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181. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Dean M. Martin

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This work provides a thorough index of terms found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty. The index includes not only every philosophical term found in Wittgenstein's text, but also many non-philosophical terms when they are used in highly charged philosophical contexts. In all, there are some 575 main entries. Moreover, a concerted effort is made to indicate in what connections a given term is used by adding subordinate qualifying phrases to the main entries. For crucial terms (e.g., 'know,' 'proposition,' 'doubt,' etc.) the sub-entries indicating context are quite extensive.

182. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Fernando R. Molina

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C.I. Lewis wrote in his autobiography that the "general tenor" of his thought --conceptual pragmatism—may have "taken shape" under the influence of Josiah Royce. This study contains excerpts from lecture notes by Lewis taken in a course on logic taught by Royce. Juxtaposed with these excerpts are references to Lewis' early works. "The similarity of content between the excerpts and points later made by Lewis can be taken as evidence that Royce indeed had a massive influence on the young C.I. Lewis.


183. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Alicia Juarrero Roque

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After a brief summary of Alvin Goldman’s theory of the “level-generation” of complex act-tokens from basic acts, it is argued that if the occurrent want which causes the basic act becomes deactivated in medias res, or during the interval between the basic act and the generated events, the latter do not qualify as actions proper. A discussion follows of Steven Davis’s at tempts to provide a counterexample to GoIdman’s theory by suggesting an example in which the Goldman conditions are met and yet intuition tells us that the generated event is not an action. After concluding that Davis’s counterexamples are men of straw, a series of legitimately generated events which terminate in non-action is offered.

184. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9 > Issue: Supplement
Fernando R. Molina

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Prepared with the cooperation and assistance of Sara Timby, Stanford University Libraries, this edition contains papers that were still on C. I. Lewis' desk at the time of his death. Especially noteworthy is the fragment entitled "On Probability" in which Lewis directs his attention to the subject of past experiences, which, although now beyond recall, are regarded as having played a role in the fomation of our beliefs. Also included are notes on thought regarded as action, on the Kantian postulate of the existence of God, and Lewis' own notion of conscious life as "repository of value."


185. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Michael Chiarello

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Too much rationalist social philosophy is polarized into radical and conservative factions, both seeking support for rival claims to intellectual authority. Moreover, each faction can raise what it sees as a valid critique of the other. To the uncommitted, this mutual critique presents a reductio ad absurdum of rationalism and invites violence and despair. The radicalist claim that a rationalist social philosophy is necessarily radical clashes with the conservative critique which sees radicalism demanding the impossible from reason. So the question is whether this radical controversy between opposing rationalisms is amenable to rational resolution.This question is addressed through an examinalion of three writers: two radicals, Jean-Paul Sartre, who presents a comprehensive rationalism, and Herbert Marcuse, whose rationalism is irrationally grounded and authoritarian, and a conservative, Karl Popper, whose critique of comprehensive rationalism is effective against Sartre’s view, but whose own concession to irrationaIism unwittingly supports Marcuse’s approach.Yet, if Popper’s approach can be improved by abandoning both polarization and the exclusion of all radicalism, then we may have a rational social philosophy of a new non-authoritarian sort. The prospects for such a new approach are considered in the last section.
186. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Richard Double

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One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism (in Mortal Questions) is criticized. The principal criticisms are: (1) Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. (2) Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
187. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Michael R. Burke

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The paper formulates and defends a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles and demonstrates that it entails a non-trivial version of the doctrine of essentialism.
188. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Palmer Talbutt, Jr.

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The essay aims to sum up distinctions and relations between motives, purposes, and reasons, to ground a socio-cultural account of action. The method is selective critique of recent analyses and arguments.Motives are causal, but reasons are not. The construal of motives and purposes should be broader than usual. Purpose is that for the sake of which something is done, motive correlating to it as attitude to object; actions may count as intrinsic goods when done for their own sake; lastly, all actions are motivated. If a purpose is unreasoned and arbitrary, it doesn’t count as a reason, reasons being justificatory.Davidson’s breaching the distinction between reasons and causes can only be extenuated, not justified. That line holds by virtue of the way philosophy of culture, not philosophy of nature, makes sense of reasons in terms of approbative emulation. There is both a basis for dualism in the differentiation of culture from the world and one for monism in their mergence. Philosophy of action and ethics effectively suggest this joint divergence/mergence.
189. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Larry Lee Blackman

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In his 1911 paper, “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars,” Bertrand Russell supposes the question whether universals are spatial or non spatial turns on the question of the existence of particulars. If particulars could be shown to exist, then since, according to Russell, they obviously are spatial, the non-spatiality of universals would be established. On the other hand, the denial of the existence of particulars would entail the spatiality of universals.In this paper, I argue that Russell’s claim is plausible only if particulars are construed either as quality instances or as ordinary objects. If, however, particulars are either substrata or collections of qualities, nothing follows in regard to the spatiality or the non-spatiality of universals. Since the alternative interpretations of particularity are, I contend, at least as attractive as Russell’s, his failure to consider them makes his position less interesting than it might otherwise have been.
190. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Ewing Y. Chinn

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According to many critics, Descartes argued in a circle when he presumed to base the certainty (and thus knowledge) of propositions that fulfill his epistemic criterion of being “clearly and distinctly perceived” on the demonstration that God exists and is not a deceiver. But his critics say, that demonstration, as he presented it, presupposed the validity of the same epistemic criterion. I critically examine two major strategies to dispel the appearance of circularity, two ways of interpreting Descartes’ argument.My approach shares with the second strategy the contention that Descartes did adopt the principle that “whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true is true,” prior to his consideration of the God question. Moreover, his demonstration of God’s existence and veracity made use of the principle. But my claim is that the knowledge of God’s existence and veracity is not used to validate the principle of clear and distinct perception (that would be unnecessary). It is used rather to defeat the sceptic’s argument that we cannot have any knowledge of the external, physical world. I proceed to present and explain Descartes’ argument centered around the thesis, “I cannot be certain that (r) any of my representational ideas of the external world are veridical, unless I am certain that (q), God exists and is not a deceiver.” That is, I prove why, for Descartes, (q) is necessary for (r). My discussion exposes some new facets to the principle of clear and distinct perception and reveals the fact that some familiar Cartesian distinctions that were not thought to be relevant to the problem of the Cartesian Circle are crucial to the solution of that problem.
191. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Martin Curd

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In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.
192. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
C. Stephen Byrum

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In a rather obscure moment in James Joyce’s Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man, Stephen Dedalus enters into a conversation with an equally obscure character named Ghezzi. The conversation concerns the Nolan, Giordano Bruno. Ghezzi recalls that Bruno was a “terrible heretic,” and expresses “some sorrow” that he was burned at the stake.For the history of philosophy, there may similarly be “some sorrow” that little more is known about Bruno than that which is contained in Joyce’s reference. He certainly has not come to be viewed as being as important as Galileo or Copernicus, and all things considered, probably is not. However, the views ahout an infinite universe which they expounded with no little fear and intimidation, Bruno bullishly popularized.From time to time, historians of philosophy will touch base with Bruno, recall his ideological martyrdom, and again try to interpret some of his odd speculations. This article attempts to serve two functions in this regard. First, it acts as a basic primer on Bruno for those who may not be especially aware of his contribution to the history of Western philosophy. Then, for those well-versed in philosophy, it acts as a review of Bruno based on some of the latest materials that have been written on his life and thought.
193. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Daniel A. Putman

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Kripke has noted that possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered, and that the stipulation of these worlds allows us to separate accidental from essential properties. In this paper I argue that possible worlds theory gives us an important tool for analyzing what Descartes is doing in the Meditations. The first Meditation becomes a thought experiment in which possible realities are stipulated in a search for one or more essential properties. Viewing the doubt in this manner sheds new light on the cogito and sum res cogitans and shows the limitations of some contemporary discussion of the cogito, namely, the positions taken by Ayer and Hintikka.
194. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
La Verne Shelton

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I argue that though a satisfactory semantics for the logic of inexact reference may assign no truth value to some statements, it should not assign truth (or falsity) of various degrees. Well-formed assertions are simply true or not. Inexactness does not “ramify.” I distinguish inexactness from other sorts of vagueness, including nonspecificity. I show that arguments from (i) use of quantifiers, (ii) the existence of properties which can be construed as a series of properties (as, e. g., red can be construed as a set of shades of red), (iii) the constructability of apparently paradoxical sorites arguments, and (iv) the presence of prototypes in the extension of a predicate do not show that there are degrees of truth.Much of the alleged evidence that inexactness ramifies is, in fact, a misreading of the undeniable evidence that there may be uncertainty about the truth value of a claim. In support of my claims, I discuss how cases of deeming that a predicate applies relate to its actually applying. A distinction between predicates of “pure” and “impure” function is essential to this.
195. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Igal Kvart

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This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
196. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Harry A. Nielsen

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Much of the literature on the question “Is a human essentially distinct from every possible machine?” proceeds on the assumption that we know what a man essentially is, namely a living body with such attributes as consciousness, freedom, feeling and linguistic competence. Is a man essentially that? The paper contrasts that picture of man with Kierkegaard’s account of man as essentially self. Hard limits of machine subjectivity begin to appear in the failure of certain everyday concepts involving ‘self’ to engage at all with the concept ‘machine’.
197. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Fred Wilson

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Bergmann has proposed an ontology that contains an entity many find strange: particularity. And in fact, Bergmann, too, seems to find it strange. He proposes a phenomenological method in ontology, and holds, as he therefore should, that particularity is presented. Nonetheless, he also holds that it is ineffable, that its presence in a particular is an unsayable state of affairs, and that it is something which is not a thing and yet is also not nothing. Bergmann’s position has been long developing, but especially in three recent essays. The aim of the present essay is to explore these views. We shall examine Bergmann’s method, and some criticisms of it by Rosenberg, in order to see whether we cannot get a better grasp of particularity. Specifically, we shall try to see whether it is not, after all, effable. It will turn out that this disagreement on the effability of particularity is really three disagreements: one concerning whether a particular can be thought apart from particularity, a second concerning the analysis of intentionality, and a third concerning whether, in the ontologically important sense of ‘different’, entities that are different are separable.
198. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Jasper Hopkins

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C. Stanley Kane’s book, Anselm’s Doctrine of Freedom and The Will, is the only monograph in English on this topic. It will therefore influence a wide array of students and scholars. The book advances five theses: (1) that Anselm operates with a general ontological principle to the effect that the essential nature of anything is determined by its purpose in existing; (2) that Anselm’s theory of the will is not determinist but a variant of indeterminism; (3) that human freedom, for Anselm, consists in the ability either to do or not do what is unjust; (4) that, on Anselm’s view, God alone directly causes all just volitions in human beings; and (5) that Anselm regards the imparting of grace as solely dependent upon God’s offer and man’s response, without regard to the influencing effect of circumstances.I show that Anselm does not adhere to a single one of these allegedly Anselmian theses.
199. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
Charles Echelbarger

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The author examines Scheffler’s extensional alternative to the usual notion of belief and shows that it is necessarily inadequate to serve the purpose for which it was designed. This point is established by showing that Scheffler’s proposed substitute for psychologically intensional verbs like ‘believes’ can not deliver philosophers from the classical puzzles over propositional attitudes and can not be used in all cases even to provide materially equivalent extensional substitutes for ordinary belief-statements.
200. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 9
William A. Rottschaefer

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Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic categories are in the first instance teleological explanatory categories and consequently can be observational. And I show how theoretical mentalism can be maintained even though thought is primarily symbolic.