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panel discussion

61. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Suren Zolyan
Сурен Тигранович Золян
Что есть «ненадежное» в вымысле и откуда оно?
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Maier’s article recalls the idea of finding common ground between different points of view on the truth in fiction and the problem of reliability that it generates. However, the criteria by which it is possible to determine the characteristics of the reliability or unreliability in the artistic narrative are unclear. A naive-realistic approach leads to contradictions. We propose to proceed from the already established approaches to the problem of “truth in fiction”, and consider as determining for the modal pragmasemantics of narrative the concept of narrator bifurcated between the actual and fictional worlds.
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62. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Emar Maier
Эмар Майер
Другие точки зрения: ответ оппонентам
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epistemology & cognition epistemology & cognition

63. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Keith Begley
Кит Бигли
Знание о противоположностях и формализация антонимии
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This paper discusses knowledge of opposites. In particular, attention is given to the linguistic notion of antonymy and how it represents oppositional relations that are commonly found in perception. The paper draws upon the long history of work on the formalisation of antonymy in linguistics and formal semantics, and also upon work on the perception of opposites in psychology, and an assessment is made of the main approaches. Treatments of these phenomena in linguistics and psychology posit that the principles of minimal difference and invariance are centrally important. It will be suggested that the standard approach employing meaning postulates fails to capture the relevant notion of antonymy, in part because it is not informed by these principles, and in part due to a number of other problems with this kind of approach, many of which may be overcome by building in the central principles from the beginning. The paper also discusses the issue of whether we can know that opposites necessarily exclude each other and, if so, how. This issue is intertwined with what is known as the colour incompatibility problem that Wittgenstein wrangled with at various times during his life. The paper assesses various solutions to these problems including an approach that was first put forward by Jerrold J. Katz. The relation between this approach and the theory of determinables and determinates is also examined. A further development upon this approach is proposed and then applied to the case of the formalisation of antonymy. It is argued that this approach avoids the problems suffered by the main approaches discussed earlier in the paper.
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64. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Oksana I. Nevdobenko
Оксана Ивановна Невдобенко
Неявные допущения декартовского сogito. Обоснование через двуприродность знака
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In the article we argue that Descartes while considering sign version of cogito does use some hidden premises in spite of well-known declaration there are none. They are:1) there’s such a length of time Δt over which I cannot be wrong on the matter of what happened over Δt (infallible time); 2) there’s such time extent Δt upon which I cannot be wrong (say, if an event happened quickly from I-viewpoint then while being measured in some standard units, one will appraise it as“quickly” as well). We investigate the advantages the evil demon can take from that. This is a sign manipulation we propose. Cogito as a sign object has to have a) a sense-data component and b) can be built only through time by consecutive generation one elementary sign after another. Then an (elementary) sign manipulation is the following: (1) I is [not am] building the sign si(or some part of it, which is not a sign any longer), (2) I thinks wrongly that the previous signs just built are s1, …, si-1 (the evil demon’s work), (3) I is [not am] going to built signs si+1, …, sn. For example, one thinks of self as thinking cogito, while in fact the real event is building “t” (the part “cogi” being prior to “t” is in the past and as such can be manipulatively substituted instead of what really happened in the life of I before building the sign “t” (whatever it is; probably, nothing; probably, I didn’t exist before generating “t”)). We investigate the source which makes the manipulation possible and the gravity of the destruction of such sort. The crucial reason for the possibility of such misconception turns out to be the sense-data component in any linguistic (being sign) constructions.
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language & mind language & mind

65. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Alexey Z. Chernyak
Алексей Зиновьевич Черняк
О семантической референции и референции говорящего
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Theory of reference is a mainstream theory of meanings of certain types of linguistic expressions (primarily proper names, indexicals, demonstratives, and definite descriptions) in contemporary philosophy of language. It assigns corresponding expressions capability to refer to what people are talking or thinking about by using them. Meanwhile it is widely recognized that there are two kinds of reference. One is conceived as a relation between an agent and an entity which he or she applies the term to in particular communicative act (or act of thought); this is roughly called “speaker’s reference”. Another one characterizes linguistic terms as referring to particular entities relative to particular languages. This is normally identified as semantic reference. The popular hypothesis based on this distinction assumes that if a name is used in communication (or thought) in a right way (i.e. in accord with particular set of conventions) then it refers to its semantic referent even when the speaker uses it to refer to something else. On the other hand, some belief that the reference of a particular use of a proper name (its token) is fully determined by the speaker’s communicative intentions. In the proposed study both these hypotheses are criticized. Different senses of such words as “designate” or “refer to” in their application to the functioning of linguistic expressions in communication are analyzed, and it is shown that linguistic conventions allegedly responsible for names’ semantic references cannot make names refer to their semantic referents independently on what particular participants of communication are believing or doing. On the other hand, the reduction of the reference of a token of a proper name to its speaker’s reference fails to explain this phenomenon as well. Neither theory explains how tokens of proper names (and supposedly other types of designators) could refer to particular entities (have referents). From this at least two conclusions may be made: the radical one would claim that any talk about tokens’ references is most likely meaningless. And the moderate one is that explanations of this phenomenon based on the distinction between semantic and speaker’s references don’t work. The author favors the first conclusion, but does not insist on it.
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vista vista

66. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Konstantin G. Frolov, Andrei I. Ponomarev
Константин Геннадьевич Фролов
Цветовые концепты как фактор когнитивного проникновения в восприятие
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The aim of the paper is to analyse the influence of linguistic concepts of an agent on the qualitative aspects of her perception. We examine conceptualist and non-conceptualist approaches to the problem of what the content of perceptions is. The conceptualist approach asserts that the content of perception is similar to the content of beliefs: both types of content are assumed to be expressible in language. The non-conceptualist approach to the content of perception assumes that the content of perception cannot be conceptualized due to too much information available to the agent through visual perception. However, the assumption about non-conceptual content of perception leads to some serious difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of cognitive penetration of perception. This is an empirically established fact that some cognitive states may influence on the qualitative aspects of agent’s perception. We show that cognitive penetration of perception implies that perception and those cognitive states which affect it should have comparable content and this mechanism is based on the influence of expectations on perception.
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case-studies – science studies case-studies – science studies

67. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Joan Gimeno-Simó
Жоан Химено-Симо
Когда «это F» не является F. Интерпретируемость, дейксис и сложные демонстративы
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In this paper I defend two claims regarding complex demonstratives (noun phrases of the form “that F”). On the one hand I argue that, when one of these expressions misdescribes the referred object (i.e., when such object is not F), the right semantic analysis is to treat the expression as uninterpretable. On the other, I claim that the uninterpretability thesis finds itself in trouble when it comes to dealing with non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives, i.e., uses of “that F” in which the speaker has no acquaintance or direct perception of any object that could satisfy the predicative material. In order to make these two claims compatible, I set out to modify the way the uninterpretability thesis has been traditionally formulated.
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68. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez
Хорхе Луис Мендес-Мартинес
Знание через слушание: на пути к эпистемологии аудиального восприятия
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This paper proposes some guidelines for the undeveloped discussion of auditory epistemology. Auditory epistemology is an approach concerned with the perceptual basis for knowledge and belief, specifically around audition. The article pursues two goals. Firstly, it claims that addressing auditory perception from the viewpoint of epistemology is more fruitful than the discussion on phenomenology which has thus far dominated the debates in the literature on sound. Secondly, it elaborates a concrete proposal pertaining to the cooperation of sense-modalities. In so doing, a model for “Perceptual Coherence” is suggested. The first section of the paper critically reviews the problem of perception as it is usually understood in traditional epistemology. An ensuing section outlines the model of perceptual coherence.
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interdisciplinary studies interdisciplinary studies

69. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Andrei G. Kuznetsov
Андрей Геннадиевич Кузнецов
Восприятие и наблюдение в сильной программе социологии научного знания
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The article analyzes a connection between empiricism and the Strong Program in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (D. Bloor, B. Barnes, J. Henry). I use Strong Program’s theories of perception and observation in science as cases to demonstrate this link. The main points of my argument are the following. First, characteristic problems of the empiricist tradition are at the focus of the Strong Program. Second, relations between the Strong Program and empiricist tradition are complex. While proponents of the Strong Program criticize classical empiricism of Bacon and logical empiricism, they employ new empiricism of Mary Hesse’s network model as a crucial theoretical resource for their social theory of knowledge. Third, The Strong Program uses Hesse’s theory as a model for the renewal of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. A key point of the analysis is that it is reasonable to add to the Mannheimian and Wittgensteinian traditions in the sociology of knowledge another empiricist one as exemplified in the Strong Program. I conclude the article by stressing interdisciplinary tendencies in this empiricist sociology of scientific knowledge.
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archive archive

70. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Dimitry A. Bayuk, Olga B. Fedorova
Дмитрий Александрович Баюк
Г.Ф. Лейбниц: от «символьной революции» в математике к концепции замещающего знания
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The transition from the exclusive use of words to the predominant use of symbols in mathematics continued for centuries, but by the seventeenth century it turned out to be explosive. This phenomenon became known as the “symbolic revolution” in mathematics. One of its main outcomes was the discovery of mathematical analysis almost simultaneously and independently by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. To both scientists their discovery served as the basis for far-reaching philosophical generalizations. For Leibniz, it led to the concept of suppositive cognition, the opposite of the prevailing notions at that time. He was the first to argue that the criterion of clarity and distinctness in cognition is impossible, because it relies on intuition about primary concepts, but these are in fact confuse and undistinct, and the foundation of such cognition is shaky. Using the successful use of symbols in mathematics as a model, Leibniz arrives at the concept of blind or symbolic cognition, cognitio caeca, which makes it possible to achieve validity and verifiability of results without reliance on intuition or primary concepts. The truthfulness of the result is found to depend more on grammar, which determines the substitution rules of some signs, or characters, for others, than on the connection between signs and the signified. Leibniz’s opening debate served as a prologue to the fundamental modernization of scientific discourse in the early Modern Time. Although he failed to achieve entirely his philosophical goals, the concept itself turned out to be extremely productive and modern, effectively decoupling the progress of natural science from its philosophical foundations. This innovative cognitive ideology opened up enormous prospects for the formation and accumulation of new knowledge, closed by the rigid requirements of the Cartesian paradigm of science still dominant in Leibniz’s time.
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new trends new trends

71. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 2
Pavel N. Baryshnikov, Magomet N. Atakuev
Павел Николаевич Барышников
Семантика суждений о внутрителесном опыте
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The linguistic representation of interoceptive sensations is valuable not only for the study of cognitive processes, but also for conceptual analysis within the framework of the phenomenal approach in the philosophy of mind. This article focuses on the deep linguistic mechanisms of metaphorical conceptualization of corporeality and their relationship with various classes of judgments expressing awareness of internal bodily experience. Interoceptive sensations are associated with the representation of the image of the inner-body space and the processes occurring in it. The content of these representations is extracted simultaneously from mental beliefs about the properties of one's own physicality and, at the same time, from both real (physical) and imaginary causes of internal states. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the relationship of the semantics of these judgments with the principles of forming a conceptual dictionary of interoceptive sensations coming from a variety of pragmatic contexts. Some results of clinical and semantic studies of psychopathology deserve special attention. Semantic intersections of metaphors in idiomatic expressions of emotional states and judgments describing an abnormal inner-body experience are found. The paper substantiates the thesis that body, in addition to the functions of the organismic “interface” device, also has deep representative properties. While attempting to formulate utterances expressing abnormal inner-body experience, a conceptually conditioned metaphorical dictionary is automatically used. Along with the formation of conceptual schemes, the formation of judgments of awareness about the qualities of one's own conscious experience takes place.
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editorial editorial

72. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Ilya T. Kasavin Orcid-ID
Илья Теодорович Касавин
Космос: большой вызов и глобальный проект
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Space is a cross-cutting philosophical theme: an unattainable dream coming from the depths of centuries, and at the same time a source of religious faith and high science. Therefore, space is not limited to specific space projects and the conquest of celestial space. In contrast to this, space is a starting point for a global problematization of politics, economics and culture. It demonstrates its archetypal significance for the history of all human culture. At the same time, space as a project and a subject matter of imagination needs today a new humanistic definition, in which the role of philosophy cannot be underestimated. It is necessary to find and theoretically justify a balance between the task of economic efficiency of space research and the results of space exploration, on the one hand, and their use for creative human development, designing a safe and fair society and forming a scientific picture of the world.
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panel discussion panel discussion

73. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Kirill A. Rodin
Кирилл Александрович Родин
Заметки Л. Витгенштейна о намерении и действии в контексте социальной теории
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A sequential reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s notes on action and intention (presented in this article) aims to stimulate a further discussion of the productivity of using Wittgenstein’s notes on action theory within social theory (and within research in moral philosophy and philosophy of law). It provides as an illustration of Wittgenstein’s consistent commitment to the principle of contextualism (suggesting an inextricable bond of social and philosophical concepts and their inclusion into various forms of life and linguistic practices). In terms of the principle of contextualism, the article examines numerous attempts to incorporate the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein into social and related research (Albert Ogien, Chantal Mouffe, ethnomethodology, Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the sociology of color).
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74. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Valery A. Surovtsev
Валерий Александрович Суровцев
Намерение, субъект воли и социальная теория
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The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.
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75. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Vitaly V. Ogleznev
Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев
Намерение и намеренное действие в философии права
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The article examines K.A. Rodin’s thesis on the possibility of including Wittgenstein’s remarks on intention and action in the context of legal philosophy research. It is shown that although the concepts of intention and intentional action are relevant to the philosophy of law, Wittgenstein’s own ideas did not have a significant impact on their relevance (and some of them did not have it at all). This influence is confined to the fact that, like Wittgenstein, many jurists and legal theorists, mainly those who were influenced by the ideas of H.L.A. Hart, also objected to the causal theory of action. However, the influence is limited to this approach.
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76. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov
Александр Афанасьевич Санженаков
Витгенштейн как «попутчик» контекстуалистской социологии
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The article attempts to criticize the concept of language games, as well as the hypothesis of K.A. Rodin on Wittgenstein’s influence on social science through the introduction of “contextualism”. Wittgenstein proposed to place language games in the first place in relation to the feelings and inner experience of individuals participating in common practices. The author of the article puts forward the following argument against it: indirect awareness of the rules and norms in which the individual does not participate or to which s/he does not obey suggests that the meaningfulness of actions stems not only from the context, but also from internal reflective understanding. In the final part of the article, the author refers to the work of E. Durkheim “Suicide: A Study in Sociology” in order to show that contextualism, as K. Rodin understands it, may have its own roots in sociology.
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77. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Denis K. Maslov
Денис Константинович Маслов
Витгенштейн и Гегель
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In his response, D. Maslov (1) presents a sketch of a comparative analysis of the notion of ‘will’ in Wittgenstein and Hegel as a response to the initial article by K. Rodin. Despite apparent (but in some ways only seeming) differences, both philosophers show similar anti-metaphysical attitude in their respective analysis. Both regard will not as a metaphysical entity, but in its concrete expression in actions and intentions and conclude that acts of will and intentions can be understood by other people. (2) On this ground and the argument of universality of language, we argue, against K. Rodin, against anti-universalist and contextualist readings of Wittgenstein’s texts.
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epistemology & cognition epistemology & cognition

78. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Louis Vervoort, Alexander A. Shevchenko
Луи Вервурт
Эпистемический релятивизм и проблема Геттиера: идеи из философии науки
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The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.
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79. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Tatiana D. Sokolova
Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
A priori в классической модели науки
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The paper is devoted to the concept of a priori and a priori knowledge within the framework of the classical model of science proposed for conducting research on the history of concepts, and in particular, the concept of “science” by digital humanities [de Jong, Betti, 2010]. In the first part of the article, I refer to the concept of model and (1) consider the classical model of science in terms of its heuristic potential for philosophical (and in particular, epistemological) research, and (2) define the main structural parts of the model for studying the concept a priori. In the second part, I consider the theoretical aspects of the classical model science in the context of a priori functional and historical concepts and the possibility of its adaptation to the analysis of the a priori in the history of science In the third part I propose a possible model for research of a priori in the classical model of science in two aspects: (1) a priori as universal principles underlying all sciences and (2) a priori as a set of propositions for a specific scientific discipline.
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language & mind language & mind

80. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Olga A. Kozyreva
Ольга Александровна Козырева
Критика картезианской концепции знания о себе в англоязычной аналитической философии
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The article presents an overview of the main strategies of criticizing the Cartesian account of self-knowledge in English-speaking analytic philosophy. First, I distinguish four basic aspects of the Cartesian account of self-knowledge: metaphysical, methodological, semantic, and epistemic ones. The first aspect deals with the justification of distinctive features of self-knowledge; the second aspect concerns the way the agent gains self-knowledge; the third aspect is about the content of mental states, and the last one is about formal principles of self-knowledge. Second, I examine four critical strategies. The criticism on the metaphysical aspect consists in denying the privacy of mental states thesis; the criticism on the methodological aspect refutes the perceptual model for introspection; the criticism on the semantic aspect rejects the internalism, i.e., the external factors do not determine the content of mental states; the criticism on the epistemic aspect involves the KK-principle failure. Finally, I briefly assess the efficiency of these critical strategies.
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