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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Takeshi Akiba

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A number of philosophers today endorse the view thatmaterial substances (ex. cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed asbundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among severaldevelopments, the theory that P. Simons proposed is seen as themost successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputationto mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: thecapacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacyfor phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to object tothis high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantagesindeed cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. Tothis aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory andexplain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up A. Denkel’scriticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unlessSimons admits a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that asa result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose thecapacity for avoiding regress in turn.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Hilan Bensusan, Manuel de Pinedo

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Holism about thought content – especially coupled with a measure of semantic externalism – can provide us with an attractive account of how thinking relates to the world. It can help us to tell a neat story that starts out with the inseparable entanglement of truth and intelligibility: in order to understand thought, to confront it to the world and to give verdicts about that confrontation, we need to grasp a considerable amount of truths. A variety of positions that emerge under the influence of Davidson’s arguments (see, for instance, his 1974) deny the possibility of severing the connection between thought and facts of the world. However, this holisticunderstanding of thought seems less attractive when it is forced to account for our capacities to engage with singularities. A (roughly) Davidsonian conception of thought faces serious problems when it tries to answer questions regarding singular thoughts, de re attitudes and beliefs, and the nature of items of the world that cannot be described or referred to without the aid of demonstratives. This tension between thought and singularity is a well-known one and shows up in different traditions of philosophy. We aim at easing the tension without giving up the intuitions behind holism.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski

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I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege’s senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are tobe classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be properly called ‘an intentional object’ a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a quasi-target of the subject’s intention. In other words: intentional objects are supposed to stand ‘before the subject’s mind’, so that they, in a sense, ‘replace’ the common sense objects of reference. It turns out that the intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups which,from the ontological point of view, are very heterogeneous. Nevertheless it is possible to formulate certain systematic criteria of classifying them.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Sun Demirli

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The bundle theory, supposed as a theory concerning the internal constitution of individuals, is often conjoined with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘no two individuals can share all their constituents’ (CIT). But then it runs afoul of Black’s duplication case. Here a new bundle theory, takingdistance relations between bundles to be a sufficient ground for their diversity, will be proposed. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the ‘triplication case’—a world containing three indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish the threespheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation—R3—that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all polyadic relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between the three-spheres world and Black’s world.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
David Gawthorne

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There are two crucial problems for those who would take existence to be a ‘real’ property. (1) The predication of such a property of a thing appears insufficient to distinguish cases where the thing exists, on the one hand, from those where it does not exist on the other. That is, the property of existence does not add anythingto the concept of a thing. (2) If non-existent things are capable of having properties and identity – which is necessary to avoid an objection made by A. J. Ayer – then the identity of all things with all other things appears to follow. However, if the concept of existence is explained as a primitive property manifest as resistance toontological contradiction then these problems can be solved. The pay-off for considering existence to be a first-order predicate is, therefore, an argument against existing ontological contradictions.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Mezentsev Gennady

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This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. The existence became not the thing-in-itself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understanding of things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problemsand presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get non-verbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism).
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Serghey Gherdjikov

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Here the topics of the virtual and that of relativity are joined together. New concepts of relation, virtuality and reality are devised. Relation is definition. It is not something detached and real but is the very ‘thing’. Relating is virtual defining – projection of the real connection between moments of a life process. ‘This’ without ‘that’ is not this. ‘I’ without ‘you’ is not I. ‘West’ without ‘East’ is not west. ‘Man’ without other living beings is not man. We pass each other. In the same degree we do not know ourselves as an ego, as community, as civilization. This is an unconsciousness relativity effect, which comes into being in the process of communication between cultures and between individuals. Relativity in awareness can be a virtual freedom for a synthesis of definitions, relations and descriptions, and a real freedom for a synthesis of a life process, identity and life in a human form. Which is real and which is not, if thongs are definiteonly in relation? Which is real and which is not in a global interrelating and virtual communication? The virtual pertains to all artefacts. The reality of artefacts, and especially of signs, lies in their being related to a meaning, their reality is relational. Meaning is understood as a moment of a human life process. The scheme iselaborated in two spheres: virtual and real relativity analogous to special and general relativity (Einstein).
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Patricia Hanna

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In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call “praxial realism”, which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Endre Kiss

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By 1989, the neo-liberal logics of identity and difference took over the Socialist, as well as the Christian basic notions of identity and difference. This means, neither Socialist solidarity nor Christian love for brethren eases the power of difference. In such cases, difference is not a simple difference, value, or ideology any more, but ontology, moreover, it acquires logical character. While in the divided world difference was based on hidden identity, now neo-liberal - human-rights identity is being filled with concrete contents by an unreconcileable difference. The power of difference is the final state of being different. In the relations of the present, the logic of identity doesn't simply dominate, but it seems to be a higher, maybe straight unexceedably final variant of identity - we are not simplyidentical with one another, but as a result of the grounding on human rights we are identical in our most dignified nature. But in actual fact, political and social spaces show a row of mutations differing from this. This doesn't mean the ideology of identity would have got unveiled, but that identity - logic has become selective in a new way. While the identity - logic is working in the foreground, in the background, a difference - logic stronger than ever before, is operating ruthlessly.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Chenchulakshmi Kolla

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11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Igor I. Kondrashin

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Rethinking “philosophy” to-day, it is necessary to think first of all about ontological foundations of the modern scientific universe description and rethink them on the ground of modern scientific knowledge, because until now there is no any precise scientific conception of the structure of the universe, of reasons and movingforces of its permanent evolution. All of it create basis to propose various unscientific ideas of creationism. Until now most of philosophers associate the motion of Matter on the whole only with its motion in space and in time, mixing philosophical and physical aspects of these two principle categories. Generally speaking, the present-day ontological model of understanding the World, the Universe is constructed purely on the basis of only these two fundamental categories. However, a more deep reflection of the essence of Being, if to realize it on the basis of only these two global categories, brings us to the disappointing conclusion, that in this case we have nothing more except a mechanical motion, i.e. spatial displacement of a material point (or a system of points) relatively some point of counting off. To make it normal and logic we should add to the ontological model one more essential part – the motion in quality. So, in order to create the full and complete picture of the formation and evolution of the material World it is necessary to observe the motion of material forming in the three equivalentphilosophical categories: in space time quality. The ideas of the new conception of ontological model become actual supplementation of really scientific philosophical knowledge on the way of a more objective ontological comprehension of our Being, of the law of development of the human civilization and the Universe as a whole. This knowledge can be successfully used for the description of the realistic paradigm of Being, in explanations of the meaning of Life.
12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Chen Lixin

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Ontology: An Ontological Interpretation to Baudrillard’s Consumption Society TheoryJean Baudrillard used “Consumption society” to describe a novel transformation of the contemporary life, “consumption society” has become to the symbol of contemporary ideology. From this we can say that reading Jean Baudrillard is very necessary. Compared with what Jean Baudrillard said, what we comprehended is more important, so it is very necessary to analyze Jean Baudrillard’s consumption society theory on the ontological viewpoint. To this, Iattach great important to the follow key issues: what kind of existent character Jean Baudrillard revealed? Hegel’s modern western philosophy participated in the foundation of the Capitalist civilization; Jean Baudrillard was unavoidably involved in, so what is the advancement in theory system? How to define the demarcation to Jean Baudrillard? He animadverted on Marx and appropriated his valuable thoughts.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Jari Palomäki

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There are three conditions which an item has to fulfill in order to be listed into an inventory. Based on those three conditions, the logically basic entities are introduced: they are points, sets, and collections. These logically basic entities are related with three different logical relations, i.e., “is an element of”, “is a subset of”, and “is a part of” –relations, to constitute concepts. Those three logical relations have different relational properties, and thus they are to be distinguished. The logically basic entities are said to exist whereas the concepts constituted by them are said to subsist. One of the most important results is that we should not mix two inventories together, since otherwise inconsistencies follow.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Eric M. Peng

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Assuming the position that takes properties to be tropes rather than universals and takes ordinary objects as bundles of tropes, the essay first argues that the Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles survives the challenge raised by Black's "two-sphere universe". It is because the Law of Indiscernibles becomes a trivialconsequence of the assumed trope ontology. The essay then considers four construals of the thesis of Uniqueness differing in strength. The construals are developed in terms of both the possibility that tropes of an object may be transferred to another object and the possibility that objects may survive cross-worldproperty changes. Finally, the essay argues that a trilemma arises from three intuitively innocent claims: (1) that same world objects do not share tropes, (2) that cross world objects may share some (but not all) tropes, and (3) that objects may survive cross-world property changes. And, unfortunately, Indiscernibles plays a role in giving rise to one horn of the trilemma. The essay suggests "ultraessentialism" as a possible way out of the trilemma.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Seyed Masood Sayf

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The issue of existence - quiddity difference is one of the important issues that were put forward for the first time in Islamic philosophy without having any background in Greek philosophy. Aristotle's metaphysics which is the main source of the first philosophy contains only synonymous and verbal meaning ofexistence. The issue of existence - quiddity difference has no room in Aristotle's works. This issue was proposed first by Farabi and then was completed by Ibn sina. In Islamic philosophy when it is proved that existence in the mind is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it but differs with it and is excess of it, that is, when it is proved that existence occurs on quiddity, this question arises that how is their relation in the outside? Whether existence occurs on quiddity or existence and quiddity are identical in the external world? To this question the Islamic philosophers answer that existence and quiddity are identical in the outside and it isimpossible that they differ from each other in the external world. The importance of this issue is that it finally led to the origination of the doctrine of the principality of existence which is known as the culmination of Islamic philosophy. The main goal of this article is study this issue and its impact upon the origination of the doctrine of the principiality of existence.
16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Nathan M. Solodukho

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An extract from the author's «A Philosophy of Non-being». The Universe is a fluctuation of being originating spontaneously in non-being (i.e., in a non-existing reality). Substance as a whole and cosmic space in the first place are the result of non-being which has lost its state of balance. Fluctuations of being, (i.e., spontaneous transitions from non-existence to existence), are immanent in the nature of unstable non-being. The world of non-being is neither a separate sphere nor a parallel world, but the very bosom of being. Non-being is here, there, and everywhere, it shrouds, penetrates and saturates being. It is substantial. Тhere will inevitably appear conditions for new fluctuations of being. And this will ever be because it is never. And this is everywhere because it is nowhere. Forthe time which non-being lacks is eternity, and the space which it does not possess is infinity. The Universe represents the superposition of cycles with the following phases: non-being - being - non-being, or nothing - something - nothing. Transition from non-being-before-being to being, and further, to non-being-after-being determines the irreversibility of processes and directivity of time from past to future through the present time. The above-mentionedcyclic processes prove to be infinite, continuous, general, and by virtue of their superposition, constantly running; they form the unified world flow of states that differ in quality. Closely related with the processes cyclicity is the law of the being regeneration which expresses the essence of movement caused due to intertransitions of non-being and being. The real world has eternal and continuous origin. It begins always and constantly terminates. And it resumes constantlyand continuously in the process of eternal and infinite regeneration of being.
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Anatoliy Stoletov

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The notion of creativeness is widely used in a number of sciences. The same time meaning of this word is not so obvious as it may seem at first sight. In most cases the notion definitions contain only one of it's meaning features unchangeable: creativeness is a kind of ability to create something new. There are several sometimes absolutely different points of view regarding to the following questions: who is a bearer of this ability, what are the main peculiarities of it’s appearance, not to mention its formation possibility and methods. We analyze these points of view to approach to the comprehension of the nature of creativeness. Demands of modern world to person increase. Creativeness is one of these aspects. Besides this one is foundation of human’s nature. Sodeciding this problem we make a base for solving many other problems. Probably the decision of this problem lies in dividing of creativeness types.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Wen-fang Wang

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I show in this paper how Putnam’s model-theoretical argument can be modified so as to generate a new general tool for Nominalism. I call such a tool “Ockham’s New Razor”. Section I illustrates how the model-theoretical technique that I have in mind can be applied to argue against Meinongian theories. Section II shows how the technique can be generalized to other cases as well. It also contains a brief discussion of the major assumption in the technique. Section III discusses possible objections to my so-called “Ockham’s New Razor”.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Haidong Yu

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The world (specifically the universe in which modern mankind, the same below) there is no absolute essence. The world's primitive also has uncertainty; the existence of all is possible. On the universe in which modern human live, the unity and distinction of material and spirit constitute the world's basic contradiction. (1) The unity of material and spirit. Many have a negative in the overall delicate generation: the material includes the spirit, the spirit depends on the material, among them under certain conditions can be transformed into each other. (2) The material and spirit is distinct: The material is essentially an objective system, the objective freedom is the essence of the spirit .The collection system is the unity of opposites; freedom is relative to the state system. (3) The spirit and awareness are two different concepts, it is necessary to distinguish between. Material and the sense of confrontation: the material is an objective reality, subjective consciousness is reflected. (4) The material and the sense of unity: the material is the source of awareness, consciousness is a product of material; material decides consciousness, awareness counterproductive in the material. Material and a sense of the unity of opposites minor contradictions in the world. (5) World of certainty and uncertainty, know and unknown, relative and absolute, as well as activity problems are dialectical. (6) Dialectics generally applicable to the entire world, but also dialectical view of its own, it should be the development of a multiple, three-dimensional, not the sleek dialectics.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 17
Xinyan Zhang

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