International Journal of Applied Philosophy

Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski have recently developed an argument against semiotic objections to markets. They argue that all such semiotic arguments are unsound because they fail to recognize that the meaning of market transactions is a contingent socially-constructed fact. They attribute this type of argument to Debra Satz. This paper argues both that Brennan and Jaworski are mistaken to attribute this particular semiotic objection to Satz and that they are mistaken to attribute to her a semiotic objection of this type. It then argues that Brennan and Jaworski have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Satz’s project. It concludes by defending Satz against Brennan and Jaworski’s charge that one of her criticisms of markets is based on an equivocation.

It is true that not all women are born equal, and likewise, not all men are born equal, so before the game even starts, there are some athletes with longer legs, bigger hands and unusually high testosterone levels. These are natural properties and structures that have the potential to cause an unfair advantage. It is argued that since athletes are not born equal, natural properties should not be controlled or suppressed but ought to be considered as fair play in sports. Forcing intersex female athletes to lower their testosterone levels to compete is not only sexist and discriminatory, it is unethical. The question of fair play is at the forefront here as I seek to work from the premise that natural inequalities have always existed and will continue to exist in competitive sports. As long as these exist, competitions will not be fair. Since athletes have no control over these natural inequalities, they are neither causally nor morally responsible for them.

It is very common for social scientists to be asked whether their findings about human nature could also be learned from reading great works of literature. Literature teachers frequently assign readings partly to teach people important truths about the world. But it is unclear how looking at a work of fiction can tell us about the real world at all. In this paper I carefully examine questions about the conditions under which the fictional world can teach us about the real world.

It has long been claimed and supposedly substantiated that there exists an association of ideas, but not of perceptions (that is, sensations or impressions). Collingwood echoed this claim from Hume, but Hume later in the Treatise produced an association of impressions (actually emotions and passions), so he came close to Hobbes’s position: human physiology has “trains of sense” and these are carried on in human thought—what we call “ideas” (he called “decaying sense”). A strong case can be made for this claim when we examine the phenomenon of food. Concerning food, I explore Chinese cuisine and more recently Kunz and Kaminsky’s The Elements of Taste for examples that provide substantiation of the association of perceptions. This proves to be a rewarding way to look at the phenomenon of food and leads us to re-examine traditional theories of perception.

If consent is valid (that is, morally transformative), then in every case it is either valid or invalid. This is because of the notion that (when valid) consent eliminates a right and a person either has or lacks a right against another. A parallel problem to the paradox of symmetrical attackers applies to consent. That is, there is a case in which two people neither consent nor do not consent to one another. As a practical matter, attorneys, judges, legislators, physicians, and sex partners should not treat consent as morally significant, except perhaps as defeasible evidence of what makes another person’s life go better. They might still want to follow the law because there is likely a duty to follow law even when its purported justification is mistaken.

Is privacy the key ethical issue of the internet age? This coauthored essay argues that even if all of a user’s privacy concerns were met through secure communication and computation, there are still ethical problems with personalized information systems. Our objective is to show how computer-mediated life generates what Ernesto Laclou and Chantal Mouffe call an “atypical form of social struggle.” Laclau and Mouffe develop a politics of contingent identity and transient articulation (or social integration) by means of the notions of absent, symbolic, hegemonic power and antagonistic transitions or relations. In this essay, we introduce a critical approach to one twenty-first-century atypical social struggle that, we claim, has a disproportionate effect on those who experience themselves as powerless. Our aim is to render explicit the forms of social mediation and distortion that result from large-scale machine learning as applied to personal preference information. We thus bracket privacy in order to defend some aspects of the EU GDPR that will give individuals more control over their experience of the internet if they want to use it and, thereby, decrease the unwanted epistemic effects of the internet. Our study is thus a micropolitics in in the Deleuzian micropolitical sense and a preliminary analysis of an atypical social struggle.

Although it is clear that the Chief Executive may be impeached while in office, it is generally thought that a sitting President cannot suffer criminal indictment while in office. There are two general arguments in support of this position. The first argument notes that criminal indictment of the President would so interfere with the duties of the office as to constitute a violation of the Constitution. The second argument simply refers to the express language of the Constitution providing that the remedy for intolerable occupation of the office is impeachment and conviction. While the Constitution does not expressly preclude indictment and prosecution, it is argued that the Constitution only so allows upon impeachment and conviction. This essay aspires to more fully explore the two alleged constitutional prohibitions against the criminal indictment of the occupant of the Office of the President and to argue that each suffers sufficiently to render each doubtful as a ground for guaranteeing Presidential immunity.

This essay examines the traumas inflicted by acts of false-flag state terrorism on 11 September 2001, and their concealment by exploitation of mythicist falsifications that are endemic to our culture—while also paying particular attention to parallels between the staging of explosive demolitions for the WTC Towers and gutting of the Reichstag by Nazi incendiaries in 1933. The study culminates in a depiction—based on heuristic distinctions between natural, gnomic, alethic, and personal wills—of how we become vulnerable to mythicist falsifications, and how truth-telling facilitates recovery of our moral integrity after the twin traumas of betrayal by acts of state terror, and complicity with that betrayal, have deeply compromised it.

Health care reform to provide long-term care supportive services for growing numbers of older Americans presents ethical, cultural, and political challenges. This paper draws lessons from Japan, the world’s oldest nation, to develop an ethical argument in support of enacting public long-term care in the U.S. Despite cultural and political challenges, the paper shows that the ethical case for reform is strong, with broad ethical support from a range of ethical perspectives.

This article aims to answer a core normative question concerning child poverty: What types of responsibilities should be assumed by the state and caregivers as the main agents of justice involved in the problem? By approaching this question, I aim to explore the complex triangulation between children, caregivers, and the state, as well as the paradox of the double role of caregivers as former victims and current agents of justice. In order to accomplish this, I will first present the internal and external issues that arise when the focus is placed on the victims, and, secondly, when attention shifts to the perpetrators. Finally, I will advocate for the need to fundamentally reframe the debates, centering attention on the damage, on investing the construction of a culture of care that includes preventive measures to dismantle common prejudices about poverty and neglect, and on introducing measures to care for the caregivers as a necessary step to break the perpetuation of (child) poverty.

While qualities of good character are of great significance and value in human social and professional affairs—and conduct which at least conforms to such qualities is invariably required for public service employment—they cannot be a requirement of the private lives of citizens in free societies. That said, there seems more of a case for the personal possession of such qualities in the case of those human professions and services for which moral exemplification to others may be considered an inherent part of the professional role. After some consideration of arguments for and against such moral character exemplification in relation to such professional roles as religious ministry and teaching, this paper proceeds to make some case for politics as professional role of this exemplificatory kind.

In this age of environmental crisis, Jainism is regarded worldwide as one of the first religions to have developed an environmental ethic, based on its practice of ahiṃsā (nonviolence). This article attempts to critically engage with the concept of ahiṃsā in its recently evolving forms—from a religious concept to its current portrayal as an environmental ethic. By explaining how ahiṃsā becomes the central concept of Jainism, tying together its ethics, theology, and ecology, this article establishes that the current global portrayal of ahiṃsā by Jains, more than being driven by environmental concerns, is directed toward attaining liberation through reducing karmic impressions on souls. The article discerns the differences between Jain practice of ahiṃsā and ahiṃsā as an environmental ethos; it argues that to recognize ahiṃsā as an environmental ethic a broader reconceptualization is required beyond the way it is currently conceptualized in Jainism.

Fundamentalism was and still is a major threat to global peace and security. The modern world has shown itself to be vulnerable to this persistent threat. The emergence and growth of many fundamentalist cults in the last century, from fascism and communism to various types of religious fundamentalism, is sufficient proof of this point. This paper presents a philosophical investigation of fundamentalism and its specific relation to skepticism, and highlights the ineffectiveness of skeptical philosophies to prevent fundamentalism in human society. Finally, it identifies a theoretical problem in modern thought which is at least partly responsible for the practical vulnerability of the modern world to fundamentalism, and discusses the possibility and necessity of a solution to fix that problem.

Changing the appraisal of stress to foster adaptive coping for students is explored by proposing an alternative lens theory of viewing the stress response from the perspective of Greek philosophy of Stoicism. The connection of Lazarus’s challenge appraisal (Lambert and Lazarus, “Psychological Stress and the Coping Process,” 634) to resilience and Stoicism is a novel perspective brought about by re-examining the foundations of current practices and has the potential to elicit new research, theories, and resources to help students learn to cope with stress differently. The concepts of stress, Stoicism, and resilience are all inextricably linked, however Stoicism is at the root of these ideas. This proposal to view stress through the lens of Stoicism is an opportunity to alter the way students think and respond to challenges by using an ancient philosophy to have a positive outlook on the stresses of modern university life.

The ethics of using genetic engineering to enhance athletic performance has been a recurring topic in the sport philosophy and bioethics literature. In this article, we analyze the ethics of cloning horses for polo competition. In doing so, we critically examine the arguments most commonly advanced to justify this practice. In the process, we raise concerns about cloning horses for polo competition, centering on normative aspects pertaining to sport ethics usually neglected by defenders of cloning. In particular, we focus on (1) how this practice could have a detrimental impact on the central skills of polo, and (2) how it unjustly creates an uneven playing field. We suggest that the polo community would benefit from critically considering the ethical quandaries posed by the practice of cloning horses for polo competition.

In “The Immorality of Horror Films,” philosopher and film scholar Gianluca Di Muzio proposes an analytic argument that aims to prove horror narratives, particularly slashers, unethical. His Argument from Reactive Attitudes contests slashers encourage pleasurable responses towards depictions of torture and death, which is possible only by suspending compassionate reactions. Doing so degrades sympathy and empathy, causing desensitization. This article will argue Di Muzio’s ARA, while valuable to discussion of art horror and morbidity, fails to meet its intended aim. The ARA contains structural flaws in its logic, compounded by reliance on insufficient evidence. Additionally, Di Muzio does not adequately consider or rebut prominent aesthetic concerns, including ontological and moral distance of representations. Lastly, the argument utilizes a flawed classificatory schema that undermines its primary goal. Even narrowly confined to slashers, the ARA cannot explain alternative reasons for engaging with horror, nor does it account for those nuanced slasher works designed to foster compassion. The project concludes by offering a modified ARA with greater potential to accurately analyze the interrelation between art horror and morality.

Medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States, and there is growing consensus that medical errors should be discussed after they occur. This essay argues that potential errors should be discussed with patients as well in the informed consent process prior to treatment. While physicians don’t have the obligation to tell patients to go to physicians and hospitals that would present less potential for error, patients should be told of increased risks compared to other options, and be guided through the data on physician and hospital rankings. Suggestions are given to improve this informed consent process.

One limitation of medical ethics modeled on ideal moral theory is its relative silence on the aftermath of medical error: not just on the recognition and avoidance of malpractice, wrongdoing, or other such failures of medical ethics, but on how to respond given medical wrongdoing. Ideally, we would never do each other wrong; but given that inevitably we do, as fallible, imperfect agents we require non-ideal ethical guidance. For such non-ideal contexts, Nancy Berlinger’s analysis of medical error and Margaret Walker’s account of moral repair present powerful hermeneutical and practical tools toward understanding and enacting what is needed to restore relationships, trust, and moral standing in the aftermath of medical error and wrongdoing. Where restitutive justice aims to make injured parties whole and retributive justice to mete out punishment, reparative justice, as Walker describes it, “involves the restoration or reconstruction of confidence, trust, and hope in the reality of shared moral standards and of our reliability in meeting and enforcing them.” Medical moral repair is not without its challenges, however, in both theory and practice; the standard ways of holding medical professionals and institutions responsible for medical mistakes or malpractice function retributively and restitutively, either impeding or giving benign inattention to patient-practitioner relationship repair. This paper argues for the value of medical moral repair, while considering some complications of extending and synthesizing Berlinger’s and Walker’s respective accounts on medical error and moral repair.