NTU Philosophical Review

In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).

Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.

In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.

Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.

本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先，本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表，釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義，並被賦予三種特色：直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變，因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次，本文論證，抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物，因此難以有真假值可言。

本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》巵言之研究。近年來，學界大多將巵言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式，如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為巵言存疑，進而試圖論證巵言基本上是簡單形式的言辭，其特色為明確但暫時性的，作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面，特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地；然而，於探討並進而提倡巵言之時，特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次─就《莊子》而言，則是寫作之層次─我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度，我們或能將此等文體稱為「巵言」，但同時不應忘記，其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。

A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper.The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”

This paper tries to explain the idea of motivational efficacy included in Zhuxi’s concept of “true knowledge” by analyzing the content and structure of this concept, and to face the challenge of the Humean problem through T. Nagel’s theory. For Zhuxi, the knowledge of “knowing without being able to act” (zhi er bu neng xing) is merely knowledge of a shallow kind as the true knowledge will definitely lead to action. In a given situation, the better a man knows what good is, the more likely he acts according to his judgment. When a man’s knowledge reaches the highest degree, he will completely follow it. This kind of knowledge (“true knowledge”) is not only the one that man acts according to what he knows, but also the one that man should do. The latter originates from one’s own mind, and it can be known only through self-reflection by gaining the motivational efficacy determining why a man does this way rather than the other in moral actions.

This essay first shows that the concept of recontextualization in Rorty and the fusion of horizons in Gadamer are ways of thinking through which knowledge is obtained. Then, I argue that recontexuationalization, as a way of thinking in Rorty, fails both in the achievement of knowledge about reality and in the establishment of Rorty’s philosophical ideal: edifying philosophy. The argument implies that the concept of recontextualization is not able to create a new paradigm by breaking the imprisonment of our present paradigm. Nevertheless, as Gadamer’s fusion of horizon avoids the theoretical difficulties existing in Rorty’s concept of recontextualization, it leads us to obtain the knowledge about reality by being able to create new knowledge. Therefore, in comparison with Rorty’s recontextualization, Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is a more satisfactory theory of thinking.

In Nietzsche (1961), Heidegger investigates the questions of being and time based on a common base, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), referring to the understanding of being. But his theses shifts from the being of beings and the individual of (in each case) mine (Jemeinigkeit) in Being and Time to the beings on the whole and being as such in Nietzsche.In Nietzsche, Heidegger has a new definition of eternity (the “Now” falling back into the Self), and seeks the eternity of the Augenblick (blink) by ways of interpreting Nietzsche’s concepts of Will to Power and Eternal Return. I argue that the new meaning of eternity which relates to time and the self (Selbst, Selbstheit) is similar to the concept of Augenblick (blink) and autonomic freedom (Freiheit der Selbstständigkeit) in Being and Time. So, mainly based on Nietzsche and with the aid of Being and Time, this paper aims to investigate Heidegger’s concepts of Augenblick and eternity as well as their relation with human beings.

Lonergan argues that intentionality analysis shows that ethical behavior is dynamic. It includes knowledge of reality, reflection on value, judgment of value, decision and action. Knowledge of reality is achieved through the application of cognitional theory. In addition, based upon the pure desire for value, human beings continue to ask a further question: “What should I do?”. With this question, human beings enter the realm of ethical reflection. In ethical reflection, human beings become conscious of value through feelings. Moreover, feelings in response to value occur in the horizon of feelings. The horizon of feelings constitutes an orientation toward the realm of value. It especially affects inquiry into value, reflection on value, deliberation, judgment of value, decision and action. Reflection on value and judgment of value are usually habitual. When human beings encounter a new situation with new feelings and new questions of judgement of value, human beings start a new process of reflection on value and judgement of value. Ethical reflection can be self-correcting as human beings make decisions and put them into action based upon their judgments of value.

Xiong Shili is one of the most influential and controversial philosophers in the modern neo-Confucianism. The paper, starting from the controversial topics haunted Xiong, tries to explore the practical base of morality behind them. Firstly, we compare the “mind-condition” structure and the cosmological structure and by this comparison a conflict hidden behind them is thus revealed as between “emptiness” and “qi”. The former is what Xiong borrows from Mahayana Buddhism, and the latter is derived from the Confucianism tradition that Xiong especially appreciates. As a matter of fact, Xiong’s absorption of the concept of “emptiness” leads to the resetting of the position of “qi” in Confucianism, and the substantial experience supported by “qi” in turn has influences on the formation of “emptiness” in Xiong’s thought. By holding the tension between “emptiness” and “qi”, we can further reveal Xiong’s ethical choice between the “ren” of Confucianism and the “karunā” of Buddhism, by which we are finally able to make tangible the profound moral concerns behind Xiong’s turning from Buddhism to Confucianism.

Political power can be defined as “what the commanders purposefully do, by all means, to acquire public obedience to their allocation of resources.” Hanfeizi claims that a morality-based power relationship is theoretically possible, but not actually feasible. Instead, laws should be the core in a political power relationship. More specifically, by assuming that human beings are benefit-oriented and harm-aversive, commanders should make orders based on their advantages in education, economic status, and military power to punish and reward people. These orders will eventually replace resistance with obedience and construct a political power relationship.

Natural deduction is the logical system most commonly used in teaching elementary logic. However, different textbooks may adopt different versions of the natural deduction system, which can be quite annoying to many teachers and students of logic. More precisely, with regard to the inference rules for quantifiers, there are two completely different systems of natural deduction. One system (which I shall call the “Gentzen system”) has a rule of “existential instantiation” that looks pretty complicated, whilst the other system (which I shall call the “Copi-Kahane system”) has a much simpler rule for existential instantiation. Although most of the Chinese textbooks for elementary logic use the rules of the Copi-Kahane system, there are still some textbooks for elementary logic or intermediate logic which use the Gentzen system. This leads to some problems especially in teaching logic, as students may find it somehow difficult to learn intermediate logic (which usually use the Gentzen system) if what they learn in elementary logic is the Copi-Kahane system. In this paper, I shall critically compare the Gentzen system with the Copi-Kahane system to judge which one is better for teachingelementary logic.

This paper argues that the purpose of Mou Zong-san’s retranslation of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is to incorporate Leibniz and Russell’s thoughts of logical analysis into his A Critique of the Cognitive Mind. In order to succeed, Mou held the distinction between “discriminating speech” and “undiscriminating speech” to express his view of “philosophical language” which has at least two meanings: First, the “philosophy” that Mou argues is based on this view. Second, Mou’s unique view of “philosophical language” is likely to be a basis of his interpretation of the classics. Therefore, clarifying Mou’s view of “philosophical language” will significantly enable us to understand the two crucial tasks (philosophical thinking and philosophical interpretations) of Mou’s philosophy.

In Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus contended that death is nothing to us since it is the deprivation of all sensations. I find that his argument implies at least three assumptions, which are hedonism, physicalism and existence requirement. At first glance, Epicurus’ argument seemed to be acceptable due to one is deprived all his sensations and unable to estimate whether death is good or bad for him when death comes. So, it is concluded that death is nothing to us. However, the question follows: is something really not bad for a person if one has no capacity to acquire the unpleasant experiences? I must say that the answer is ‘No’. In this essay, I will argue that something is bad for the people even they don’t have any unpleasant experience and most of us will agree that he is indeed harmed by the lack of pleasant experiences. Thus, Epicurus’ argument is implausible because the strong version of existence requirement is not justified.

Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought has its intrinsic development clue. During the period of his ‘early doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi dealt with the stirring and not stirring problems by thinking of entity and function; he considered that not stirring was entity and nature, while stirring was function and mind. Corresponding to the theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means ‘first identifying the source of consciousness then cultivating with Heart.’ During the period of his ‘later doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through chronological arrangement and motion and still in space in empirical phenomena, through which not stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking no sprout and things without realizing,’ while stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking sprout and things realized.’ He also considered that ‘nature’ was the entity of mind, and Qing was the function of mind, man's spiritual mentality consists of sense and sensibility. Corresponding to such theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means that ‘self-restrain when not stirring, self-examinate when stirring, and respectfulness exists through stirring and not stirring.’ In his later years, Zhu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through minds responding thing following Li or not, and thus made possible the interaction between the stirring and not stirring. He did not insist on figuring out the boundary of chronological arrangement and motion and still in space between stirring and not stirring. Therefore, Zhu Hsi tried to unite respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li as a whole and emphasized that respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li should be interpenetrative, which makes his Gong-fu Thought be more harmonious.

This paper uses The Platform Sutra as the theoretical background for probing the ethics on which Chan Buddhism built its foundations. First of all, I analyze the type of ethics that the content of the The Platform Sutra can be said to display from the perspective of the view on precepts and mind-nature and subsequently offer my opinion on the similarities between virtue ethics and the type of ethics displayed in The Platform Sutra. Next, I give consideration to whether The Platform Sutra can be classified as a type of consequentialism when viewed in terms of the Chan Buddhist notion of instant revelation, along with the ultimate Buddhist aim of liberation from suffering and the attainment of Buddhahood. The outcome of this paper suggests that, The Platform Sutra offers a transcendental cognition aiming at Nirvāna and that its central theme of “non-abiding,” derived from the ethical perspective of this text which in turn is based upon both the theoretical journey of returning to mind-nature and a world view constructed around Dependent Origination and Impermanence. The theoretical journey that starts with “cognition” and culminates in “liberation” prompts an ethical pattern of autonomy, whereas the moral subject spontaneously perfects all virtues through the practical wisdom of proper conduct. When considering the ethics of The Platform Sutra it would be prudent to conclude only the following: when seen purely from the aspect of theoretical similarity, the ethical pattern of The Platform Sutra can be said to be roughly analogous to virtue ethics and consequentialism, and perhaps even to deontology. However, when the intrinsic theory of The Platform Sutra is taken into account, it is evident that apart from theoretical similarity, the view of differentiation still needs to be incorporated into the ethical equation of this text.

This paper argues that the concept of reason in Hegel’s philosophy is the rationalization of the commandment of love in Christianity. The commandment of love is the greatest one in the New Testament of the Bible. Love surpasses but also fulfils the law of the Old Testament. There is contradiction in the commandment, which is most evident in the command ‘love for enemies.’ Nevertheless, only by love is the mortal raised to the divine and the infinite. Hegel’s reason has all of these characteristics: it sublates the law; it appears as something contradictory to human understanding; and it is comprehended as belonging to the infinite.