Browse by:

Displaying: 21-40 of 1779 documents

articles in english

21. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
HsinMei Lin

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
What is the kind of relation between knowledge and luck? In the past decades or so, many philosophers have been discussing the Gettier-style counterexamples in order to search for the nature of knowledge. But, they have always faced the problem of epistemic luck. What do we need to avoid the luck problem? Let knowledge be certainly true. If we do, what is the value of knowledge? In the contrary, if we couldn’t avoid the “lucky truth” in our beliefs or propositions, would we lose knowledge which we thought we possessed? I don’t think so. Because the goal of human knowledge is to make our life be better. Knowledge is a direction. We would not like to lose all of knowledge. However, the luck problem is always there. So, what can we do? Should we keep going and look for the nature of knowledge? Or, maybe we should accept the possibility of some lucky elements in our knowledge, and let justification continue to play certain role which can still make human beliefs highly probable true.
22. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Stathis Livadas

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article tries to establish the relevance of phenomenological analysis within the current epistemological edifice, in particular, with regard to certain key issues of the epistemology of our time, this last one meant as a philosophy of science. In doing so, it is primarily based, on the one hand, on certain Husserlian texts mainly those published in Logical Investigations, Formal and Transcendental Logic and the Phenomenology of Time Consciousness and, on the other, on certain developments, essentially running from the beginning of 20th century, in such diverse fields of positive science as logic and the foundations of mathematics as well as quantum mechanics. The overall argumentation serves to establish a holistic approach of the objects of knowledge, taken as material or mental ones, to the extent that they may be taken as objects in evident presentation in front of an embodied consciousness provided with certain a priori constitutional modes.
23. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Manuel Liz, Margarita Vázquez

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There are very few analyses of the structure of points of view. However, we can identify two general approaches. One of them assumes as a paradigm the structure of propositional attitudes. Here, points of view are understood as having an internal structure similar to the one we can find in propositional attitudes. The other approach is based on the notions of location and access. Here, the internal structure of points of view is not directly addressed. The features that are emphasised are related with the role that points of view are intended to have. Points of view would be ways of having access to the world, and to ourselves, from certain emplacements. The paper has three parts. In the first one, we present these two approaches and some interesting developments inside each one of them. In the second one, we examine more closely the relationships between the two approaches. In the third part of the paper, we defend the non-reducible relational nature and modal character of points of view obtaining some conclusions.
24. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Michael Lockhart

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Epistemic value monists hold the view that virtuous agents only have one goal qua intellectual being, the truth goal: to acquire true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Monism has recently come under attack by those who think there is a plurality of intellectual values and goals. I welcome value pluralism in part because it opens up the possibility of identifying values and goals that cannot otherwise be identified in real-world virtuous agents. I go even further than some pluralists by arguing that, not only are there more values than acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones, but in addition, agents sometimes virtuously seek false beliefs and avoid true ones.
25. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
D. L. C. MacLachlan

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The causal representative theory of perception dominated theory of knowledge for hundreds of years after it was put on the map by Descartes and Locke. It is now almost extinct. How could this happen? The theory collapsed because it could not explain how we acquire knowledge of the external world, since it presupposes a causally organized system of external objects producing sensations in us. This presupposition, however, is generally recognized as true, so that the pattern of causal inference at the heart of the theory is surely justified. The theory cannot explain how we originally acquire our knowledge of the external world, but it is entitled on a second pass to correct our empirical beliefs, where necessary. This includes replacing our naive picture of the physical world with a more sophisticated scientific conception, which downgrades secondary qualities. This was, indeed, the main reason why it was originally introduced by Descartes and Locke, and has been the source of its attraction over the years.
26. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Luis Mazzei

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This work presents both types of rationality proposed by Marcelo Dascal and analyses how they interact and complement each other. What is traditionally understood as scientific rationality is what Dascal refers to as hard rationality. Argumentation based on this form of rationality seeks the certainty, the conclusive proof. However, the philosopher broadens the concept of rationality, allowing the existence of a soft rationality, which deals in the area of opinions. Arguments built from this form of rationality seek the persuasion. Usually, Mathematics is taken as an example of hard rationality, since it is structured upon the demonstrative reasoning. Here, I show that mathematical demonstrations follow the deductive logic, deal with universals and seek proof, certainty. Thus, it is an example of hard rationality. However, when applied to particulars, it is possible to construct mathematical arguments to persuade, or highlight elements that support decision making, without determining which position is correct. These arguments are examples of soft rationality. Therefore, I want to demonstrate that both rationalities interact, and arguments build based on demonstrative logic (hard) can be used in argumentations that seek to convince (soft).
27. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Julia Morkina

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper the autopoietic model of consciousness is employed to analyze dynamic being of philosophic concepts. It will be demonstrated that this being consists in permanent transformation within human mind. The autopoietic model of consciousness presupposes that consciousness builds itself anew in each moment of its duration, durée. It doesn’t rest in immobility, but persists in becoming, and so maintains permanent assimilation and production of new meanings. Autopoiesis is viewed as a process of simultaneous loss and acquiring by creative consciousness of its identity. To keep identity for consciousness means to change without cease, i.e. to lose it to some extent. A living human – empirical subject – that is subject possessing unique attributes: corporality, biographic situation, psychological and physiological features, individualized, different from others by his opportunities and abilities, belongs in a peculiar way to transcendental in E. Husserl’s sense of “pure flow of consciousness as such”. The concept of transcendental imagination is introduced to analyze phenomenon of imagination in respect of its contribution into being of philosophical concepts apart from numerous psychological characteristics of imagination.
28. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ana Marcela Mungaray-Lagarda, Herminio Nuñez-Villavicencio

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This text presents a brief reflection on the knowing construction of the body. Displaying three key moments: The modern Cartesian (1637) proposal of rationality where the body provides knowledge against a sensitive world; the idea of ‘tabula rasa’ posed by Locke (1690) recognizing experience as the basic framework that forms the possibility of representation of the reality by man, and the phenomenological experience posed by Merleau-Ponty (1968) by incorporating perception from reality and the possibility of truth. The discussion is about the questioning that the body makes on the construction of knowledge and its own condition of truth, interweaving three paradigms about the possibilities to understand reality.
29. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Ionel Narita

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The medieval thinker Anselm of Canterbury developed an argument, called ontological argument, through which he aimed to persuade that God exists in reality. The inference that founded this argument is logically valid and its premises are true. Therefore, the thesis that “God exists” is necessarily true. However, the ontological argument proves only that the meaning of the term “God” contains, among its elements, the attribute of existence but, from here, we cannot infer that the class of the term “God” is not empty. The ontological argument leaves opened the problem that the term “God” has an empty class or not. It follows that, although the sentence “God exists” is true, (if the meaning of “God” is as in ontological argument), we cannot know if God is a real thing. For instance, if we define Santa Claus* =df “The existing Santa Claus” then, the proposition “Santa Claus* exists” is true. Despite this, the class of the term “Santa Claus*” is the same with the class of the term “Santa Claus”, being empty.
30. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Rafal Palczewski

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper is devoted to the analysis of the ascriptions of practical knowledge to the groups of agents. The analysis is based on two very general theses: 1) the intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge (‘know how’) is a kind of propositional knowledge (‘know that’) or objectual knowledge (‘know NP’), and 2) the thesis which links an individual knowledge attributions to a group knowledge attributions: If ‘s knows that p’ has the property P, then ‘G knows that p’ has the property P. Subsequently, the three kinds of a group practical knowledge are examined: two summative (or deflationary), i.e. the distributed knowledge and common knowledge, and one non-summative (or inflationary), i.e. the collective group knowledge. This leads, prima facie, to some problems for the two main intellectualist approaches: i) it seems that groups does not have ‘the practical modes of presentation’ (see: Stanley & Williamson 2001, Stanley 2011), and ii) it seems that groups does not have the objectual knowledge (see: Bengson & Moffett 2007; 2011). I end with some remarks on the possible solutions to these problems.
31. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Silvia Pimenta Velloso Rocha

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Nietzsche’s conception of knowledge, usually known as perspectivism, bears such a resemblance to and has so many points of convergence with the skeptical doctrines that some of his commentators take Nietzsche’s “skepticism” for granted. But Nietzsche was frequently critical to skepticism and aimed to demarcate his own uniqueness towards the skeptical position. We propose to investigate here the similarities as well as the radical differences that separate both doctrines. We sustain that perspectivism is not a reflection on the limits of reason, but a reflection on the incognizable nature of the world itself. Nietzsche’s attitude towards knowledge is not a skeptical doubt, but a suspicion. Unlike doubt, suspicion itself is likely to be included in the set of things under suspicion and he who suspects admits remaining in uncertainty.
32. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Manashi Roy

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
We know that Hans. George Gadamer, in his book Truth and Method substitutes the word ‘Bildung’ (education, self-formation) for ‘knowledge’. Our attempt to edify ourselves or to edify other persons may refer to the hermeneutic activity or to the inverse of hermeneutic activity, or, it may refer to activity of self-formation (Bildung). The basic formulation of the question may be expressed in this way: whether there is one way or many ways in which we might be edified. Broadly speaking, different approaches to this basic issue have been formulated differently. But there is an attempt to re-orient the notion of truth as a property of the propositional content to an event or phenomenon with ‘temporal specificity’ which is the result of accepting truth as that which occurs when the interaction between knower and the known object creates a fusion (Gadamer). Hence there is a possibility to reorient the conception of truth as that which occurs when the interaction between knower and the known object creates a fusion two of the achievement of mental pacification. (Buddhism) Buddhists tend to see truths (ultimate) as nirvāna. Hence from the perspective of the Pudgalavadin the status of emptiness as a prajnapti would not have hindered it from the category of an ultimate truth.
33. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Nigina A. Shermuhamedova

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Epistemological problem has been one of the central in philosophy in the post-Soviet area for the last forty years. This sphere of philosophy (as well as logics, philosophy of science, some sections of the history of philosophy) had less ideological pressure and there were opportunities for a research work. Here, interesting philosophers appeared with their original conceptions (including O.V. Il’enkov, T. P. Shedrovitsky, M. K. Mamardashvili, G.S. Batishev, M.K. Petrov and others) who created their own schools. Live discussions were conducted and fruitful links were established with some special sciences such as psychology, history of science, and linguistics. The situation has changed at present. New disciplines have appeared the existence of which in philosophy was impossible, such as political philosophy and philosophy of religion. In essence, the history of Central Asian philosophy has been studied anew. For the irst time it has become possible to discuss seriously those problems related to social philosophy or ethics. In this new situation epistemological problem has become less important. It seems that the main approaches to its solution are known and developed in detail while one cannot say that about the other sections of philosophy.
34. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Natalia Smirnova

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The subject matter of the paper is supposed to be the challenge to the transcendentalist theory of knowledge from the background of the “epistemology naturalized” (or the so-called “eliminative epistemology”). The heuristic power and cognitive limits of the naturalistically oriented theory of knowledge will be thoroughly scrutinized. A “strong” and more reasonable “moderate” attitude to eliminative epistemology will be considered. It is argued that the non-intentional re-description of the basic concepts of traditional epistemology in terms of impersonal and non-intentional “information”, “prediction”, “control” (which lead to “adaptation”, “effectiveness” and so on) paves the way not only to the elimination of the philosophical theory of knowledge, but also to the depreciation of philosophy as such. It will be substantiated that philosophical theory of knowledge cannot be reduced to general theoretical divisions of cognitive sciences. The significance of E. Husserl’s phenomenology as one of the most sophisticated approaches to the study of human reason in maintenance of the basic principles of the philosophical theory of knowledge will be shown.
35. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Emiliya Taysina

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This theory is revealed in terms of existential materialism finding its source in Aristotle’s maxim that philosophy is a study of essential unity of the grounds of being and consciousness. Let me coin a word for this remarkable situation from which the process of cognition starts: “Dabewuβtsein”. New theory still makes use of the old principle of reflection postulating the subject/object dyad. Its metamessage is anti-new-Kantianism, indifferent to the unity mentioned, splitting essence and phenomenon, be it epistemology or its postmodern background. Despite of the recognition of subject/object coincidence turning into their mutual interference in “Dabewuβtsein”, new theory points out that there is not really a dyad, but a triad of cognitive relationship: subject – language – object. To cope with the main gnoseological problem of truth, we offer that not only paradigmatic, but also syntagmatic axis has to be considered. The basic syntagma of gnoseology is contemplation on absolute and relative in true knowledge (but not in Hegelian way, deriving it from Absolutische Idee).
36. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Sander Verhaegh

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Quine’s eyes, naturalism can be characterized negatively as the abandonment of a first philosophy prior to natural science. But what are Quine’s reasons for rejecting first philosophy? Prima facie, Quine’s argument against first philosophy seems to be pretty straightforward: in his “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine famously argues that we ought to abandon traditional epistemology because all attempts to ground our beliefs on sense experience have failed. That is, he argues that we ought to despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena. Let me call this the standard conception of Quine’s rejection of first philosophy. The standard conception is widespread among both Quine scholars and critics. In this presentation, I will argue that the standard conception is mistaken. I will show that Quine’s argument against the first philosopher is considerably stronger than the standard conception suggests. Quine does not abandon traditional epistemology out of despair but because the project does not make sense to begin with. Not only is the idea of an external validation of science incoherent, the scientific enterprise also does not require any additional justification in the first place. What I will try to offer, then, is a reconstruction of Quine’s actual argument against first philosophy and a reinterpretation of “epistemology naturalized”.
37. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Rúbia Liz Vogt de Oliveira

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The tradition of philosophy relies on the hard rationality, which has the standard logic as and its application as its fundamental model. Knowledge and reason are relegated to only two options: hard rationality or irrationality. By attentively studying the history of science and its debates, Dascal comes out with his types of polemics theory. There are two types of polemics that are related to that dichotomized view of rationality: The discussion, guided by hard rationality, and the dispute, the “pathological” debate guided by no rationality. Dascal brings out an alternative via, the controversy. The controversy is able to deal with a range of inquiries from science that remains unsolved, such as those that are inaccurate and uncertain. To be up with this open frame of questions for the debate and to accomplish persuasion, the controversy employs what Dascal calls soft rationality that is about what is reasonable. Aristotle, as it is well-known, presents the hard rationality of science on the Analytics. My aim here is to show that we can find a philosophical support for soft rationality even in the traditional Aristotelian view.
38. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Penelope Voutsina

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I explore the conflict of philosophical intuitions that makes it hard to get a grip on the nature and scope of first-person knowledge. First, I shall sketch the shape of this disagreement, applying it to a debate between philosophical accounts of self-knowledge and psychological ones. Secondly, I shall argue that philosopher’s current work on self-knowledge opens up an entirely new way of thinking about many of our first-person claims. But while, this new way of thinking is inspired by philosophical considerations, it is driven by psychologist’s empirical findings. I suggest that the philosophical and psychological accounts of self-knowledge can be reconciled; it may simply be a matter of calibrating this debate in terms of the kinds of mental states and processes under consideration, or the kinds of situations in which first-person judgments are made, or the kind of self-judging subject in question (that is child or adult). I suggest an emphasis on the claim that more work needs to be done on methodological direction of acquiring self-knowledge that can subsume this psychological work on fist-person error while leaving the inalienable, intentional authority of agents intact.
39. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Monika Walczak

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper is a contribution to the comparison of – on the one hand – the understanding of knowledge and belief by Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904-1984), whose philosophy is a version of transcendental philosophy (interpreted as a form of transcendental Thomism, intentionality analysis, or phenomenology), with – on the other hand – notions of knowledge and belief held by contemporary analytical philosophers (such as P. K. Moser, W. P. Alston, K. Lehrer, A. Plantinga, among others). A crucial problem of contemporary analytical epistemology (the theory of knowledge) is the question: what is knowledge? Although in epistemology we find different conceptions of knowledge, the basic conception to which discussions (be they positive or polemical) appeal is the classical conception of knowledge. This limits knowledge to propositional knowledge, which is defined as justified true belief. The task of the paper is, first, to reconstruct the notion of belief used by B. Lonergan; second, to show how Lonergan’s notion of belief differs from that of analytical philosophers; and third, to show that the Lonerganian notion of belief is not the basic category involved in understanding propositional knowledge as it is understood by analytical philosophers.
40. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 75
Tianen Wang

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Any description must take some corresponding stipulation as its premise. All stipulations are formed in the tension between objective basis and subjective needs. This means that description has clear anthropological characteristics and therefore the nature of standard. Description will reach its edge and lose its meaning while it describes the stipulation as the premise of itself. But it will turn into the basic way of development of human description when the description is made on the foundation of a higher level stipulation and goes beyond the original one. Some stipulations are clear and definite, and some others may be implied. It’s the origin of paradoxes that the description conflicts with the implied stipulation as the premise of itself. The basic origin of paradox is the conflict involves stipulation in the description. As for the concrete origins of paradoxes, there are three kinds of mechanisms that descriptions causes the conflicts between stipulations: (a) Description causes the conflicts between the description as a special stipulation itself and the stipulation(s) as the premise of the description itself; (b) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by interrelating stipulation(s) involve(s) paradox; (c) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by the adhesion of stipulation(s);(d) Description causes the conflicts between stipulation(s) by the confusion of stipulation(s).