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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
John Earman, John T. Roberts

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2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Daniel M. Haybron

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The psychological condition of being happy is best understood as a matter of a person’s emotional condition. I elucidate the notion of an emotional condition by introducing two distinctions concerning affect, and argue that this “emotional state” view is probably superior on intuitive and substantive grounds to theories that identify happiness with pleasure or life satisfaction. Life satisfaction views, for example, appear to have deflationary consequences for happiness’ value. This would make happiness an unpromising candidate for the central element in a theory of well-being, as it is in L. W. Sumner’s work. Yet on an emotional state conception, happiness may prove to be a key constituent of well-being. The emotional state view also makes happiness less vulnerable to common doubts about the importance of happiness, and indicates that mood states are more important for well-being than is generally recognized.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Thomas M. Crisp, Donald P. Smith

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Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be better off if she could state her theory in terms accessible to all. We think she can. What is needed is a definition of ‘is wholly present at’ that all can understand. in this paper, we offer one.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Harvey Siegel

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In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over-emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust,that is educationally basic.
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Juan Comesaña

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In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge).
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Anthony Brueckner

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Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher

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book symposia

8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Hilary Kornblith

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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Alvin Goldman

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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Martin Kusch

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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
William J. Talbott

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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Hilary Kornblith

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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
David Wiggins

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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Uwe Meixner

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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
E. J. Lowe

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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
David Bakhurst

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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
David Wiggins

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review essay

18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Dennis McKerlie

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critical notices

19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Matthew McGrath

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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 71 > Issue: 2
Evan Fales

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