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61. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ángeles J. Perona

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Every time that one refers to the political philosophy that could be drawn from the so called " Last Wittgenstein ", the most habitual thing is to associate it with conservative positions, given that the majority of the available literature on the matter does it so. Nevertheless, in the last few years some philosophers, such as Chantal Mouffe and Paolo Virno, have tried to offer a new picture in which Wittgenstein fits better with democratic political ideas, even though this manoeuvre requires to go beyond some presuppositions of Wittgenstein philosophy. My aim is to twofold. First, I will analyze why it has been thought that some elements ofWittgenstein’s late philosophy are compatible with political conservatism. Second, I will try to point out what notions of this network should be discarded in order to make it useful to elaborate democratic anticonservative models. This last task is necessary since it is logical to think that the same body of thought cannot be coherent with so different and even opposite political derivations.
62. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
He Ping

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Ideology has been a most prominent problem in today’s China ever since the establishment of the overall socialist market economy in China in the 1990s. What kind of ideology is in need for Chinese market economy? The question directly challenges Marxism, the leading ideology. Liberalism,New-Confucianism split and contradicted socialism and market economy, denied Marxist ideology and required the adoption of western Liberalism or traditional Confucianism as the leading ideology for today’s China. Whereas the Marxists insisted on socialist market economy, but had not founded the new theory of ideology suitable for thedevelopment of today’s China to criticize Liberalism and Neo-Confucianism. All these study caused the complicated situation of ideology. I think that the Chinese market economy challenges the former Marxist philosophy while at the same time becomes the moment that develops Marxist philosophy and recreates. This challenge shows the internal contradiction in the Chinese social structure, therefore, indicates that China is now experiencing a culture revolution in the micro world. Owing to this revolution, ideology is no longer the abstract knowledge suspended over the foundation, but a self-creation movement penetrating into thedaily life. Therefore, the creation of the Chinese ideology is not something clinging to the surface of the market economic construction but an internal part of it, the significant aspect leading the healthy development of the Chinese market economy.
63. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
M. Polishchuk

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The tragic experience of the XX century, the worth expression of which was Holocaust, challenges the fundamental values of civilized society. Its terrifying symbol is Auschwitz, extermination camp, Universe of terror – “the kingdom not of this world”. Its understanding is beyond classical concepts of good and evil and can not be described in the usual categories of crime and punishment . The entrance to this “kingdom” can be illustrated by Dante’s words written at the entrance to Hell (Inferno): “Abandon all hope, ye who enter here”. Finding no help, either in God or in human Reason, the shattered mind has to seek a new “measure of all things” to perceive wisdom born in despair.
64. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Gabriel Radu

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This article pays special attention to some issues of justice erased by extending constitutional and political problems to a more generally rank. Controversies generated by the principle of justice are multiplicated in their formulation in different social spaces and time relocation. In this article we test the applicability of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice in changing political orders, emphasizing its particularities and limitations. Solving past political problems in different political regimes induces many theoretical disscutions. In spite of all dificulties, new debates in intergenerational justice appears like a possibility in approaching controversial political matters. We’ll try also to formulate some proposals concerning the possibility of applications of some constrains of the theoretical model of intergenerational justice to changing political order issues.
65. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Juha Räikkä

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Political conspiracy theorists have done a lot of good in the past; undoubtedly they will do a lot of good in the future too. However, it is important to point out that conspiracy theories may have adverse consequences too. Political conspiracy theorizing, as a public activity, may lead to harmful scapegoating and its implications may be racist and fascist rather than democratic. Conspiracy theories may undermine trust in political institutions. Certain conspiracy theories are kept artificially alive, because of their political effects; “conspiracy theorists” do not always believe in their theories, but repeat them in public because of politicalreasons. Conspiracy theories have close connections to populism, and when theories are accepted widely enough, they remind harmful rumors. Sometimes conspiracy theories are designed and disclosed to make political decision-making more difficult and to create an impression that certain questions are still “open”. Certain conspiracy theories are disguised libels: they place individual persons in a “false light” in the public eye. In my presentation, I aim to discuss the ethics of political conspiracy theorizing and conditions for ethically acceptable conspiracy theorizing.
66. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Sushila Ramaswamy

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It is generally believed that through one-person one vote the diverse groups within society would be integrated into a shared identity. But the multiculturalists- Kymlicka, Parekh, Taylor, Young- argue that in well established democracies, some groups like African-American, indigenous peoples, ethnic and religious minorities and women feel marginalized and as a remedy, propose measures that the political system could mirror the distinct cultural identity of the different people. The critics of multiculturalism- Miller, Barry- argue that Liberalism accommodates cultural plurality and stresses on the need for shared identity and common public space, which multiculturalism overlooks.
67. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ali Rizvi

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Jürgen Habermas has emerged as a sharp, and occasionally harsh, critic of the Bush administration’s policies since the Iraq war. Habermas has developed this critique in several of his short pieces and interviews, some of which are available in fine collections in both English and other languages. However, the occasional and journalistic character of Habermas’ political interventions often hide the theoretical basis of his critique. In this paper, I argue that Habermas’ critique of the Bush administration’s foreign policy emanates from, and is founded upon, his conception of modernity, and specifically his views about the relationshipbetween “particularity” and “generality.” The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate how Habermas’ critique can actually be read as a critique of particularism, which Habermas sees operating behind American (and British) foreign policy, and which, in his view, compromises the key achievements of modernity (especially in its Kantian version.)
68. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Jitendra Nath Sarker

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In their book entitled “Democracy and the American Party System” Austin Ranney and (Willmoore Kendall have brought a charge again the pluralists that they denied the desirability of creating sovereign state and as such, according to them, they were opponents of democracy as well as of the very idea of government. The aim of this paper is to refute their charge and thereby to establish the view that the pluralists are in fact strong supporters of democracy in the real sense of the term and of popular sovereignty. What did most of them was that they made an attempt to bring to light the fact that democracy, as it is being practiced almost everywhere in the world, ultimately leads to denial of popular sovereignty, the basic element of self-government. Self-government can best be realized where the people is the real sovereign neither the state nor the numerical majority. And the government formed by the representatives elected in a traditional party-based election does not therefore, mean self-government. It can at best be called the government of the majority. Majority rule does not anyway mean democracy. It may be called ‘numbersocracy’ after the proper terminology of Ranney and Kendall. Democracy, de facto, is nothing other than majority rule that is best termed by John Calhoun, the ex-vice-president of the U.S.A, as the ‘rule by numerical majority’. ‘Numerical’ majority”, says he, “is not the people”. I strongly adhere to the pluralists’ view and therefore, conclude with an insistent assertion that numerical majority rule in disguise of democracy has in fact ruled out popular sovereignty.
69. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Paul Schollmeier

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The American philosopher John Dewey defines a public as those who are affected by indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that they deem it necessary to care systematically for these consequences. Unfortunately, his definition enables a public to cooperate merely for the control of the negative consequences of human action. Plato suggests that we might better define a public as those who deem it desirable to care for human action for the sake of itself as well as for the sake of its consequences. This definition would especially empower a public to increase cooperation for attaining the goods of human happiness and virtue.
70. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Omid Payrow Shabani

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Given the rise of religious movements during the past decade, some have argued that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as separation of church and state and principle of the public use of reason are too restrictive and ought to be rethought. I would like to argue along a Habermasian line that the principle of secular justification ought not to result in a private/public split in religious citizens’ identity if they recognize and adopt an “institutional translation proviso”. This proviso requires an epistemic ability on the part of religious citizens that enables them to translate their religious beliefs and insight into secular reasons when they pass beyond the informal public sphere into governmental institutions like courts and parliaments. Citizens can express and defend their claims in the public sphere in religious terms if they cannot find secular translation for them. However, this proposal requires a complementary change in the mentality of the secular citizens that recognizes the continued existence of religious communities in diverse liberal democracies.
71. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ramesh Chandra Sinha

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The present paper entitled "Subaltern Language Games and Political Conditions: A Perspective on Applied Philosophy" attempts to streamline Wittgensteinian language games and political conditions. The expression `subaltern ` stands for the meaning as given in the concise oxford dictionary, that is, `of inferior rank`. Subaltern language game is the game of marginalized people. Language game is meaningful in the context of social and political relationship. My contention is that technical or symbolic language is an instrument to serve the end of the affluent class. I think that any social and political change requires change in languagegame. By applied philosophy, I mean that philosophical theories are applicable in concrete human situation. In this sense, I have considered Wittgenstein as an applied philosopher because he holds that words are dead but assume life when it is used or applied in the concrete life situation. In order to make society free from exploitation and reduce inequality, we have to change the prevailing language game. The language game which I am proposing may be called as the "Subaltern Language Game". I have tried to understand Wittgenstein's language game in the light of Derrida's theory of deconstruction. The ordinary languagephilosophy as expounded in` Philosophical Investigation` deconstructs `technical language philosophy' of `Tractatus` because technical language gives an abstract system of symbols and lacks blood and flesh of lifeworld. My contention is that language game is inseparable from socio-political structure. As a matter of fact language game is the expression of forms of life. The language game of the affluent and the ruling class is different from the language game of the poor and downtrodden. The language game of one ethnic group is different from the language game of another ethnic group. The language game of the white people is different from the language game of the black. In Indian context, the language game of the upper caste is different from the language game of the lower caste. The possibility of inequality due to linguistic advantages of privileged class is a fact and not a fantasy. In order to develop linguistic capacity, it requires socio-political and socio-cultural mechanism. The social inequality due to linguistic handicap of individual can be lessened by a process of change in values. This process of change in value system is called culturalisation or sanskritisation. It can be helpful in changing the use of language and its meaning. Thus, in moving from theory to practice, philosophers work to change these words and rules for those philosophers who are trying to do applied philosophy. The language game of the applied philosopher should be fashioned in accordance with socio-political realities. It is not plausible to do applied philosophy with outdated mode of philosophising.
72. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Flavia Stara

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This paper explores both some of the concepts John Dewey exposed while in China in the 1920’s and considers why his idea of democracy did not thrive in China. In the lectures Dewey delivered in China he focused on the strength of democracy, from the perspective of political science, social science, philosophy and education. Dewey clarified the democratic way of thinking, doing and living to the Chinese people. Of these topics, he considered the philosophy of education and social and political philosophy to be the most important. Through his speeches, he underlined the importance of reflective thinking and reasoning in constructing human intelligence and lively inquiries. In the early part of the 20th century, both Dewey’s pragmatism and Marx’s communism were honored and speculated. While both Dewey and Marx promoted similar aims for human beings, that is, the creation of a society for the common good, their means were substantially different. For Dewey, such a result could only be obtained by a gradual construction of communicative social relationships; for Marx, a radical revolution was necessary to get expunge the old currently dominant parties. With regards to their relationship to working for the common good, for many Chinese, Dewey’s philosophies and ideas were unclear, overly complicated, and inefficient, while Marx pointed out a concrete destination, a clearly designed and expedient wayto implement an egalitarian society.
73. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
James Sterba

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Libertarianism has long been known for its opposition to a right to welfare, In this paper, I will oppose this view of libertarianism, maintaining that the libertarian’s own ideal of liberty requires just such a right to welfare. I begin by showing that there are conflicts of negative liberty between the rich and the poor. I then argue that when these conflicts are evaluated by the “ought “ implies “can” principle, the liberty of the poor has priority over the liberty of the rich, and it is this priority that provides the grounds for a right to welfare. Along the way, I argue that there are not two interpretations of libertarianism - an ideal based versionand a rights-based version - but only one and this interpretation supports a right to welfare.
74. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Andrzej Szahaj

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The paper treats about the relation between ideas of democracy and justice produced by a leading American political philosopher - John Rawls and ideology of multiculturalism. The author tries to show that Rawls’ arguments cannot meet the expectations of partisans of the ideology in question because they are very much Western or ethnocentric at the bottom. He argues that such a predicament is not to be lamented about because to be Western or ethnocentric when Euro-American culture is at stake is not something bad. On the contrary, being true to the some ideas of Western culture, especially these ones that are connected with individualism, human rights and liberal democracy, is worthy of acceptation. The conclusion of his paper says that the ideology of multiculturalism can be accepted only in its moderate forms and should be rejected in its extreme forms. It means that the limit of approval of multiculturalism lies at the political level and is connected with the relation of this ideology to the core political values of the Western culture.
75. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Joanna Szalacha

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In this paper the concept of structural power is presented as a philosophical and social category that should be used when modern processes of political, cultural or economic change are considered. The arguments will be presented in three stages: 1. Power - two perspectives, two traditions 2. Structural power - the concept 3. Structural power - as a mechanism of explanation the modern social change. The paper refers to two traditions of analyzing the problem of power (as a corrective or as a persuasive influence) and shows that concept of structural power can be a link between those two theoretical perspectives. The paper also refers to the problem of modern, macro changes. It will be shown how the concept of structural power, because of its usage of categories like "experts' power,"public discourse meanings" or "legitimization", can be useful in philosophical reflection about contemporary international and national issues.
76. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Gaziz Telebayev

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The "culture of war" has been formed firmly and minutely enough by humanity and is used with greater effectiveness than the "culture of peace" in modern world. Scepticism is one of the philosophical traditions where conceptual idea was worked out and later became a theoretical base of culture of peace. Seeing the meaning of scepticism in formation of culture of peace as an ideological paradigm in proper perspective one should mark those intentions which were offered and taken by philosophical society. The following principle can be referred to such philosophical intentions as principle of “isosthenea”, principle of “epoche”, tradition of “ataraxia”, principle of religious tolerance. The admission of principle of isosthenia means that the most preferable (that is valid, logical) way of settling the argument or conflict is a peaceful, compromise way because nobody can rely on greater truth of one's statement in comparison with the statement of an opponent. Principle of abstention from judgment (epoche) means that nobody can establish some values as absolute ones, nobody can possess the role of a judge while appraising the situation, and nobody can interfere the case which doesn't concern him. The result of abstention from judgment is the reaching of “ataraxia”. Scepticism of XVI - XVII centuries played a great role in methodological formation of culture of peace by means of manifestation and detailedbasing of principle of religious tolerance.
77. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Roberto Terrosi

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This speech analyzes the constitutive relationship between liberty and domination. In it freedom is intended as opposition to power through the concept of liberation. But many forms of power, in spite of fighting liberty, try to present themselves as liberators or as a guarantor of liberty itself. In this way the concept of freedom becomes first with Christianity and then with modernity an instrument for a sophisticated technology of power that has the opposite function. This individualistic notion of liberty is criticized also from an epistemological point of view (complexity theory, chaos theory), and from a multicultural point of view by a brief comparison with holistic Sino-Japanese concept of spontaneity. Complexity theory shows that the subject is always connected to a system in his decision making process. Chaos theory shows that what seems spontaneous is an unpredictable interaction of causes. Finally Sino-Japanese culture has not a traditional concept of freedom, because it focuses the spontaneity of Dao or nature that is conceived as whole necessary for the comprehension of the individuals’ life. The aim of this text is to give just some hints for a “mise en question” of the concept of liberty related to recent problems such as globalization, environmental problems and crisis of modern political systems.
78. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Leonid Tysyachnyy

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Following the design of the author, reforms of the UN would consist of four rules. The first rule: Payments from the global community should correspond with the services provided by the UN. - For this purpose it is necessary to develop a system of compensation in which payment would be made only for the completion of a concrete service. Such a system would in effect serve as a continuous audit and guarantor of quality service at all times visible to the entire public. The second rule: Servantura not dictatorship - The author has created a word "servantura" and has given it the following meaning: the performance of administrative service, guided by (1) ethical conduct, (2) democratic norms, (3) the newest scientific knowledge, (5) safe technology, (6) justice, (7) equality of people and (8) the priority of human life. On an idea of the author, servantura is a global managerial philosophy with a system of global service in which each decision should be in accordance with the wishes and the will of the entire global community, not of a separate group of nations, or a single nation, or person. The third rule: Noncommercial services. Commercialization of the UN should be considered a crime. Further commercial use of the UN should be stopped, as it will lead to aglobal catastrophe. The fourth rule: Without enemies or competitors, Full transparency and a strict prohibition of secrecy and privacy in the UN must be established. i.e. openness, publicity and a strict international prohibition on any secret structures or secret activities within the UN.
79. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Lysun Olga Valerevna

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The purpose of the article is to show the great potential of human ability in social development and to reveal the personality conditions for the development of mankind. The categorical arrangement of global responsibility is given relating to the individual personality and to civilization. The creation of social conditions addresses the vital importance for the individual development of global responsibility. The theoretical base of the research includes numerous works on fundamental problems in the field of social philosophy, philosophy of law, individual and social psychology, theory of personality, culture research, and worksabout civilization. The historical and socio-philosophical approaches are used to reveal the regulation of development of global responsibility on the individual level and the level of civilization. Phenomenological and axiological methods are used to study the activity aspect of global responsibility.
80. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Peter Vallentyne

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I shall develop and defend a view of the reparation (e.g., rights to compensation) and enforcement rights (i.e., rights to use force) that individuals have in response to rights-transgressions. The general nature of the account is intermediate to two well-developed alternatives. Pure responsibility accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold only to the extent that the transgressor is culpable, or in some way responsible, for the transgression or resulting harm. Strict liability accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold merely in virtue of the transgression and independently of the agent’s culpability orresponsibility. I shall defend an account according to which: (1) in agreement with pure responsibility accounts, there are reparation rights against a transgressor only to the extent that the transgressor is responsible for transgression-harm (i.e., harm from a transgression), and (2) in agreement with strict liability accounts, there are enforcement rights even against innocent transgressors—although, in agreement with pure responsibility accounts, the extent of the enforcement rights depends in general on the extent to which the transgressor is responsible for the harm and for acting wrongfully. The central feature of the proposed account is that reparation and enforcement rights in a particular context are sensitive to the extent to which their implementation will reduce (in a way specified below) direct transgression-harm.