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論 著 / articles

1. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2021 > Issue: 61
Jerry J. Yang
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Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, the argument from reporting and expressing, and the argument of the individuation of mental states. I suggest that the content of a mental state can be considered to be an information space, which will allow for an explanation of consciousness. My rejection of Rosenthal's position relies on distinguishing two different forms of intrinsicalism: with and without self-representation. We shall find that both versions have explanatory traction from a naturalistic perspective.
2. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2021 > Issue: 61
Chi Yen Liu
Two Criteria of Reasonable Inferences
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3. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2021 > Issue: 61
Tsung-Hsing Ho
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Some philosophers argue that pain is an object located in bodily parts because the locative form of pain report is permissible in English. To examine this argument, Liu and Klein recently argue that the linguistic argument cannot work because the locative form is impermissible in Mandarin. They are wrong, however. I demonstrate that the locative form in Mandarin is not only permissible but also common.