rights & permissions
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In response to Novák’s polemic attack I try to remove some misunderstandings and defend compatibilism about free will. My main argument goes thus: Let us take for example two agents who both decide not to kill. The first one makes his choice out of his dilemmatic mental state of incertitude and perplexity. Conversely the second person understands the sense of moral principles so clearly that she makes the right decision with necessity. Since the morality of the second person surpasses that of the fi rst, my point is that the libertarian thinker puts in confl ict morality and freedom: The more a person (the latter agent) is virtuous, the less she is free (for the supposed necessity of her volition is taken to be incompatible with freedom in the libertarian theory). And – on the other hand – the less an agent (the former one) is moral, the more he is free. Indeed, he would be free while the latter unfree if it were true (as the libertarian believes) that freedom entails contingency. This is a peculiar rule of proportion. Compatibilism avoids such a peculiarity.