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articles

1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Stijn Bruers Orcid-ID

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Is animal farming permissible when animals would have a positive welfare? The happy animal farming problem represent the paradigmatic problem in population ethics, because its simple structure introduces the most important complications of population ethics. Three new population ethical theories that avoid the counter-intuitive repugnant and sadistic conclusions are discussed and applied to the animal farming problem. Breeding farm animals would not be permissible according to these theories, except under some rather unrealistic conditions, such as those farm animals being so happy that they themselves would prefer a continuation of animal farming. Given the fact that many people believe that most farm animals are not so happy and the fact that one can formulate reasonable population ethical theories that condemn happy animal farming, it can be concluded that it is better to avoid animal farming and the consumption of animal products in general.
2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Dan Hooley

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This article considers the collective obligations humans have to wild animals. One proposal, put forward by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, argues that we should understand wild animals as living in sovereign communities, is argued against. A Sovereignty Model is a poor fit for the unique interests of wild animals and requires stretching this concept beyond recognition. Most crucially, however, it ignores and obscures ways that human states must work to prevent their own citizens from harming wild animals. Instead, it is argued that wild animals should be seen as living in Wild Animal Protectorates, a new political category, inspired by protected states that exist among human states. This framework for thinking about the relationship between human states and wild animals has advantages over a Sovereignty Model when it comes to issues of borders, political representation, and international protection.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Sigurd Hverven

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This article examines the concepts of alienation and identification in the context of the Anthropocene. It is a common claim in environmental thinking that alienation from nature drives ecological destruction and that a part of the cure for such an unhealthy relationship to nature is to recover a sense of identification with nature. The article challenges this view, by arguing that in the Anthropocene identification with nature may not be solely good, alienation from nature may not be solely bad, and identification and alienation may not be mutually exclusive phenomena. This thesis is defended through a critique of Arne Næss’s view on identification and alienation, and by drawing and elaborating on Simon Hailwood’s study of alienation in environmental philosophy and Adorno’s critique of “identity-thinking.” It also considers a specific case, the so-called “Plastic Whale” that was stranded outside the coast of Norway in 2017.
4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Simo Kyllönen Orcid-ID

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Current ecological threats, such as the sixth mass extinction or climate change, highlight the need to evaluate the moral implications of changing populations, both human and non-human. The paper sketches a non-anthropocentric and multispecies sufficientarian account of population ethics. After discussing several other options for multispecies population ethics, the paper proposes a two-level account of multispecies sufficientarianism, according to which the value of populations depend on two kinds of sufficientarian thresholds. First, there is a species-relativized individual-level threshold for what species-specific flourishing is for an organism. Second, there is a population-level threshold for a sufficiently viable population enough to support the species-specific flourishing of the current and future members of that population. The paper concludes by discussing some of the practical implications and concerns raised by the two-level account suggested.

book reviews

5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Tyler Cooper-Kolb, Allen A. Thompson

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6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Julia D. Gibson

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7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Ronald Sandler

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Valerie Soon

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Steven Vogel

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4

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11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4

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