Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy

This paper is a contribution in discussions about the nature of a human being. The global epoch reveals uncertainty as a fundamental characteristic of human existence. The knowledge of that is a driver to research into the areas, which are still beyond a philosophical consideration. Theoretical legitimization of the ‘prohibited knowledge’ about human nature 1) concerns its ‘the dark side’ defined as ‘inner demons’ (S. Pinker), 2) shatters illusory nature of own image as a crown of divine or natural creation, 2) gives birth to another illusion – on dehumanization and crisis of human existence. The problem of relation between mind and body constitutes a disputable core of the human nature. The dichotomy of mind and body presents an interpretation of the nature of a human being in a modern (Descartes’) vision. Denunciation of the mind-body dualism is a way of rethinking of a human being within emergence of a new philosophical ontology that is able to convey such aspects of reality as social instability, fragmentation, contingency, fragility, and unpredictability – the so-called ontological “negativity”. In contrast to human mind, human body is a substance that is open to chaos. Theoretic substantiation of chaos in corporality ontology enables overcoming of the mind-body dichotomy. Comprehension that chaos is a principal attribute of human corporality allows discerning an ontological substance in it, as no human existence is possible without it. The corporeal ‘uncertainty’ as a fundamental attribute of the human body, on the one hand, exposes it to chaos, destruction, and decay, but, on the other hand, enables a body to transform into the body that is to acquire the different cultural canons. Defining the ‘uncertainty’ as ‘saving deficiency’ contests conception of fallenness of the human body as its sinful and corrupted quality. After all fallibility as a condition of ‘saving deficiency’ opens horizon for numerous cultural canons to wit possibility for transformation of the human nature. An archaic body starts human’s battle against fear of own body that launch a process of human being transformations. The history of culture represents the stages of this battle. Homer’s archaic body is considered as ontological alternative of Descartes’ organism. Ontology of ‘saving deficiency’ of the human body allows going beyond the limits of the constructivist position in interpreting the history of the human body.

This paper deals with the problem of self-consciousness in connection with awareness of the body. The latter is a necessary component in the activity of perception and execution of action in space (such as the determination of subject’s own place in space and operations with the objects of the world). The author considers the simple forms of awareness of the body, as the basis of the self-consciousness. More complex structures of identity, such as a person and Self, are based on it. The main referred authors: American psychologist J. Gibson, Russian physiologist N. A. Bernstein and others. Self-consciousness is understood by the author as a special kind of knowledge, carried out by the subject in its interaction with the world.

In the heated debate about trans-humanism the main battleground remains, in my view, the human body. If trans-humanism holds that current human nature could be improved through the use of advanced science and technologies, it has become self-evident that human enhancement technology intends to overcome the corporality of human nature. Two questions arise at this point. One is, just what happens to our body? We need to ask first what is going on in or on our body when we apply human enhancement technology to ourselves and what exactly the costs are going to be. And, second, just what kind of moral role does the body play in making our life more human? The answer I want to give is that the ethical question how to live must be based on cultivating our body. In the following I will try to explore what is involved in modifying human nature. What can be “enhanced” and to what extent on and in our body through enhancement technology? While trying to answer these questions, I argue that body is the limit of human enhancement.

The paper discusses the disciplinary production of the normative feminine body and analyses the shift that has taken place in the rationality underpinning our current techniques of gender. I argue that Foucault’s radical intervention in feminist philosophy, and more generally in the philosophy of the body, has been the crucial claim that any analysis of embodiment must recognize how power relations are constitutive of the embodied subjects involved in them. His studies of disciplinary technologies show how bodies are constructed through mundane, everyday habits and techniques as certain kinds of subjects. Similarly, feminist appropriations of Foucault’s thought have demonstrated how feminine subjects are constructed through patriarchal, disciplinary practices of beauty. My argument is that that there have been significant changes in the last decades in the rationality underpinning these techniques of gender, however, which have emerged in tandem with the rise of the neoliberal, economic subject. I will appropriate Foucault’s idea of governmentality, and particularly of neoliberal governmentality, as an alternative framework to discipline for studying the contemporary construction of the feminine body. I will show that it provides us with a more comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding the construction of the feminine body in its current form.

The author presents eleven theses summarizing his theory of a holistic philosophy of the body. Convinced that “body” is an indispensable category to meet the challenges of our time, explains his new concept that breaks the dualism of body and soul, while beyond the materialistic approach. The body we are is the totality of things visible and invisible. To approach it requires new categories, such as “bodily valences”, the “body coordinates”, besides others. Our body is the measure of the other bodies, the a priori of knowledge, but their results change because they depend on how we understand and live the body. The critique of culture and social, economic and political institutions, are to be examined from the body’s natural needs: biological, social and personal, which are the foundation and measure of values.

The main purpose in this paper is to present the philosophical affinities among the French phenomenological philosopher, M. Merleau-Ponty, and certain oriental traditions related to a very sophisticated cognitive hermeneutics as, for instance, the Buddhism doctrine with its different schools, certain epistemic foundations of Chinese ancient cosmology and, of course, the Daoism ontogenesis and alchemical processes of corporeal transformation, insofar as both prospects, in spite of the well-known cultural and historical distances, present an position against the mechanistic or substantialist understanding of body. In this sense, it seems clear that Merleau-Ponty’s strategic critique of cognitive paradigm about the constituent subject (in terms of an modernized Cartesian model of reality) and his philosophical alternative based on a pre-reflexive and silent experience that shows body and world as an indivisible unity, converts the carnal existence into an epistemological reference from which we can start to develop a theoretical confrontation or comparative study between his thought and key philosophical contents which belong to Eastern philosophical traditions.

Concepts of health involve material dimensions that rely heavily on dominant theories of matter. Two approaches to understanding the nature of matter influence attempts to define health: scientific realism and social constructionism. Scientific realism assumes that bodily materiality is real and exists external to and independent of mind. On this view, definitions of health are objective and mind-independent. This view is permeates mainstream (allopathic) Western medical practice and theory. Social constructionism, on the other hand, insists that material configurations and even living bodies are socially constructed rather than natural. Critical theorists use a social constructionist approach to show the vulnerability of definitions of health to social and cultural forces. While these understandings of matter seem to be diametrically opposed, in this paper I show that they share a common assumption, which is that matter operates mechanistically; it is inert, passive, without agency. In both cases this assumption causes impasses that can be alleviated by a more dynamic account of matter. The work of feminist materialists Karen Barad and Elizabeth Wilson charts new paths for thinking matter more dynamically, and demonstrates how this shift can free us from the epistemological and political impasses that plague scientific realism and social constructionism. Furthermore, rethinking matter as more dynamic has significant implications for the task of defining health. It opens up the possibility for thinking the materiality of bodies in more accurate, just, and medically efficacious ways.

In introducing his discussion of seeing as in Part II of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two uses of the verb ‘to see’. On the one hand, there is a use of ‘to see’ in which one succeeds in seeing in the relevant sense if one is able to represent the object seen. On the other, there is a use of ‘to see’ in which one succeeds if one recognizes a resemblance between two objects. In clarifying the relation between these two uses of ‘to see’ and thus the relation between perception and understanding, I articulate a Wittgensteinian account of perception in which one’s perception is organized and oriented by the demands of what one is going to do. Perception does not, for Wittgenstein, happen in stages, wherein understanding is brought to bear on a perceptual given. Instead, a practically oriented understanding orients and organizes our experience of what is salient, allowing us to go on in response.

Cet exposé se propose de remarquer, très succinctement, nécessairement, qu’il n’y a plus chez le philosophe Jean-Luc Nancy un corps qui réfléchirait une âme, une spiritualité ou une pensée – en «relevant» singulièrement les dualismes de «l’âme» et du «corps» (à Descartes) autant que les monismes de la «chair» et les significations psychanalytiques du corps, les onto-théo-idéologies de l’immédiateté et de l’indivisibilité du toucher charnel ou spirituel autant que les philosophies (phénoménologies) du «corps-propre», Nancy nous donne à penser «le» corps comme (étant) la pensée ou l’écriture adressée saisie comme en situation, comme en location, c’est-à-dire, et dans un dire du philosophe à l’allure très spinozienne, «le» corps n’est pour lui que l’ «étendue[…] de l’âme», «l’étendue de psyché», voire «la pensée-en-corps».

Edith Stein realiza su aproximación fenomenológica a lo que es el cuerpo de la persona en la conciencia, lo cual le permite decir que la principal nota o característica del cuerpo es que es un cuerpo propio. Con el rigor fenomenológico que la caracteriza, poniéndose en la conciencia, integra la comprensión del cuerpo como cosa material y como viviente, logrando hacer ver cómo siendo el cuerpo cosa material, no se nos presenta sólo como cosa material, del mismo modo se nos da como viviente pero tampoco se da sólo como viviente. El modo del darse del cuerpo personal, es justamente lo que lo especifica, lo que lo hace ser este cuerpo y no otro cuerpo, lo que lo hace ser mío y no de otro. Edith Stein integra así la realidad material y el dinamismo viviente del cuerpo humano sin fraccionar o segmentar el análisis, logrando así mostrar la unidad sin posibilidad de separación entre cuerpo y conciencia.

While utopia seems to have low esteem in current philosophical theory, technique, conversely, is increasingly followers. Utopia, as the original creation of the Renaissance, currently taking shape in different configurations to classical. Although the technique on permanent open spaces philosophical discussion, in some interpretations of the original elements remain τέχνη. From two operational definitions of utopia (Horkheimer) and technical (Bloch) I propose a division of utopias to display the proper place to instrumental uto-pias and, within them, to technical utopias. We describe Bloch’s proposal, we point his limitations and propose overcome it with the critical theory of technology approach

The power of technology is extended to the fundamental properties of existence, metaphysics becomes increasingly active in its ability to change these properties. This paper discusses a new relationship between philosophy and the advanced technologies that I call onto-technologies, because they change the foundations of being, the structure of existence and the way in which we experience it. In the past, technology was preoccupied with material particulars, while taking care of concrete human needs, such as food, shelter and transportation. Philosophy, in its turn, was preoccupied with big ideas, the first principles, essences and universals. Technology used to be utilitarian, while philosophy was speculative. Today technology and philos-ophy are moving ever closer towards each other: the power of technology is extended to the fundamental properties of the Universe, while philosophy becomes increasingly active in its ability to define and change these properties. Onto-technology has the power to create a new spatio-temporal continuum, a new sensory environment and modes of its perception. As a result, technology is now moving not away from, but towards, metaphysics; this way, the two of them are meeting at the very core of being, where the principles and universals traditionally considered the prerogative of philosophical study can be found.

This paper is an effort to remark the importance of re-conceptu-alize what is democracy considering the importance that the new technologies, especially concerning to the information and communication. It is important to redefine the model of political action according to the technological advance of our era, and for that is necessary a discussion in which the philosophical aspect get in touch with technology to re-dimension the scope of democracy nowadays. To prepare the field for this new concept of e-Democrcy, first of all I present the case of an earlier attempt to revitalize democracy with new technologies, it is the case of cable TV, and after that I show the reason for its fail. After the exposition of the cable TV case, I show some of the conditions that are necessary to make the transition from analog democracy to digital democracy or e-Democracy.

The framework of engineering design for operation as a problem that seeks a satisfactory solution calls for a thorough consideration of issues such as the partial ignorance of lawfulness, of interdependence as well as of unmodeled dynamics of subsets of reality. Moreover the consideration should account for the inability of the complete and exhaustive mathematical representation of such subsets. A key element in the resolution of this problem is the possibility of causal unilateralization. This element is not innate in physical phenomena but is brought to the surface for exploitation by ingenious engineering contrivances. In conjunction with a guiding principle projecting the achievement of accuracy despite the unavoidable inaccuracy of the means, and along with conforming praxiological methods, the whole design procedure renders the goal of achieving any well-defined operation feasible. In addition, it follows that this line of approach leads to the distinct characteristic that for any desired outcome what is sought after is not the derivation of the necessary but rather the sufficient conditions which will guarantee an admissible manifestation of it. On the way it becomes apparent that engineering design of operation is a process that involves possible realities.

Three main features of engineering thought have formed over the centuries: artistic, practical (or technical), and scientific. Galileo chose an approach unusual for scholastic science: technology began to depend on mathematical knowledge and models. At the same time, he criticized the craftsmens’ approach to technical activity, which overlooked scientific knowledge and the laws of nature in building machinery. Galileo’s works paved the way for the formation of engineering thinking and activity in practice as well as theory. He personified a new figure, the engineer-scientist. His geometric-kinematic theoretical schematic model of the machines was a beginning and precondition of the application of the natural scientific theory to the first special engineering science – the theory of the mechanisms and machines or kinematics. Galileo elaborated not only a new scientific methodology oriented to technical needs, but also a new philosophy of technology based on scientific knowledge.

When the Technological Singularity (Bostrom, Kurzweil, Smart) is more and more near, the human-machine interaction covers various merging processes. Yet, in the Digital Era, we have to deal with and manage an amazing plethora of different identities (plural, multiple, alternative, concurrent, divergent, virtual, and so on). This engages us in a discussion on the criteria of the identity and it leads us from ‘no entity without identity’ (Quine) to ‘no identity without a process’ (Boyd). We also have to deal with the problem of what the “wisdom” is nowadays. In the last decades, we have continuously passed from the classical wisdom – word and face to face based, toward a multi-channelled, digital wisdom (Prensky) – a symbiotic, non-generic and non-unitary wisdom (Guliciuc). The analysis of those merging processes and multi-faceted, processual identities engages us in the search for a classification of our “merged identities” in the Digital Era, toward identities that are continuously negotiated.

In our everyday lives, we come into contact with a series of technological objects and use a lot of technologies. Usually, the “relation” we develop with these objects works, on a first level, for our benefit. On the other hand, we actually know little about the technologies we use in order to accomplish various activities. Technologies have neither been developed, nor do they exist independently, even though we tend to perceive them as natural objects in themselves. Perhaps they are as much defined by causal laws, which are relevant to their “behavior” as specific artifacts, as they obtain ad hoc characteristics through our significations, which already belong to a specific social system. This ignorance of common sense often leads to the exclusion of a number of topics that are intertwined with the technological phenomenon from the everyday agenda of political debate. Moreover, the errors that stem from our unsophisticated or even unconscious attitude towards these artifacts have important consequences on various areas, including “development” and “work”, education, the environment, and human communication itself. This short article will try to present elements of a critical theory of technology (highlighting topics and themes that emerge in the works of Andrew Feenberg) in order to illustrate the need to link the technological phenomenon with everyday political practice.

In this paper, I intend to support a currently controversial approach to the a priori -- the one that respects its fundamental role in science, and I furthermore suggest the relevance of the a priori may be expanded to technology. I shall address the following three issues: a priori in scientific and technological methodology, a priori and the essence of science and technology, and a priori in the assessment of science and technology.

Albert Borgmann’s account of modern technology is considered to be one of the leading positions in the American philosophy of technology which is informed by continental philosophical “paradigms”, such as hermeneutics. In particular Martin Heidegger’s late hermeneutics of the technological world has been a powerful source of inspiration for Borgmann, as has become evident in his Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. In our paper we will argue that, despite the strengths of Borgmann’s analysis both in the 1984 book as well as in his more recent studies, its obvious weakness pertains to the negligence or underestimation of Heidegger’s leading phenomenological line of thought. This negligence or underestimation compromises his approach to Heidegger’s account of technology, as becomes evident in the critiques addressed to him by phenomenologists, such as Hubert Dreyfus, and “postphenomenologists”, such as Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek.

If we assume that the artifacts have framed their functional level low the conceptual construction, under the planes defined from intentional functions and duties provided as givers of meaning, which has reduced its conceptualization instrumental for the design process. In this paper, we will focus on discussions of technological artifact referring the concept of the interface, which is defined in the processes of interaction with complex objects with their context. From approach defined the construct of technological artifacts from heuristics, beyond levels of functional troubleshooting framed isolated artifact in interaction, in from interaction with their technological context. This paper aims, first, interpreting technological artifacts from heuristic factors provided by the sciences of complexity. That interface defines the process as interactive relationship with the context and with the construction of heuristics that solve problems of varying degrees of complexity.