Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations.

This article attempts to comprehend the problem within the methodology of science. The authors compare the concepts of creativity and heuristics and suggest a semantic differentiation between them, and also offer their own viewpoint on the main types of activity corresponding to these concepts. The problem of creativity is associated with the characteristics that a person must have in order to solve tasks and problems. The authors consider the relationship between the problem and the task, as well as some major techniques to tackle them. Here they substantiate the idea of a wider adaptation of randomization as a special tactic, that is, going beyond the narrow framework of mathematical statistics and empirical research. In this context, the authors introduce the notion of “epistemological randomization”, designed to denote the following of open rationality without abandoning the rational way of solving scientific problems. This technique is viewed as a phenomenon related to the counterfactual thinking. The last part of the article proposes a typology of personalities as problem and task solvers – adaptive, heuristic and creative personalities. It is assumed that the “heuristic” personality aims to complete tasks, which, unlike problems, have a final solution, while the “creative” personality aims to expand the problem field. The latter type is characterized as capable and inclined to use the “epistemological randomization”, the techniques of lateral thinking and other techniques that suggest several methods of solving problems and tasks at once.

This is a reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin, S.V. Shibarshina “Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science”. The comprehension of the general philosophical problems of scientific rationality is inextricably linked with the creative development of the world. An actual philosophical position can be formed on the basis of the intersection of several alternative approaches. The first is connected with the understanding of rationality as a special style of thinking of the epoch, in which the coordinate system of the worldview is set. Such rationality sets general ideas about the cognizability of the world, and forms methodological and theoretical scientific strategies. Rationality outlines the boundaries of a scientist’s creative thought. Addressing the problem of the rationality of scientific creativity involves the use of a second approach, on the basis of which we can talk about the use of a variety of logics in describing the world. At the same time, confidence in their connection with reality allows us to hope for the formation of a holistic description of the problem in the future. In this case, we are dealing with an act of cognitive activity, as a result of which our consciousness throws a rational construct as a network on a situation of uncertainty, explaining and mastering it – the picture of the world is ordered. According to the third position, the evaluation of scientific results is flexible, plastic in nature: what is perceived as methodologically erroneous today may turn out to be a scientific discovery tomorrow. Thus, it can be stated that the creative thinking of the researcher is inscribed in certain cultural conditions of understanding reality, and this situation has a rationally given meaning. At the same time, the human mind always strives beyond the limits of the definable and categorically set, with the help of rationality, progressively groping the boundaries of the unknown and going beyond the limits of the possible.

The article considers the concept of serendipity (the ability to make unexpected discoveries) in comparison with the concept of “epistemological randomization” introduced by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. The genesis and content of the concept of “serendipity” in the interpretation of American sociologists R. Merton and E. Barber are revealed. The division of serendipity into three types is considered depending on the source and result of an unexpected scientific discovery. The first type of serendipity refers to a situation of random observation, when neither the observation itself nor the conclusions drawn from it are part of the research already being carried out. The second type of serendipity is associated with the process of finding a solution to one problem, which suddenly leads to a solution to another. A third type of serendipity can arise when investigating a familiar problem, when the solution comes from an unexpected source. It is concluded that epistemological randomization, which is introduced into an existing study, is similar to the second and third types of serendipity, where the randomness factor is limited. In conclusion, it is emphasized that, in contrast to the principle of epistemological randomization, serendipity is an emergent phenomenon and cannot be caused consciously. Serendipity is manifested where an unexpected phenomenon meets a special type of subject who is able to notice and fruitfully interpret an unusual phenomenon.

The article offers a socio-historical approach to the problem of creative personality in polemic with the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. Creative activity is considered not as a psychological process or an expression of cognitive abilities, but as a result evaluated by the professional scientific community and even by the entire society. The distinction between the psychological, historical and historical-epistemological interpretation of creativity is discussed. The authors argue that although the proposed approach has an explanatory potential for creativity as a socio-historical phenomenon, it reduces the nature of individual personalities and their role in scientific research to a public response to a new result. The personality of an author is getting vanished in this result, becoming only a label of some social achievement. Using the terminology of J.-P. Sartre, the essence of the author as a unique individual is reduced to his social existence as a scientist. The purpose of this existence is not the fulfillment of a vocation, but the implementation of a professional mission to promote science as a public good, which consists, among other things, in creating a field of intellectual tension. The scientist ensures the objective increase of public awareness of the painful points of history and modernity; critically analyzes global risks from ecology to security; and presents images of a possible and required future. Thus, creative science acts as a source for development through problematization, a factor of cognitive dissonance, a troublemaker, a potential violator of social stability.

In this reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, the question of the creative nature of the randomization technique is considered, which is understood as a rejection of logically obvious ways to solve scientific problems, and involves the inclusion of an element of randomness, or uncertainty, in the scientific search procedure. Some doubt is expressed about the consequences of introducing the technique of epistemological randomization into the tactics of solving scientific problems. The author of the article emphasizes the fact that an attempt to solve scientific problems by an inclusion of other, non-scientific elements in the area of science may be a case of randomization. The author determines the areas which are subject to an uncertainty factor. Art and culture are regarded as such non-science areas. However, the appeal to uncertainty is an indication of a fundamental inability to describe in quantitative terms the origin of creativity. This position can be characterized as “misterianism” in the interpretation of creativity, by analogy with misterianism in the understanding of consciousness by K. McGinn. In this case, the randomization technique is nothing more than one of the possible conditions for creativity, which cannot guarantee the appearance of an original result.

In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity.

The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science.

Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory.

This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message’s meaning.

After Copernicus (1473–1543) and the ongoing development of contemporary cosmization, a new epistemological paradigm of post-religious humility is replacing religious versions. In the 100th year of Kuhn/Lakatos, this article explores the differences between religious and post-religious paradigms of humility as a formative aspect of human knowing. Although post-religious humility does not necessarily strive to criticize earlier paradigms of humility, an implicit critique is often present. In accordance with Kuhnian/Lakatosian theory, this article is not about psychological traits or personality characteristics; rather, both types of humility as epistemological paradigms exist at the nascent stage of knowledge development. In retrospect, various thinkers throughout the Renaissance and Enlightenment demonstrate flux and conflict between the two paradigmatic humilities, and various theorists also struggle to articulate the emerging paradigm. The overall trajectory radicalizes the abandonment of anthropomorphism and positivistic assumptions about certainty. Historically, post-religious humility also intersected with society’s perception of science’s “progress” and a deeper embrace of finitude and mortality than was possible earlier. Movements like transhumanism, as well as phenomena of technological prowess and remarkable achievements in modern scientific research, do not contradict the new humility’s role. Whether religious or post-religious, postpositivistic civilization increasingly experiences that the new paradigm repositions the sociological and cognitive place where humility can now comfortably reside.

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects.

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects.

The central problem of the article is the paradox in the history of Newton’s mechanics: prominent researchers of the genesis of the Principia did not believe Newton’s words about the origin of the idea of universal gravity. They did not believe that he could have come up with this idea as early as 1666, considering circular orbits, and believed that Newton invented the story of the falling apple. The article proposes a “subjunctive” scenario leading to the law of universal gravity and feasible at the level of Galileo’s knowledge and skills in 1611. The basis for such a scenario is the description of a thought experiment in Newton’s manuscript “The System of the World”, preceding the creation of Principia. The proposed reconstruction helps to consider and clarify the concept of “modern physics”, the birth of which was the main event of the Scientific Revolution of the XVI–XVII centuries. The traditional understanding reduces the essence of modern physics to a reliance on experience and on the language of mathematics. Such a definition, however, is not sufficient. The geometry of Euclid and the physics of Archimedes were mathematically perfect, and their axioms were based on objective experience. Despite the importance of the tools of mathematics and experiment, the key innovation of modern physics has become the belief in the hidden fundamental laws of the Universe and in the right of the researcher to invent invisible, “illogical”, “absurd” concepts and postulates, experimentally verifiable only together with the theory based on them. This postulate of fundamental cognitive optimism combines bold ingenuity with a humble need for empirical verification.

The structure of Russian science of the XIX century was dominated by state forms of its organization. At the same time, there were also a few private (non-governmental) forms of research communities. One of the little-studied phenomena of scientific privacy is the so-called “kruzhok” (a little circle in Russian). The article examines the history of the formation and activity of one of such “kruzhoks”, formed in the 1880s–1890s around Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, who was seriously engaged in research in the field of lepidopterology (the branch of entomology studying butterflies, Lepidoptera). The role and significance of this “kruzhok” for the development of descriptive entomology in the situation of its weak institutionalization in Russia at the end of the XIX century are briefly considered, the course of scientific research of the Grand Duke and his entourage and the reasons for the termination of their activity are discussed. The history of this informal association is interpreted by us as a manifestation of the purposeful life-making of the Grand Duke, who thus tried to professionalize his hobby and enter the scientific community of entomologists on an equal footing, without breaking with his social environment and without going beyond the behavioral norms established by society for persons of his status. It is shown that the Nikolai Mikhailovich’s “kruzhok” became not only an instrument of his life-making, but also an influential center of Russian lepidopterology, the development of which was thereby given a powerful impetus.

This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon.

The article explores the contemporary philosophy of science in the context of the idea of eternal return. The problematization of the intellectual field “after postpositivism” runs through the renewed questions “what?”, “how?”, “who?” and “for what?” of scientific research. This questioning is a search for bearings in the historical space and time that determines “after what?” or “back to whom?” the thinking about science unfolds. Such a reflexive appeal to the origins leads to the ideas of the philosophy of science of the first half of the twentieth century. It is then that the main differences within the research of science were formed: between sociological and methodological approaches, between philosophy and disciplines that study science, between the goals of forming a worldview and managing science. The philosophy of science “after postpositivism” expresses itself in the controversial interpretation of the subject matter and method of the study of science, in the division of labor between disciplines and approaches that lose the possibility of constructive interaction and reach the point of “science wars”. In conclusion, it is argued that philosophy as the "hard core” of scientific research, a historical appeal to the origins of scientific activity and the interpretation of the scientific revolution as a renewal of tradition can make such modernity valuable for return.

The article discusses the methodological principle of reflexivity as formulated within the strong program of the sociology of scientific knowledge (STS). The applicability of this principle in science and technology studies is analyzed from empirical and theoretical points of view. The principle of reflexivity expresses the requirement of scientific universalism: it forbids the exclusion of one’s own cognitive activity and its results (knowledge) from the world totality of objectively observable things and processes, in this case – beliefs. In D. Bloor’s imperative formulation, the principle prescribes applying the explanatory methodology of the strong program in relation to the strong program’s own fundamental theoretical and methodological concepts. The implementation of this principle in STS faces practical problems and theoretical paradoxes. In line with the methodology of the strong program, the author asks the question about the social conditions of the failure of the principle of reflexivity. The author shows that empirically cognizable social conditions for the realization of the principle of reflexivity can be fulfilled. However, their fulfillment does not lead to reflexive work, which presupposes an external position of the one who explains in relation to what is explained. In accordance with the postpositivist concept of the underdetermination of theory by facts, the external position is achieved through the speculative transition from the factual given to the hypothesis explaining this given. The author shows that the external position taken by internal critics of the STS research community becomes the position of speculative philosophy.

This reply draws attention to the importance of taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of reflexivity in scientific knowledge, which have been obtained in the domestic philosophical and methodological tradition. We believe that taking this kind of results into account could enrich the analysis of the strong programme in the STS. We touch the origins of reflexive tendencies, the reflexive and non-reflexive in scientific knowledge, personal and transpersonal forms, the types and levels of reflexion in science, as well as denote the mechanisms that allows taking an external position in relation to the subject about which reflexive procedures are carried out (if we mean the interval approach implementation).