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plenary session: ancient philosophy

1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Anne-Marie Schulz

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plenary commentaries

2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
R. Bensen Cain

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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr., Terrell Taylor

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articles

4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Robyn R. Gaier

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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Deborah K. Heikes

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“Ignorance” is receiving an increased amount of philosophical attention. The study of it even has its own name, “agnotology.” Some ignorance remains simply a case of not having enough information, but increasingly philosophers are recognizing a whole other type of ignorance, one that is socially constructed and often actively promoted. In the first section of this paper I examine perhaps the best known type of socially constructed ignorance, “white ignorance.” White ignorance reflects a lack of genuine understanding of the social realities of others and it creates injustice. In the second section of the paper, I consider what it means to “genuinely understand,” arguing that when it comes to issues of justice those with epistemic power have a moral obligation to at least attempt to understand others’ social realities.
6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
E.M. Dadlez

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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
David Antonini

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8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Dustin Nelson

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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Bob Fischer, Isaac Wiegman

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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Bell

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Based upon research done by evolutionary psychologists into the reason why human beings feel depression in social situations, I argue that philosophers have significant warrant to consider depression as an important feature conditioning moral imagination. The moral imagination come up with new enterprises and new ways of organizing social life. This reorganization would meet many of the goals put forth by pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. I argue that depression will work as a leading clue and unique imaginative “space” to reconstruct various social situations.
11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Thomas Metcalf

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I present a new way to resolve some peer disagreements in philosophy. While a straightforward majority-based argument would be inconclusive, I show that some philosophical majorities are special cases. I focus on the example of moral realism. First, I discuss how mathematically, small variations in our justified confidence in some particular cognizer’s judgment entail large differences in our justified confidence in the decision of a populous voting bloc comprising such cognizers. Second, I argue that plausible considerations about epistemic and moral virtue justify putting slightly more trust in moral realists’ judgments than we would in other philosophers’ judgments. This inspires a new argument for resolving this debate in favor of moral realism, an argument that is stronger than a simple majority-based argument and has advantages over traditional arguments for moral realism. I conclude by suggesting how this tactic may apply to other philosophical debates that feature peer disagreement.
12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Kyle Bromhall

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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Raff Donelson

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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Morton

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In this paper, I pose a dilemma for a very influential kind of metaethical constructivism, advocated recently by Sharon Street. It is either true or false that, if an action is morally wrong for a certain agent, then that agent has a normative reason not to do it. If it is true, then the constructivist (of this kind) is committed to the counterintuitive claim that some apparently morally horrendous acts are not actually wrong. If it is false, then the constructivist cannot maintain a distinctively metaethical constructivism. Either way, this type of constructivism comes with a significant cost.
15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Hilary Yancey

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It is widely agreed that first-person testimony is a good source of evidence, including testimony about the contents of mental states unobservable to others. Thus we generally think that an individual’s testimony is a good source of evidence about her wellbeing—after all, she experiences her quality of life and we don’t. However, some have argued that the first-person testimony of disabled individuals regarding their wellbeing is defeated: regardless of someone’s claim about how disability affects her overall wellbeing, other evidence about disability undermines the force of her testimony with respect to our justified beliefs. In this paper, I argue that at least some cases of first-person testimony about disability is not defeated. Particularly, neither the existence of conflicting testimony nor evidence about disabilities’ associated harms or challenges successfully undermine either the content of the testimony or the reliability of the testifiers. While I do not claim that first-person testimony is the only evidence relevant to characterizing disability, I argue that it is not always blocked by other evidence about disability. At least some first-person testimony from disabled individuals is, therefore, undefeated evidence relevant to evaluating disability and overall wellbeing.
16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Peter Westmoreland

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90% of human beings are right-handed. Naturally, the human world is dexterocentric, or designed for encounter with the right hand. Moments of this right hand bias are widely recognized, and, through devices such as left-handed scissors, coffee mugs, and wooden spoons, non-right-handers fi nd accommodation. From the perspective of one-off accommodations, however, the extent of right hand bias is unclear. This paper offers a unifying framework for understanding right hand bias. It focuses not on which hand is used, but on how the hands are used in space. This is a novel approach to laterality studies. I first argue that differences in how left and right-handers inhabit space entail dissimilar left and right-handed body comportments. I next argue that the norms governing spatiality conform to the right-handed comportment, yet apply to all. I conclude that right hand biased norms are pervasive. We can next ask if they are oppressive.
17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Justin Remhof

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18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Peter R. Nennig

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In this paper examine the relation between the account of mechanical memory in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the speculative sentence in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Both accounts involve a transition to speculative thinking, a kind of thinking that is free from given images and representations. By discussing them together I hope to illuminate how speculative thinking functions for Hegel and why it is important. Specifically, I try to show how what Hegel calls mechanical memory can shed light on Hegel’s more familiar notion of the speculative sentence. I also draw out implications of language and mechanical memory for what Hegel calls speculative thinking. First, I examine Hegel’s account of language acquisition in the Encyclopedia, which involves an account of mechanical memory, to show how Hegel thinks the mind can produce a vehicle for thinking that it has produced both in form and content. Second, I show how this vehicle of language works in the speculative sentence in the Phenomenology.
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Thomas Dabay

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Price defends a form of global expressivism that aspires to be both naturalistic and thoroughly anti-representational. I argue that although Price achieves the latter aspiration, his minimalist treatment of semantic notions prevents his global expressivism from being genuinely naturalistic. To do this, I propose two demands that any view must meet in order to be considered naturalistic—a Deflationary Demand and an Objectivity Demand—and show how the indexical nature of Price’s use of disquotational schemata prevents him from meeting the Objectivity Demand. I conclude by extrapolating from my critique of Price’s global expressivism to the claim that similar points might apply to other forms of semantic minimalism.
20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 1
Mark Bauer

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