while the courage of conviction is the ability to confront the fear of personal transience, this ability being directed by the agent's sense of moral responsibility. While not necessarily being a moral virtue, courage in the first of its two forms constitutes an important component of the agent's capacity for self-fulfilment. In its other form it enables the agent to confront the fears of meaninglessness and of being a social outcast, involving her in a quest for objectivity and in doing the right thing rather than giving in to conventions.
13. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Tuija Takala

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In this paper I will study the theoretical foundations of autonomy and argue that many of the disputes around the principle follow from different understandings of what is "true freedom." My analysis will center on the two notions of liberty introduced by Isaiah Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty" (originally published in 1959). The problem is that there is no unequivocal way to understand the division. In my paper, I will give one interpretation of Berlin's two concepts, and argue that this reading both captures the essence of his essay and explains why there are so many ways of respecting autonomy
14. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Jan Hartman

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I present an analysis of the dialectic relationship uniting concepts of responsibility and loyalty, on the background of the political question of the right to move (immigration, in a very broad sense of leaving one's native community). I present a thorough analysis of the meanings of the categories of responsibility and loyalty, concentrating on the aspects that reveal their mutual antagonism. It is specially claimed that no responsibility is purely individual (however neither is it collective) and in this respect the concept of responsibility is confronted with the concept of guilt. In conclusion, it's claimed that the universal right of settling in a democratic country is a practical solution of the contradiction between the requirements of loyalty and responsibility on the one hand and freedom and justice on the other.
15. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Laura E. Weed

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In this paper I will present the accounts of two influential contemporary moral philosophers, Grace Clement and Amartya Sen, to argue for the social context and inter-related nature of autonomy. In fact, there can be no autonomy for anyone without a loving and caring social environment that actively promotes independent thinking and capacity empowerment among people. This social dimension of autonomy has often been ignored by traditional theorists, who have considered autonomy to be an individual accomplishment that is a function of an individual's will power, intellectual ability, or self-discipline and virtue.
16. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Gopal Sreenivasan

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According to the standard view of informed consent, a prospective subject's consent to participate in a research study is invalid if the individual fails to comprehend the information about the study standardly disclosed to him. I argue that this involves three mistakes. First, the standard view confuses an ethical aspiration with a minimum ethical standard. Second, it assigns the entire responsibility for producing comprehension in study participants to the investigators. Most importantly, the standard view requires the termination of many otherwise perfectly ethical research studies. This last conclusion follows from appreciating a pervasive phenomenon that is known as the "therapeutic misconception." I argue that a prospective subject's consent to participate in research can be perfectly valid even if he or she does not comprehend the information that investigators are required to disclose. Furthermore, I explain that this alternative view does not in the least compromise the vital goal of ensuring the protection of subjects in research.
17. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Jennifer S. Hawkins, Ezekiel J. Emanuel

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Commentators often claim that medical research subjects are coerced into participating in clinical studies. In recent years, such claims have appeared especially frequently in ethical discussions of research in developing countries. Medical research ethics is more important than ever as we move into the 21st century because worldwide the pharmaceutical industry has grown so much and shows no sign of slowing its growth. This means that more people are involved in medical research today than ever before, and in the future even more will be involved. However, despite the pressing need for reflection on research ethics, it is important to carefully identify the concerns we have about research. Otherwise we run the risk that the moral language we use, and which we hear other people use, may do our moral thinking for us. We argue that many recent claims about the occurrence of coercion in medical research are misguided and misuse the word "coercion." We try to identify the real problems, and urge people to attend carefully to the implications of their descriptions of moral problems in research.
18. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Kathleen Gill

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Under certain circumstances the act of apologizing has moral import. It requires a commitment to truth, adherence to moral standards, and a willingness to acknowledge and regret one's own moral failures. In this paper I examine the moral import of apologizing within the U.S. legal system and as a response to historical acts of injustice. In both of these contexts apologies are expressed in a public forum, which adds an interesting dynamic to their moral significance. Within the legal system the judge, representing the interests of the community, may use apologizing to directly address the harm done to victims, as an indicator of recidivism on the part of offenders, and to help create an atmosphere of respect for law in the community at large. Different moral aspects of apologizing come to the fore in the context of historical acts of injustice. Interesting philosophical questions arise, e.g. the legitimacy of moral judgments across time and culture and the very possibility of group action. And skepticism is commonly expressed about the value of such apologies: aren't they empty words that provide no real benefit to victims or the descendants of victims? Aren't they irrelevant to the future? I identify what I hope are convincing reasons to believe that historical apologies can in fact have considerable moral value and a significant impact on the future.
19. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Jacob Dahi Rendtorff

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My aim in this analysis is to give a philosophical clarification of the scope of corporate social responsibility within our present market economy. The issue is to what extent social responsibility of the firm is compatible with existing market structures in our present economy. In this context, I will address the conceptions of corporate social responsibility within philosophy, economic theory, and economic sociology. This analysis aims at clarifying the concept of corporate social responsibility within traditional neoclassical economic thought and confronting it with the institutional theory of society. On this basis, I will look on the more fundamental philosophical issue about how it can be possible to ascribe moral personality, responsibility and intentionality to corporations. In this context, I will examine collectivist arguments for corporate responsibility in order to show the limits of a strong collectivist conception of corporate social responsibility. After this, I will look at the nominalist view of corporate social responsibility, which represents the view opposite to the collectivist position. Finally, I will put forward a third possible view on corporate intentionality, which aims at overcoming the oppositions between the collectivist and the nominalist view on corporate social responsibility.

section: views of ethics in discussion

20. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Ieva Lapinska

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Considering world problems in a context of inter human relationship, I refer to the approach developed in Emmanuel Levinas' ethics. This approach encourages raising a question about the potential usefulness of knowledge in solving problems of human relationship. The fundamental trait of the human condition face-toface with the other is, according to Levinas, unrestricted responsibility of the I about the other. The other has ethical, not ontological, authority, which explains why observable deafness to one's responsibility can not serve as a proof against its absolute nature. Consequently, whatever one's judgement on the current situation, moral requirements are valid. The relationship between the I and the other comes before any theory and there is no need for the help of knowledge. However, the multiplicity of human beings demands a solution to problems involving many people. There arises a need for theoretical thought—its aim is to pose a question of justice. Ethical knowledge for Levinas is primary. Ethically motivated thought can seek knowledge as received from the other. Such knowledge can help to conceive of just action, if there is a wish to perform it. But it is not knowledge that motivates one to act morally and it is not argument that can convince one to act this way.