Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

The Mahāsamghika is known as a sect which includes several Mahāyānic elements. Several scholars have pointed out that people belonging to it insist that the physical body of a Buddha is anāsrava (undefiled) and his existence in this world is lokottara (transcendental). In the Mahāvastu, a representative text inMahāsamghika literature, we find the word lokānuvartanā (conforming to the world), which is related closely to the anāsrava and lokottara theory on the physical body of a Buddha. However, though the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda, both of which are generally believed as having a more “realistic” understanding regarding the image of a Buddha, basically criticize the Mahāsamghika’s view, we can find descriptions similar to the concept of lokānuvartanā in their own literature. This implies that the problem of understanding a Buddha’s physical body in sectarian Buddhism is not as simple as was previously thought. For example, Buddhaghosa stated that all (past and future) Buddhas originally have asankheyya (immensely long period) lifespans. However, in reality, the duration of each lifebecomes longer or shorter, depending on the lifespan of human beings which cyclically increases and decreases due to cosmological conditions and hence, each Buddha is also subject to this principle when appearing in this world. This explanation is indeed analogous to the concept of lokānuvartanā in the Mahāvastu, and we can find several other descriptions by Buddhaghosa, which bear close resemblance to this idea. In the first place, the image of a Buddha,which is depicted in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda literature, is also full of mythical and miraculous characteristics. Moreover, with respect to using the “two‐bodies theory” (dharmakāya and rūpakāya) to explain the essence and the appearance of a Buddha, it is the Sarvāstivāda rather than the Mahāsamghika that is closer toearly Mahāyāna. In the dispute between these two sects as to whether the physical body of a Buddha is āsrava or anāsrava, we can see that according to the Ta p’i-p’o-sha lun 大毘婆沙論, both of them acknowledge their legitimacy based on one sentence in a sutra, namely “The Tathāgata is living in this world but he is not stained by any worldly elements.” Thus, their dispute merely arose from a discrepancy in the interpretation of this sentence. In conclusion, two things should be stated. First, though it is true that we can find several Mahāyānic elements in Mahāsamghika literature, at least in terms of regarding a Buddha’s physical body as part of this world, both the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda rather than the Mahāsamghika are closer to early Mahāyāna. Second, the dispute between theSarvāstivāda, which regards the physical body of a Buddha as āsrava, and the Mahāsamghika, which explains his appearance by the concept of lokānuvartanā, certainly reflects an important difference of opinion. We should not, however, accept that this difference means a total disagreement between the two concerning the understanding of a Buddha’s appearance in this world. At least, their differing view does not imply that “while the former basically had a ‘realistic’ image of a Buddha, the latter had a ‘deified’ one which was closer to that of the Mahāyāna.”

Epistemological investigation belonged to the core topics in Indian philosophical traditions, too. Right cognition had generally been regarded as one of the important means to emancipation (niḥśreyasa) since ancient times. To reach this religious goal, they keenly discussed the problems of what kinds of cognition we should accept as right or what kinds of objects a right cognition refers to. Specifically it is about the number and the nature of the means of right cognition that opinions differ from school to school. The number ranges from one (perception) to six or even ten (perception, inference, comparison, testimony, implication, non-perception, equivalence, tradition, gesture, and intuition). The concept of each means of right cognition, too, varies greatly among schools. In this paper I take up the Nyāya System, a rationalistic school of Brahmanic philosophy. In Nyāya the inference is regarded as particularly important, but it never means that logical thinking dominates testimony or the authority of religious scriptures in the Nyāya System. On the contrary we find such cases as the religious authority seems to delimit the validity of inference. Some inferences are obstructed by an axiom established in the school, whereas others by a ristriction of Brahmanic tradition. In this manner they seemed to protect their whole system from followers of other Schools. By examining this topic I would like to throw a tiny light on the characteristic affinity between philosophy and religion in Indian thought.

Jinul (1158-1210) is one of the most important scholar monks in Korean history. His view on the awakening in Zen Buddhism, called 'sudden awakening and gradual practice,' has recently been criticized by Seongcheol (1912-1993), one of the representative monks in Modern Korea. Seongcheol's criticism isbased upon the fact that Jinul's argument on sudden awakening and gradual practice cannot be allowed in authentic Zen Buddhism according to his own observation. Instead, Seongcheol argues that real awakening need no further practice. The choice between Jinul and Seongcheol might become a serious concern among Zen practitioners. We should, however, be concerned rather with what their arguments can signify to their own contemporary humanbeings. We should understand their arguments against their historical backgrounds and social contexts. Especially, Seongcheol also argues that we should practice strenuously in order to achieve Zen awakening. This argument does not accord properly with Chinese traditional Zen Buddhism in that Huineng, the founder of Chinese Zen Buddhism, bases his own argument on the thesis that true awakening needs no prior practice. Jinul and Seongcheol, though commonly understanding the power of such thesis, recognized the peril of no practice. So there is their emphasis on practice, though there is the difference of before or after the awakening between them. The two Korean Zen monks can contribute commonly to us in that they caution the perils of easily misunderstanding authentic Zen awakening and wrongly conceiting themselves over their own awakening.

Was Nāgārjuna a thinker of philosophy or religion? This must be a question of the kind to which the answer depends heavily on the definition of “philosophy” and “religion”. Therefore, we may prefer to rephrase this question as: “Can Nāgārjuna legitimately be called a thinker of philosophy or religion?” Although it has been and may still be defined by its method or the objects of “philosophical thinking”, philosophy is, in most cases, expected to have the following characteristics: (1) Philosophy is a type or product of human thought. (2) It is motivated by the human inclination for inquiry into the fundamental basis of being, whether human, social, or natural. (3) It is, theoretically at least, free from any types of dogmatic premises, whether traditional, social, or religious. (4) It requires a thoroughly logical and unequivocal usage of words and sentences. Likewise, although it has been and may still be defined by the existence or number of the absolute(s), be they god(s), spirit(s) or mental state(s), religion is, in most cases, expected to have the following characteristics: (1) Religion is a type of human beliefsystemor a product thereof. (2) It is motivated by the human inclination for ultimate reliance upon the absolute being or state. (3) It is, in practice, not completely free from some types of authoritative premises, whether traditional, customary, or founded by a certain individual. (4) It requires a purified mind, a deep understanding oftradition, constant practice and a careful observance of certain rules and regulations. Taking into account of the above characteristics of philosophy and religion, can we legitimately regard Nāgārjuna as a thinker of philosophy, religion, both, or neither? Let me focus on this question with an analysis of Nāgārjuna’s discussion as found in his magnum opus, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and related works.

The Buddhism has been developed as a philosophical system along with the Brhamanic tradition to maintain a complete and distinct identity of its own thought after Buddha. This paper attempts to understand the basic philosophical foundation of Buddhism. It believes that the Four Noble Truths (ārya-satya) are the original teachings of the Buddha which contained philosophical insights and thoughts like its doctrine of pratītya-samutpāda. It also presumes that the very existence itself produces the whole human predicaments in the form of anxiety, desire, anger, sorrow and pain which are the effects that relate to certain causes. In Buddhism, two revolutionary views, i.e., universal impermanence (anityatā-vāda) and refutation of permanent soul-substance (anātma-vāda) are formulated. These views are the anticipated philosophical ideas of Buddhism which have a parallel to the sceptic philosophy of Hume in western philosophy.

Nyāya, which is one of the orthodox Brahmanical schools in India, accepts the authority of both the Vedic scriptures and God as its composer. Nyāya has specialized in logic and argumentation from ancient times while at the same time gradually strengthening its theistic tendency. Nyāya polemicist, Udayana, is famous for his contribution to the rational proof of the existence of God. In this paper, I will consider a tiny part of his proof of the existence of God given in his theistic monograph, the Nyāyakusumāñjali, and in particular a topic called prāmāṇyavāda, or the Theory of Validity, from the viewpoint of the historical development of this argument. In this topic, it is argued how we justify our cognition and undertake actions. Nyāya polemicists preceding Udayana argued this topic in order to justify the Vedic scriptures and to encourage people to perform the Vedic rituals. And this topic has had little relationship with theological context. However, Udayana seems to link this argument to his theory of theology in an implicit way. I will suppose in his argument the implicit linkage between the prāmāṇyavāda and the assumption of an omniscient being.

Japanese Buddhism is sometimes called “funeral Buddhism” contemptuously. Buddhism is often criticized in that it serves only the dead and does not useful for the living. In truth, the main duties of Buddhist monks are to perform funeral services, maintain graves and perform memorial services for the dead in Japan today. Modern Buddhist leaders in Japan tried to argue against such criticism and insisted that Buddhism in origin was not a religion for the dead but for the living. In the post-modern situation, however, the philosophy of the dead is becoming necessary instead of the philosophy of the living that has been prevalent in modern ages. The living human beings cannot live without thinking of the dead. For example, the war victims in Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Nanjing and other places do not forgive us even today. In this situation, it is necessary to evaluate Buddhist tradition in Japan that shows us the way how to go with the dead. In this paper, first, I will introduce the philosophy of Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) who insisted the existential co-operation with the dead under the influence of Zen Buddhism and next, examine some Mahayana Buddhist sutras from the viewpoint of the relation between the living and the dead.

The proposed paper wishes to reflect on the conception of non-self and Shunyta and how these ideas are discerned in the process of remaking of Man as it is understood in the classical Indian philosophy. The concept of non-self is very carefully elaborated in such a way that it could define the unique relationship that thehuman being have with the world of existence where remaking of man is an absolute necessity to transact with the uncertain and indescribable phenomenal world. The paper would prefer to review this aspect based on the method employed by the Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy, using the idea of shnyata where allphenomenal experiences are delineated based on selflessness of the phenomenal world and of the subjective self (dharmanairatmya and pudgalanairatmya). It is argued here that the conception of self is understandable only contextually where a notional subjective self is in contact with phenomenal happenings of the world, but a proper understanding of either of the entities would reveal the conception of selflessness and the notional self. The procedure of “remaking ofman” is explained as the proper discernment of essencelessness of subjective self. The notion of a real self (pudgala) is clearly understood by reconstructing the psychophysical personality of man that the notion of selflessness is revealed by explaining the function of his dispositions and feelings. A proper conception of sunyata and the procedure remaking of man are intrinsically connected.

It is intriguing to think about the range of kind of things one could say with the help of words, but out of these myriad tasks philosophically the most fascinating one is to convince the other about the inefficacy of the words or language in certain domains of experiences in our lives. It is fascinating and intriguing for onesimple reason namely that in such cases language is put to a task of undoing itself and more importantly by itself with the help of nothing apart from itself.

The author of this paper aimed to understand the early Buddhism community in its entirety by examining the individual episodes in the "Mahavagga". There is a remarkable experience of the psychic power between the Buddha and the Brahmins. They are both aware of coming across of psychic forces that entered the way to the Buddhist Community. Using the brahmins mythology as a instrument for missionary work, the early Buddhism brings people close to Buddha's community. The Buddha visited Uruvela-Kassapa and took lodging for the night where the sacred fire was kept, in spite of Kassapa's warning that the spot was inhabited by a fierce Naga. The Buddha, by his magical powers, overcame, first this N ganad then another, both of whom vomited fire and smoke. Kassapabeing pleased with this exhibition of iddhi-power, undertook to provide the Buddha with his daily food. The Buddha spent the whole rainy season there, performing, in all, three thousand five hundred miracles of various kinds, reading the thoughts of kassapa, splitting firewood for the ascetic sacrifices, heating stoves for them to use after bathing in the cold weather, etc. Still Kassapa persisted in the thought, "The great ascetic is of great magic power, but he is not anarahant like me." Finally the Buddha decided to startle him by declaring that he was not an arahant, neither did the way he followed lead to arahantship. Thereon kassapa owned defeat and reverently asked for ordination. The Buddha asked him to consult with his pupils, and they cut off their hair and threw it with their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained. Nadi Kassapa and Gaya Kassapa were ordained with their pupils. At Gay sisa the Buddha preached to them the Fire Sermon, and they all attained arahantship for the early Buddhist Community. The episode of Uruvela Kassaps in the Mahavagga text ultimately idealizes the power of psychic and the start of the community. It is probable, even at the time when the episode were written, that as a matter of fact every one, in ordinary daily life, spoke imply the vernaculars in a much more simple and natural state of society. It is the Mahavagga authors, when addressing a cultured public at a date when the vernaculars had become the paramount literary language. Another point is that though brahmins take part in the religious and philosophical conversations of those early tims, and in the accounts of them are always referred to with respect, and threaten with the same courtesythat they always themselves extended also to others, yet they hold no predominant position. The majority of the ascetic, and the most influential individuals among them, are not brahmins. That is only a matter of course will be the obvious subjection. The Mahavagga texts I quotes, if not the work of bitter opponents, were at least composed under India bramins influence, and are prejudiced against the brahmins.

The current paper reflects my own personal struggle between two different fields of my training and career: religious studies and philosophy. Scholars with training in religious studies are understandably less interested in philosophical issues and more interested in such issues as myth, ritual, practice, eschatology, and, in the case of Buddhism and other Indian religions, soteriology. I will mainly address the tension between soteriological and philosophical discourses. I do agree that philosophy, Eastern philosophy in particular, is a byproduct of religious activities. But I do not agree with a popular view among scholars of Buddhist studies that all the Buddhist philosophical discourses serve a soteriological goal. On my view, Buddhist philosophy may have been developed out of asoteriological context, but it takes its own life and cannot be reduced too quickly to soteriology. I will illustrate this point with the well-known silence of the Buddha.

1, Li pei hua is my teacher, this is discussing to him the introduction. The content is Buddhism to the outer space understanding and the universe responsibility. 2, Li pei hua thought that Buddhism's understanding is includes: Outer space spatial structure; Time cycle; With has other star person and so on six kind of imagination. Its content is very rich. 3, Li pei hau thought that Buddhism advocated not only relieves Earth's disaster, moreover must relieve the universe thedisaster. Is ultra humanitarianism. 4, Li pei hua also proposed that to humanity's outer space development, must treat dialectically, must prevent, the earthman to the outer space environmental pollution and the destruction, with kills other star biology. Must consider that the outer space crowd attacks brutally to the Earth. The advocate security space environment, carries forward the Buddhism spirit, this is person's universe responsibility.

The author of this paper aimed to understand the early Buddhism community in its entirety by examining the individual episodes in the "Mahavagga". There is a remarkable experience of the psychic power between the Buddha and the Brahmins. They are both aware of coming across of psychic forces that entered the way to the Buddhist Community. Using the brahmins mythology as a instrument for missionary work, the early Buddhism brings people close to Buddha's community. The Buddha visited Uruvela-Kassapa and took lodging for the night where the sacred fire was kept, in spite of Kassapa's warning that the spot was inhabited by a fierce Naga. The Buddha, by his magical powers, overcame, first this N ganad then another, both of whom vomited fire and smoke. Kassapabeing pleased with this exhibition of iddhi-power, undertook to provide the Buddha with his daily food. The Buddha spent the whole rainy season there, performing, in all, three thousand five hundred miracles of various kinds, reading the thoughts of kassapa, splitting firewood for the ascetic sacrifices, heating stoves for them to use after bathing in the cold weather, etc. Still Kassapa persisted in the thought, "The great ascetic is of great magic power, but he is not anarahant like me." Finally the Buddha decided to startle him by declaring that he was not an arahant, neither did the way he followed lead to arahantship. Thereon kassapa owned defeat and reverently asked for ordination. The Buddha asked him to consult with his pupils, and they cut off their hair and threw it with their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained. Nadi Kassapa and Gaya Kassapa were ordained with their pupils. At Gay sisa the Buddha preached to them the Fire Sermon, and they all attained arahantship for the early Buddhist Community. The episode of Uruvela Kassaps in the Mahavagga text ultimately idealizes the power of psychic and the start of the community. It is probable, even at the time when the episode were written, that as a matter of fact every one, in ordinary daily life, spoke imply the vernaculars in a much more simple and natural state of society. It is the Mahavagga authors, when addressing a cultured public at a date when the vernaculars had become the paramount literary language. Another point is that though brahmins take part in the religious and philosophical conversations of those early tims, and in the accounts of them are always referred to with respect, and threaten with the same courtesy that they always themselves extended also to others, yet they hold no predominant position. The majority of the ascetic, and the most influential individuals among them, are not brahmins. That is only a matter of course will be the obvious subjection. The Mahavagga texts I quotes, if not the work of bitter opponents, were at leastcomposed under India bramins influence, and are prejudiced against the brahmins.

Enlightened experience (i.e. awakened to the truth) is the most valuable one in most religions including Christianity and Buddhism. As well-known cases of such experience are Apocalypse St. Paul and many Grand Zen masters in Zen Buddhism, it is natural for us to believe that the enlighten is for very talented or speciallytrained ones. However, applying the complexity theory on the structure of enlightenment, based on the power law function, selforganized criticality, phase transition, and emergence, it is clear that the full awakening can be experienced by everyone in daily life. Furthermore, such experiences are not necessary to be limited in religious one. Rediscovering the path to full awakening by complexity theory leads to the demythologization of the enlightenment in Korean Zen Buddhism, which emphasizes a hard apprenticeship in temple for long periods for the purpose.