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41. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Mark McCullagh

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Many debates in philosophy of language are driven by examples in which two expressions have the same meaning, in some sense, yet fail of intersubstitutability in some of their occurrences. The usual move in response is to postulate a kind of meaning different from that which is shared by those two expressions. I argue that that the resulting semantic theories nevertheless typically cannot explain such failures: the explaining is not done entirely by the postulation and individuation of the new meanings. It is done partly by accompanying metaphysical and epistemological claims about them. Making this clear requires distinguishing between intersubstitutability salva veritate and intersubstitutability on grounds of logical form, and getting straight on what kinds of facts secure the obtaining of each.
42. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
William Hannegan

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43. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Trevor Adams

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44. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Brian Kim

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Infallibilism leads to skepticism and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. In this narrative setting, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has been marketed as a way for fallibilists to address one of their central problems. While pragmatic versions of infallibilism have been left unexplored, I propose that going pragmatic also offers the infallibilist a way to address its main problem, the skeptical problem. Pragmatic infallibilism, however, is committed to a radical pragmatic view of epistemic certainty, where the strength of a subject’s epistemic state can vary depending upon the practical context. To make room for the plausibility of such a view, I discuss the role that the framing of decision problems can play in the evaluation of choices and evidence. And based on this discussion, I offer some suggestions about how we might develop a pragmatic version of infallibilism.
45. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Tim Bloser

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46. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Guus Duindam

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Kant famously claims that there is only a single supreme principle of morality: the Categorical Imperative. This claim is often treated with skepticism. After all, Kant proceeds to provide no fewer than six formulations of this purportedly single supreme principle—formulations which appear to differ significantly. But appearances can be deceptive. In this paper, I argue that Kant was right. There is only a single Categorical Imperative, and each of its formulations expresses the very same moral principle.
47. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Lane DesAutels

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48. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Daniel D. Carr

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I contend that scientific realism and realism about natural kinds should be given separate treatment because a person could be a scientific realist in general without having key realist commitments about natural kinds. I utilize Chakravartty’s three dimensions of commitment for scientific realism to create three key conditions for realism regarding natural kinds in particular. I find that Dupré’s promiscuous realism fails at least one these conditions, and therefore, for the sake of terminological consistency and clarity, we should classify promiscuous realism as an antirealist view of natural kinds.
49. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Casey Hall

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50. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Jaeha Woo

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51. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Joshua Anderson

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52. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Mike Jostedt, Jr.

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53. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Deborah K. Heikes

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Epistemologists debate the nature of epistemic responsibility. Rarely do they consider the implications of this debate on assigning responsibility for undesirable beliefs such as racist and sexist ones. Contrary to our natural tendency to believe and to act as if we are responsible for holding undesirable beliefs, empirical evidence indicates that beliefs such as implicit biases are not only unconsciously held but are intractably held. That is, even when we become consciously aware of our biases, we have enormous difficulty changing them and believing differently than we do. This paper considers five responses to epistemic involuntarism. It considers how each response provides or fails to provide a principled means for holding individuals epistemically responsible for their undesirable beliefs. The involuntaristic nature of at least some beliefs seems obvious, but, in the end, we can choose to cultivate epistemic virtues that can influence these beliefs.
54. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green

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55. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Brian J. Collins

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Despite utilitarianism’s status as one of the major ethical theories, historically it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. The primary goal of this paper is to respond to the structural objections that have been leveled against utilitarian accounts of political obligation. In the process of responding to these objections I fi rst offer a sketch of a general account of “obligations” which the utilitarian can endorse. Secondly, I argue that anti-utilitarian theorists have missed an important ethical distinction between “derivative” and “nonderivative” moral principles. The failure to make this distinction, as it relates to ‘political obligation,’ has not only brought about the categorical dismissal of utilitarian accounts it has also muddied the terms and goals of the debate generally.
56. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Travis Quigley

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57. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Josué M. Piñeiro

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Mark Rowlands develops a novel account of remembering in which episodic memories survive in a mutated form after their content has been long forgotten. He dubs this account “Rilkean memories.” I draw from this account to argue that episodic memories of past epistemic harms resulting from Miranda Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice, can persist as embodied behavioral or bodily dispositions that have negative epistemic and practical consequences long after these episodic memories have been forgotten. The way that others judge us as epistemic agents—as people with the capacity to know or the ability to contribute to the pool of knowledge—and following this judgment, treat or fail to treat us as epistemic agents can cause us to adopt attitudes or behaviors with consequences to our epistemic agency. When embodied as Rilkean memories, these attitudes or behaviors raise new difficulties and become quite difficult to eradicate.

commentaries

58. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Karl Aho Orcid-ID

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59. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
Sabrina B. Little Orcid-ID

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60. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 2
John Casey

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