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commentaries

1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Susan V. H. Castro

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In his paper “Getting Sophisticated: In Favor of Hybrid Views of Skilled Action in Expertise,” Spencer Ivy (2023) argues effectively for what he calls a “sophisticated hybrid” view of expertise, driven by empirical considerations and argument from contemporary phenomenology and cognitive architecture. Here I raise three unfair objections which I think lead to some fair questions that may be productive for discussion and future work.
2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
John Montani

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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Christopher Scott Sevier

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In his paper, “Mersenne’s Principles of Song Creation,” Eric Wilkinson (2023) lists several aims he intends to establish. I will confine my comments to two areas only: First, on the reasons given for preferring Aquinas’s theory of the passions as the major influence on Mersenne to those of either Aristotle or Cicero, and Second, on its representation of Aquinas’s theory of the passions.
4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Luke Hillman

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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Christopher Martin

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Aristotle argues that the world is populated by real and distinct physical substances; Spinoza that there must and can only be one physical substance. Aristotle’s view carries considerably intuitive appeal, but Spinoza’s logic can, under the right interpretation, seem awfully convincing. Andrew Burnside (2023) helps us to explore what occurs when Aristotle’s unstoppable intuitive appeal meets Spinoza’s impeccable logic. Burnside’s project, as I understand it, has two aims: to show that Spinoza’s argument for one extended substance is a better account of physical reality than Aristotle’s arguments against an infinite body and, second, to support this claim by defending Yitzhak Melamed interpretation of Spinoza as genuinely dividing reality into substances and modes. I would like to press Burnside on the usefulness of comparing Aristotle and Spinoza with respect to an infinitely extended physical thing and then raise several question for his reading of Spinoza.
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Dan Larkin

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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Thomas Tuozzo

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8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Laura J. Mueller

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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez

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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Henry Jackman

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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Beth Seacord

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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Klaus Ladstaetter

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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Scott Aikin

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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Stefan Sencerz

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15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Tailer Ransom

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16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Justin Simpson

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17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Alastair Norcross

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18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Robyn Gaier

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19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Justin Bell

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20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 2
Rachael Yonek

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