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81. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Noah Greenstein

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82. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
James Simpson

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Fallibilism is typically taken to face a problem from the apparent infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions (hereafter, CKAs). CKAs are of the form: “S knows that p, but it’s possible that q,” where q obviously entails not-p. CKAs sound to the ears of many philosophers as contradictory or infelicitous. But CKAs look to be overt statements of fallibilism, since if S fallibly knows that p, then she can’t properly rule out some possibility in which not-p. Do fallibilists, then, have some way of explaining the seeming infelicity of CKAs that doesn’t impugn the truth of fallibilism? Fallibilists think so. In this connection, there are two well-known responses to the problem: Patrick Rysiew’s pragmatic strategy and Jason Stanley’s semantic strategy. While both strategies have real virtues, there are aspects of each strategy that face certain complications. In this paper, I’ll outline those complications and I’ll develop some remedies to them. The aim of this paper will be to show that the challenge posed by CKAs isn’t a grave problem at all. In particular, I’ll argue that if the semantic strategy fails because CKAs really are overt statements of fallibilism, then there’s good reason to think that the pragmatic strategy succeeds, but if the pragmatic strategy fails because CKAs are obviously false or aren’t overt statements of fallibilism, then the semantic strategy succeeds. Thus, I’ll conclude that the problem for fallibilism posed by CKAs isn’t a grave problem at all.
83. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Lucy Vollbrecht

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84. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Henry Jackman

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85. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Mark H. Herman

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Cognitive heuristics, as proffered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, are reasoning shortcuts that are useful but flawed. For example, the availability heuristic “infers” an event’s probability, not by performing laborious, ideally rational calculations, but by simply assessing the ease with which similar events can be recalled. Cognitive psychologists presume that cognitive heuristics should be identified with a distinct cognitive mechanism. I argue that this is a mistake ultimately stemming from descriptive rational choice theory’s entangling of descriptive and normative theorizing. Such mechanism-identification is a desideratum for kinds used in answering, “How—in a causal-mechanical sense—do we reason?” However, cognitive heuristics befit a different question, namely, “How—in a contrastive sense—do we reason vis-à-vis ideal rationality?” Clarifying cognitive heuristics’ nature and appropriate explanatory expectations can enhance understanding, provide lessons applicable elsewhere, and illuminate an important episode in the history of cognitive psychological science.
86. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
R.M. Farley, Deke Caiñas Gould

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87. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Josué Piñeiro

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88. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green

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89. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Gareth Fuller

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In this paper I defend the possibility of robustness analysis as confirmatory. Given that models are highly idealized, multiple models with different sets of idealizations are constructed to show that some result is not dependent on those idealizations (it is robust). This method of robustness analysis has been criticized since, no matter how many false models agree, all of them are false and lack confirmatory power. I argue that this line of criticism makes an assumption that a model is confirmatory only if it ontically represents its target. I draw on work about explanations to motivate a challenge to this assumption, and argue that this assumption needs bolstering.
90. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Joseph Spino

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91. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Ross Gilmore

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92. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Patrick Bondy

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93. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
T.J. Buttgereit

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94. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Robert B. Tierney

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95. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Eric Reitan

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In Hell and Divine Goodness, James Spiegel defends the surprising position that of the two dominant non-universalist Christian views on the fate of the damned—the traditionalist view that the damned suffer eternal conscious torment (ECT), and the annihilationist view that the damned are put out of existence—the annihilationist view actually posits the more severe fate from the standpoint of a punishment. I argue here that his case for this position rests on two questionable assumptions, and that even granting these assumptions there are intuitive reasons, reasons Spiegel has not addressed, for supposing that ECT is more severe.
96. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Thomas N. Metcalf

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Critics of the Fine-Tuning Argument for Theism have recently argued that even if the universe is fine-tuned for life, certain features of the universe are still surprising given theism, because God should be indifferent between those features and their contraries. In the first section of this paper, I summarize this sort of Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument. In the second section, I explain why contrary to initial appearances, these objections fail. In the third section, I present the Argument from Compatibility, which attempts to turn the tables by arguing that the paradigmatic features are more surprising given atheism than they are given theism.
97. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Emerson R. Bodde

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98. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Burnside

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This paper is a critique of Adorno’s ideas concerning jazz from his own perspective. I approach the topic from a dialectical standpoint, accounting for the historical development of jazz in the African-American context while trying to understand why Adorno found nothing of the genre redeemable; he scorned jazz as an unoriginal product of the culture industry. Drawing on the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Fumi Okiji on jazz, history, and Adorno, I try to demonstrate the internal contradiction of Adorno’s dislike of jazz and appraisal of Beethoven. Although Adorno’s critical tools of the culture industry, deconcentration, and his usage of Lukács’s idea of reification are indispensable, Adorno should have consistently applied the subtle distinction between two intrinsically tied but nevertheless separate entities: (1) an artwork and (2) the mode of production in which it is developed.
99. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Russo

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100. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andréa Daventry

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