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1. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Thalia Wheatley

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2. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Walter Glannon

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3. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Julian Savulescu, Ingmar Persson

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4. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Alfred Mele

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5. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Robyn Repko Waller

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6. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Andrew Fenton

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A recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities (one popular expression of what is commonly known as neuroreductionism) promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman animal minds. What’s more, these brain-mental-state identities offer the further promise of dismantling the deadlock over the moral status of nonhuman animals, to positive affect in such areas as agriculture and laboratory animal science. I will argue that neuroscientific claims assuming brain-mental-state identities do not so much resolve the problem of other animal minds as mark its resolution. In the meantime, we must rely on the tools available to us, including those provided by such behavioral sciences as cognitive ethology, comparativepsychology, and ethology as well as the neurosciences. Focusing on captive animal research, I will also argue that humane experimentalists do not doubt that many of their research subjects have minds (in some substantive sense of that term). In that light, to suggest that the resolution of the problem of other animal minds would change the scientific use of animals misses the point at issue. Instead, what is required is a ‘sea change’ in the perceived grounds for human moral obligations to nonhumans. It is difficult to see how brain-mental-state identities could be the deciding factor in this continuing issue in applied ethics.
7. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Andy Lamey

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8. The Monist: Volume > 95 > Issue: 3
Juha Räikkä, Saul Smilansky

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