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21. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Andrey N. Pavlenko

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To analyze some sсeptical arguments was build the epistemological model about only one perceiving subject “Enarch”: he is one (ἐνᾴϛ) and has beginning (ἀρχῄ) in itself. This model was applyed for critical analysis of Husserl’s and Putnam’s attempts to overcome scepticism (i) by using “the intersubjective program” in a first case and (ii) argument “brains in a vat” in a second one. To justify the equivalence of the “intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” Husserl suggested the existence of transcendental Community . The main goal of the paper is to show that intersubjective epistemology faces the difficulty: the equivalence of the“intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” is not feasible. Developing Putnam’s model “brains in a vat” about boundaries of scepticism has been formulated the argument about “back of the head”. It showed that skepticism is much more strictly doctrine than it was suggested by Putnam.
22. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Baron Reed

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Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances of knowledge. In thispaper, I offer a solution to the lottery paradox that is grounded in a thorough-going acceptance of fallibilism.
23. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Juho Ritola

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Epistemic circularity is a problem of arguments purporting to establish the reliability of our different sources of belief‐acquisition. For example:(TRA)At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p.At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q.At t3, …Therefore, sense perception is reliable source of beliefs.The problem is that any arguer putting forth this argument is ompelled to rely on the thing to be proven in establishing the second conjuncts of each premise. But relying on the thing to be proven is begging the question; therefore, the argument is fallacious. This has been argued to have serious skeptical implications: if there is no other way to establish the conclusion, we have no way of showing the reliability of, e.g., sense perception. Different authors have tried to resist this result. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004) argues that sense perception skepticism only follows from epistemic circularity if certain questionable assumptions are granted. He also argues that epistemic circularity is a specific type of circularity that is not vicious in the way logically circular arguments are. I argue thatSchmitt’s dismissal of the discussed assumptions is questionable and that the argument (TRA) is viciously circular under very minimal assumptions about inferential justification. Therefore, Schmitt fails to dissolve the problematic nature of (TRA).
24. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
V.I. Selivanova

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The purpose of the present report is to draw the philosophical community’s attention to the universal principle of cognition, the principle of extrapolation, capable of integrating the present and possibly, the future methods of man’s cognitive attitude to the world. Extrapolation is interpreted as a key logical-and-gnosiological procedure and, depending on subject/object relationships, is subdivided into “actual” and “real”. According to the actual extrapolation principle in any kind of cognition, it is important to take account of the fact of the ontological presence of the individual in the world. The real extrapolation method is based on the available gnosiological content of a cognizing subject and on the use of a totality of the logical, gnosiological, epistemological, methodological, content-related and even psychological wealth of accumulated knowledge with the aim of its augmentation. The all-important aim of new gnosiology (theory of knowledge) should consist in studying permissible bounds of extrapolation, and in identifying basic laws of extrapolation of knowledge in two forms of its being as a necessary condition of their possible synthesis.
25. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ken Shigeta

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There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. Moore, H. Putnam, C. Wright), and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle of knowledge used in the demonstration while permitting the validity of C1. Another scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. It seems that most critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical consequence, thereby conceding the validity of C1. However, it is difficult to say whether their attempts succeeded, and in my opinion, they are indeed unsuccessful. This is because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. Their lack of success could also stem from the incompletion of Descartes’ own methodological doubt. The somewhat paradoxical‐sounding aim of this thesis is to show that the skeptical paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if the Cartesian skepticism is extended far beyond the endpoint of his attempt. The argument of this thesis is based on the important arguments of Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC)
26. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Victor Shreiber

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Some options to single out the foremost function of philosophy in culture are discussed. As any functioning part has to possess definite level of the internal unity, I begin by tracing out the main views on the unanimity of philosophical knowledge and demonstrate that the opposed variants can be reduced to well‐known contraposition between subject matter (a strong variant) and method (a weak one). I show further that at least one strong version, which identifies philosophical subject matter with the concrete universal being, seizes on only one piece of metaphysics. As a result, the boundary line between strong and weak versions erodes and the strong version converges into the weak one. Finally, I argue that fundamental philosophical themes can be united on the base of three famous Kant’s questions: What can I know? What may I hope? What ought I to do? Difference across modalities testifies against the interpretation of these questions as synopsis. Moreover, these questions correlate well with the three core parts of the making‐decision situation. Such a situation includes a set of possible alternatives and a system or an aggregate of selection criteria for a choice of the variant desired. These two components are logically prior to goal setting. Clearly, to achieve desired object one is to determine what steps are necessary for success. It is no less clear that in the structure of an action, they represent something one ought to do. Thus, specific cultural mission of philosophizing lies in the design and justification of Weltanschauung.
27. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Mohammad Hasan Soleimani

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The human in continuous century envisage the skepticism. When the human envisage the deficiency of his knowledge, will be in trouble of skepticism, when the knowledge of human fundamentally is doubted, all internal or external impressions will be doubted, so the man envisage the unlimited skepticism. But is it possible and logical? The possibility of it is a psychological question too, but my effort is the epistemological surveying of it. We can survey this question in two ways. One way is justifier reasons of skepticism. Are there sufficient for unlimited skepticism? Every deduction is based on preludes and if they’re uncertain the result will be uncertain too. There any deduction can’t justify unlimited skepticism. The other way is the surveying results of this skepticism. We have beliefs thatnever can doubt them like our existence. This inability express that the unlimited skepticism doesn’t agree the logic of our subject. Moreover the unlimited skepticism brings the mixed continuums. If we doubt anything, doubt this doubting too and this involving haven’t extremity, the demoniac hang that can’t be accepted by our.
28. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Emilia Anvarovna Taissina

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The article is based upon the following starting position. In this post-modern time, it seems that no scholar in Europe supports what is called “Enlightenment Project” with its naïve objectivism and Correspondence Theory of Truth1, - though not being really hostile, just strongly skeptical about it. No old-fasioned “classical” academical texts; only His Majesty Discourse as chain of interpretations and reinterpretations. What was called objectivity “proved to be” intersubjectivity; what was called Object (in Latin and German and Russian tradition) now is related to as a phenomenon; what was called Subject either is looked upon as Cartesian “cogito” or disappeares at all; what was called Truth turned to be either method of demonstration (by positivists) or the author’s sincerity (by existentialists); what was called Essence is now merely a joke. Alternatively, we speak about Sense, Meaning, and Value.
29. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Stella Villarmea

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30. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ron Wilburl

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I argue herein for two claims. First, contextualist strategies to tame or localize epistemic skepticism are ineffectual if contextualist factors are construed internalistically. Second, since efforts to contextualize externalism via subjunctive conditional analysis threaten circularity, only internalistic interpretations of contextualism can even be motivated. These two contentions do not themselves give us a grounds for skepticism. However, they do give us reason to suspect that contextualism, as such, is unlikely likely to provide a cogent anti-skeptical strategy.
31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Kai-Yee Wong

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This article aims to evaluate the purported empirical character of computer-assisted proof, as suggested by Thomas Tymoczko and others. Tymoczko famously argued that the proof of the Four-Color Theorem introduced a new, empirical method of proof, forcing us to modify the traditional conception of mathematical argument as a priori reasoning. Detlefsen and Luker contended that Tymoczko’s suggestion entailed that typically mathematical proofs were empirical. My chief interest is to raise some objections to a line of thought common to both of these arguments, with a view to outlining an account of the a priori which allows thepossibility of a priori knowledge obtained by appeal to computers or through testimony. Drawing on some recent discussions by Tyler Burge, this account gives a broad construal of the non-justificatory, ‘enabling’ role that experience is held to play in knowledge and cognition, allowing us to argue that the purported empirical character of the appeal to computers pertains only to the role experience plays in enabling our access to the a priori warrant provided by computer proof.

articles in spanish

32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Elena Nájera

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Con el interés de reconocer lo particular y amparar el derecho a la diferencia, el programa de superación de la epistemología que comparten R. Rorty y Ch. Taylor pone en cuestión las nociones de “verdad” y “objetividad”, aunque en dos sentidos encontrados. Para el primero de estos autores, se trata de anularambos conceptos a favor de un ironismo liberal que concede la contingencia de nuestras prácticas interpretativas, mientras que para el segundo, el camino pasa por justificarlos éticamente, en clave comunitarista. Frente a ambas estrategias, se perfilan las posiciones de otros pensadores de vocación epistemológica —e ilustrada—, como S. Haack y I. Hacking, que, sin recaer en el fundamentalismo que aquejaba al proyecto moderno, pero sin apoyarse tampoco en el comunitarismo, defienden la necesidad de conservar no sólo por razones teóricas sino esencialmente prácticas —ligadas al modus vivendi occidental— el punto de vista normativo que encierran la verdad y la objetividad.

articles in russian

33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Backsansky Oleg E.

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Modern cognitive approach represents the interdisciplinary branch of scientific reflection uniting researchers of knowledge, studying laws of purchase, transformation, representation, storages and reproduction of the information. People react to own experience, instead of "objective" reality. Cognitive map of the world according to which we operate, our feelings, belief and life experience create. We have no direct access to a "objective" reality, therefore our cognitive map is for us this unique "real" reality. Cognitive science widely uses methodology of synergetic approach successfully describing processes of self‐organizing. On the other hand, the synergetic addresses to modelling cognitive systems both the separate individual and collective cognitive processes. Therefore there are bases tospeak about formation cognitive‐synergetic scientific program ‐ the approach which is under construction on principles of modern nonlinear thinking.
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Evgeny Krotkov

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Diagnostics is becoming one of the most important kinds of epistemic practice: accurate and timely diagnosis is necessary not only for ill people, but for economic, social and political systems and institutions, culture, science, technology, and ecosystems. The analysis of researches into diversity of diagnostics used in various branches enabled the author to develop the outline of the philosophical theory of diagnostics, to identify its subject matter and problems, to name the categories and principles of the epistemological and methodological analysis of diagnostics activities, and to characterize its essential components. Diagnostics is defined as the process of developing cognitive perception of the object being investigated (sought for) and identifying it with existing knowledge of the object (orobjects of the same type). Diagnostics has the following constituents: a) determining something known and constant in the unknown and inconstant; b) identifying the single and occurent with the “ready-made” classification schemes and explanatory patterns, i.e. identifying it with the common and consistent; associating new facts with the known, common and consistent by applying well-tried methods, algorithms and technologies. The author identifies two levels of diagnostics: factual (empirical) and discursive. Discourse is defined as a finite course of reasoning based on a common concept. Reasoning is defined as the search for an answer to a cognitively significant question through drawing a conclusion (making a deduction). The author also analyses the role of argumentative, interpretative (explanatory), qualifying and predictive reasoning in the diagnostic thinking. The specific character of the diagnostic search is determined by an all-important role played in its process by a priori normative (paradigmatic) knowledge, as well as by its orientation to the cognition of the single and individual. The article alsotouches upon the issue of relationship between diagnostics and research investigation. This enables the author to specify the nature of scientific work and identify the correlation of existing knowledge and innovations.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Alexander Krushanov

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Historical becoming and evolution of scientific knowledge are connected with the passing through very specific and important stages – stages of terminological chaos and its eliminating (like it was in the times of K. Linnaeus in botany and A. Lavoisier in chemistry). This specific and important experience is not represented in the famous models of cognitive dynamics (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Styopin etc.). Situations of such a kind are fixed in the report as “prestandard situations”. It means: 1. it’s time when some of the terms or symbols express simultaneously different meanings 2. there are some parallel terms or symbols with essentially the same meaning 3. scientific community (or some scholar) has to leave usual operating with the scientific knowledge and to work out system of terminological or symbolic priorities (standards for the field). This model includes also description of main stages of the pre-standard situation maturing.
36. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
V. A. Okladnoy

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Rational reconstructions of cognition, outgoing from the results of cognitive activity, often introduce incorrect or imaginary cognitive procedures. Cognition needs to be examined as the open creative process directed to the unknown future. In the process of cognition a theoretical language, perceptive structures, methods of empiric researches and ontological phenomena are mutually constructed. The contents of the results of cognition are encoded in the language of theory and becomes objective in its ontology. It is the same information represented in different forms. The classic theory of truth is faithful, always used for the estimation of our assertations, but the terms of its use are constructed in the process of cognition. The only mode to show that the theory is not truthful and the ontological phenomena are not real is to construct a successful alternative theory.
37. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Niginahon Shermuhamedova

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Complexity of studying of scientific creativity, in particular, scientific search consists that is the multiplane phenomenon comprising the whole complex of different changes, such as social, psychological, subject, information, logic, methodological philosophical and other aspects. And only consideration of all these aspects in their unity and interaction opens an opportunity of construction of the complete theory of scientific creativity (scientific search), explanations of laws and mechanisms of reception of new scientific results, fulfillment of opening. For this reason research of last time are guided by the complex analysis of creative activity, on use of methods and means of various disciplines more and more. In scientific search the main thing – to direct efforts to the decision of the putquestions, to concentrate on the studied phenomena for a long time. Even then, when scientific search leads to new results, the researcher far not always gives the exhaustive formulations, allowing considering the given question solved. It is not always capable to formulate and those conclusions which the analyzed material allows it to make. The researcher during search should reconsider constantly former guesses, ideas and hypotheses, differently its search will not lead to success. In scientific search of success or failure always depend on set of factors. These factors can change both a course and a direction of the search. Alongside with it scientific search is impossible without persevering aspiration, without creative boldness of the researcher. Search is fruitful and effective only when the researcher arms with progressive ideas of time, possesses independence and impartiality of thinking, a wide general outlook and feeling new when search reflects the certain expectations of a society.

articles in chinese

38. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Kaifeng Huang

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By exploring the inner relationship between historical understanding and historical evaluation, this essay argues that the understanding and the evaluation of history are two indispensable parts of a full process of historical study. There is a unification between the subjectivity of evaluation and the objectivity of knowledge. Understanding history is not just for respecting the facts, but for exploring the influence of the past on the social progress nowadays. Only by combining theassessment of value and the understanding of past facts, can an integrated research process come into being. Evaluation never stops so long as the understanding of historical fact goes on. For obtaining an understanding of historical objectivity, one needs to cultivate his correct, reasonable value and philosophy, to conduct his research in accordance with the value of promoting social progress and with the people as the subject. A correct and reasonable concept of value helps historians to acquire objectivity in their historical knowledge; even so, objectivity comes first, for it is a symbol for historical study becomes science. A past which once existed, after all, shapes and prescribes the limit of historical evaluation.
39. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Dongkai Li

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RENE DESCARTES had a dream , to find out the root basis theory for human’s all knowledge. Obviously in 16th century , that was only a dream. Since the onto is the root basis of everything, then, the knowledge of everything should have their root in the onto. Believing in this law, the philosophiers like Descartes in the thousands years history, had the same dream--to find out the root basis theory for all the knowledge. This root basis theory for knowledge, in fact, is refers to the onto, but at the aspect of cognition in philosophy. In ontology, it is theory of the onto, in cognition, it is called the root basis for knowledge. In my other papers, I already presented my new study in the ontology and cognition, my new theory in the ontology and cognition, is to be the root basis of knowledge. In my this paper, as per my new ontology and cognition, I will demonstrate which kind of humanities knowledge could be produced.

articles in korean

40. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Seon-Hui Lee

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This paper is for the purpose of clarify that perception is a conscious act through Bergson’s theory of images and perception in Matter and Memory. And yet this ‘act’ is not a pure action of consciousness or of sprit, which is transcendental from the reality and composes or recomposes it. That is, our perception is not pure knowledge. A pure conception is unconscious one, which takes place infinitely within the system of matter that is an ‘aggregate of images’ in which all the elements act and react upon one another according to the law of nature. This system is excentric. On the contrary, the consciousness comes into being in themoment when these unlimited actions/reactions are limited and with choice, that is, when the passage from the ‘immediate’ to ‘useful’ in done. Therefore an activity of consciousness is already a practice of life. However, this perception as act reveals at the same time a proper capacity to subject/being, in that it forms a realm of subjectivity and creates its own field of perception, which are not reducible to the movement or nature of matter, so are different system from matter, every moment through memory.