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session 8: justice in twentieth century thomism

21. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
William Matthew Diem

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Anscombe argues in “Modern Moral Philosophy” that obligation and moral terms only have meaning in the context of a divine Lawgiver, whereas terms like ‘unjust’ have clear meaning without any such context and, in at least some cases, are incontrovertibly accurate descriptions. Because the context needed for moral-terms to have meaning does not generally obtain in modern moral philosophy, she argues that we should abandon the language of obligation, adopting instead the yet clear and meaningful language of injustice. She argues further that we should develop an account of human flourishing to answer the question why we need to be just. The essay contends that Aquinas has an account of obligation that requires neither a god nor an account of human flourishing, and that proceeds immediately from the common apprehension of justice Anscombe noted.
22. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
James Dominic Rooney, OP

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Hans Bernhard Schmid has argued that contemporary theories of collective action and social metaphysics unnecessarily reject the concept of a “shared intentional state.” I will argue that three neo-Thomist philosophers, Jacques Maritain, Charles de Koninck, and Yves Simon, all seem to agree that the goals of certain kinds of collective agency cannot be analyzed merely in terms of intentional states of individuals. This was prompted by a controversy over the nature of the “common good,” in response to a perceived threat from “personalist” theories of political life. Common goods, as these three authors analyze them, ground our collective action in pursuit of certain kinds of goals which are immanent to social activity itself. Their analysis can support an alternate position to “intentional individualism,” providing an account of collective practical reasoning and social metaphysics based on shared intentional states, but without involving implausible “group minds.”

acpa reports and minutes

23. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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24. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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25. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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26. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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27. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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28. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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29. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90

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