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1. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Ross D. Inman

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articles

2. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Walter J. Schultz Orcid-ID

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The Barcan formula is a theorem of quantified modal logic. Its most straightforward interpretation appears to commit one to “possibilism,” the view that merely possible things exist. Alternative systems of logic revise the formal semantics to preclude the theorem and its consequences. The crux, however, is the modal metaphysics presupposed by the formal semantics. This paper presents an alternative metaphysics of possibility that follows Augustine’s suggestion that God’s plan is only one of a range of alternative histories for a creation. The metaphysics is a version of “trace actualism”—neither pure possibilism nor pure actualism.
3. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Dwayne Moore

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The argument from reason states that if naturalism is true, then our beliefs are caused by physical processes rather than being causally based in their reasons, so our beliefs are not knowledge—including the belief in naturalism itself. Recent critics of the argument from reason provide dual process replies to the argument from reason—our beliefs can have both a naturalistic cause/ explanation and be caused/explained by its reasons, thereby showing that naturalism can accommodate knowledge. In this paper I consider three dual process replies and conclude that none of them are successful
4. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
R. Scott Smith

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William Lane Craig maintains that propositions and properties are not real. Yet, if we examine his proposed nominalism and his appeal to Rudolf Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, we can find that his view depends upon their reality, even as abstract objects. By drawing upon phenomenological insights, I argue that if we pay close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, we can become aware that there is more to what is real than simple, concrete particulars, even in his linguistic examples. We can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.
5. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
John M. DePoe

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One objection to skeptical theism is that it implies radical moral skepticism. Humans cannot make any moral judgments on this view because of their ignorance of the inaccessible divine knowledge that is called upon to explain the existence of apparently gratuitous evil. In answering this objection, I propose two important moves for skeptical theists. First, skeptical theists should be positive skeptical theists (the existence of God positively implies the appearance of gratuitous evil), rather than negative skeptical theists (the appearance of gratuitous evil is probabilistically inscrutable given theism). Second, the skeptical theist can affirm a model of divine transcendence whereby the unknown divine moral knowledge is continuous with human moral knowledge. These two moves, I contend, assist in saving skeptical theism from accusations of radical moral skepticism.
6. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Thomas M. Ward Orcid-ID

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Could God command us to hate him? Here I offer two arguments that He cannot. I also argue that this restriction on God’s power is consistent with a strong doctrine of omnipotence according to which God can do anything broadly logical possible.

book reviews

7. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Chris D. Lee

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8. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Dan Kemp

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9. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
K. Lauriston Smith

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10. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Paul Copan

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11. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2

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12. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Ross D. Inman

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symposium on love divine

13. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Kevin W. Wong

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In this essay, I introduce the symposium on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity, by discussing its origin as a book panel, providing the context for the significance of Wessling’s contribution, and previewing the essays that follow.
14. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Jordan Wessling Orcid-ID

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To set the stage for the symposium on my monograph, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity, I present the purpose of this manuscript and summarize its main themes and chapters. Additionally, to orient readers to the wider literature in which Love Divine is situated, I respond to recent reviews of Love Divine and mention some of the most significant challenges to the book raised so far by those not represented within the symposium.
15. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
R. T. Mullins

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In this paper, I offer some brief reflections on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity. I explain what I take to be its strengths in articulating an account of divine love that solves a variety of problems that classical theism cannot solve. Then I articulate a potential problem for Wessling’s account of divine love and hell.
16. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Keith Hess

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In chapter 3 of Love Divine, Jordan Wessling argues against glorificationism, the view that God primarily created for the sake of his glory, and for amorism, that God created primarily out of love for creation. His arguments are based in both scripture and natural theology. In this paper, I offer reasons to think that Wessling’s arguments are not successful. I then suggest that we remain agnostic about God’s primary motivation for creating the world while still affirming that he was motivated by both self-glorification and love for creation.
17. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Ty Kieser Orcid-ID

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Wessling’s treatment of divine love raises several questions for systematic consideration. My goal here is to articulate some of these questions and their rationale insofar as they relate to the Creator-creature distinction. I begin with the nature of “creaturely love,” with its material content and methodological contours in Wessling’s account. Then I move to questions about the Creator’s love with regard to divine aseity. Finally, I ask about the Creator’s relationship to creatures in the hypostatic union of the Son with a human nature.
18. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Jordan Wessling Orcid-ID

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I here respond to my interlocutors in the symposium on my book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity. Addressing each of them in the order in which their essays appear within this symposium, I reply to the comments by R. T. Mullins, Keith Hess, and Ty Kieser.

articles

19. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Daniel Spencer

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In this paper, I investigate the merits of an argument in the philosophy of mysticism which, if sound, appears to have serious implications for our estimation of various Christian saints, mystics, and theologians and some of their most profound spiritual experiences. After giving an initial statement of this argument, I offer a (tentative) defense of the two main premises at play and conclude the argument is plausibly sound. Following this, I turn to a discussion of Nelson Pike’s important objection to this argument and contend that, while doubtless more interesting than commonly supposed, it ultimately falls short of the mark.
20. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 24 > Issue: 1
Angus Menuge

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Many pro-life supporters accept the substance view (SV) of human value, tying intrinsic value to properties essential to all human beings. Many pro-choice supporters accept the functionalist view (FV) of human value, tying intrinsic value to accidental functional properties. They argue that there are circumstances in which terminating human beings is permissible. I offer three reasons for rejecting FV. First, FV fails to ontologically ground intrinsic qualities. Second, FV entails that technologically enhanced human beings may have greater intrinsic value than unenhanced human beings. Third, FV entails a problematic pragmatic-utilitarian view of value that undermines widespread convictions about human dignity.