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Volume 25, Issue 2, Fall 2021
Rethinking Phenomenology with Edith Stein

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rethinking phenomenology with edith stein

1. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Antonio Calcagno

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2. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Angela Ales Bello, Antonio Calcagno

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This paper explores the question of the meaning of life, not only from the perspective of its temporal unfolding from birth to death but also from the perspective of its own particular meaning and its final cause, to use Aristotelian categories. In order to discuss this argument I refer myself to Edith Stein to show how crucial moments of her own life give rise to important and de􀏔ining philosophical positions that touch upon questions of personal identity, social and communal relations, and a relationship with God.
3. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Anna Maria Pezzella, Antonio Calcagno

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Edith Stein came to phenomenology after beginning her university studies in psychology. She struggled with the inability of psychology to justify and delineate its founding principles. She found in Edmund Husserl, though his sustained criticisms of psychologism, the possibility of a phenomenological ground for psychology. This article demonstrates how Stein, drawing from but also distancing herself from Husserl, justifies the possibility of a phenomenological psychology framed within a personalist structure of subjectivity and sociality.
4. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Daniele De Santis

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This paper presents a systematic discussion of Edith Stein’s critical understanding of Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism. After a brief explanation of the way in which, according to Stein, Husserl’s idealism should be framed, this paper offers an evaluation of her criticism with a special focus on her Introduction to Philosophy lectures of 1920. I argue that if, ultimately, Stein’s rejection of Husserl’s idealism in the text in question is deemed unsuccessful, we must examine the premises on which her own per-spective on the eidetics of nature is based.
5. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Sarah Borden Sharkey

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One striking feature of Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein’s exceedingly rare use of the term “metaphysics.” She uses the term “formal ontology” numerous times, but the term “metaphysics” only appears a handful of times in the body of the text, and even those references are themselves a bit surprising. This could be explained in several ways, some of which may be quite innocent and have nothing to do with whether she understands her project as metaphysical. In the following, however, I would like to explore a differing explanation and argue that (at least, in part) her reason for avoiding describing her work as metaphysical is connected with the type of philosophical critique she wants to make of traditional metaphysics. I will not argue that Finite and Eternal Being should ultimately be read as a phenomenological analysis of being rather than any sort of metaphysical treatise, but I will argue that Stein has explicitly phenomenological reasons for being cautious about using the term “metaphysics.”
6. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Nicoletta Ghigi, Antonio Calcagno

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This article seeks to advance a way of being in the world of the hu-man person that encompasses both the truest sense of freedom of choice and its result, namely, happiness. Starting from the proposal of a relational ethics in Stein I intend to show how, in the authentic relationship through Einfühlung, it is possible to arrive at the “revelation” of what is deeper in ourselves, i.e., the personal core that characterizes us as unique and unrepeatable entities. The growth and development of our personalities occurs coherently with who we are. But the “choice” to adhere to the authenticity of a deep self is a choice of freedom that also leads one to harmony, to the acceptance of one’s finitude and weaknesses, and thus to living well with who one “really” is. This result coincides with being happy.

regular articles/articles variés

7. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Kyle Novak

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Throughout much of his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: “we do not even know what a body can do.” The problem is closely associated with Deleuze’s parallelist reading of Spinoza and what he calls ethology. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which he intends to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze’s sugges-tion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of “thinking with AND” rather than “thinking for IS.” The argument is developed through Deleuze’s monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought.
8. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Thibault Tranchant

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L’un des gestes distinctifs de Cornelius Castoriadis fut de rapporter l’histoire de la philosophie à un concept de création « ex nihilo », qu’il définissait comme surgissement immotivé et irréductible de nouvelles déterminations formelles de l’être dans le temps. Cet article s’intéresse à la signification d’un tel parti pris pour l’instruction de la question cosmologique, entendue comme enquête sur les principes et le devenir de la totalité de l’être. L’auteur montre dans un premier temps comment Castoriadis a justifié sa position ontologique à partir d’une réflexion sur l’histoire de la science. Il la rapporte ensuite à deux voies possibles afin de résoudre la question cosmologique : la dialectique et la complexité. Il est soutenu que l’intention de Castoriadis ne fut pas de produire une cosmologie comme telle, mais de rapporter la pratique scientifique à la création et d’expliciter les conditions de possibilité de son intellection.
9. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Ioannis Trisokkas

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The article reflects on Heidegger’s “metaphysical” interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation is driven by two theses Heidegger holds: (1) that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s “system of science” and (2) that the Phenomenology is metaphysics. These two theses contrast with Houlgate’s “epistemological” interpretation, which claims that the Phenomenology is not a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science and that it is not metaphysics. The article shows that while Heidegger has an argument that establishes, contra Houlgate, his second thesis, this very argument has consequences that undermine his first.

rethinking phenomenology with edith stein

10. Symposium: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2

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