Cover of The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy
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21. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Ubiratan B. de Macedo

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22. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Alistair M. Macleod

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In opposition to the instrumental doctrine of rationality, I argue that the rationality of the end served by a strategy is a necessary condition of the rationality of the strategy itself: means to ends cannot be rational unless the ends are rational. First, I explore cases-involving ‘proximate’ ends (that is, ends whose achievement is instrumental to the pursuit of some more fundamental end) — where even instrumentalists must concede that the rationality of a strategy presupposes the rationality of the end it serves. Second, I draw attention to the counter-intuitive consequences — in cases involving ‘non-proximate’ ends — of substituting (allegedly more manageable) questions about de facto ends for questions about the rationality of ends. Third, I argue-against Nozick — that it is a mistake to suppose that the only question dividing instrumentalists from non-instrumentalists is whether the instrumental doctrine needs supplementation. Finally, I try to show that questions about the rationality of ends need not be viewed as impossibly daunting.

23. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Alison Roberts Miculan

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One of the most pervasive problems in theoretical ethics has been the attempt to reconcile the good for the individual with the good for all. It is a problem which appears in contemporary discussions (like those initiated by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue) as a debate between emotivism and rationalism, and in more traditional debates between relativism and absolutism. I believe that a vital cause of this difficulty arises from a failure to ground ethics in metaphysics. It is crucial, it seems to me, to begin with "the way the world is" before we begin to speculate about the way it ought to be. And, the most significant "way the world is" for ethics is that it is individuals in community. This paper attempts to develop an ethical theory based solidly on Whitehead’s metaphysics, and to address precisely the problem of the relation between the good for the individual and the common good, in such a way as to be sympathetic to both.

24. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
John Mizzoni

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Michael Ruse has argued that evolutionary ethics discredits the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Ruse must employ dubitable assumptions, however, to reach his conclusion. We can trace these assumptions to G. E. Moore. Also, part of Ruse’s case against the foundations of ethics can support the objectivity and foundations of ethics. Cooperative activity geared toward human flourishing helps point the way to a naturalistic moral realism and not exclusively to ethical skepticism as Ruse supposes.

25. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Douglas Moggach

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This paper examines the relation between Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in order to explain the analogy in the doctrine of right (Ak. VI, 232) between juridical interactions and the movement of bodies according to mechanical laws. Kant’s various formulations of the idea of reciprocal action, and his concept of limit, are central to the examination. A comparison with Fichte is suggested, and implications for the theory of property are indicated.

26. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Joanna G. Patsioti

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I examine the philosophical perspectives of Aristotle on issues of medical ethics and on his social ethics in general, including the moral issues of abortion, euthanasia, and other issues of social ethics such as the issue of cloning. I have chosen the domain of applied ethics as viewed from the Aristotelian point of view precisely because certain issues have been virtually unexamined by scholars. I shall direct attention to certain treatises of the Aristotelian corpus such as On the History of Animals, On the Generation of Animals, On the Soul, The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics. My main objective is to provide a more systematic account of the Aristotelian perspectives on the above controversial issues and to establish the Stagirite’s main approach to social ethics. For this reason, issues like the notion of personhood, his attitude towards death, and his theory of the will and ethical conduct of a moral citizen-agent will be examined. Throughout this investigation, the close interrelation between philosophy and medicine, both in antiquity and in modern times, will also become more apparent.

27. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Christopher Phillips

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Philosopher Matthew Lipman, in Social Inquiry, says that there are instances in which 'what one deserves may be specified fairly readily. A sick child deserves medicine, a hungry child deserves food, children deserve an education...' This seems to imply that these are cases in which what one deserves is clear-cut, and only when 'the cases become more complicated' does it become 'progressively more difficult' to determine desert. I would submit that these cases are not nearly so cut-and-dry, in terms of determining desert, as one might imagine. Is it really correct to say that a sick child deserves medicine? Who is to say? Who is to be the ultimate arbiter? Is there some sort of authority or power (higher or otherwise) who is looked to in order to make such a determination (or who is looked to in order to justify making such an assertion in the first place)? Is desert to be determined based on need? On abundance of what is deserved? On legal entitlements? This paper will address just such questions.

28. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Gut Przemysla

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Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist, die fundamentalen Gründe dafür zu bestimmen daß die Ethik von ihrem Wesen her normativ ist und daß sie als (1) theoretische und (2) autonome Disziplin möglich ist. Seit dem Positivismus begegnet man immer häufiger der gegenteiligen Ansicht (die heute besonders im Naturalismus präsent ist), daß eine als normative und autonome Disziplin verstandene Ethik nicht real sei. Man meint, sie [die Ethik] müsse durch reduktive Analyse entweder als Teil der Biologie oder als Fragment der Soziologie interpretiert werden-wer schon Comte von einer ‘sozialen Physiologie’ sprach. Die Ethik soll nicht mehr sein als lediglich (1) eine Art von Analyse der Motive, die von streng definierten biologischen Mechanismen ausgelöst werden, welche von bestimmten emotionales Reaktionen begleitet sind (Lust oder Unlust), oder (2) eine Art von Analyse der sozialen und psychologischen Dimension des menschlichen Lebens, eine Untersuchung der dieses beherrschenden Gesetze. Dabei wird vorausgesetzt, daß das faktische Verhalten sowie die faktischen Bestrebungn unk Neigungen sowie die ihnen zugrundeliegenden beständigen biologischen Mechanismen autonomatisch in sittliche Verhaltensregeln übersetzt werden (siehe M. Schlick, Fragen der Ethik]. Man is der Meinung, jeder Versuch einer rationalen Erklärung und Begründung der Aufgaben der Ethik (der faktisch formulierten Urteile und Norman) sei nur ‘von außen her’ möglich, d.h., infolge der Anweendung von aus anderen Theorien (Biologie, Soziologie oder Psychologie) übernommenen Prozeduren unk Kriterien. Andernfalls bliebe die Ethik ein ungeordnetes und unkoordiniertes Ensemble von Direktiven und Beobachtungen, denen höchstens eine übergeordnete Losung oder-schlimmer noch-the bloße Names einer Autors eine gemeinesame Farbe verleihen könne [siehe M. Ossowska Glówne modele systemów etycznych, Studia Filozofiezne 4 (1995), nr. 4.

29. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Hermann Rampacher

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Social standards guide us in what to do and what to refrain from doing. But can social — moral or legal — standards be trusted? This paper presents an evolutionary ethical theory that generates trustworthy ethical norms. Each norm is assigned a demonstrable risk, called an ethical risk, that depends on both human behavior and danger to the survival of society. The assigned risk is minimal if and only if everybody obeys the norm. The higher the risk assigned to a norm, the higher the norm’s rank (an empirical quantity depending on the evolutionary status of society). An ordered finite set of ethical risks and ethical norms allows the settlement of ethical problems arising in society. Subsets of existing moral and legal standards all over the world are compatible with norms being elements of these ordered finite sets of ethical norms. Like all standards, ethical norms are often violated. A single violated norm suffices to activate correlations between risks, resulting in an ethical conflict. The more often a high-ranking norm is violated, the poorer the society in question. Ethical conflicts can be resolved by responsible persons or groups advancing higher-ranking norms involved in optimization at the expense of lower-ranking norms. Examples are given to support the theory.

30. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Edward Sankowski

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I argue that autonomy should be interpreted as an educational concept, dependent on many educative institutions, including but not limited to government. This interpretation will improve the understanding of autonomy in relation to questions about institutional and societal legitimate authority. I aim to make plausible three connected ideas. (1) Respecting individual autonomy, properly understood, is consistent with an interest in institutions in social and political philosophy. Such interest, however, does require a broadening of questions about institutional and societal legitimacy. (2) Individual autonomy can and should be re-conceived as a multi-institutional educational notion. We must appreciate the manifold institutional process. There are diverse questions about legitimacy as institutional and societal authority that generate normative demands binding on the individual. (3) There is some uncertainty about which institutions do or should educate for autonomy. The shift to an educational, multi-institutional model of autonomy renders more questionable and probably de-emphasizes the role of blame and punishment as paradigmatically institutionalized expressions of respect for autonomy in educating for autonomy. Nonetheless, such an educational model does not eliminate concern about autonomy, blame and punishment. Rather, it broadens questions about the legitimacy of the normative function of various institutions, and of society as a whole.

31. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Jitendra Nath Sarker

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Both utilitarians and the deontologists are of the opinion that punishment is justifiable, but according to the utilitarian moral thinkers, punishment can be justified solely by its consequences, while the deontologists believe that punishment is justifiable purely on retributive ground. D. D. Raphael is found to reconcile both views. According to him, a punishment is justified when it is both useful and deserved. Maclagan, on the other hand, denies it to be justifiable in the sense that it is not right to punish an offender. I claim that punishment is not justifiable but not in the sense in which it is claimed by Maclagan. The aim of this paper is to prove the absurdity of the enquiry as to whether punishment can be justified. Difference results from differing interpretations of the term 'justification.' In its traditional meaning, justification can hardly be distinguished from evaluation. In this sense, to justify an act is to say that it is good or right. I differ from the traditional use and insist that no act or conduct can be justified. Infliction of punishment is a human conduct and as such it is absurd to ask for its justification. I hold the view that to justify is to give reason, and it is only a statement or an assertion behind which we can put forth reason. Infliction of pain is an act behind which the agent may have purpose or intention but not reason. So, it is not punishment, but rather statements concerning punishment that we can justify.

32. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Paul Schollmeier

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Moral philosophers, beginning with Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, have recently broached the topic of moral luck in the philosophical literature. They limit their discussion however to considerations of how luck affects our ability to carry out actions or how it affects the consequences of our actions. I wish to suggest that luck is also an important factor in determining our actions as ends in themselves. What actions we may choose to perform for their own sake in a given situation depends much more than we might care to think on causes beyond our control. Our happiness rests ultimately on our luckiness.

33. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Horst Seidl

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The controversies in our time between teleological and deontological ethics which come down to the problem "from being to ought," referring to human being or nature, can be resolved only by an adequate conception of human nature. Taking up the ancient tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoa) again, we can re-examine the teleological conception of human nature as primarily instinctive and selfish, and say that human nature is constituted also by reason and that the instinctive nature is predisposed to be guided by reason or intellect. The constitutive order of the human soul, with the subordination of the instinct under the intellect, involves already some natural goodness, of which the intellect is aware (in the natural moral conscience) and for which the will strives (in a natural inclination). This is the basis for the "moral law" and for normative ethics. Thus, human nature is not selfish in itself. Although moral goodness as humankind’s perfection is an ideal, it has in us already imperfect natural beginnings, a "natural morality." In a certain sense, the moral ought of actions comes from one’s being, from the natural moral goodness of which the intellect is aware in itself, and from its good intentions.

34. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Josef Seifert

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Kant says that moral values are ‘good without qualification.’ This assertion and similar remarks of Plato can be understood in terms of a return to moral data themselves in the following ways: 1. Moral values are objectively good and not relative to our judgments; 2. Moral goodness is intrinsic goodness grounded in the nature of acts and independent of our subjective satisfaction; 3. Moral goodness expresses in an essentially new and higher sense of the idea of value as such; 4. Moral Goodness cannot be abused like intellectual, aesthetic, temperamental and other values; 5. Moral values are good in that they never must be sacrificed for any other value, because they are incomparably higher and should absolutely and ‘first’ be sought for; 6. Moral goodness makes the person as such good; 7. All three different modes of participation in moral values are linked to the absolute, most ‘necessary’ and highest good for the person; 8. Moral Values are goods "in the unrestricted sense" by being pure perfections in the sense that "neither in this world nor outside it" can we find anything that could be called good unqualifiedly except moral goodness which is absolutely better to possess than not to possess. 9. Moral Values are unconditionally good because they are never just ‘means’ towards ends. 10. Moral values imply a new type of ought which elucidates the ‘absolute sense’ in which they are good. Conclusion: These distinctions allow a better grasp of Kant and Plato as well as of a central ethical truth decisive for the moral education of humankind.

35. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Maurice F. Stanley

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The language of ethics can be viewed as consisting of de facto analytic claims: ‘Murder is wrong,’ ‘One ought to meet one’s responsibilities,’ etc. I argue that it is narrow-minded to think, as Quine and others do, that we should put scientific and mathematical claims above those of ethics, for the terms of ethics fit together just as geometrical terms do, and it does not matter whether there is any correspondence between such terms and an ‘external world.’ What matters is whether we wish to use ethical language as we do scientific language to understand the world. We posit points in space-time, we posit rights and wrongs. The former are no more real than the latter, and no less. Values, like circles, are no less real for our having imposed them on the Lebenswelt.

36. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Vidam Teodor

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This study presents some clarifyings of conceptual order concerning the understanding of several basic terms such as: morality, morals and ethics. Morality is presented as a colective work, spontaneous, as a result of peculiar experience, not as a lived or experimented experience, but one that refers to the effort of achievement of an ideal. Due to the internal conditions that made it possible (liberty, will, consciousness) morality is founded affectivly before it manifests rationally. Morals is in the same time a product and a project: as a product includs intimate determinations between morality, amorality and imorality, as a project it is a step of the conviction regarding participation in social changes. Ethics is a second but not secondary (corpus) a systematized of value judgements about human rules. Peculiars ethics (medical, bioethics, ethology a.s.o.) must take part in forming a general-human morals in the next millenium, under the direction of communication ethics, the only ethics placed under the sign of postmetaphisics thinking.

37. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Toshiro Terada

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In his essay "Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?", R. M. Hare tries to show that Kant's moral theory contains utilitarian elements and it can be properly asked if Kant could have been a utilitarian, though in fact he was not. I take seriously Hare's challenge to the standard view because I find his reading on the whole reasonable enough to lead to a consistent interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. Still, I hardly believe that it is necessarily concluded from Hare's reading that Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this paper, I will first show that Hare's interpretation of 'treating a person as an end' as treating a person's ends as our own is reasonable, and so is his reading of 'willing our maxim as a universal law' and 'duties to oneself,' which is based on that interpretation. Then I will argue that Kant couldn't be a utilitarian despite the apparently utilitarian elements in his theory because caring about others' ends (of which happiness is the sum) is a duty. This is so, in Kant's view, not because happiness is valuable in itself, but because it is the sum of those ends set freely by each rational human being who is valuable in itself, that is, an end in itself.

38. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
John J. Tilley

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To the question "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows, I show that the SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect.

39. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Robert van Es

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As a form of moral debate, discourse ethic, according to Habermas, is based on regulated discussion. Participating moral agents share a common understanding in the ideal speech situation. Following procedures they try to reach consensus on questions of justice and rights. Critics of discourse ethic point to the bias of Western assumptions regarding agents and methods, the danger of elitism, and the optimism and the pacifism that run through the theory. After modification, Habermas distinguishes two types of discourse: the discourse of justification and the discourse of application. The second is inferior to the first. In the second, there is room for negotiating. There is another way of looking at negotiation, one that takes negotiating seriously as an important category of human behavior. This category shows an interesting overlap with moral behavior. Distinguishing four concepts of negotiating and using reciprocity and trust as the moral minimum, Negotiating Ethics is presented as a two level moral debate, close to Habermas but morally different in essential aspects.

40. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 44
Paul Voice

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In this paper I argue that David Gauthier’s answer to the Why be moral? question fails. My argument concedes the possibility of constrained maximization in all the senses Gauthier intends and does not rely on the claim that it is better to masquerade as a constrained maximizer than to be one. Instead, I argue that once a constrained maximizer in the guise of "economic man" is transformed through an affective commitment to morality into a constrained maximizer in the guise of the "liberal individual," then a purely rational justification for morality must become invisible to the latter. If I can show this, then I can show that rational justification can have no motivational power for the "liberal individual" and that Gauthier fails to answer the problem of moral motivation.