|
1.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Anita L. Allen
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
2.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Geoffrey Brennan
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
3.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Leslie Pickering Francis
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
4.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Chandran Kukathas
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
5.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Scott A. Anderson
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
6.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
David Matheson
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Ignorance theorists about privacy hold that it amounts to others’ ignorance of one’s personal information. I argue that ignorance theorists should adopt a distributive reductionist approach to the right to privacy, according to which it is reducible to elements that, despite having something significant in common, are distributed across more fundamental rights to person, liberty, and property. The distributed reductionism that I present carries two important features. First, it is better suited than its competitors to explain a sense of scatter that many have about the right to privacy. Second, it warrants caution about claims to the effect that the right to privacy is sharply to be distinguished from such rights as the right to liberty and the right to property.
|
|
|
7.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Steve Matthews
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
8.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
David Meeler
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
I will argue for a straightforward claim: privacy is best understood as protecting information about us from being known by others. To those unfamiliar with recent scholarship regarding privacy, this claim may seem self-evident, too trivial to deserve defense. At the same time, scholars of privacy may find the claim too narrow or outdated to enjoy sustained defense. This situation makes the view an interesting one, I think. My goal is to develop a conception of privacy that is concise enough to be legally functional and robust enough to be morally valuable. Beginning with richer moral conceptions ofprivacy, I will pursue a type ofreductioniststrategy by defending infonnational privacy as the only meaningful core of privacy interests. My reductionism is not necessarily conceptual. While I think a conceptual reduction might also be defended, my reduction can be seen, primarily, as practical. My reasons for focusing on information are straightforward:(conceptually) I suggest that any private matter must be related to the information aspect, and (practically) that protecting information privacy is sufficient for protecting the other aspects identified in the richer moral tradition; however, protecting only the other regularly acknowledged aspects (either access or expressive privacy) fails to protect information privacy. This analysis of privacy centered on information should be clean enough for legal application while addressing the deepest worries that motivate morally thick analyses. We define the parameters ofself-expression and legitimate government access most effectively by carefullydefining the parameters for protecting information about our lives.
|
|
|
9.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
Travis Dumsday
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
|
10.
|
The Monist:
Volume >
91 >
Issue: 1
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|