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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Ruben Apressyan

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The concept of morality proposed herein is an aggregated one – hence it is represented in sequential manner. At individual level, morality is shown up in values, which directs towards the good of others (individuals, groups, society in general, and all of humankind, potentially). The main values are: non-harming, recognition, solidarity, care. These values exist within a culture, and are recorded in texts of various kinds, in the form of abstract preferences or in the form of corresponding demands: cause no harm to others, recognize others, help others, care for others. The very existence of these demands determines the necessity of another type of values – the ones that would reflect an individual’s adherence to these demands. In other words, virtues understood as human qualities that enable an individual to fulfil these demands and reach the ideal of moral excellence, or perfection, expressed in corresponding demands, namely, to be virtuous and perfect. Moral demands have a number of traits which manifest the specific nature of moral imperatives (non-institutionalised, ideal character of sanctions, presumed independence and reflective autonomy of the moral agent, etc.) Morality manifests differently at individual and public levels, and, in this paper I will try to briefly describe these differences.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Olga Artemyeva

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I presuppose that morality meets fundamental needs of human being as such. Its domain is interpersonal relationships. It uses particular values and norms in order to orient a person towards achieving personal perfection and fostering perfect relationships with other people. Moral perfectionism differs from all the other kinds (creative, religious, etc.) in the efforts aimed at attaining moral perfection that are made within the space of human relationships, relevant to them and, ultimately, for their sake. To a large extent these two orientations (towards personal perfection and perfect interpersonal relationships) are mutually dependant — one is a pre-requisite of the other. My aim is to demonstrate that undue emphasis on one of them in moral theory, at the expense of the other, results in irresolvable contradictions in the idea of morality and deformations in moral practice as well.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Yubraj Aryal

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In the Spinozist universe man is free from the moral dogma of good and bad imposed from outside, but with a responsibility to understand the natural laws with which his own body encounters with other bodies in nature, as well as the nature of affections such encounters produce. Freedom here is understood not as acting freely but having ‘adequate ideas’ of how one body in nature encounters other body. For Spinoza, a free man knows how to act according to the nature of laws of his own body. This knowing makes him a free man. By knowing the laws of nature, he acts to maximize his pleasure. Spinozist universe is not free and man’s action is not free. Everything works with the necessity. But in knowing that he is determined in a way he is determined makes man free. It is because this understanding makes him active. And the more one becomes active, the more free man one becomes.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Robin Attfield

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While climate change mitigation remains indispensable, together with adaptation to such climate change as cannot be prevented, current slowness of progress towards attaining an international agreement on these matters has fostered suggestions about climate engineering, originally proposed as supplementary to adaptation and mitigation. These suggestions take the forms of Solar Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal. This paper discusses the ethics of researching and of deploying them. Solar Radiation Management ranges from harmless but inadequate measures such as making roofs reflect sunlight to ambitious ones such as projecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere to reduce incoming radiation. Some favor this measure as a quick and inexpensive replacement for mitigation; but its possible side-effects and lack of an exit-strategy mean that its deployment would be misguided, and that researching it might undermine determination to reach a mitigation agreement. Some forms of Carbon Dioxide Removal (seeding the oceans with iron filings to grow carbon-reducing algae) face similar objections, but others, like afforestation and Carbon Capture and Storage (itself not yet operative), comprise acceptable enhancements of current technology. Even if they do not buy time, these measures could beneficially supplement a global Climate Change agreement.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Francesco Belfiore

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Moral motivation has been variously conceived and explained. The main theses maintain that moral motivation springs directly from moral judgments and beliefs (internalism) or that it is due to factors external to moral judgments and beliefs, such as desires (externalism). In this paper, I defend the thesis that moral motivation is contributed by several factors, so that it can be defined as “multifactorial”. I refer to my previously proposed conception according to which mind exerts three kinds of activity, each of which, in turn, creates outward/selfish and inward/moral products. Thus, mind rational activity creates outward/selfish ideas and beliefs and in ward/moral thoughts or beliefs; mind emotional activity creates outward/selfish sentiments (desires/aversions) and inward/moral feelings; and mind practical activity creates outward/selfish actions and inward/moral acts. The inward/moral activity is directed to mind itself, under stood and felt as an evolving entity, whose evolution is the moral good. I attempt to show that moral motivation does not spring only from ideas, thoughts, and beliefs (internalism) but is also contributed by moral feelings and selfish desires (as externalism holds) as well as by the cost of moral acts and selfish actions. Thus, moral motivation is contributed by all six mind products and, therefore, is multifactorial.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Tadeusz Buksiński

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The paper describes the modern morality as conditional morality, represented by theories of social contract and utilitarianism. They conditionally impose the moral duties on people, if the other people fulfil moral duties, too. As a result they justify the use of the political power to compel the citizens to public morality, leaving a certain margin of freedom to individual morality in the private domain which is fairly inconsequential for collective life. Public morality, on the other hand, is rigorously regulated and precisely defined by statutory laws and political authority. An individual citizen thus becomes incapacitated in the public domain: reduced to accepting decisions adopted by the ruling group, perhaps also electing them once per several years. Unconditional morality, as represented by evangelical or Kant’s ethics, imposes rights, obligations and moral duties on individuals, requires compliance with them regardless of other individuals or groups. It may never constitute a foundation justifying violence, use of force, abuse of power, deception or restriction of liberty. Within this framework, such actions are considered immoral, irrespective of whether they occur in the institutionalized form or otherwise.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Clark Butler

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Human rights have increasingly come to the center of political and social philosophy since 1945. The have been widely discussed in publications on topical human rights issues, in the work of some of the most notable philosophers of the time like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, and in volumes on global justice. But, despite Habermas work in Diskurs Ethik, discussion ethics (what I call ‘Human Rights Ethics’) has never clearly been presented as a normative ethical theory in competition with the classical rivals such as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. This paper makes a clear, concise case recognition of human rights ethics as a contemporary normative ethical theory, and for its inclusion in future elementary textbooks. Universal legal human rights protect the central ethical human right to freedom of expression (as integral to a cooperative search for the truth, including the truth as to the correct normative ethical theory). Human Rights Ethics supersedes classical theories based on evident first principles because these principles are either merely asserted without justification (once the appeal to self-evidence has been has been dropped) or are justified (or refuted) by being superseded by the final self-justifying standard of definable ethical discussion. The very refutation of human rights ethics could be sound only through ethical discussion, with all parties exercising the ethical, but not yet universally legal, right to freedom of expression. Hence the refutation of the ethical right to freedom of expression cannot be sound.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Leonardo Caffo, Sarah De Sanctis

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For the past thirty years postmodernism has been the major philosophical trend. Starting as a potentially emancipatory tool, though, it has virtually resolved into an acceptance of any kind of (epistemological, ethical) position, in the name of a very politically correct relativism. The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism (Ferraris 2012) in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism, showing that it does not imply a return to a ‘traditional’ or ‘strong’ realism but that, on the contrary, it involves a kind of ‘weak realism’: a blend between realism and constructivism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Where postmodern epistemological claims will be proved to be quite easily confutable, its ethical implications will be faced more carefully. Ethical new realism will, therefore, be presented as particularly challenging (Caffo, De Sanctis 2012), but also promising and important to the future of philosophy.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Patrice Canivez

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In Oneself as Another Paul Ricoeur develops a practical philosophy that articulates the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions, the pursuit of the “good life” and the moral imperative. What he proposes is a critical reconstruction of Aristotle’s ethics. Ricoeur does not merely seek to give a faithful rendering of Aristotle’s theory. Rather, he is interested in discussing the problems that are posed by this theory. In particular, there are two problems that deserve attention: The distinction between praxis and poiesis and the concept of happiness. On the one hand, Ricoeur gives an interesting account of the distinction between praxis and poiesis. However, he concludes by questioning the philosophical relevance of this distinction. On the other hand, Ricoeur interprets the human ergon – in the effectuation of which happiness consists – as the realization of a personal life project. In this paper, I discuss Ricoeur’s interpretation of Aristotle on both points. Firstly, I envisage a reformulation of Ricoeur’s solution to the problem of praxis that preserves the relevance of the distinction between praxis and poiesis. Secondly, I propose an alternative interpretation of the human ergon that relates happiness to a sort of “practical presence” rather than to the temporality of a life project.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Asha Chaudhary

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The world is a statuette of realism where everything is an element or aspect of reality. In ancient times, need and situations made the man to progress towards a definite evolution. Thoughts gave way to human demeanor which was later regarded as ethics. Thus, ethics is an integral branch of philosophy which determines its rules by taking into consideration both, necessity for a human being to survive gracefully and reasons propelling a human being to commit inhuman acts. Moral consciousness cannot exist since birth, as archaeological explorations have already established that the early peoples did not have any ethical knowledge. It was the experience of nature that helped them to discover an abstract of moral consciousness. However, in today’s scenario, people seem to have forgotten the significance of ethics and are excessively concerned over materialistic behoove. The current scenario does not require mere ethical theories, but learning and practical application, which, actually, are now getting dormant. It does not matter if we discover our moral consciousness from within or from something or someone else. The point is to start practicing and not wait and ponder as to when morality will knock the doors within.
11. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Göran Collste

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The point of departure for this paper is an argument for global rectificatory justice. The paper discusses conceptual questions and elaborates a model for rectificatory justice: X (the agent: person, state, etc.), did A (an injury or harm; stealing, killing, exploiting, etc.), to Y (the victim: a person, group, nation, etc.), at t (time). Given Case P, rectificatory justice requires; X’ acknowledges the harm done to Y’ and X’ apologizes for A, X’ compensates Y´ with B (something valuable; money etc.), andX’ assures that the harmful acts should not be repeated and a new relation between X’ and Y’ is established.The model is applied to the legacy of colonialism. Global rectificatory justice implies that there is a history of domination and exploitation behind the present unjust global relations and that colonial subjection is behind the present conditions for the global poor. Subsequently, the former colonial powers have a duty to rectify former colonies based on the premise that if you have harmed someone you are obliged to rectify.
12. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Bergen Coskun

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In recent years there have been many debates about the care ethics. Although there are some philosophers who claim that ethics of care should be separated from ethics of justice, some philosophers insist that care and justice are closely related with each other and they both should be taken into consideration. In this paper Socrates’ apology will be taken as an example of the junction point of ethics and justice, and the connection of care and justice will be examined in the light of the viewpoints of some philosophers who are interested in this subject.
13. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Carmen Cozma

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Acknowledged as one of the major trends in the post-Husserlian philosophy, phenomenology of life of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka offers a richness of inspiring conceptual and interpretative articulations for an ethics that stems from the original thesis about the “Ontopoiesis of Life”. Unfolding basic issues regarding the virtue(s) and the universal call for measure, the moral sense with its benevolent sentiment, the ethical responsible status of man within the entire web of life in the openness of human transcending and positioning in the cosmos, the Tymienieckan phenomenology circumscribes an ethics of life in the horizon of an enlarged valuation of creativity. According to the phenomenologist of life, creativity represents the most important potential to be activated for a constructive, enlightening and elevated human becoming(ness). In this paper, I aim to emphasize a part of a great learning of wisdom (in life) focused on the moral reference. I will especially explore so much needed orientation for well-being and progress in our nowadays bewildered reality, for the life’s continuous affirmation in its meaningfulness.
14. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Roit Dahan

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Marcuse critiques the positions of Kant and Freud regarding the emancipation of reason. According to Kant and Freud, the individual attains autonomy via reason and consciousness. Marcuse claims that the concept of rationalism is rooted in the same social order that created the oppression! Thus, we must re-examine that concept in order to establish freedom and happiness. Marcuse believes that reason, in its accepted sense in Western philosophy, does not confer immunity from manipulation of consciousness. Reason’s advanced achievements do not lead to liberation; in fact, they lead to unnecessary oppression and suffering. Thus, we must establish freedom in a completely different dimension – one that will be the foundation for the reorganization of society. In this paper I will argue that Marcuse’s ideas regarding a new social order are not necessarily utopian. According to Marcuse, a change in the conception of a rational life style is necessary for the achievement of a true, free consciousness. Thus, a new social order, that aspires to reducing the time spent on alienating work alongside enlarging leisure time and deepening interpersonal relations, will create possible conditions to proceeds towards freedom and peace.
15. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Javier Echeñique

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In this paper I critically examine the key normative claim of the so-called ‘new Natural Law ethics’, namely, the claim that being alive, in the biological sense of the word, has an intrinsically valuable standing. This claim is at the basis of the absolute condemnation of all acts aiming at destroying such a good. After explaining the meaning of this fundamental normative claim, I engage in a dialectical argument between the suicidal person and the new Natural Law ethicists in order to show that, despite the reluctance of new Natural Law ethicists to argue in favour of the intrinsically valuable standing of life, such argument is absolutely necessary. Finally, I critically examine the arguments that have been adduced to support it and reject them.
16. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Björn Eriksson

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This paper approaches the old question of what, if anything, we should do with our moral practice if we believe that moral nihilism is true and that there are no objective moral facts. Four responses to nihilism are discussed: abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism and propagandism. They are all found to have their respective problems. Most of these problems stem from the complexity and variability of our actual moral practices which are curiously overlooked in previous discussions of this issue. These problems, however, point towards a solution. By combining some of the elements from the four discussed views, a fifth response to nihilism, that retains their virtues without their drawbacks, is proposed. This response I call ‘negotiationism’ and I defend it as the hitherto best answer to the question of how to deal with our moral practice in case we think nihilism is true.
17. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Jesus Adrian Escudero

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The secret of Being and Time and of its constant cultural and philosophical presence lies in its unusual hermeneutical richness. It becomes, so to speak, a precise seismometer capable of detecting, with surprising accuracy, the slips and falls of the contemporary era, offering us an exact scan of the ethical and moral conscience of our time. Being and Time does not develop a philosophical theory among others, but rather it faces the challenge of thoroughly reflecting upon the dilemma that is constantly present in philosophy, namely the question of human being and its relation to being in general. From this point of view I would like to consider the possibility of reading this Heidegger’s fundamental work as an ethics of existence, that is, as a book that promotes a cultivation of the self.
18. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Lorenz Moises J. Festin

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Happiness is essentially an actualization [energeia], whereby a potentiality comes to be realized. Such a process of actualization is then viewed not simply as a means to an end but as instantiating the end itself. In this regard, the exercise of moral virtue may be viewed as forming part of what could be considered happiness. Consequently, a neat differentiation can hardly be made between what constitutes the means and what pertains to the end. As a moral virtue, friendship is an essential element of a happy life. “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.” [Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a 5-6] How essential is friendship in happiness? What role does it play in the experience and realization of human ultimate good? And in what way can friendship help us understand the nature of happiness? The paper first argues why it is essential to view eudaimonia as actualization. It then takes into account the nature of friendship, pointing out its parallelism with happiness. And it aims to explain how friendship, insofar as it is paradigmatic of eudaimonia, can clarify the Aristotelian notion of happiness.
19. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Edgard José Jorge Filho

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In the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason Kant claims to afford a proof of the objective reality of transcendental freedom, which can be found in the Analytic of this work. However, the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason had already established the impossibility of a legitimate theoretical proof of that reality. So, in this study I attempt to interpret the proof developed in the second Critique as a practical one. I consider, first, that this proof would not be a theoretical transcendental deduction. Then, I investigate what might be a practical proof, by means of inquiring into its conditions and their fulfillment. One of these conditions would require the reference of the Idea of freedom to an object not as a possible datum, but as a possible accomplishment of pure practical reason. A strong candidate for this object would be the feeling of respect for the law, whose origin is pure. Finally, I argue that the supposed practical proof of freedom is inconclusive.
20. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Scott Forschler

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A common strategy in ethical argumentation tries to derive ethical obligations from the rational necessity of not acting against certain “necessary” conditions for satisfying some good end. This strategy is very often fallacious, and works by equivocating over what counts as a “necessary” condition. Very often, what is counted as a necessary condition is not logically necessary for the end in question, but is at most related to it by affecting the probability of the end’s satisfaction. If other conditions affecting the probability of satisfying this (or similar) ends are then discounted as merely “instrumental” or “probabilistic” (in contrast to others imagined as being “necessary”), this strategy has the function of hypocritically privileging some of the arguer’s preferred values over others. We should instead recognize that nearly all conditions affecting the probability of satisfying some good end borrow some value from the value of the end, in proportion to how much they tend to affect its probability of satisfaction. The fallacy tends to support rigid deontological norms; once we abandon it, many arguments against consequentialism are revealed merely as special pleading. Many ethical arguments use this fallacy, but I focus here on its use by Immanuel Kant.