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1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Sharon Anderson-Gold

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In contrast with his major ethical works, Kant’s writings on history are replete with the theme of the social character of moral development and the interdependence of individual and community. I argue that historical-moral progress is an important part of Kant’s comprehensive ethical theory. However, in order to link the moral goals of humanity with the moral goals of individuals, judgement must have a dimension that can apprehend the purposiveness of those human achievements which are social in their significance and socially transmitted. In other words, such achievements transcend individual intention. The ‘historical signs’ of such moral purposiveness provide moral orientation through the conflicting claims that arise within and between complex and historically evolving human communities. I explore the role of disinterested judgement in providing this orientation and in marking the moral disposition of the species.

2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Antonio Trajano Arruda

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P. F. Strawson’s essay "Freedom and Resentment" was a landmark in the study of determinism, free-will, and morality. It contributed a much-needed correction to the problem of overintellectualization as found in twentieth-century compatibilist literature. Although most of the central claims in Strawson’s essay are important and true, it fails to fill the lacuna in the analysis, discussion and proposals of traditional compatibilism. The reasons may be summarized as follows. The web of moral demands, feelings and participant attitudes comprises a set of facts within human social life which must be investigated in order to understand the relation (or lack thereof) between determinism and morality. If the facts themselves fill the gap, then it must be some adequate and coherent understanding of them. According to Strawson, the incompatibilist has an understandable dissatisfaction with his opponent’s account because, among other things, the latter fails to deal with the condition of desert and of the justice of moral condemnation and punishment. However, the theory of "Freedom and Resentment" fails equally on this point. What is now needed is a combination of factual study with ethical inquiry. The former would draw on the results of social psychology, the psychology of moral development, the social sciences of morals, and (philosophical) moral psychology.

3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Jeffrey W. Bulger

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This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole. The first part of this paper defines the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium mode. It briefly explains how it is a combination of both the theory model of moral decision-making and the intuition model of moral decision-making. The second part of this paper defines mid-level principles and explains how they are a natural development of the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium method. It will then be shown that both Mill and Kant used this method in their own moral theories. Lastly, it will be shown how "weighing and balancing" and "specification" are integral components in this model and were also practiced by Mill and Kant in their moral systems.

4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Michael Byron

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Consider the paradox of altruism: the existence of truly altruistic behaviors is difficult to reconcile with evolutionary theory if natural selection operates only on individuals, since in that case individuals should be unwilling to sacrifice their own fitness for the sake of others. Evolutionists have frequently turned to the hypothesis of group selection to explain the existence of altruism; but group selection cannot explain the evolution of morality, since morality is a one-group phenomenon and group selection is a many-group phenomenon. After spelling out just what the problem is, this paper discusses several ways of solving it.

5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Philip Cafaro

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There are two basic types of ethical judgments: deontological judgements that focus on focus on duty and obligation and eudaimonist judgements that focus on human excellence and the nature of the good life. I contend that we must carefully distinguish these two types of judgement and not try to understand one as a special case of the other. Ethical theories may be usefully divided into two main kinds, deontological or eudaimonist, on the basis of whether they take one of the other of these types of judgement as primary. A second important contention, which this paper supports but does not attempt to justify fully, is that neither type of theory trumps the other, nor should we subsume them under some more encompassing ethical synthesis.

6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Angela Calvo de Saavedra

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La investigación moral emprendida por Hume se inscribe en el proyecto de abordar filosóficamente la naturaleza humana-"la capital"-de manera experimental, realizando una geografía mental a partir de la observación atenta y delicada de la vida humana como aparece en sus diarias ocupaciones, interacciones y placeres. Se trata de disponer de manera ordenada las fuerzas y la extensión del entendimiento, las pasiones, el gusto y el sentimiento. El ánimo que lo impulsa es doble: instruir a la humanidad, reduciendo así el poder del dogmatismo y la superstición, y poner en movimiento la sensibilidad favorable a la virtud y condición de la felicidad.

7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Patricia Moya Canas

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En este artículo se explica el papel educador de la sociedad en la adquisición de la virtud desde la perspectiva aristotélica, teniendo en cuenta el análisis que realiza sobre estos temas Gadamer en sus obras Verdad y Método I y II. Este autor destaca la peculiaridad de la razón práctica que, a diferencia del modo de operar de la ciencia teórica, tiene como objeto el hecho fáctico. En el trabajo se analizan, en primer lugar, los aspectos en los que la ética aristotélica constituye un aporte para el problema hermenéutico, particularmente en el caso de la aplicación, pues la ética pone de relieve la tensión entre lo general y lo particular y hace necesaria la aplicación de la ley a la situación concreta, lo cual constituye en cierto modo una corrección de la ley. Junto con esto se afirma la necesidad de comprender esta racionalidad práctica dentro de un contexto de ideal de vida, que supone un análisis teórico de lo que es el bien del hombre. El examen del capítulo 9 del libro X de la Etica a Nicómaco sugiere interesantes indicaciones acerca de la educación de la virtud que no se pueden llevar a cabo sino a partir de un sustrato virtuoso, pues el hombre que no practica la virtud, sólo podrá vivirla por la coerción de la ley, pero sin conseguir de este modo el verdadero hábito por el que no sólo practica la virtud, sino que ésta constituye en el sujeto como una segunda naturaleza. Sólo se consigue mover a la práctica de la virtud cuando ya existe una inclinación favorable a ésta la cual se consigue fundamentalmente por la educación y por el papel de la ley que dispone favorablemente al hábito por medio de la costumbre.

8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
M. Y. Chew

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The realist dispute in ethics has wide implications for moral ontology, epistemology, and semantics. Common opinion holds that this debate goes to the heart of the phenomenology of moral values and affects the way in which we understand the nature of moral value, moral disagreement, and moral reflection. But it has not been clearly demonstrated what is involved in moral realist theory. I provide a framework which distinguishes three different versions of the theory while at the same time showing the interrelations between them. I also demonstrate how issues such as objectivity, cognitivism, and truth can be related into the discussion by means of this framework.

9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Jacqueline Chin

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In reading the Republic, there is no reason to search for arguments which show that Platonic justice ('inner justice' or 'psychic harmony') entails ordinary justice. The relationship between inner justice and ordinary justice is of no importance in Plato's Republic. We note that Plato tries to argue from the very first book that the true source of normativity lies in knowledge attained by philosophical reason. What is crucial, then, is the relationship between inner justice and acts which brings about a just polis.

10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Vladimir N. Dubrovsky

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The universe as a whole can be shown to consist of two worlds: the real world and the transcendental world. The real world is a multitude of passing things in a gravitational field: it is the world of nature, every unit of which is born (from the transcendental world), develops, degrades and dies (that is, it returns to the transcendental world). The transcendental world is the world of the integrated, nonpassing, unborn and undying, internally functioning Unity, which is the other side of the real world (so to speak) as roots to a tree and its branches in relation to the surface of the Earth. The fundamental science of the real world is theoretical physics. The transcendental world is also a 'physical' but energyless world. In this paper, I outline characteristics of the real world, and the basic characteristics of the transcendental world which are essential for constructing a theory about the functioning of the cosmological vacuum.

11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Graciela Fernández

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Did Kant fail in his attempt to give a transcendental foundation to ethics? In this paper, I maintain that historically considered, Kant never attempted such a thing. But at the same time, I argue that transcendental philosophy plays an important role in the growth of moral knowledge. Beyond the founding aspect, transcendental philosophy has made (and probably will make) discoveries on moral matters. But, it is important for the old and the new transcendental philosophy to (1) recognize its own basic theories, and (2) limit its foundational claims.

12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Karen Gloy

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Nach einer heute weit verbreiteten Auffassung besteht zwischen Sein und Sollen, deskriptien und normativen Aussagen, Theorie und Praxis eine Interdependenz. Man hegt die Meinung, daß die vorstellung, die wir uns von der Welt machen, das Bild von der Nature, der Gesellschaft oder von welchem Bereich immer, bestimmte Handlungsintentionen aufweist, d.h. bestimmte Verhaltensweisen veranlaßt und urgiert, während sie andere zurückweist, ablehnt, verhindert. Ein bestimmtes theoretisches Rahmenwerk enthält Anreize und Motivationen für bestimmte Handlungen, wie es Hemmschwellen für andere Verhaltensweisen aufbaut. Es enthält einen Kodex erwünschter und erlaubter sowie gerade noch geduldeter Handlungen wie auch untersagter, die einem anderen, alternativen Rahmenwerk angehören. Da deskriptive und normative Aussagen Hand in Hand gehen, lassen auch umgekehrt bestimmte Verhaltens- und Handlungsdispositionen auf den dahinter stehenden, leitenden Vorstellungsrahmen schließen. Denkbar ist folgende Alternative: Entweder gibt die vorgegebene Natur- und Seinsordnung das Vorbild, die Richtschnur und den Maßstab für unser Handeln ab, so daß sich das Handeln der Nature anpassen, nach- und Mitvollzug der natürlichen Ordnung sein muß, oder das menschliche Subjekt legt die Bedingungen und Normen für das Verhalten gegenüber der Natur fest, so daß umgekehrt die Natur sich nach diesen Bedingungen richten muß und Handeln zum Konstruieren der Natur wird.

13. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Irwin Goldstein

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Ethical antirealists believe the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, do not signify properties that objects and actions have or might have. They believe that when a person calls pain or any other event ‘bad’ and adultery or any other action ‘wrong’, he does not report some fact about that object or action. J. L. Mackie defends ethical anti-realism in part by appealing to an ontological queerness he believes value properties would have if they existed. "If there were objective values," Mackie writes, "they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe." Goodness would have a queer magnetic power. "Something's being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it," Mackie says. If there were a property of the sort we conceive of good as being, it would be a queer property—one we cannot reasonably believe exists, Mackie argues.

14. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Christopher W. Gowans

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I argue that persons are unlikely to have moral knowledge insofar as they lack certain moral virtues; that persons are commonly deficient in these virtues, and hence that they are regularly unlikely to have adequate moral knowledge. I propose a version of this argument that employs a broad conception of self-worth, a virtue found in a wide range of moral traditions that suppose a person would have an appropriate sense of self-worth in the face of tendencies both to overestimate and underestimate the value of one’s self. I begin by noting some distinctive features of this argument that distinguish it from more common arguments for moral skepticism. This is followed by an elucidation of the virtue of self-worth. I then consider some connections between self-worth and moral knowledge and, more briefly, the extent of self-worth among persons. Finally, I respond to the objection that the argument is incoherent because it presupposes moral knowledge that it later undermines.

15. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Norman Haughness

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According to the views expressed in this paper, influences unrelated to the conclusions of Immanuel Kant and G. E. Moore respecting what they saw as the appropriate foundation for moral systems seems to have been at work in the reactions of both to the earlier criticisms of David Hume. Building on a "recent meeting" with Hume in a pub on Princes Street in Edinburgh, I develop the suggestion that both Kant and Moore were loyal to traditional notions of an intuited, non-prudential basis for ethical injunctions. Kant, by his insistence that any morality linked only to hypothetical imperatives cannot be truly "moral," and Moore by his refusal to see the emptiness of his posited "good as simply good" which he felt must be kept free of any corrupting reference to real-world prudential constituents, thus support the foundation of ethical systems in an inner, unanalyzable moral impulse. And they do so in obedience to commitments that antedate their moral philosophies. I also claim that Hume has been misunderstood in that he did not mean to oppose the naturalistic grounding of moral systems in his famous statement disjoining is-statements from ought-statements; what he really intended was to point out the illogic of moralists who improperly pretend to derive categorical or intuited moral imperatives from real-world is-statements while denying any prudentiality or a posteriority to the transaction. Because both maintain that this simple inner moral impulse must be independent of prudential considerations in making moral decisions and judgments, Kant and Moore oppose naturalistic ethical systems which, like J.S. Mill's, suggest that this-worldly welfare and happiness are in large part coexistent with the true meaning of morality. Their position, therefore, places both of these proponents of intuitionist metaethics at odds with the principle of political social democrats that a respectable moral system must place worldly satisfactions and happiness above obedience to any putative "higher" moral law and its intuited imperatives.

16. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Raymond M. Herbenick

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Philosophers since antiquity have argued the merits of mathematics as a normative aid in ethical decision-making and of the mathematization of ethics a theoretical discipline. Recently, Anagnostopoulos, Annas, Broadie and Hutchinson have probed such issues said to be of interest to Aristotle. Despite their studies, the sense in which Aristotle either opposed or proposed a mathematical ethics in subject-matter and method remains unclear. This paper attempts to clarify the matter. It shows Aristotle’s matrix of exactness and inexactness for ethical subject-matter and ethical method in the Nicomachean Ethics. Then it probes a resultant puzzle from the matrix, namely, the HL model of the happy life without consideration of mathematical justice (Bk. III) and the HJL model of the happy life with such consideration (Bk. V). Finally, it examines Aristotle’s twofold rationale for differentiating these two models in his overall moral feedback loop system: differences in the intellectual virtue of good deliberation; the priority of friendship over justice for the happy life. This suggests Aristotle saw no objection either to using mathematics as an aid to ethical decision-making for a happy life, or to mathematizing at least some parts of an ethical theory of eudaimonism.

17. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Patrick Paul Kain

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Some hold that Kant’s conception of autonomy requires the rejection of moral realism in favor of "moral constructivism." However, commentary on a little noticed passage in the Metaphysics of Morals (with the assistance of Kant’s Lectures and Reflexionen) reveals that the conception of legislation at the core of Kant’s conception of autonomy represents a decidedly anti-constructivist strand in his moral philosophy.

18. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Christian H. Krijnen

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In what follows, I evaluate whether so-called evolutionary ethics is able to answer basic ethical questions. I argue that it cannot on the basis of its methodological structure. The philosophical notion of validity confronts evolutionary ethics with unresolvable difficulties. My criticisms derive from the modern idealistic transcendental tradition of philosophy-a tradition which many evolutionary philosophers themselves criticize.

19. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
John W. Lango

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Is Kant’s "Formula of the End in Itself" overly demanding? In addressing this question, I sketch a conception of co-obligation, that is, a sort of moral requirement that holds, not of persons distributively, but of persons collectively. I then raise a problem of devolution: How does a co-obligation for all persons devolve upon me? For instance, given that we must maximize happiness, it does not seem to follow that I must always act so as to maximize happiness. In partial answer to this problem, I claim that some Kantian duties do stem from co-obligations. But this claim has as a crucial assumption the following conjecture: The "Formula of the End in Itself" is to be read as implying that we must treat each person as an end and not simply as a means.

20. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

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It has been claimed that decisions concerning scientific research topics and the publication of research results are purely methodological, and that any moral considerations refer only to research methods and uses of acquired knowledge. The arguments advanced in favor of this view appeal to the moral neutrality of scientific knowledge and the intrinsic value of truth. I argue that neither is valid. Moreover, I show three cases where a scientist’s decision to begin research clearly bears moral relevance: (1) when starting an inquiry would create circumstances threatening some non-cognitive values; (2) when achieving a certain piece of knowledge would threaten the existence of the individual’s private sphere; and (3) when there are reasons to think that humankind is not prepared to accumulate some knowledge. These cases do not prove the existence of some intrinsically ‘morally forbidden topics,’ but show that the moral permissibility of any given inquiry is not a priori guaranteed but needs to be judged in the same way that its methodological soundness is judged. Judgments concerning research topics have both methodological and moral aspects and these two cannot be separated under the threat of distorting science. Making such judgments requires knowledge not only of scientific methodology, but also of its social and philosophical implications. Philosophy is necessary in order to do good science.