NTU Philosophical Review

Lewis’s arguments for the triviality results are considered as a powerful rejection of the truth-conditional accounts of conditionals: the absurd consequencethat for any propositions A and C, p(C/A) = p(C) is derived from the classical probability calculus, conditionalization, and Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals.In this paper, it is argued that the triviality results need not be a threat to Stalnaker’s semantics, for we can derive a generalized triviality result from the classicalprobability theory and any thesis about conditional probability. The lesson, I suggest, is that we should reconsider the classical probability theory or set a restriction on the rule of conditionalization such that the triviality results may be avoided.

Mou Zong-san’s “intellectual intuition” contains two internal contradictions: first, a contradiction between intellect and sensibility regarding moral feeling; second, a contradiction between being and creation of the thing-in-itself. These contradictions are caused by his acceptance of Kant’s theoretical assumption of a dichotomy between sensibility and intellect as well as by the characteristics of non-sensibility and creativity in Kant’s theory of intuition. In turn, this has led to unresolvable difficulties in Mou’s “intellectual intuition” reading of Chinese philosophy. While Husserl’s theory on the intentionality of perception resolved Kant’sdichotomy between sensibility and intellect, his distinction between sensation and perception also provides a phenomenologically based theoretical foundation for solving the internal contradictions of Mou’s “intellectual intuition”: while sensation is equivalent to intellectual intuition as a way for intuiting the thing-in-itself, it involves sensibility and non-creativity, and therefore avoids Mou’s two theoretical contradictions.

This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular.

Professor Mou Zongsan once proclaimed: “Kant has no great successors in the West.” Recently, Professor Karl Ameriks also uttered: “A supposed childless professor, Kant the metaphysician left behind a fertile family of illegitimate heirs.” By contrasting Mou’s and Ameriks’ perspectives employed to express a somehow shared sentiment, this paper intends to extract the philosophical imports from this seemingly mere sentiment taking place in the history of philosophy.Mou believes that Kant is often too polite to attribute “intellectual intuition” exclusively to God. Instead, Mou, by taking the stand of Chinese practical philosophy, attributes “intellectual intuition” to humans, thus dissolves the gap between “phenomena and thing-in-itself” and further establishes an “absolute realism” based on values. Ameriks, on the other hand, thinks that Kant’s philosophy is apologetic and modest in comparison to its direct successors in German Idealism. The transformation of Kant into the German Idealism through advocating “the primacy of practical reason” by K. L. Reinhold, however, also misunderstands Kant's very basic discourse of critical philosophy. On the other hand, in the absence of English translation of Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, theAnglo-American Kantians, get Kant’s philosophy expressed in a completely different direction. By following the thread of exact science, they convert the Kantian philosophy to logical positivism, scientific realism and pragmatism, and thus miss the critical flavor of Kant's original insights. Only the early Romantics, in Ameriks’ view, have inherited Kant's critical philosophical thinking.

The category of “li” as it appears in the Yueji (Record of Music) chapter of the Liji (Book of Rites) is of considerable significance. On the one hand, the Liji Yueji contains the first instance of the word ‘lunli’ in the history of the category of “li.” On the other hand, following Zhuangzi, it contains an early use of the concept of “tianli” (principle of nature) and broadens this to “tianli renyu” (principle of nature and human desires). From all meanings of the character ‘li’ in the pre-Qin period, the Yueji inherited its aspects of “internal property and operational pattern of all things and events,” “consciousness of destiny and life,” and “ethics” (lunli). From a school perspective, the Yueji blends the thought of the Confucian, Daoist and Mohist schools, yet with Confucianism as its main framework. It moreoverbuilds a three-level tacit structure with li as body (ti), etiquette and music as performance (xiang), and the practice of social traditions and customs as function (yong). Moreover, the Yueji also generates close connections between “li” and other philosophical categories, thereby revealing the intellectual context of the category of “li” in the pre-Qin period.

尋覓一套適切的語言，以便用於有關上帝的言說（God - talk），歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具，自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇，但對宗教論述而言，類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後，才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論，是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋，還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究，對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油：邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的，因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為，宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界，人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩（Ian Ramsey）對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先，他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時，他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」（model）與「揭 示」（disclosure）進路，恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出，宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的，是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較，並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時，本文也會 指出，兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。

The epistemological positions of Kant and Hegel are greatly different, and the meanings they give to the idea of God play a clear indication to it. Both of them have the same idea of God as “ens realissimum,” but they understand it differently. The reasons why there is a great difference between the two philosophers could be seen in the fact that the purport of their dealing with the problems of God is different and their theological views of the world are not the same. In this article I propose to contrast Kant’s statement on the idea of God with Hegel’s on the basis of their respective metaphysical ideas and methods.

Wang Tingxiang is one of the most highly regarded Qi theory ideologists. Originally developed by Zhang Zai, Qi theory is about the human nature. However, Wang Tingxiang often quoted Cheng Hao’s Qi theory which was different from Zhang Zai’s. He pointed out that since Zhang Zai, neo-Confucian scholars have divided human nature into philosophical connotations and natural disposition. This division is accordingly deviated from traditional Confucian philosophy. He believed instead that human nature is a natural disposition and supported the idea of inherent qualities. He suggests that human nature includes both good and evil, persisting that all these arguments can be directly supported by Cheng Hao’s ideas. In this way, it seems as if the two scholars had the same view on thetheory of human nature. However, in the latest perspective of Neo-Confucianism researches, Wang Tingxiang is regarded as a representative of Monism of Qi from the Ming Dynasty, while Cheng Hao is a representative of the Theory of One Origin. From this perspective, there must be some significant differences between the two. This essay attempts to identify these differences. The former discussed human nature in an analytic way and the latter did it through the idea of integration. Of greatest importance is Wang Tingxiang’s refusal of the aspect of integration. Although both basing their discussion of human nature on natural disposition, Cheng Hao accepted the division between philosophical connotations and natural disposition in his integration theory, whereas Wang Tingxiangabsolutely refused the possibility of philosophical connotations. By taking their theories of human nature into account, this essay attempts to discuss thesimilarities and differences between Cheng Hao and Wang Tingxiang from the following three questions: What is human nature? Is human nature good, evil or both? Is it possible to remove evil and follow the good?

The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third partof Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant’s arguments “Reciprocity Thesis” and “Doctrine of fact of pure reason”.

Jia Yi (賈誼) was a political philosopher active in the West Han Wendi (西漢文帝) period. At this time, Li (‘禮’) was growing in importance and Jia Yi was one of its leading proponents. Most academics point out that Jia Yi’s conception of Li was influenced by Xunzi (荀子). However, in Jia Yi’s book Jia Yi Xinshu (賈誼新書), we cannot find any obvious influence from Xunzi. On the contrary, when Jia Yi spoke about Li he quoted ancient documents such as Guanzi (管子), Qingshishi zhi ji (青史氏之記), Xueli (學禮), Quli (曲禮), Wangzhi (王制).This article will first examine Jia Yi’s conception of Li based on the analytical constructs of ‘visualization (可視化)’ and ‘discipline (規訓化)’ in Jia Yi Xinshu. Second, it will discuss the relationship between Xunzi and Jia Yi Xinshu. Though there is a strong resemblance between the two, Jia Yi Xinshu does not refer to Xunzi. Why is this? On the one hand, Jia Yi was very conscious of the Qin (秦) dynasty, at which time one premier, Li Si (李 斯), was a student of Xunzi. However, in the early days of the Han dynasty, the Qin was not held in particularly high esteem and thus Jia Yi could not overtly refer to Xunzi. Furthermore, Jia Yi had read not only Xunzi, but also many other ancient documents, no longer extant today, and so he did not necessarily need to quote from Xunzi. We should not neglect these points, and accordingly, we must reconsider the role of Xunzi’s thinking at the beginning of the Han dynasty.

With the recent unearthing of such Warring States bamboo manuscripts as “Taiyi sheng shui” of Guodian and “Heng xian” of the Shanghai Museum corpus, thestudy of Chinese metaphysics has gained a wealth of new materials and concepts for exploration. Yet new materials continue to come forth, such as the recentlypublished Shanghai Museum v. 7 manuscript “Fan wu liu xing” (in two copies), a text rich in metaphysical significance and of tremendous value to the study ofpre-Qin intellectual history. In a form similar to the Chuci text “Tian wen,” this text is made up of a series of fundamental questions—all in rhymed stanzas—such as“By what means are all things able to take form?” or “Once things take form, by what means do they survive?” It constitutes an important early example ofmetaphysical inquiry in the Chinese tradition, with interesting similarities to and differences from major received philosophical texts from the same time period and region. This essay aims to provide a credible reading of the first half of this important new document and make a brief inquiry into its metaphysical significance.

In Hegel’s philosophy God is “the sole object of philosophy”, in other words, philosophy has to attain in God the complete knowledge, to relate everything to God and to explain everything through God; thus philosophy in essence is a theology and is a worshiping of God. In the context of Hegel’s philosophy, God is considered to be both the final result and the precondition of philosophy, both its final goal and its starting point.The speculative philosophy of Hegel has been formed in the context of the dialogue between various philosophical theories. Regarding knowledge aboutGod, Hegel rejects the validity of the “three agnosticisms” of the Enlightenment: the rationalist theology of Wolff, the critical philosophy of Kant and Jacobi’stheology of feeling. The agnosticism of Wolff’s rational theology was founded on objective view, whereas Kant’s critical philosophy and Jacobi’s philosophy offeeling refuted the possibility of knowing God based on subjective standpoints. Hegel held that these three theories are all based on the faculty of intellect ratherthan on the one of reasoning. He argued that reasoning can attain knowledge not only of the existence of God but also about God Himself.

Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.

This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number of interpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false.Moreover, in this article I will point out that by putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, the two versions of the Third Man Argument, which are set out in Parmenides 132a1-b2 and 132d1-133a7 respectively, should be considered as his warnings against the possible misunderstandings concerning the relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. the relationship of “participation.” In other words, if we mistakenly interpret the conception of participation in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the “Largeness Regress”; and if we comprehend the relationship of participation in terms of the “likeness” between Forms and particulars, and consider the later to be a symmetrical relation, then the Theory of Forms must fall into the “Likeness Regress.”

This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can beclarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis－pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis—are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. ‘Pure sensus communis’ is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. ‘Ideal sensus communis’ is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes “pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.

The discussion in this article is about the criticism to Hu Hong in The doubt of Zhi yan Proposed by Zhu Hsi. The author is aiming to clear the dissimilar wayof thinking between the two philosophers to the effect that both their significant theory could be appeared. Hu Hong’s philosophical announcement alwaysintegrates the ontological and practical theory, which results to the ambiguity and give rise to the criticism from Zhu Hsi. Zhu Hsi possessed the position of thegoodness of nature to query Hu Hong about his no good and no evil opinion toward the theory of the human nature. In the definition of the mind and nature,master Zhu Hsi proposed the mind comprise the nature and the felling and argued with Hu Hong’s different opining. Concerning about the practical procedure theory, Zhu Hsi insist the cultivation should be built on daily life, and critic Hu Hong’s philosophy being short of this understanding. In this article the author will use the interpretational structure of the practical theory and the theory of being to analyze the different consciousness in these two systems and suggest that there exist no real conflict between them so as to explain both their philosophical thinking.

Most of the Western philosophers regard self-consciousness as a problem of theoretical philosophy, and conscience as a problem of practical philosophy.Both of them belong to different areas of philosophy. In contrast with this, some philosophers in the tradition of Confucianism tend to ascribe both concepts topractical philosophy. This tendency reaches its highest point in the writings of Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), the most important representative of ContemporaryNeo-Confucianism. Fichte (1762-1814) is one of few Western philosophers, who regard both concepts as the problems of practical philosophy. It’s worthy tonotice that both Mou Zongsan and Fichte come to this conclusion by criticizing Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. I argue in this paper the following two points: (1) Mou Zongsan and Fichte have similar idea of practical self-consciousness. (2) Mou Zongsan identifies practical self-consciousness with conscience; on the contrary, Fichte holds them to be heterogeneous, the former is pure thinking and the latter sensible feeling.

This paper analyses the usage of the two concepts of nature (xing) and artifice (wei) in the Xunzi. It will be suggested that each of the two concepts is given two definitions in the Xunzi and that in each case the two definitions form into a two-tier structure. That is, each concept has not only two aspects but the two aspects are also of two stages, one acting as the basis of the other. The two concepts could be further combined and gives us a three-tier structure of human agency. According to such an understanding, the natural endowment of human beings is the target of reflection and transformation. Human beings reflect upon our natural endowment and give it a form of expression, the result of which is human action. Through the accumulation of human action we could construct out of it some normative principles and form human culture. On the one hand, such a three-tier structure of human agency explains why Xunzi thinks that nature of humans is bad and that any good comes from artifice. It is because nature by itself does not have a proper form of expression and will only disrupt agency and give rise to bad consequences. A good form of expression and consequently good action could only be the result of artifice, which consists of perception, reflection and deliberation. On the other hand, such a three-tier structure also explains why Xunzi emphasizes nonetheless that nature and artifice must be joined together to accomplish order and flourishing. For without nature, there is nothing to be reflected upon and to be transformed. The three-tier structure of human agency discloses Xunzi’s vision that human beings are not the slave of our natural endowment but could deliberate and reflect upon our nature so as to bring about self-transformation and self-realisation. It is also through such a structure that Xunzi justifies Confucian rituals, for rituals are self-imposed normsand represent the best form of expression of our nature.

In Liu Xiang's “Other Records”, it is said: “Shi Zi was in the State of Chu, but probably in (Shu) Sichuan. Now according to the book 'Shi Zi', he has the name 'Jiao' and originally from the State of Jin. He became an adviser to Wei Yang, the prime minister of Qin. He was always consulted in the administration and legislation that Wei Yang (Lord Shang) contemplated and implemented. Later, When Lord Shang was executed, Jiao fearing complicity in and fled to Sichuan. Since then, he completed this book containing 60,000 words in 20 chapters. He died in Sichuan."Since the excavation of Four Texts of the Yellow Emperor at Ma Wang Dui in Chang Sha in 1973, scholars have come to understand the full aspect of the"School of Huang Lao" from the period before Qin to the beginning of Han. What the Royal Historian, Tai Shi Gong had characterized about "Daoism"as " bending to the alternation of Yin and Yang, adopting the positive aspects of Confucianism and Mohism, summing up the essentials of the school of Min(Names) and Fa (Legalist)," the scholars have come to appreciate this being essentially an integration of thoughts at the time of the Warring States from allprevious schools since the period of Spring and Autumn. As Ban Gu said about "Shi Zi", it "incorporates Confucianism and Mohism, combining Min andFa." In fact, it also includes the thoughts of Lao Zi and Yin Yang, and is a work from the Warring States period. Ban Gu classified it as one of the "Miscellaneous Schools."Lao Zi's "Dao" is an abstraction of prevalent principles and laws. It is not something that could be understood through sensory perception or that could be altered subjectively. Thus, Lao Zi emphasizes "non-intervention", "natural", "not to go against the nature of things", "cause over effect". Hence, "Shi Zi" also says in the chapter "Feng": "Once on the right track, no longer need wisdom and techniques." : "(care for the people, appreciate advisers, govern diligently) may appear different, but really belong to the same principle. And thus, in chapter "Fa Mung" :"Once the right analysis is made, it is applicable to every matter; once the right regulation is established, everything is so regulated." In the chapter "Qui Yan": “The old lived in a house without chimney and crack knows no fire alarm all his life.” In the chapter " Chu Dao": "Know the world without setting foot outdoor, govern the world without descending his court, for the principles are the same." In the chapter "Fa Mung": "An aware Lord does not need to enhance his hearing and sight, does not need espionage, does not expressly find out; for he observes when formations appears, listens when sound arrives and reacts when events transpire." "Shi Zi" assume the objectivity and universality of these principles and laws in order to distill and describe the thoughts of the different schools so as to establish its own school of thought. So it is in the study of "Shi Zi", one must grasp what in the original text and then proceed to compare it with Daoism, Confucianism, Mohism and Fa in order to fully interpret its thoughts and contentions.

This thesis is aimed to study the approach when Chi-tsang composed verses of commentary on the Nagarjuna founded and Pivgala annotated Middle Treatise(Chung-lun), how, through back and forth debating on the relativistic concepts such as “delusion” and “non-delusion”, “selfness” and “selflessness”, “arising/ceasing” and “non-arising /ceasing”, and finally summing-up to “mundane truth” and “noble truth”, he tried to bring up the notion of the “True Reality of AllDharmas”, and established the philosophical contents of Buddhist teaching. With argumentative analysis and elucidation done in this thesis the author expects to assist fellow scholars to understand and grasp a sideway viewpoint in Chi-tsang’s Buddhist thinking, so as to reflect on the essential philosophical issues of “by what it means to see ‘True Reality’ ”, and/or “what the so-called ‘True Reality’ is.”The bibliography of this thesis mainly consists the Commentary on The Middle Treatise (Chung-kuan-lun Su) and other Buddhist writings and commentary works by Chi-tsang. An Argumentative Explanation Approach is adapted as the study approach; as for the methodology, through conceptual connotation analyzing, subject backgrounds reestablishing, and multilayered probing and summarizing of the dogma, it achieves the goal of illustrating the objective that Chi-tsang set to establish the debates on the True Reality philosophy.The key argumentative points of this article are briefly summarized as follows:Chi-tsang suggests, based on the “Ultimate Emptiness” notion of the true reality of all dharmas dogma, since it is not possible to establish any ideas such as “being” or “non-being” or even “oneness” or “multiplicity”, therefore, when sutras and commentaries write about “selfness” or “selflessness”, or even “permanence” or “impermanence”, although some relativistic pedagogical meanings might exist, nevertheless, in essence the dogma is established with theonly intention to relate all phenomenon to the virtuous status of “nonattainment”. In addition, Chi-tsang points out that every causal dharma of falsephenomenon or illusory existence, at its heart “is real too.” Therefore, if we understand the existence nature of the illusory or false phenomenon dharma, knowing that it is dependent on arising, and furthermore cease to abide by illusory existence or false phenomenon, we then will be able to open the “Door of True Reality”.By the verses of commentary Chi-tsang teaches us the basic conceptual approach to opening the “Door of True Reality”, which is by griping without parting the “Causation” theory of “Two Truths” doctrine, to carry out analyzing and differentiating issues such as “being” and “non-being”, “permanency” and “non-permanency”, and even “arising” and “ceasing”, “delusion” and “non-delusion”, knowing that basically they are no more than causal hypothesis of “duality but non-duality” or “non-duality but duality”, therefore, in order to approximate the truth, we must liberate ourselves from the mental processing style which forms illusory external phenomena, that is to say, we need to extinguish “differential false thinking” which stops us from observing correctly the genuine truth of dharmas.