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121. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
D.S. Patelis

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Different conceptions of social philosophy were divided and polarized in different variants: from biological reductionism (the attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of biology) to sociocentrism. The approach V. A. Vazulin’s conception of “The Logic of History” makes it possible to concretize the dialectic of the natural (including the biological) and the social. The creative development of the method of scientific investigation made it possible to reveal the inner systematic interconnection of laws and categories of social theory which reflect the structure of developed society; it also made it possible to outline thetheoretical periodization of human history (the objective laws of its “ascent” from the very beginning, emergence, formation, to maturity) through a prism of interconnections of natural and social factors. The conception of “The Logic of History” opens a stage in the successive dialectical development of social philosophy by sublating historical materialism and the formation approach. The structure of society as a whole is a multi‐level, hierarchical and subordinated system, the organic whole of interconnected elements, relations and processes. The historical process is regarded as a gradual transformation of the natural (including the biological) by the social, i.e., as a social “sublation” of the latter by the former. The stages in the process of development are analyzed here: as theunity of the natural (including the biological) and the social; as a process of emergence of the social from the natural; as the transformation of thenatural by the social.
122. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
V.V. Pavlovskiy

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A modern stage of globalization is a historical and logical continuation of “an economical social formation” (K.G. Marx), a civilization (L.G. Morgan). The analysis of this globalization in philosophy and social sciences has an extremely contradictory character which is law-governed in the modern society. Modern globalization has been showing itself as a qualitatively new historical process since 1991. Judging from the positions of the dialectical materialistic theory of history (K.G. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin and others) it by its essence has got a postneoimperialistic, antagonistic character. It’s main features, attributes has been revealed. It doesn’t solve any sharp global problems, but only aggravated and intensifies them. This globalization has greatly increased, made inhuman the process of “cosmopolitization” which developed during the whole existence of capitalism and imperialism. A total degradation and dehumanization of a social person have been taking place, interstate and civil burst into flames, mass disturbances arise, hundreds thousands of people die, genocide and depopulation of some peoples on the planet become “normal” including the countries of the UIS. Destructive process of modern globalization with the USA as the main “player” together with corresponding international institutions (WTO, ICF, World bank, NATO and other), TNC have been resisted in a definite way by antiglobalizing andalterglobalizing movement in many countries on the planet.
123. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Lucinda Peach

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The so-called “war on terror” launched by the United States following 9/11 is only the latest in an ongoing strategy of responding to conflict around the world with military violence and armed force. These interventions appear to be premised on a belief that there is no alternative to using violence and armed force to resolve conflicts because human beings have fixed and unchanging identities which are either “with us or against us,” “friends or enemies,” “good or evil.” In contrast, despite the pervasiveness of violent conflict, suffering and human rights violations in their homelands, it is striking to note how a number of prominent Buddhist political and spiritual leaders remain optimistic about the possibilities of positive peace in the world. In exploring the reasons for these differences, I will focus on the views of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader of the government of Tibet in exile and the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize as well as the congressional gold medal, as well as those of two other Buddhist leaders: Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi, the democratically elected leader of Burma who has been held under house arrest by the ruling military junta for several years since her election in 1989, and the Vietnamese Buddhist Thich Nhat Hanh, who has worked for peace in his country since the start of the Vietnam War. As I will show, their views reflect starkly different assumptions about human beings, “enemies” in particular, that provide a more constructive framework for resolving conflict situations than those evident in the seemingly automatic resort to armed violence employed by US leaders.
124. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Rodney G. Peffer

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In my 1990 work – Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice – I argued for four modifications of Rawls’s principles of social justice and rendered a modified version of his theory in four principles, the first of which is the Basic Rights Principle demanding the protection of people’s security and subsistence rights. In both his Political Liberalism (1993) and Justice as Fairness (2001) Rawls explicitly refers to my version of his theory, clearly accepting three of my four proposed modifications but rejecting the fourth ‐‐ the demand for social and economic (in addition to political) democracy – on grounds that it automatically justifies socialism as opposed to capitalism. I argue, contrary to Rawls, that it is not true that this demand automatically picks (democratic) socialism as the preferablesocioeconomic/political system and that a Social and Economic Democracy Principle demanding workplace and neighborhood democracy is officially neutral between these two systems … although plausible empirical assumptions may, indeed, favor the former. I then significantly elaborate my second version of Rawls’s theory of social justice which is composed of the following principles arranged in a very strong order of priority (if not quite a lexical order): (1) Basic Rights Principle, (2) Equal Basic Liberties Principle, (3) Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, (4) Modified Difference Principle, and (5) Social and Economic DemocracyPrinciple. I argue that this elaborated version of the theory – which I call “Justice as Fair Rights” – is better than either Rawls’s original theory or my previous versions of it.
125. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ángeles J. Perona

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Every time that one refers to the political philosophy that could be drawn from the so called " Last Wittgenstein ", the most habitual thing is to associate it with conservative positions, given that the majority of the available literature on the matter does it so. Nevertheless, in the last few years some philosophers, such as Chantal Mouffe and Paolo Virno, have tried to offer a new picture in which Wittgenstein fits better with democratic political ideas, even though this manoeuvre requires to go beyond some presuppositions of Wittgenstein philosophy. My aim is to twofold. First, I will analyze why it has been thought that some elements ofWittgenstein’s late philosophy are compatible with political conservatism. Second, I will try to point out what notions of this network should be discarded in order to make it useful to elaborate democratic anticonservative models. This last task is necessary since it is logical to think that the same body of thought cannot be coherent with so different and even opposite political derivations.
126. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
He Ping

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Ideology has been a most prominent problem in today’s China ever since the establishment of the overall socialist market economy in China in the 1990s. What kind of ideology is in need for Chinese market economy? The question directly challenges Marxism, the leading ideology. Liberalism,New-Confucianism split and contradicted socialism and market economy, denied Marxist ideology and required the adoption of western Liberalism or traditional Confucianism as the leading ideology for today’s China. Whereas the Marxists insisted on socialist market economy, but had not founded the new theory of ideology suitable for thedevelopment of today’s China to criticize Liberalism and Neo-Confucianism. All these study caused the complicated situation of ideology. I think that the Chinese market economy challenges the former Marxist philosophy while at the same time becomes the moment that develops Marxist philosophy and recreates. This challenge shows the internal contradiction in the Chinese social structure, therefore, indicates that China is now experiencing a culture revolution in the micro world. Owing to this revolution, ideology is no longer the abstract knowledge suspended over the foundation, but a self-creation movement penetrating into thedaily life. Therefore, the creation of the Chinese ideology is not something clinging to the surface of the market economic construction but an internal part of it, the significant aspect leading the healthy development of the Chinese market economy.
127. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
M. Polishchuk

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The tragic experience of the XX century, the worth expression of which was Holocaust, challenges the fundamental values of civilized society. Its terrifying symbol is Auschwitz, extermination camp, Universe of terror – “the kingdom not of this world”. Its understanding is beyond classical concepts of good and evil and can not be described in the usual categories of crime and punishment . The entrance to this “kingdom” can be illustrated by Dante’s words written at the entrance to Hell (Inferno): “Abandon all hope, ye who enter here”. Finding no help, either in God or in human Reason, the shattered mind has to seek a new “measure of all things” to perceive wisdom born in despair.
128. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Gabriel Radu

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This article pays special attention to some issues of justice erased by extending constitutional and political problems to a more generally rank. Controversies generated by the principle of justice are multiplicated in their formulation in different social spaces and time relocation. In this article we test the applicability of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice in changing political orders, emphasizing its particularities and limitations. Solving past political problems in different political regimes induces many theoretical disscutions. In spite of all dificulties, new debates in intergenerational justice appears like a possibility in approaching controversial political matters. We’ll try also to formulate some proposals concerning the possibility of applications of some constrains of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice to changing political order issues.
129. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Juha Räikkä

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Political conspiracy theorists have done a lot of good in the past; undoubtedly they will do a lot of good in the future too. However, it is important to point out that conspiracy theories may have adverse consequences too. Political conspiracy theorizing, as a public activity, may lead to harmful scapegoating and its implications may be racist and fascist rather than democratic. Conspiracy theories may undermine trust in political institutions. Certain conspiracy theories are kept artificially alive, because of their political effects; “conspiracy theorists” do not always believe in their theories, but repeat them in public because of politicalreasons. Conspiracy theories have close connections to populism, and when theories are accepted widely enough, they remind harmful rumors. Sometimes conspiracy theories are designed and disclosed to make political decision-making more difficult and to create an impression that certain questions are still “open”. Certain conspiracy theories are disguised libels: they place individual persons in a “false light” in the public eye. In my presentation, I aim to discuss the ethics of political conspiracy theorizing and conditions for ethically acceptable conspiracy theorizing.
130. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Sushila Ramaswamy

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It is generally believed that through one-person one vote the diverse groups within society would be integrated into a shared identity. But the multiculturalists- Kymlicka, Parekh, Taylor, Young- argue that in well established democracies, some groups like African-American, indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious minorities and women feel marginalized and as a remedy, propose measures that the political system could mirror the distinct cultural identity of the different people. The critics of multiculturalism- Miller, Barry- argue that Liberalism accommodates cultural plurality and stresses on the need for shared identity and common public space, which multiculturalism overlooks.
131. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ali Rizvi

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Jürgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administration’s policies since the Iraq war. Habermas has developed this critique in several of his short pieces and interviews, some of which are available in fine collections in both English and other languages. However, the occasional and journalistic character of Habermas’ political interventions often hide the theoretical basis of his critique. In this paper, I argue that Habermas’ critique of the Bush administration’s foreign policy emanates from, and is founded upon, his conception of modernity, and specifically his views about the relationshipbetween “particularity” and “generality.” The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Habermas’ critique can actually be read as a critique of particularism, which Habermas sees operating behind American (and British) foreign policy, and which, in his view, compromises the key achievements of modernity (especially in its Kantian version.)
132. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Jitendra Nath Sarker

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In their book entitled “Democracy and the American Party System” Austin Ranney and (Willmoore Kendall have brought a charge again the pluralists that they denied the desirability of creating sovereign state and as such, according to them, they were opponents of democracy as well as of the very idea of government. The aim of this paper is to refute their charge and thereby to establish the view that the pluralists are in fact strong supporters of democracy in the real sense of the term and of popular sovereignty. What did most of them was that they made an attempt to bring to light the fact that democracy, as it is being practiced almost everywhere in the world, ultimately leads to denial of popular sovereignty, the basic element of self-government. Self-government can best be realized where the people is the real sovereign neither the state nor the numerical majority. And the government formed by the representatives elected in a traditional party-based election does not therefore, mean self-government. It can at best be called the government of the majority. Majority rule does not anyway mean democracy. It may be called ‘numbersocracy’ after the proper terminology of Ranney and Kendall. Democracy, de facto, is nothing other than majority rule that is best termed by John Calhoun, the ex-vice-president of the U.S.A, as the ‘rule by numerical majority’. ‘Numerical’ majority”, says he, “is not the people”. I strongly adhere to the pluralists’ view and therefore, conclude with an insistent assertion that numerical majority rule in disguise of democracy has in fact ruled out popular sovereignty.
133. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Paul Schollmeier

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The American philosopher John Dewey defines a public as those who are affected by indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that they deem it necessary to care systematically for these consequences. Unfortunately, his definition enables a public to cooperate merely for the control of the negative consequences of human action. Plato suggests that we might better define a public as those who deem it desirable to care for human action for the sake of itself as well as for the sake of its consequences. This definition would especially empower a public to increase cooperation for attaining the goods of human happiness and virtue.
134. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Omid Payrow Shabani

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Given the rise of religious movements during the past decade, some have argued that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as separation of church and state and principle of the public use of reason are too restrictive and ought to be rethought. I would like to argue along a Habermasian line that the principle of secular justification ought not to result in a private/public split in religious citizens’ identity if they recognize and adopt an “institutional translation proviso”. This proviso requires an epistemic ability on the part of religious citizens that enables them to translate their religious beliefs and insight into secular reasons when they pass beyond the informal public sphere into governmental institutions like courts and parliaments. Citizens can express and defend their claims in the public sphere in religious terms if they cannot find secular translation for them. However, this proposal requires a complementary change in the mentality of the secular citizens that recognizes the continued existence of religious communities in diverse liberal democracies.
135. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ramesh Chandra Sinha

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The present paper entitled "Subaltern Language Games and Political Conditions: A Perspective on Applied Philosophy" attempts to streamline Wittgensteinian language games and political conditions. The expression `subaltern ` stands for the meaning as given in the concise oxford dictionary, that is, `of inferior rank`. Subaltern language game is the game of marginalized people. Language game is meaningful in the context of social and political relationship. My contention is that technical or symbolic language is an instrument to serve the end of the affluent class. I think that any social and political change requires change in languagegame. By applied philosophy, I mean that philosophical theories are applicable in concrete human situation. In this sense, I have considered Wittgenstein as an applied philosopher because he holds that words are dead but assume life when it is used or applied in the concrete life situation. In order to make society free from exploitation and reduce inequality, we have to change the prevailing language game. The language game which I am proposing may be called as the "Subaltern Language Game". I have tried to understand Wittgenstein's language game in the light of Derrida's theory of deconstruction. The ordinary languagephilosophy as expounded in` Philosophical Investigation` deconstructs `technical language philosophy' of `Tractatus` because technical language gives an abstract system of symbols and lacks blood and flesh of lifeworld. My contention is that language game is inseparable from socio-political structure. As a matter of fact language game is the expression of forms of life. The language game of the affluent and the ruling class is different from the language game of the poor and downtrodden. The language game of one ethnic group is different from the language game of another ethnic group. The language game of the white people is different from the language game of the black. In Indian context, the language game of the upper caste is different from the language game of the lower caste. The possibility of inequality due to linguistic advantages of privileged class is a fact and not a fantasy. In order to develop linguistic capacity, it requires socio-political and socio-cultural mechanism. The social inequality due to linguistic handicap of individual can be lessened by a process of change in values. This process of change in value system is called culturalisation or sanskritisation. It can be helpful in changing the use of language and its meaning. Thus, in moving from theory to practice, philosophers work to change these words and rules for those philosophers who are trying to do applied philosophy. The language game of the applied philosopher should be fashioned in accordance with socio-political realities. It is not plausible to do applied philosophy with outdated mode of philosophising.
136. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Flavia Stara

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This paper explores both some of the concepts John Dewey exposed while in China in the 1920’s and considers why his idea of democracy did not thrive in China. In the lectures Dewey delivered in China he focused on the strength of democracy, from the perspective of political science, social science, philosophy and education. Dewey clarified the democratic way of thinking, doing and living to the Chinese people. Of these topics, he considered the philosophy of education and social and political philosophy to be the most important. Through his speeches, he underlined the importance of reflective thinking and reasoning in constructing human intelligence and lively inquiries. In the early part of the 20th century, both Dewey’s pragmatism and Marx’s communism were honored and speculated. While both Dewey and Marx promoted similar aims for human beings, that is, the creation of a society for the common good, their means were substantially different. For Dewey, such a result could only be obtained by a gradual construction of communicative social relationships; for Marx, a radical revolution was necessary to get expunge the old currently dominant parties. With regards to their relationship to working for the common good, for many Chinese, Dewey’s philosophies and ideas were unclear, overly complicated, and inefficient, while Marx pointed out a concrete destination, a clearly designed and expedient wayto implement an egalitarian society.
137. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
James Sterba

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Libertarianism has long been known for its opposition to a right to welfare, In this paper, I will oppose this view of libertarianism, maintaining that the libertarian’s own ideal of liberty requires just such a right to welfare. I begin by showing that there are conflicts of negative liberty between the rich and the poor. I then argue that when these conflicts are evaluated by the “ought “ implies “can” principle, the liberty of the poor has priority over the liberty of the rich, and it is this priority that provides the grounds for a right to welfare. Along the way, I argue that there are not two interpretations of libertarianism - an ideal based versionand a rights-based version - but only one and this interpretation supports a right to welfare.
138. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Andrzej Szahaj

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The paper treats about the relation between ideas of democracy and justice produced by a leading American political philosopher - John Rawls and ideology of multiculturalism. The author tries to show that Rawls’ arguments cannot meet the expectations of partisans of the ideology in question because they are very much Western or ethnocentric at the bottom. He argues that such a predicament is not to be lamented about because to be Western or ethnocentric when Euro-American culture is at stake is not something bad. On the contrary, being true to the some ideas of Western culture, especially these ones that are connected with individualism, human rights and liberal democracy, is worthy of acceptation. The conclusion of his paper says that the ideology of multiculturalism can be accepted only in its moderate forms and should be rejected in its extreme forms. It means that the limit of approval of multiculturalism lies at the political level and is connected with the relation of this ideology to the core political values of the Western culture.
139. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Joanna Szalacha

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In this paper the concept of structural power is presented as a philosophical and social category that should be used when modern processes of political, cultural or economic change are considered. The arguments will be presented in three stages: 1. Power - two perspectives, two traditions 2. Structural power - the concept 3. Structural power - as a mechanism of explanation the modern social change. The paper refers to two traditions of analyzing the problem of power (as a corrective or as a persuasive influence) and shows that concept of structural power can be a link between those two theoretical perspectives. The paper also refers to the problem of modern, macro changes. It will be shown how the concept of structural power, because of its usage of categories like "experts' power,"public discourse meanings" or "legitimization", can be useful in philosophical reflection about contemporary international and national issues.
140. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Gaziz Telebayev

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The "culture of war" has been formed firmly and minutely enough by humanity and is used with greater effectiveness than the "culture of peace" in modern world. Scepticism is one of the philosophical traditions where conceptual idea was worked out and later became a theoretical base of culture of peace. Seeing the meaning of scepticism in formation of culture of peace as an ideological paradigm in proper perspective one should mark those intentions which were offered and taken by philosophical society. The following principle can be referred to such philosophical intentions as principle of “isosthenea”, principle of “epoche”, tradition of “ataraxia”, principle of religious tolerance. The admission of principle of isosthenia means that the most preferable (that is valid, logical) way of settling the argument or conflict is a peaceful, compromise way because nobody can rely on greater truth of one's statement in comparison with the statement of an opponent. Principle of abstention from judgment (epoche) means that nobody can establish some values as absolute ones, nobody can possess the role of a judge while appraising the situation, and nobody can interfere the case which doesn't concern him. The result of abstention from judgment is the reaching of “ataraxia”. Scepticism of XVI - XVII centuries played a great role in methodological formation of culture of peace by means of manifestation and detailedbasing of principle of religious tolerance.