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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Stijn Bruers Orcid-ID

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Is animal farming permissible when animals would have a positive welfare? The happy animal farming problem represent the paradigmatic problem in population ethics, because its simple structure introduces the most important complications of population ethics. Three new population ethical theories that avoid the counter-intuitive repugnant and sadistic conclusions are discussed and applied to the animal farming problem. Breeding farm animals would not be permissible according to these theories, except under some rather unrealistic conditions, such as those farm animals being so happy that they themselves would prefer a continuation of animal farming. Given the fact that many people believe that most farm animals are not so happy and the fact that one can formulate reasonable population ethical theories that condemn happy animal farming, it can be concluded that it is better to avoid animal farming and the consumption of animal products in general.
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2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Dan Hooley

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This article considers the collective obligations humans have to wild animals. One proposal, put forward by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, argues that we should understand wild animals as living in sovereign communities, is argued against. A Sovereignty Model is a poor fit for the unique interests of wild animals and requires stretching this concept beyond recognition. Most crucially, however, it ignores and obscures ways that human states must work to prevent their own citizens from harming wild animals. Instead, it is argued that wild animals should be seen as living in Wild Animal Protectorates, a new political category, inspired by protected states that exist among human states. This framework for thinking about the relationship between human states and wild animals has advantages over a Sovereignty Model when it comes to issues of borders, political representation, and international protection.
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3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Sigurd Hverven

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This article examines the concepts of alienation and identification in the context of the Anthropocene. It is a common claim in environmental thinking that alienation from nature drives ecological destruction and that a part of the cure for such an unhealthy relationship to nature is to recover a sense of identification with nature. The article challenges this view, by arguing that in the Anthropocene identification with nature may not be solely good, alienation from nature may not be solely bad, and identification and alienation may not be mutually exclusive phenomena. This thesis is defended through a critique of Arne Næss’s view on identification and alienation, and by drawing and elaborating on Simon Hailwood’s study of alienation in environmental philosophy and Adorno’s critique of “identity-thinking.” It also considers a specific case, the so-called “Plastic Whale” that was stranded outside the coast of Norway in 2017.
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4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Simo Kyllönen Orcid-ID

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Current ecological threats, such as the sixth mass extinction or climate change, highlight the need to evaluate the moral implications of changing populations, both human and non-human. The paper sketches a non-anthropocentric and multispecies sufficientarian account of population ethics. After discussing several other options for multispecies population ethics, the paper proposes a two-level account of multispecies sufficientarianism, according to which the value of populations depend on two kinds of sufficientarian thresholds. First, there is a species-relativized individual-level threshold for what species-specific flourishing is for an organism. Second, there is a population-level threshold for a sufficiently viable population enough to support the species-specific flourishing of the current and future members of that population. The paper concludes by discussing some of the practical implications and concerns raised by the two-level account suggested.
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book reviews

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Tyler Cooper-Kolb, Allen A. Thompson

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6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Julia D. Gibson

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7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Ronald Sandler

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Valerie Soon

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Steven Vogel

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4

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12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Allen Thompson

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articles

13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Marion Hourdequin, Orcid-ID Allen Thompson

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14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Keje Boersma Orcid-ID

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In this article, I address and argue against the tendency to understand the anthropocene as inaugurating the end of nature. I conduct two key moves. First, by way of an engagement with the concept of anthropocene technology I explain how understanding the anthropocene as the end of nature prevents us from recognizing what the anthropocene is all about: interventionism. Secondly, I illustrate how a nondualist understanding of the human-nature relation allows us to recognize interventionism as the hallmark of the anthropocene without falling back into the hierarchical human-nature conceptions that underlie interventionism. A nondualist framework that conserves the human-nature distinction helps us in our ability to relate critically to contemporary science and technology in the anthropocene. I illustrate the conceptual narrative of the article through the specific case of gene drive technology development.
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15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Michael Aaron Lindquist

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This paper approaches the question of terraforming—the changing of extraterrestrial environments to be capable of harboring earth-based life—by arguing for a novel conception of moral status that accounts for extraterrestrial bodies like Mars. The paper begins by addressing pro-terraforming arguments offered by James S. J. Schwartz before offering the novel account of moral status. The account offered builds on and modifies Keekok Lee’s No External Teleology Thesis (NETT), while defending a proposed Non-Fungibility Thesis (NFT). The NETT is modified and defended with specific reference to Lee’s work on artifactuality and transgenic organisms. The NFT builds on work around objectification and irreplaceability, offering an account that recognizes the importance of bearers of value above and beyond the mere value they purportedly possess. Finally, the plausibility of the account is established by an overview of its applicability to other possible candidates for moral status.
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16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Anna Peterson

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In Thinking Like a Mall, Steven Vogel proposes an environmental philosophy “after nature,” meaning one that rejects the division of the world into wild and humanized spaces. This division is false because environments are always constructed by people, who are enmeshed in landscapes and ecological processes. The opposition between wild and humanized parallels the religious division between sacred and profane, according to Vogel. He believes this dualism is an inextricable part of religious worldviews and thus that environmental philosophy must reject religion. This understanding of religion echoes the work of many scholars of religion, who define religion in terms of an opposition between sacred and profane. However, this approach fails to take into account the many traditions that do not divide the world this way. In many cultures, the sacred is connected to the profane much as the natural and the human are intertwined in Vogel’s materialist philosophy. This entanglement is evident in ecological restoration, in which human actions help construct processes that ultimately transcend human intentions and control. I argue that this is a kind of transcendence, which points to a way in which religious language can help us think about a post-natural environmental philosophy.
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17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 3
Lars Samuelsson

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Many people who claim to genuinely care about nature still seem reluctant to ascribe intrinsic value to it. Environmentalists, nature friendly people in general, and even environmental activists, often hesitate at the idea that nature possesses value in its own right—value that is not reducible to its importance to human or other sentient beings. One crucial explanation of this reluctance is probably the thought that such value—at least when attached to nature—would be mysterious in one way or another, or at least very difficult to account for. In addition, Bryan Norton’s influential convergence hypothesis states that, from a practical point of view, it makes no or little difference whether we ascribe intrinsic value to nature, given the depth and variety of instrumental value it possesses. In this paper, I argue that people who genuinely care about nature cannot avoid ascribing intrinsic value (in a certain sense) to it, if they want to be able to consistently defend the kind of claims about protecting nature they arguably want to make, i.e., claims to the effect that we ought to protect for instance nature areas and species. The cost of denying intrinsic value in nature is the cost of giving up a crucial resource to philosophically defend such claims.
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18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Anna Deplazes-Zemp Orcid-ID

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The question of whether or not people are part of nature is relevant to discuss humans’ role on earth and their environmental responsibilities. This article introduces the perspectival account of the concept of ‘nature,’ which starts from the observation that we talk about the environment from a particular, human perspective. In this account, the term ‘nature’ is used to refer to those parts of and events in the environment we perceive as being shaped by typically human activities. Humans themselves are part of nature insofar as they participate in and are products of natural processes. Therefore, in this account, nature is not only the passive environment, but also something active and generative that does not operate human creativity, but rather and it in shaping our environment. According to the perspectival account, the ‘nature’ concept expresses a particular relationship between the human agent and the non-human environment, which can be the starting point for normative theory.
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19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Matthew Hall Orcid-ID

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Empathy, and its role in human-human and human-animal relationships, has been discussed at length in recent years. Empathy for plants has received little to no attention. In this essay I briefly examine existing theory about human-plant empathy, primarily Marder’s account of a projective empathy. I use contemporary scholarship by Dan Zahavi, as well as phenomenological accounts of empathy, to query this understanding of empathy and to lay the conceptual groundwork for developing an account of empathy for plants in line with Max Scheler’s embodied empathy. In doing so, I sketch an account of the basis for human-plant empathy, including the gestures and behaviors that an empathy for plants may pay particular heed to. The essay concludes by outlining how such an empathy for plants may be developed.
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20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth

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In this paper, an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity is developed in dialogue with the Norwegian environmentalist Arne Naess and the Japanese ethicist Watsuji Tetsurō. More specifically, Naess’s concept of Self-realization is supplemented and supported with Watsuji’s ethic of authenticity (本来性) and phenomenology of climate (風土). And the ecological potential of Watsuji’s thought is realized in relation to Naess’s ideas of human responsibility and symbiosis. After establishing an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity, the practical application of this concept is then demonstrated in relation to satoyama and the preservation of nature in Japan. Whilst the intended outcome is to develop an ecologically extended ethic of authenticity, a secondary aim is to illustrate the benefit and importance of cross-cultural dialogue to advance philosophical thought and understanding.
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