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1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Fahmina Ahmed

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The rapid rate of population growth in the last half of the present century causes anxiety about the future of humanity because the amount of resources needed to satisfy basic necessities is extremely large. Correspondingly, the satisfaction of basic needs cannot be the sole criterion of the good life. Human beings have a right to live a life composed of things that make life go best. The case of Bangladesh shows that the majority of people live a life barely worth living, a life morally undesirable. One major reason is the rapid increase in population. Bangladesh covers an area slightly less than that of the state of Illinois, but has a population that is roughly half of the total population of the United States. The quality of life is inexorably linked to population growth. Further, human welfare and the quality of life are closely linked to the availability of resources. Rapid increases in population growth reduces resource availability and often degrades the environment. At some point, regulation is needed to limit population growth in Bangladesh in order to maximize opportunities for living worthwhile lives both by present as well as future generations. I develop a moral viewpoint that justifies population control in Bangladesh.

2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
William W. Clohesy

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The marketplace as an institution enjoys widespread popularity today. Many economists hold that most of society’s problems could be best solved by applying the market mechanism to them. Government, by contrast, is widely considered to be a problem rather than a solution. Some would like to see the government restructured along market lines so that policies would follow voter choice, as products follow that of consumers. Some, myself included, believe that a world in which all relationships are rendered matters of private choice would lack the "public happiness" that comes from participation in public discourse and concerted action. In this paper I address what it would mean for the market to be truly public. A market that is truly public will discourage speculative investment so that managers of various firms can concentrate on the long term good of creating a social institution through which the concerted efforts of various stakeholders are coordinated. In this way, stakeholders can enrich the world through their work.

3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
David Crocker

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I discuss the nature and genesis of international development ethics as well as its current areas of consensus, controversies, challenges, and agenda. A relatively new field of applied ethics, international development ethics is ethical reflection on the ends and means of socioeconomic change in poor countries and regions. It has several sources: criticism of colonialism and post-World War II developmental strategies; Denis Goulet's writings; Anglo-American philosophical debates about the ethics of famine relief; and Paul Streeten's and Amartya Sen's approaches to development. Development ethicists agree that the moral dimension of development theory and practice is just as important as the scientific and policy components. What is often called "development" (e.g., economic growth) may be bad for people, communities, and the environment. Hence, the process of development should be reconceived as beneficial change, usually specified as alleviating human misery and environmental degradation in poor countries.

4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Dan Egonsson

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In this paper I will defend a kind of human-centered perspective regarding ethical questions wherein the interests of humans and nonhumans alike are involved. Compared to other species, however, the idea that there is something special about being human is commonly vague. For example, it is unclear whether the thought is (1) being a human being is important in itself, or (2) it is important to be like a human being — that is, to have the capacities which a normal adult human being enjoys. I build my defense of human dignity on the claim that we regard a biological human being as a being of intrinsic importance, which is what (1) is about. However, I also consider the ethical implications of (2), which concerns the moral significance of personhood. I argue that the idea of a special intrinsic value of being a human is applicable only to cases where we deal with nonpersons. I claim that in spite of this qualification, we might defend a substantial principle of human dignity founded upon this generalization.

5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Frank Fair

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Recently, unrestrained consequentialism has been defended against the charge that it leads to unacceptable trade-offs by showing a tradeoff accepted by many of us is not justified by any of the usual nonconsequenlist arguments. The particular trade-off involves raising the speed limit on the Interstate Highway System. As a society, we seemingly accept a trade-off of lives for convenience. This defense of consequentialism may be a tu quoque, but it does challenge nonconsequentialists to adequately justify a multitude of social decisions. Work by the deontologist Frances Kamm, conjoined with a perspective deployed by several economists on the relation between social costs and lives lost, is relevant. It provides a starting point by justifying decisions which involve trading lives only for other lives. But the perspective also recognizes that using resources in excess of some figure (perhaps as low as $7.5 million) to save a life causes us to forego other live-saving activities, thus causing a net loss of life. Setting a speed limit as low as 35 miles per hour might indeed save some lives, but the loss of productivity due to the increased time spent in travel would cost an even greater number of lives. Therefore, many trade-offs do not simply involve trading lives for some lesser value (e.g., convenience), but are justified as allowing some to die in order to save a greater number.

6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Christopher B. Gray

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Aristotle centers the citizen’s education (paideia) on leisure (schole). Its features, especially of play (paidia), are evoked to remedy deficiencies in three contemporary philosophies of leisure: classical, critical and communitarian.

7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Carlos Kohn W.

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I criticize the liberal foundations of democracy on two counts: (1) the impossible defense of a "neutral" model of the state; and (2) the individualist foundation of its moral and political philosophy. I suggest as well that political liberalism reduces the emancipatory chances of the democratic project by pursuing the goal of Hobbes. Leviathan-that is, by seeking to establish a well-ordered society that endorses an overlapping consensus favoring the ruling classes. The guiding dictum of the "demoliberal" theory seems to be-to paraphrase Adam Smith and Hegel-the invisible hand which regulates the market is the cunning reason of democracy, or, the key of its governability. Are we approaching the end of history as longed for by Fukuyama? I will analyze the premises which sustain his thesis.

8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Louis Logister

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The problems that face contemporary applied ethics are indissolubly related to some characteristics of postmodern civil society. In this paper I will try to take a stand in the discussion between a proponent of a particularistic approach and one who favors a universalistic approach to the present difficulties that accompany human action. Karl-Otto Apel combines in his ethics of discourse a focus upon universal and normative structures of communication with a Kantian transcendental method of thought. Paul van Tongeren follows Aristotle and Nietzsche in arguing that the local and historically determined contingent traditions are the basis on which to approach our ethical questions. After giving a brief presentation of their respective contributions to the discussion, I shall end with some reflections on the difference between, and the merits and demerits of, a universalistic and a particularistic ethics.

9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
John Ozolins

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In this paper, I argue that if the debate about the morality of surrogacy is couched in terms of respect due to other human beings and the paramount importance of their intimate relationships with one another, then it may be shown that most ordinary instances of surrogacy are morally wrong. Human flourishing cannot be separated from one’s relationships with others and any circumstance which is destructive of such relationships must be considered immoral. The surrogate, unless she is treated as an object or merely as a means to an end, is intimately involved in the relationships between the child and its putative parents and important relationships become ambiguous and so harmed. Furthermore, if this view if rejected, then the feminist argument that surrogacy always involves the exploitation of the surrogate renders it immoral.

10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Walter Pfannkuche

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Der Aufsatz fragt danach, ob in den modernen und von Arbeitslosigkeit geplagten Industrienationen die Einführung eines Rechts auf Arbeit moralisch gefordert ist. Zuerst wird ein Modell moralischer Argumentation verteidigt, das von vielen gegenwärtigen Moralphilosophen geteilt werden kann. Die Grundidee dieses Modells besteht darin, das Wohl aller durch Rollentausch und Unparteilichkeit gleich zu berücksichtigen. Dann wird untersucht, wie aus der so konstituierten moralischen Perspektive eine Modell der marktnahen Umverteilung von Arbeit zu bewerten ist. Die wichtigsten Komponenten diese Modells sind: A) Es gibt ein individuell einforderbares Recht auf Arbeit. B) Dieses wird durch die Umverteilung der wirtschaftlich nachgefragten Arbeit gewährleistet. C) Dem Recht auf Arbeit korrespondiert eine Pflicht zur Teilnahme am System der wechselseitig nützlichen Arbeiten. Abschliebend werden drei mögliche negative Konsequenzen diese Modells diskutiert: Die Auswirkung auf die Vertragsfreiheit, auf das Eigentumsrecht und auf die Effektivität des Wirtschaftssystems und damit auf den allgemeinen Lebenstandard. Die These ist, dab es nach Abwägung aller Gesichtspunkte rational und moralisch geboten ist, ein so definiertes Recht auf Arbeit zu establieren.

11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Frits Schipper

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This article aims to give an analysis of the concept of efficiency. The importance of such an analysis lies in the fact that the role which efficiency plays in different sectors of our society leads to opposite evaluations resulting in a clash of opinions concerning this role. In order to clarify this situation, I first trace the historical roots of the concept. This brief historical reconnaissance shows that ‘efficiency’ is not a unitary concept. Moreover, I also argue that our use of the concept of efficiency presupposes the decisions which we make with regard to the kinds of costs we recognize. Such decisions do not come out of the blue; they relate to the opposite evaluations of efficiency mentioned above. The decisions concerning what we consider to be costly determine in part the actual content of the concept of efficiency. I argue that this content must be in harmony with the meaning of the different practices in which we are engaged, otherwise this concept can easily lead us astray. Therefore, a proper use of the concept of efficiency demands a clear and reliable view of these meanings.

12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Roy Weatherford

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In this paper I present a moral argument against capital punishment that does not depend upon the claim that all killing is immoral. The argument is directed primarily against non-philosophers in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Oddly, the moral argument against capital punishment has not been effective in the United States despite the biblical injunction against killing. Religious supporters of the death penalty often invoke a presumed distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘murdering’ and avow that God forbade the latter but not the former. Self-defense and just wars are cited as cases of morally justified killing. Accepting these premises, I point out that when cases of justified killing in self-defense are altered to include an element of delay, disarming and premeditation, they too become murder. Since the death penalty clearly involves the elements of delay, disarming and premeditation, I conclude that the death penalty is murder in the biblical sense and ought to be abolished in any God-fearing (or otherwise moral) society.