Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-18 of 18 documents


articles

1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Witold Płotka Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary rather than opposite, and in the course of defending this claim enters into discussion with Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. It is asserted that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of the phenomenological method to be arrived at, one must take into consideration, especially, Husserl’s B III 10 manuscripts. By referring to these, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both approaches to inquiry. Moreover, he claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method stems from Husserl’s inquiries into the concept of consciousness, as defined in Ideas I.
2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Guilhem Causse Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The transmission of the craft and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder have in common that they involve a relationship of act to act between the master and the apprentice on the one hand, and between the therapist and the patient on the other. Phenomenology has from the outset considered movement as inherent to the flesh: Hardy thus hypothesises that the origin of the flesh is a gesture. For all that, his description remains largely dependent on a flesh that is primarily perceptive: this gesture can thus be qualified as an aesthetic gesture. But if the flesh is as much mobile as it is perceptive, would there not be another gesture that generates the flesh in movement that is not linked to perception? Housset takes a step in this direction and allows us to hypothesize the kinesic gesture which, alone, allows us to account for the two experiences mentioned above.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Adriana Warmbier Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper considers the problem of various different forms of pre-cognitive affective appraisal and their role in the process of gaining self-knowledge. According to the phenomenological approach, if we are to understand our inner states (our emotional experiences), these cannot be extracted from the context within which they arise. Emotions not only refer to the inner states of the subject, but also to the outer world to which they are a form of response. Brentano, Husserl and Scheler claimed that emotions are directed towards values. It is to this essential feature of emotional experience that I would like to turn. I shall therefore re-examine Sartre’s views concerning affectivity (i.e. the capacity to reveal evaluatively significant qualities of one’s environment), as well as the dual-aspect theory of (reflective and non-reflective) consciousness. The main argument of this paper is that a plausible account of the essential role of affectivity in the emotions may be provided on the basis of a phenomenological theory of pre-reflective consciousness and its relation to reflexivity. I will focus on three different claims about pre-reflective (affective) consciousness. According to the first of these, a large part of cognition is of a prelinguistic (pre-reflective) nature; I argue that the evaluative content of emotion is not only conceptually determined, but may also take a non-conceptual form (as affective appraisal). The second claim refers to the notion of affect, which ought to be distinguished from (unintentional) bodily sensations. The third conceives of the relation between pre-reflective (affective) consciousness and reflective consciousness (propositional attitudes) as normative (rather than causal). I aim to demonstrate that a plausible view of emotional affectivity must appeal to a phenomenological account of the pre-reflective aspect of consciousness.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Jarosław Jakubowski Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article starts with the hypothesis that the measure of first-person experience of initiative is not, as it has been customary to believe, the present moment. Jean Nabert’s philosophy (and especially his early work titled L’expérience intérieure de la liberté) provides tools that make it clear that the sense of initiating action that one has in the present moment carries the stigma of illusoriness. If I experience initiative in the present moment, it means that I have taken part in an activity initiated before. Therefore, even though the very moment of initiating action remains unavailable to me, the measure of initiative experience should be sought not in the present but in the past. To this end, one needs to consider the genesis of motives propelling my action. In line with Nabert’s conception, these motives—manifesting themselves as some kind of representations—are grounded in actions that I have not completed. However, the fact that the initiative I demonstrate is conditioned by these unfinished actions does not imply that my actions so far make up, by definition, a harmonious arrangement. Nevertheless, all these actions coalesce in one history, embracing my “desire to be” that constitutes my existence.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Szczepan Urbaniak Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, we analyse the relation of philosophy and theology in the work of Jean-Luc Marion in order to be able to see not only how the phenomenology of givenness can serve as a “new apologetics” for theology, but also how Marion’s phenomenology itself, in its historical development and in its core principle and method, is influenced and changed by theological phenomena. We present three ways of describing the relation, tension, mutual influence and separation of philosophy and theology: firstly, in line with Pascal’s distinction between the orders of reason and of the heart; secondly, in phenomenology, in terms of indications to the effect that there can be a phenomenon of revelation in the mode of possibility that is distinguished from the phenomenon of Revelation in theology in the mode of historicity; and thirdly, by analogy with Christian apologetics. In particular, we analyse this third dimension, putting forward the thesis that Marion’s phenomenology itself has some characteristics of the Christian apologetics he describes. We try to demonstrate this interpretation of his phenomenology in its key dimensions, such as the counter-method and descriptions of the phenomena of love and revelation, which constitute the culmination of the phenomenology of givenness, although at the same time, as it were, its limit, crossing over into the theological order.
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Kozak Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity?

articles on other subjects

7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Wojciech Szczerba Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article analyzes the notion of apokatastasis, first as it appears in the Greek philosophical tradition and then in the context of Christian thought. It shows how the cosmic theory of eternal return unfolded within early currents of Hellenic philosophy, and subsequently how the personal dimension of apokatastasis grew out of those traditions, where questions about the fate of humanity became primary. The article then points to the fundamental philosophical assumptions of apokatastasis in its cosmic and personal forms. Christian thought, in the process of its evolution, made significant use of Greek methodology and concepts. One of the theories transferred to the Christian context concerned the notion of universal salvation (apokatastasis). Such thinkers as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and John Scotus Eriugena developed the concept into its mature form. Although apokatastasis has been condemned on numerous occasions, it has survived in Christian teaching. From a secular perspective, it can be regarded as a symbol of the equity of all people, beckoning us in the direction of the notion of religious inclusion. As such, it ought to be construed as translating into respect and care for the other person sic et nunc.
8. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Alicja Pietras Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Hans Wagner (1917–2000), using the achievements of German transcendental philosophy, gives a transcendental argument for the idea of human dignity. He claims that to ground the validity of human thinking and all its products (e.g. culture), we must accept the validity of the idea of human dignity. The structure of my paper is as follows: First, I consider what it means to give a transcendental justification of something. I reconstruct the neo-Kantian’s understanding of transcendental method. Then I argue that Wagner’s idea of human dignity as a foundation of every ethics and law is nothing other than a fruitful interpretation and continuation, perhaps only making explicit Kant’s main ethical ideas. To make this more clear I present the relation between Kant’s ethics and the material ethics of values and, following Wagner, I argue that grounding ethics on the idea of self-determination of human will does not necessarily lead to formalism in the form in which it was criticised by the representatives of the material ethics of values. Finally, I reconstruct Wagner’s argument for the claim that the idea of human dignity is a transcendental condition for the possibility of ethics and law in general.

book reviews

9. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2
Marta Ples-Bęben Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

10. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

11. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

articles

12. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Józef Bremer, Orcid-ID Mariusz Flasiński Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper we discuss the views on the Turing test of four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John Searle. Based on various beliefs about philosophical and/or linguistic matters, they arrive at different assessments of both the significance and suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and AI models. Nevertheless, they share a rejection of the idea that one can treat Turing test as a test for “machine thinking.” This seems to stem from a concern for the proper use of language—one that is a fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.
13. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Babalola Joseph Balogun Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Christopher Peacocke’s Interlocking Account offers an example of the identity-based strategy for resolving the conceptual problem of other minds. According to the Identity Model, the sameness of meaning of a mental concept across inter-subjective domains is guaranteed by the sameness of the mental states to which the concept refers. Hence, for example, the meaning of the concept “pain” is fixed by the sameness of the sensation of pain to which the concept refers across inter-subjective fields. As an instance of this model, the Interlocking Account draws its most fundamental strength from the claim that human beings are similar in so far as they are carriers of conscious mental states, and that similar mental concepts have similar mental contents across individuals. The implication of this is that when similar mental concepts are used to describe contents of experience by different persons, the meanings of the concepts used are fixed by the similarity of the contents of experience to which the concepts refer. This paper argues that this identity-based strategy fails for three main reasons: (1) the identity relation it purports to establish between one’s own case and those of others is difficult to achieve; (2) the sense in which the relation of one's mind and those of others exhibits that identity is not clear; and (3) it is an argument by analogy in disguise.
14. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Kingsley Mbamara Sabastine Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The concept of Christian Philosophy is not new in the history of philosophy. However, since the mid-twentieth century the idea of Christian Philosophy gained momentum and has become an object of explicit discussion among philosophers. The historical circumstances leading to its emergence as a distinct type of philosophy are not here discussed, and the existence of Christian Philosophy with a distinct content and purpose that sets it apart from other philosophies is here presupposed. Instead, the paper focuses on the concept and methods of practising Christian Philosophy with specific reference to the methodology developed by Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986). The paper argues for the suitability of his method of philosophising within the context of Christian Philosophy. Kamiński proposes a unique style that is strictly philosophical but also Christian. This methodology was based on the classical theory of being which fulfils the demand for the autonomy of philosophy but in relationship to faith. Kamiński’s doctrinal standpoints in philosophy are rational, objective, and universal. But is also most friendly and compatible with the Christian faith. In this sense, one can speak of his Christian philosophy and the suitability of his methodology for the practice of Christian philosophy.
15. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Wojciech Szczerba Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The article refers to the issue of freedom from a philosophical perspective. First of all, it discusses Plato’s metaphor of the cave in Politeia, in which the philosopher writes of freedom in its individual and collective forms. Then the article indicates how the metaphor was read by such contemporary philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, who interpret Plato’s metaphor from existential-phenomenological and political perspectives. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. A person, who experienced the truth as un-concealment, is not enslaved anymore to the impersonality of the crowd. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of freedom is shown in his care for others, even if it means risking one’s life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right forcefully to pull them out of the cavern? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? In this way Arendt refers to the concept of freedom, as it is sketched in Plato’s cave. At the same time, she argues with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic metaphor.
16. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Piotr Duchliński, Orcid-ID Piotr Stanisław Mazur Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The aim of this article is to outline the concept of transcendentalising reduction and demonstrate its role in Thomistic metaphysics. The proposed analysis puts forward an adaptive interpretation involving the application of phenomenological thinking, based on a reduction to Thomistic metaphysics via the notion of epoché. This is used to present the structure of the transcendentalising reduction, in which the epoché takes several different forms. Consistently applied, such a reduction can be expected to lead to a neutralised concept of being as the subject of metaphysics, expressed in the formula “being as being.” In conclusion, we note that the proposed interpretation opens the door to further research, in which phenomenology could be applied in the context of metaphysical studies to a greater extent than has been the case to date.

book reviews

17. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1
Kamila Drapało Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by

18. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 27 > Issue: 1

view |  rights & permissions | cited by