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101. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 43
W. T. Schmid

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I emphasize four points: (1) Socratic dialectic challenges the interlocutor not only to acquire the correct moral opinions, but to question and think for oneself and to develop one's own moral rationality; (2) it involves anticipatory acts of several types of virtue: courage, moderation, and justice and concern for the common good as opposed to competition and jealousy; (3) what is at stake is not only the topic of the particular exchange, but the opportunity for membership in a rational/educational community; and (4) the fact that Socrates' interlocutors typically reject the opportunity for moral insight and personal growth he makes available to them explains why he cannot be said to possess a techne of moral education, and why he insists that virtue cannot be taught. The process of education through the elenchus is not a matter of correct instruction, but of rational elicitation, which must be responded to by personal choice. Thus Socrates' principles may represent not only beliefs he has tested over many years of dialogue, but also values he has come to through participation in elenctic inquiry, the idealized extension of norms required by and created in the practice of dialectic. Socratic education involves the interlocutor in the confrontation with a self whose irrational attachments of appetite and ego are exposed and must be overcome for the interlocutor to experience catharsis.

102. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 43
Jules Simon

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This essay explores my own situation of teaching philosophy in a more or less traditional undergraduate setting but in a way that is especially relevant to the theme of this Congress, namely, the theme of "philosophy educating humanity." In my case, I teach philosophy but from a perspective that is non-traditional and which undercuts the standard questions originating from and orienting around a "philosophia perennia." Specifically, I teach philosophy of religion from the perspective of Jewish philosophy, and even more specifically, from the perspective of the French Jewish philosophy of Emmanuelle Levinas. Moreover, I teach philosophy in an educational environment that is representative of the greater global community because I teach at the University of Texas at El Paso, situated on the border that separates the United States and Latin America. Finally, my teaching situation is one that is further marginalized because of the precarious nature of my academic position, namely, trained outside the traditional borders of philosophical faculty and working at first as a part-timer and only recently as a full-time, non-tenure track teacher of philosophy and humanities. Hence, I offer my experience of doing work of successfully teaching philosophy "on the borders" in the hope that others gathered here will be challenged to think differently about their own way of educating others.

103. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 43
Edward Slowik

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This essay explores the benefits of utilizing non-scientific examples and analogies in teaching philosophy of science courses, or general introductory courses. These examples can help resolve two basic difficulties faced by most instructors, especially when teaching lower-level courses: first, they can prompt students to take an active interest in the class material, since the examples will involve aspects of the culture well-known to the students; second, these familiar, less-threatening examples will lessen the students' collective anxieties and open them up to learning the material more easily. To demonstrate this strategy of constructing and employing non-scientific examples, a lengthy analogy between musical styles and Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is developed.

104. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Robert Allen

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In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.

105. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Susana Raquel Barbosa

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Desde la obra de Max Horkheimer se asume que la profesionalización de las humanidades ha dado por tierra lo que en su emergencia estas significarán. Por otro lado, ya desde las convicciones del pensamiento griego, es de consenso que lo filosófico está reñido con lo servil. Se toma este término es dos direcciones: la filosofía no depende de las ciencias-ni las sirve-y la filosofía no es un saber de tipo utilizable-como las estrezas estadísticas. En este artículo se indaga la función pedagógica de la crítica tal como puede desprenderse de la obra de Horkheimer y se investigan tanto sus modos de instalación frente a otros saberes como su posición en la constelación de las teorías consagradas por la "autoridad de la tradición." Si la filosofía no tiene una función determinada dentro del "ordenamiento existente" de la vida social, tal como esta se da con una jerarquía de valores vigente, necesariamente debe ser crítica. Si la filosofía no ocupa una posición de sierva de los saberes particulares ni menos aún de las necesidades del saber administrativo, necesariamente debe aislarse e instalar una tensión-irreconciliable-con la realidad existente. Si la teoría crítica de la sociedad y de la ciencia apunta a una consideracida diferente de las condiciones en las que actualmente se dan aquellas, necesariamente se autoconcibe como negativa respecto del órden vigente. La función de la filosofía es pedagógica en la tarea de orientar a los hombres a la percepción-negativa y en tensión con la realidadde las condiciones sociales; tal experiencia los instala en la certeza de que aquellas condiciones no son naturales-ni fijas ni definitivas-y en la persistencia del mejoramiento de la totalidad social.

106. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Julia J. Bartkowiak

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Recently, several authors have cited traditional liberal principles to argue that religious education must be offered in public schools in the United States of America. These authors claim that exposure to a variety of religious beliefs and traditions is a necessary means to attaining the two goals of providing children with "open futures" and encouraging tolerance of religious diversity. This paper contends that these arguments are seriously flawed, and provides reasons which demonstrate that, in practice, these two goals cannot be accomplished by religion courses in the public schools. Additionally, mandatory religion courses in the public schools appear to be unconstitutional and infringe on parental rights and freedom of religion. Consequently, the goals of a liberal state are best achieved by not offering religious education in the public schools.

107. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
John A. I. Bewaji

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The classical contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have enjoyed such fame and acceptance as being basic to the development of liberal democratic theory and practice that it would be heretical for any scholar, especially one from the fringes, to critique. But the contract tradition poses challenges that must be given the flux in the contemporary sociopolitical universe that at once impels extreme nationalism and unavoidable globalism. This becomes all the more important not in order to dislodge the primacy of loyalty and reverence to this tradition but from another perspective which hopes to encourage that the anchorage of disclosure be implemented. The contract tradition makes pronouncements on what is natural and what is nonnatural. It offers what many have contended are rigorous arguments for these pronouncements that are "intuitive," "empirical," "logical," "psychological," "moral," "religio-metaphysical." What I offer in this essay is a challenge from the outside. I ask: 1) on what empirical data are the material presuppositions of contractarianism built? 2) what is the epistemological foundation of contractarianism? 3) is contractarianism not derivable from any other form of sociological presupposition except that of the state of nature? 4) does any human know a "state of nature"? 5) given the answers to the above questions, to what extent are the legal and moral foundations of contractarianism sacrosanct? I attempt to answer these questions in what can only be a sketch, but my answers suggest that it is very presumptuous of contractarianist to suppose that they have captured the only logically valid basis of democratic practice universally.

108. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Ioan Biris

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Cette étude part de l'observation que l'idée de 'champ,' tout comme celle de 'fonction' représente une nouveauté de la pensée moderne. Employée surtout en physique, l'idée de 'champ' est fréquemment utilisée ces derniers temps dans les sciences sociales. El term de 'champ' reste tout de même un terme polymorphe. Cette étude se propose de tirer au clair les cadres conceptuels de ce terme et sa fonctionnalité pour le domaine du social. A cette fin, on considère qu'il faut fructifier la tradition de Tönnies en sociologie, où l'accent tombe sur la conception du social en tant que 'relation,' que 'réseau de significations.' Dans cette direction, il s'impose que la notion de 'champ' soit délimitée de celles de 'système,' de 'contexte' ou bien de 'pattern.' C'est pour cela que cette étude fait appel à la classification de Kant concernant la nature des connexions: 1) la composition (agrégation ou coalition); 2) la connexion (physique ou métaphysique). Il s'avère que les notions de 'pattern' et de 'contexte' sont des espèces de la composition-coalition, la notion de 'système' semble correspondre à la connexion physique de la classification kantienne et la notion de 'champ' a son équivalent dans la connexion de type métaphysique. Tout en considérant comme situations de 'champ' social ou culturel ces cas ou les parties constituantes ne peuvent ni être réduites les uns aux autres, ni rigoureusement séparés, l'analyse continue par révéler deux fonctions essentielles de l'idée de 'champ': la fonction générative et la fonction intégrative.

109. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Gustavo Caponi

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In The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism, Popper argues that there is no essential methodological distinction between human and natural sciences. Each of them, he claims, endeavors to elaborate and test causal explanations of the phenomenal world. However, in later writings he revises his position. The very notion of "situational (or logic) analysis" (previously introduced to characterize a simple heuristic device employed in the elaboration of explanations of human action) is more and more identified with the notion of "objective understanding." Such a notion is thought of as referring to the method which is peculiar to the human sciences. I show that the peculiarity of this method lies in the fact that experience is no longer investigated by means of "the principle of causality." Rather, it is investigated by means of what Popper calls "the principle of rationality" or "the principle of the adequacy of actions."

110. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Sandra Caponi

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Building on criticism directed against August Comte by Georges Canguilhem, I analyze Émile Durkheim's usage of the "normality-pathology" typology and show that these concepts do not support the organicist metaphor or the analogy between the social and the individual body. Rather, as suggested by Ian Hacking, these concepts are linked to the use of statistics and the Quetelian media, tools which allow us to understand social phenomena on populational terms. Thus, from the application of biological and statistical categories to sociological analysis, a kind of speech is born which enjoys solidarity with strategies of administration and management of the masses. This Foucault called the "biopolitics of the population."

111. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Anna Drabarek

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I assume that the feeling of evil is more widespread than the feeling of good. That is why intolerance as an attitude appears to be even more common than tolerance. This thesis is justified by psychological and sociological theories which, by analyzing the psyches of humans as individuals and of societies, explain why intolerance, destruction and aggressiveness control our actions so frequently. Therefore, in spite of positive intentions inherent in every person who dreams about being the best and living as decently as possible, an honest picture of our time evokes a rather pessimistic disposition. Although a lot has been done to implement a principle of ethical minimalism in society, at the same time there is also a moral approval — though with no one willing to admit it! — for integration mechanisms based on xenophobia.

112. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Chris Eberle

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In this paper, I articulate and evaluate an important argument in support of the claim that citizens of a liberal democracy should not support coercive policies on the basis of a rationale they know other citizens reasonably reject. I conclude that that argument is unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that religious believers who support coercive public policies on the basis of religious convictions do not disrespect citizens who reasonably regard such religious convictions as false.

113. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Marie Fleming

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In contemporary philosophy and social theory, Harbermas's theory of communicative action stands indisputably for a modernity enlightened about itself and its potential. Yet, however much he professes his commitment to universalist ideals of inclusiveness and equality, his influential theory is also marked by disquieting statements on matters of gender. I argue that the problem of gender in Habermas's theory can be traced to his attempt to rework the Marxian tradition of historical materialism. I do so by (a) discussing Habermas's proposal for reconstructing this tradition, and (b) examining the system/lifeworld distinction on which the theory of communicative action is based. Regarding (a), I direct attention to his argument that the Marxian concept of social labor cannot account for the specifically human form of reproducing life; a theory of social evolution and historical progress requires equal recognition of socialization processes and the moral-practical insight transmitted through those processes. I show that Habermas attributes a special value to the "female" labor of socialization and that he conceptualizes such labor as outside "social" labor. Regarding (b), I argue that while Habermas's system/lifeworld distinction in the context of historical materialism makes possible a more complex interpretation of Marx and Engels understanding of the basic components of social labor, his theory of communicative action-like his proposal for reconstructing historical materialism-reproduces the Marxian exclusion of "female" labor from social labor.

114. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Heta Häyry

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Recent developments in biology have made it possible to acquire more and more precise information concerning our genetic makeup. There are four groups of people who may want to know about our genes. First, we ourselves can have an interest in being aware of own health status. Second, there are people who are genetically linked with us, and who can have an interest in the knowledge. Third, individuals with whom we have contracts and economic arrangements may have an interest in knowing about our genetic makeup. Fourth, society as a whole can have an interest in the composition of our genes. As regards the question of motivation, the term 'should' can be interpreted in three ways. Prudentially speaking, to say that individuals should act in a certain manner is to say that the actions in question promote the long-term self-interest of these individuals. From the viewpoint of morality, we should do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong. When it comes to legal thinking, it is held in most liberal societies that grave other-regarding harm should be the primary justification for the use of coercion and constraint. In the paper, all these aspects are examined in more detail.

115. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Thelma Z. Lavine

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Habermas' social philosophy can now be perceived in its oppositional structures and their symbolic meaning. His repetition of structural opposition finds its expression in the symbolism which pervades The Philosophic Discourse of Modernity in the opposition between the dreaded myth of the Dialectic of Enlightenment and the redemptive fantasy of the path yet to be taken. More significant for the intellectual culture of modernity is the neglect, by erasure on the part of this esteemed philosopher, of the great drama of philosophy in our time. This is the drama occasioned by the dialectical struggle, rushing to climax in the 20th Century, between Enlightenment reason and its Counterenlightenment opponent. The struggle between these philosophical constellations is refracted in the great wars of this century. Thus the drama of the philosophical thought of the century and its historical development is lost. The philosophic discourse of modernity has yet to be written. Its text, once it has been freed from the tenacity of ideological hostilities and their erasures and concealing circumlocutions, will at the same time provide the sought-for foundation for social philosophy and a just society: it is the philosophic framework of Modernity itself which is the foundation of all modern philosophies, in the dialectic of Enlightenment and its Counterenlightenment other.

116. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Wolfgang Leo Maar

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The apprehension of the culture industry in its totality, as it is presented in Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, makes it necessary to turn to his Theory of Self-Formation, where the cultural domain of the constellation of society has an explicit formative dimension. The cultural formation, the German Bildung, expresses such a prism. It is not a national peculiarity, but it translates in the experience of delay of the German bourgeois society as the formative dimension of culture, generally hidden in the social constitution, facilitating the basis of immanent criticism. In the State interventionist society that follows the liberal order, with the manipulation of the totalitarian State and the society of mass consumption, the productive process does not tolerate the formative experience of autonomy: there is a social reconstruction of culture as culture industry, which turns out to be a political concept. Here there is not absence, but an eclipse of formation. It is semi-formation: only integration, without autonomy. When universality, instead of residing in ideals formed within culture formation, resides on universalization of given cultural goods, the mercantile ideals only integrate the masses. The culture industry is the chore of what appears as the cultural construction of society, in terms of the integrating semi-formation. The disintegration of the working class and its reconstruction en masse are a result of the formation process of which the culture industry is a part. Formation is concealed because the social construction is confounded with the cultural construction; society is itself ideology. The social organization obstructs the experience of the social formative labor in the integration. Society appears to be an extra-productive socialization.

117. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Roger Magyar

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Rawls' justification of political liberalism has been the subject of recent discussion in socio-political philosophy. In Political Liberalism, he has adjusted his original notion of ideal convergence, found in A Theory of Justice, to one of overlapping consensus. I argue that Catholics would find themselves excluded from being good citizens as Rawls defines proper citizenship. This follows from his statements concerning fairness in participating in the democratic process in that it would lead to, what I term, the Catholic paradox. This perspective from within the Catholic point of view indicates that there are similar problems to be found in other traditionally informed conceptions of what the good life is. In this way, the Catholic paradox draws attention to the empirical implausibility that competing conceptions of what the good life is, as understood from within their traditions, will not endorse Rawls' political theory. I then relate how easily it can be inferred that other traditions will face the same paradox and that they will not accept Rawls' political theory as being justified from their perspectives.

118. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Patricia S. Mann

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Ours is a time of dramatic and confusing transformations in everyday life, many of them originating in the social enfranchisement of women that has occurred over the past twenty-five years. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild demonstrates a widespread phenomenon of work-family imbalance in our society, experienced by people in terms of a time bind, and a devaluation of familial relationships. As large numbers of women have moved into the workplace, familial relations of all sorts have been colonized by what Virginia Held critically refers to as the contractual paradigm. Even the mother/child relationship, representing for Held an alternative feminist paradigm of selfhood and agency, has been in large part "outsourced." I believe that an Arendtian conception of speech and action might enable us to assert anew the grounds for familial relations. If we require a new site upon which to address our human plurality and natality, the postpatriarchal family may provide that new site upon which individuals can freely act to recreate the fabric of human relationships. It would seem to be our moral and political responsibility as social philosophers today to speculatively contribute to the difficult yet imperative task of reconfiguring the family. In this paper, I attempt to articulate the basic assumptions from which such a reconfiguration must begin.

119. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Anthony Mansueto

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This paper argues that: a) philosophy generally, and the dialectical tradition in particular, first emerged in Ancient Greece in response to the nihilism and relativism generated by the development of a market economy; b) despite differences between its 'idealist' and 'materialist' wings, it is possible to speak of a basically unified dialectical tradition extending from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle through the great medieval Aristotelians (Ibn Sina, Ibn Rusd, Maimonides, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas), up to Hegel, Marx and their interpreters, a tradition unified around the proposition that we can rise by rational means to a first principle which in turn serves as a principle of value and a criterion for ethical norms, thus becoming a standard by which to criticize the market order and argue for an alternative allocation of resources; c) the historic difficulties and current crisis of the dialectical tradition arise from a failure to demonstrate that the universe is a teleological system ordered to the perfection of form or the development of increasing levels of organization; and d) recent developments in the physical, biological and social sciences suggest that we may soon be in a position to remedy this difficulty. This paper criticizes those who say that it is no longer possible to "do philosophy the old way," and argues for the critical importance of philosophy generally and the dialectical tradition in particular for the future of the human civilizational project.

120. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 42
Alexandr V. Maslikhin

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The subject of this paper is social time-the peculiarities of the Past-Present-Future in social processes, and their unbreakable connection. I also focus on the necessity of taking stock of time in human activities and in the societal development. The Past in progress of society signifies the Already-happened which has become the possession of history. This Past exerts an enormous influence on the Present, determining it both directionally and functionally. The Present includes the Present itself, a part of the Past, and some elements of the Future. It represents the only reality for human beings as life is lived in the Present only. The Present creates the material and spiritual preconditions for the Future. Resolution of contemporary global problems is crucial for our Future which runs sequentially in three stages: immediate Future, visible Future and distant Future. All three exert influence on the Present by providing ideological and informational images. Time disciplines our minds and wills, organizes our actions and promotes our cognitions of the Past, the Present and the Future.