Balkan Journal of Philosophy

This article examines the epistemological views of key quantum physicists of the Copenhagen circle (Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Léon Rosenfeld). The discussion begins with a presentation of their conception of measurement, indeterminacy and complementarity, and goes on to focus on their views regarding the nature of being and knowledge. The author identifies the basic areas of consensus in the Copenhagen circle as well as the disagreements and disputes that arose between its members. Three main points are argued: (1) The fundamental epistemological consensus in the group was that subject and object are inseparable; that the subject participates in the formation of images of reality, which are multiple and depend on how the subject is concretely constituted historically; the disagreements within the group did not arise with logical inevitability from the principles of quantum mechanics but largely stemmed from ideological clash in the Cold War context. (2) Being linked to specific configurations of the subjects, knowledge is always relative; but it does not follow that knowledge is illusory or inadequate; on the contrary, it is the pretension of attaining the ultimate nature of things “in themselves” that leads to devaluation of any concrete knowledge. (3) The world is something external, generally independent of our desires and will, but at the same time is constructed as concrete objects through the specific configuration of each concrete subject.

The scientific paradigm which I rely upon in the framework of this article is quantum mechanics, whose “cognitive revolution” consisted of replacing the classical principle of separability with the principle of nonseparability or global intercorrelation. According to this intercorrelation, highlighted at the subatomic level, the part cannot be separated from the whole, because every part has a global and instantaneous connection with the whole universe. For this reason the foundation of the world cannot be the part (elementary particles), but the whole, which is therefore logically and ontologically prior to the part, i.e., self-consistent. Consequently, the principle of global intercorrelation elucidates and validates some of the oldest philosophical problems and intuitions about the unity or self-consistency of the world. An example in this sense is the bootstrap theory of American physicist Geoffrey Chew, which presents such striking similarities to the metaphysical system of Leibniz's Monadology that the two intertwine and mirror each other, like twin souls, to the extent that it could be stated that if Chew’s bootstrap theory represents the explanatory physical level of Leibniz’s metaphysics, then, analogously, Leibniz’s Monadology represents the explanatory metaphysical level of Chew’s physics.

The present paper intends to show that computer simulations used in science are akin to fiction. Starting from the problem of defining computer simulation, the paper discusses the uses and disadvantages of simulations in science. Computer simulations have a representational function, but they do not resemble the phenomena that they purport to represent. Computer simulations do not preserve the content of the models, input data, and theories from which they proceed, since the content is modified by computational processes. Because of the complexities of these processes, we cannot control or test the methods used to process the content of computer simulations. Still, simulations may help to explain the behaviour of a possible aspect of the phenomenon under examination. Although their role in doing so may be limited, by conforming to and immersing us in the worldview of science, simulations, thus reinforce the intuitions of the existing body of scientific knowledge, and similarly to the “believable fiction” described by John Woods, provide genuine understanding.

The aim of this article is to show how the ambivalent nature of reality might impact artificial intelligence (AI) use in medicine. The work illustrates that machine learning (ML) modelling requires some significant levels of data straight-jacketing to be efficient. However, data objectification will be counter-productive in the long run in AI-enabled medical contexts. The problem is that the ambivalent nature of realities requires a non-objectified modelling process, which is missing in machine learning at the moment. On the basis of this, the study hypothesizes that AI-enabled medicine will continue to depend largely on human intelligence to be efficient at least for the foreseeable future. The implication of this is that intelligent machines should be viewed as co-workers with man. The study draws from the theories of ontology in the Western continental tradition (especially the Heideggerian ontology) and the African philosophical tradition to ground the discourse.

Organic Marxism, a new development in the history of Marxism, has elicited scrutiny in China. Beyond merely being considered absurd, it has been accused of curbing China’s development on the pretext of ecological motivations,weakeningChina’s dominant ideology by introducing ideological competition, and enabling religious infiltration by promoting Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and constructive postmodern philosophy, which are of a religious nature. Fortunately, organic Marxism has survived despite fierce attacks from fundamentalist Marxists. This paper intends to answer three questions related to this topic: How can organic Marxism survive in China? What is it about organic Marxism that attracts the Chinese most? What lessons can be learned from the fundamentalist Marxists’ attacks?

Mugham is deeply rooted in Azerbaijan’s history as it is undoubtedly depicted as the pearl of Azerbaijani musical art. Mughаm (Azerb. Muğam) (God sent music) is one of the main genres in traditional Azerbaijani music, part of the musical-poetic art of Azerbaijan’s nation. The Mughаm embodies philosophical poetry including the philosophy of music as a complement to the harmony of being. In 2008, UNESCO proclaimed the Azerbaijani Mugham as one of the masterpieces of verbal and intangible cultural heritage. This music must be understood in its two dimensions – as an example of an art and as a way of thinking, in which Sufism and Mysticism are two lines that intersect. The aim of the article is to show the unity of Azerbaijan’s spiritual culture and the synthesis of music and religion. Special attention is focused on Mugham as a type of connection with God, through mystical love and spiritual experience. This perspective differs from that of common research and discussions of Mugham, which view it principally as a unique type of poetic-musical communication between performers and a devoted audience. The post-Soviet period allowed Western scholars to become acquainted with the musical works of Azerbaijani masters of Mugham and to compare their musical-aesthetic features with those of German Romanticism. In this paper, we move beyond such considerations to claim that Mugham ought to be recognized ‘as a spiritual process preserving the dynamism of thinking’. The report will conclude with the concomitant claim that Mugham represents an intercultural philosophy.

The article addresses the two sides of the work of Nicholas Maxwell – his criticism of science and his call to bring about a revolution in academia encouraging it to become much more effective in tackling the real problems humanity is facing. I would use: It focuses on the connection of these two aspects of Maxwell’s work and provides a critical analysis of Maxwell’s conceptual framework. It is argued here that the two sides of Maxwell’s whole conception are not necessarily connected, and do not have to be. Academia can be more effectively organized even without a change in our understanding of science. Maxwell has argued that academia has to aim at making wisdom rather than knowledge its goal. The knowledge-inquiry framework that currently prevails should be exchanged for wisdom-inquiry. Maxwell has explained his understanding of wisdom in several publications, while not being fully consistent in his explanations of what wisdom-inquiry has to embrace. In addition, Maxwell’s original approach to rationality goes against traditional attitudes. Maxwell is definitely critical of the Enlightenment but his attitude to Romanticism remains unclear. Related to these, the article addresses the future tasks of universities.

In the following paper, I address the worry that there is an increasing gap between the way the world is perceived by students and by their professors and teachers respectively. I argue that even if there is indeed a huge difference between our two generations, ‘the gap’ becomes irrelevant when we engage in philosophising. I will attempt to provide three short proposals on how to eradicate the gap when teaching philosophy. My hope is to show that, if we really want to make an attempt to eliminate the lack of understanding between the students and us, there are four basic rules that we could apply to our educational method. My argument makes use of the concepts of truth-value, consensus and epistemic normativity.

The paper is devoted to the problem of investigating the identity of a personality in contemporary philosophy. The author states that some factors (intensification of cultural and communicative exchange, population migration, information technologies) have led to a significant transformation of the phenomenon of identity at the civilizational stage. The presented points of view and approaches of contemporary philosophers (representatives of psychoanalysis, existentialism, etc.) that the author relies on indicate a crisis of identity. The author of the paper describes creativity, communication, reflection, value-semantic sphere, cultural and symbolic environment as the criteria of identity. The author also constructs her own model of the identity system based on the famous Russian researcher, G.P. Shchedrovitsky’s concept of the system, as the way to avoid a crisis of identity. The author comes to the conclusion that the identity of a modern person is wholly constructed, in contrast to the phenomenon of pseudo-identity. The results of the paper can be applied in sociology, cultural studies, psychology in the context of the problem of personal and collective identity.

This article will address descriptive and normative concepts vis-à-vis their inferential value and epistemic evolution within the social sciences. The analysis focuses mainly on the normative concept, which arises in the intersection between various disciplines of the social sciences, blending within itself a dialectic between the subjective and the objective, between the individual and the social. The descriptive concept – which acts as a link between logos qua language and the empirical reality – will have less elaborated analysis. The article’s purpose is convenient for readers acquainted with the field in question as well as those for whom the topic is less known. Indeed, the article is intended to address the above concepts from the point of view of the political scholar. However, during the research process, it was considered appropriate that these conceptions have an interdisciplinary heuristic reflection in order to be of value and interest to scholars of political science, philosophy, and law. As a first step, we will present in classical form the meaning and explanation of the concepts in question, based on linguistic and philosophical dictionaries. The article also focuses on the solid definition given to the concept of normativity – understood in legal terms – by Hans Kelsen through his idea of a Base Norm (Grundnorm) and his critique of Max Weber’s sociological conception of norms. Secondly, we will outline the dichotomy between the concepts of “is” and “ought” – the former analyzed by Kant as a hypothetical imperative, as a determinant of goals and actions based on desires and, the latter considered as a categorical imperative, as a normative determinant based on reason. Another dimension of normativity is seen from the perspective of analytical jurisprudence, the dialectic created between formalists and anti-formalists in the treatment of morality, both in subjective and social terms. Finally, the emphasis will be placed on normativity in politics and in spoken language, dimensions that define the normative approach.

The article reviews cases of unsuccessful implicatures and possible reasons for misunderstanding the speaker’s meaning. The focus is on explaining misunderstanding with the graded salience hypothesis. Under review are examples of cases where the conventional meaning and intended meaning differ thus resulting in a misunderstanding. The graded salience hypothesis offers an explanation of how we understand expressions based on personal preference priority, so the main argument made is that in cases of misunderstanding the speaker and the listener prioritize different meanings attributed to the same expression due to differences in knowledge, personal background, familiarity with the expression in particular usage, etc. There are also cases of scalar implicatures where the inference meaning is not always the same. In such cases, the speaker’s meaning could be misunderstood if the listener considers a different meaning of the scalar expression as more salient than the one the speaker wishes to convey.

Ontological parsimony requires that if we can dispense with A when best explaining B, or when deducing a nominalistically statable conclusion B from nominalistically statable premises, we must indeed dispense with A. When A is a mathematical theory and it has been established that its conservativeness undermines the platonistic force of mathematical derivations (Field), or that a non numerical formulation of some explanans may be obtained so that the platonistic force of the best numerical-based account of the explanandum is also undermined (Rizza), the parsimony principle has been respected. Since derivations resorting to conservative mathematics and proofs involved in non numerical best explanations also require abstract objects, concepts, and principles under the usual reading of “abstract,” one might complain that such accounts turn out to be as metaphysically loaded as their platonistic counterparts. One might then urge that ontological parsimony is also required of these nominalistic accounts. It might, however, prove more fruitful to leave this particular worry to the side, to free oneself, as it were, from parsimony thus construed and to look at other important aspects of the defeating or undermining strategies that have been lavished on the disposal of platonism. Two aspects are worthy of our attention: epistemic cost and debunking claims. Our knowledge that applied mathematics is conservative is established at a cost, and so is our knowledge that nominalistic proofs play a genuine theoretical role in best explanations. I will suggest that the knowledge one must acquire to show that nominalistic deductions and explanations do indeed play their respective theoretical role involves some question-begging assumptions regarding the nature and validity of proofs. As for debunking, even if the face value content of either non numerical claims, or conservative mathematical claims, or platonistic mathematical claims didn’t figure in our causal explanation of why we hold the mathematical beliefs that we do, construed or understood as beliefs about such contents, or as beliefs held in either of these three ways, we could still be justified in holding them, so that the distinction between nominalistic deductions or non numerical explanations on the one hand and platonistic ones on the other turns out to be spurious with respect to the relevant propositional attitude, i.e., with respect to belief.

The paper presents the classical theory of the subject in the predication judgment, and then the Hegelian doctrine on the subject, with the intention of conducting a comparative analysis. The results of the analysis sustain the viewpoint according to which between the classical subject and the subject of speculative judgment there are some relations that entitle one to consider speculative judgment as a development of classical judgment, for the cases in which the subject is taken as a process.

In the present article, the author analyses the interpretation of the phenomenon of Christ by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. The author uses comparative and hermeneutic methods of historical and philosophical research. Dostoevsky's Christ and Nietzsche's Jesus are interpreted as “conceptual characters” (G. Deleuze), occupying an important place in the philosophical constructions of both thinkers. Stating the epoch-making event of the “death of God” in European culture, they discover the origins of nihilism in Christianity itself and attempt (each in his own way) to recreate the original, pristine Christianity. Reconstruction of the original image of Christ makes it possible to comprehend not only the historical destiny of Christianity and the European portion of humanity, but also the prospects for overcoming the crisis of European and Russian (in the case of Dostoevsky) self-consciousness. It is argued that both interpretations, although far from orthodox Christianity, play the role of a central link in the development of the philosophic thinking of the Russian writer and German philosopher from the critical deposition of European humanism and metaphysics to new projects of human existence in the world. The conceptual images of Dostoevsky's Christ and Nietzsche's Jesus personally embody the spiritual attitudes and models of life that are timeless in nature, and at the same time serve as an expression of the “fundamental metaphysical positions” (M. Heidegger) of existential thinkers. The assertion of the absolute genuineness and beauty of the moral ideal of Christ allows Dostoevsky to return transcendence to the godless world – to substantiate the neo-Christian version of metaphysics, the religious-existential ontology. The “Glad Tidings” of Jesus, his life and death, appear in Nietzsche’s works as a practical elimination of transcendence, the Platonic dualism of the “true” and “visible” worlds. The spiritual attitude of Jesus reveals a direct affinity to Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical “philosophy of becoming”.

Evolutionary models for scientific change are generally based on an analogy between scientific changes and biological evolution. Some dissimilarity cases, however, challenge this analogy. An issue discussed in this essay is that despite natural evolution, which is currently considered to be non-globally progressive, science is a phenomenon that we understand as globally progressive. David Hull's solution to this disanalogy is to trace the difference back to their environments, in which processes of natural selection and conceptual selection occur. I will provide two arguments against this solution, showing that Hull's formulation of natural selection prohibits him from removing the environment from the selection process. Then I point to a related tension in his theory, between realism and externalism in science, and give some suggestions to solve these tensions.

The article reviews the concepts of the French anthropologist and political theorist Sylvain Lazarus and the philosopher Alain Badiou, who suggest a new perspective on the subjective foundations of politics as thought. The focus on the subjective foundations of politics can be explained by the initial ambiguity in the works of the French theorists, who interpret the activities of the intellectual activist in different ways. The paper shows that Sylvain Lazarus is more concerned with the intellectual activity of political activists, whom he categorizes as political activists and politicians by the degree of intellectual activity. It was concluded that, according to Lazarus, politicians occupy a priority position. They are presented as professional lone thinkers with revolutionary consciousness, which allows them to think politics from the perspective of a probable revolution. In this regard, the politics, according to Lazarus, is a politics of revolutionary action. It was found that in Alain Badiou’s theory the semantic emphasis is on the participation of intellectuals in politics. Based on Plato’s thought on the development of a philosopher, Badiou formulates the idea of an exemplary subject of politics. The exemplary subject of politics is a philosopher-mathematician who is good at mathematical logic.