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81. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
M. Lorenz Moises J. Festin

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The main purpose of the paper is to investigate the relevance and significance of the concept of common good in contemporary society. First, I make a brief historical remark about the philosophical concept of common good. I will argue that the concept is rooted in the ancient Greek philosophical understanding of society, namely as polis, whereby human being is thought to have an end that is not merely individual but also collective. I then discuss how societies have significantly changed over the years and how the current global order resembles the situation during the time of Alexander the Great, whose vision it was to establish a cosmopolis, literally a global city. In the end, I consider whether the notion of common good in itself has lost its relevance in the face of the manifold social changes. I bring my discussion to a close with a note on the universality and naturality of the common good of humankind.
82. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Barry L. Gan

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During the latter half of the twentieth century political realism dominated national and international landscapes. The twenty-first century has seen the rise of neo‐conservatism, what Charles Krauthammer has called “democratic realism” and what others see as a re-birth of Wilsonianism—making the world safe for democracy. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, in a speech on Sept. 17, 2007 in Williamsburg, VA, at the World Forum on the Future of Democracy, acknowledged these different strains of current U.S. policy, saying that “once again [people are] talking about the competing impulses in U.S. foreign policy: realism versus idealism, freedom versus security, values versus interests.” These competing concerns—but especially fear about terrorism coupled with asense of retributive justice—have divided much of the world. Nonetheless, it is clear that no matter what terms one gives to domestic and foreign policies, they are all in one way or another mired in the attitude that the end justifies the means, an attitude that will remain both morally and politically bankrupt until such time as people, policies, and programs embrace the concept of principled nonviolence, if not principled nonviolence itself.
83. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Raf Geenens

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In this paper I investigate a class of theories that attempt to justify democracy and human rights on the basis of a specific political anthropology. These theories belong to what could be called contemporary French liberalism, as exemplified by Claude Lefort, Marcel Gauchet, and Pierre Rosanvallon. These thinkers share the important intuition that human coexistence is rooted in a fundamental “political” and “historical” condition. Although this condition can be illustrated by meansof empirical examples, I will argue that their argument should be taken to mean that societies are necessarily caught up in this condition. In a second step I will consider the normative consequences of this thesis. The key idea is that ignoring this fundamental condition inevitably leads to pathological consequences, as can be illustrated in reference to both predemocratic societies (e.g. non-Western premodern societies) and postdemocratic societies (e.g. totalitarian regimes). It is only democracies, so they contend, that are able to deal with this condition in a “correct” way, for here this condition is not overlooked or repressed but is openlyrecognized and even institutionally protected. In the final part of my paper I will argue that this line of reasoning offers a promising alternative for the many strands of foundationalism that dominate contemporary political theory, even if it remains beset by a number of weaknesses.
84. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Simon Glynn

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Of the many ideological blind spots that have afflicted US and, to a lesser extent, European, perceptions and analysis of the economic, political and social milieu, none have been more debilitating than the equation of democracy with political liberalism. Thus those who attempt to derive propaganda value from such an equation are vulnerable, as the US government has found, to the rhetorical counter attack that in opposing democratically elected governments, such as that of Hamas or Hugo Chavez, they are not merely being anti-democratic, but are in illiberally opposition to human rights and civil liberties also; an argument quiteindependent of the same charges, emanating more legitimately, from their support of, for example, the Masharraf regime and the Saud dictatorship.Furthermore no less an august body than the Council of Europe has drawn attention to the US government’s inhumane, humiliating, degrading and cruel treatment, including torture, of prisoners, at Guantanamo, and, seemingly even more extreme treatment of prisoners in the supposedly secret or “black” prisons operated both by the CIA, and other countries, where the torture of prisoners, often illegally or extra judicially rendered to them, has been outsourced. In light of this the paper takes up a discussion of the nature of the relationship between Liberalism, Democracy and Torture as it is germane to the current legitimation crisisfacing liberal democracies.
85. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Stefan Gosepath

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In this paper I present an argument for a procedural principle of distribution, which is often called the presumption of equality.
86. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Alexander L. Gungov

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Late Edmund Husserl’s examination of the crisis of the European sciences is the point of departure of this paper. Husserl’s views about wrong objectivisation and naturalization of reason in science and philosophy have prepared the ground for dissatisfaction with reason in various trends of 20th century Social and Political Philosophy. This intellectual climate has naturally bred the radical criticism against the social project of Enlightenment practiced by the first generation Frankfurt School. Later on, the Modern reason misfortunes in social and political sphere are epitomized by Emanuel Levinas’ uprising against fundamentalontology for the sake of responsibility to the Other as well as by Julia Kristeva’s appeal to reestablish the social contract on new sensibility and new rationality. Finally, Jean Boaudrillard puts the univocal diagnosis that reason has surrendered to the code of consumerist simulacrum. In the second part of the paper, some suggestions proposed by the above philosophers (except for Baudrillard) about resolving the deadlock prepared by the Modern reason are viewed briefly. A conclusion is made that Baudrillard’s pessimistic position seems to be the most plausible and relevant in the current socio‐political and philosophical climate.
87. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Zilya Habibullina

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The present paper deals with the Russian cosmism in the conditions of modern society and views. The cosmism is conveyed in both philosophical and naturalistic aspects. The idea of the so-called cosmicity of the human and cosmic outlook is one of the most attractive features of the Russian cosmism for our contemporaries. Among the fundamental issues elaborated by the Russian cosmists is an idea of dynamic evolution. It is the lack of integral system of social actions, that indefinitely postpones the implementation of the projects, elaborated by the Russian cosmists. Many ideas of the Russian cosmism are topical, in a view of new discoveries in the field of science, technology and cosmos development they have become even more convincing.
88. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Ranjoo Seodu Herr

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Despite numerous democratic movements and some successful instances of democratic consolidation in the non-liberal Third World cultures, most observers of democracy in the liberal West equate democracy with liberal democracy conceptually linked to the liberal value of individual freedom. Consequently they deny the possibility of nonliberal democracy by arguing that non-liberal cultures do not advocate the liberal value of individual freedom. In this paper, I argue that democracy is conceptually compatible with non-liberal cultures because democracy is not necessarily tied to the value of individual freedom. I first deconstructthe liberal position on democracy and then construct a broader conception of democracy compatible with nonliberal cultures.
89. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
James Hersh

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John Rawls, in his Political Liberalism (1993), claims that his justice-as-fairness prescription for liberal democracy does not require its citizens to harbor doubts regarding the truth claims of their religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines. Citizens, he says, need not be “hesitant or uncertain, much less skeptical, about [their] own beliefs.” This claim is necessary for the protection of liberty of conscience, a “primary goods”, but it is also necessary to his description of his scheme as a “reasonable utopia” since citizens are not likely to agree to a demand for skepticism. The problem arises for Rawls’s scheme when he says that for a citizen to participate in this political process she must be “reasonable” and that to qualify as “reasonable”, she must acknowledge what Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment” (that is, “limits on what can be reasonably justified to others”). This acknowledgment allows her not only to qualify as reasonable herself, but forces her to concede the reasonableness of other citizens who hold different truth claims from her own. Rawls’s fourth “burden of conscience” is an admission that the truth claims of all citizens, including her own, are conditioned by what Rawls calls her “total experience”. Unless she is willing to make the admission that her truth claims are contingent, a citizen cannot qualify as “reasonable” and is excluded from the conversation of public reason whose purpose is to produce a consensus on justice principles. This leaves his scheme in the category of “unreasonable utopias”.
90. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Marek Hrubec

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The paper analyzes recognition in relation to the global legal arrangements. It articulates of an extra-territorial recognition of right-holders by means of the development of a philosophical theory of recognition on the global level. It examines contemporary possibilities of extra-territorial recognition that are bound to the nation-states hitherto. The paper indicates an increasing influence of various transnational agents in order to show (1) the possibilities and limits of extra-territorial recognition based on a state-centric approach, and (2) a demand of supranational recognition. Therefore, it maps the development from thecontemporary international system to the system that can contain also important supranational elements. In its practical consequences, it leads not only to rethinking social, political and legal philosophy but also to a philosophical reinvention of the United Nations because a new supranational stage of recognition requires not only a responsibility of the nation-states but also a direct responsibility of non-state transnationalagents.
91. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Hahn Hsu

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It is virtuous for individual and collective agents to be tolerant. However, toleration is difficult, both in practice and in conceptualization. Firstly, given that toleration can be understood in various ways (Walzer 1997, Forst 2007), it seems that to determine what is the proper conception of toleration would be controversially difficult. Here I shall suggest one particular conception of toleration is more suitable than others. This conception allows, as I shall explain, us to better understandthe difficulties of toleration. Thus, this particular conception of toleration should lead us to see what is more adequate for dealing with the difficulties of toleration. To be more precise, I shall argue for a political conception of toleration, which different from the attitudinal conception of toleration as being indifferent, or the ethical conception of toleration as respect. There is the suggestion of toleration as recognition (Galeotti 2002). These alternative understandings of toleration do not provide better diagnoses of the difficulties of toleration. The political conception of toleration is intended to be grounded on some moral considerations, notpragmatic purpose. It is political in that it recognizes the fact that toleration is essentially practiced to deal with a power relationship among the parties of toleration. Where these is no such power relationship, as I shall argue, there is no issue of toleration. Secondly, this proposed conception of toleration is political in the sense that it shall not deal with differences coming from, to use John Rawls’s phrase, the fact of pluralism by adopting any comprehensive doctrine such as an ethics of respect or recognition.
92. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Donald Ipperciel

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Renan’s paradigmatic question ‘What is the nation?’ has been inflected in many ways: When is the nation? Where is the nation? Why is the nation? etc. However, few have explicitly considered the normative question: ‘What ought the nation to be?’, which raises the distinctively moral and philosophical-political question of the normativity of the nation in general, and in turn, that of the normative criteria that underpin the nation’s normativity. Since the choice of these criteria is clearly arbitrary and culturally-determined, any normative justification will have a counterfactual character. Nonetheless, in spite of its inherent limitations resulting from axiological relativism, such an approach has the advantage of providing not only a descriptive model for countries subscribing to theselected normative principles, but also a critical basis for the evaluation of their national aspirations.
93. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Joaquín Jareño-Alarcón

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Over the last few years, in part due to the political impact of terrorist activities, the debate on the moral significance of torture as a useful means of obtaining information from enemy combatants has arisen with an urgency not seen in many years. Stressing the importance of exceptional cases, the defenders of torture attempt to justify its acceptance by and back its use in the judicial system of Western democracies. Yet what is at stake here are the basic moral principles—especially that of human dignity-on which our political convictions rest. Admitting of exceptions would change the value of these principles: what once werefixed guidelines for acceptable action now become alterable according to specific political demands, thus making torture into a morally neutral act. The current defence of torture in the West may be a symptom of the progressive absolutization of the State.
94. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Yuko Kamishima

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With our state-guaranteed or internationally recognized human rights, liberalism is rather a common basis of political discussion today. John Rawls’s theory of justice, which set a framework for liberal theory of justice in the last decades of the twentieth century, is notably contractarian. Martha Nussbaum, although claiming to be a neo-Aristotelian, argues that her capabilities approach (hereafter CA) can upgrade the liberal theory of justice, particularly that of political liberalism, to deal with unsolved problems of justice, namely, disability, nationality, and species membership. However, this paper argues that her proposal issuccessful only when her CA-based theory proves its affiliation with political liberalism in more detail. As defined by Rawls, political liberalism produces “free-standing” political conceptions and rejects any metaphysical or religious ideas. It halts conceptions of justice that promote conceptions of good derived from particular comprehensive doctrines. I do not believe a mere convergence between CA and contractarianism is sufficient enough to secure the rational acceptability of her CA-based theory. I suggest that if she wishes to maintain her CA-based theory’s being politically liberal, she either has to prove more of the public, in particular the global public, acceptability of her intuitive ideas of human dignity without relying on her intuitions or alter the meaning of political liberalism itself so that it allows a room for some sort of comprehensive doctrine.
95. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Hye-ryoung Kang

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Distinguishing between “abstraction” and “idealization,” O’Neill has warned that idealized accounts of justice are misleading because “insofar as contemporary theories of justice start by assuming ‘ideal’ conception of persons, rationality or independence... their theories will be inapplicable to the human case.” The principles of justice in Theories of Justice by John Rawls has often been criticized as a typical example of such an idealized account of justice. However, in response to such criticism, Rawls may contend that the problem with the ideal account of justice can be addressed in this non‐ideal theory, which is fully explored in his Law of People. In this paper, I aim to provide a critique of non‐ideal theory in Law of People by arguing that in as much as what injustice and non‐ideal mean is pre-defined by his ideal theory by the top-down model, not from existing conditions, and his non-ideal theory also has the same problem as hisideal theory, thus, systematic exclusion of particular types of actual injustice. Thus, I argue that while Rawls’s idealized non ideal theory may capture the concerns of idealized reasonable liberal people, it fails to capture the actual justice concerns of those people suffering from the injustices of neo-liberal globalization mainly derived by actual liberal people.
96. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Anatolij Karas

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The perspectives of Ukraine which are outlined by the notion of the “Ukrainian project”, and determined by potential of development of civil society, as congruent with perspectives of steady international development for the sake of collaboration and peace, are examined in the article. Determination of such basic analytical notions as discursive practices of “prevailing” and “understanding” is offered with this purpose. Discourse is considered as reason for choice and giving the advantage to one meaning over the others that is set in the certain modes of signification. Discourse of understanding – is the process of creation of such knowledge, the nominative function of which stops being the function of power, and becomes the instrument of the renewed perception and understanding at new level of communicative space. As discursive reality is reflected not only on the methods of thinking, but also on the practical behaviour of people, we have warrants to speak about its ethical conditionality and the corresponding discursive‐ethical practices of “freedom and authenticity”, “paternalism and clientism” and “nihilism and anarchy”. Last two discursive-ethical practices are examined as obstacles on the way to realization of the “Ukrainian project” in relation to itsdemocratic development in direction to the civilization values common with the European Union.
97. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Arnold Kazmin

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Russian philosopher, the author of such books as: 1. Arnold Kazmin The theory of intellect: how to elect a president. M: ‐ “CDPress”, 2001. 2. Arnold Kazmin The globalization of morality-the evolutional step to civilization. M: - “CDPress”, 2005. 3. Arnold Kazmin “The Hegel’s code: system thinking and social cybernetics. M: - “CDPress”, 2006. Presidium Member of the Russian Philosophical Society. Took part of The The 21st Universal Philosophy Congress at Istambul, Turkey, 2003. The editor-in-chief of Russian Philosopher newspaper.
98. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Rahid Khalilov

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The paper states that the world as a self-ruling system needs creation of its new concept based on philosophy of harmony. Harmonic foundation-building of the world system, safeguarding the turning strategy of the world from non-balanced into balanced development, formation of world order on the basis of convergent idea on world unity of nationstates, the leading way of integral globalization contrary to unipolar globalization are the principal conditions of the world’s progress. The necessity on creation of harmony in the world occupies an important place in the practice of international social, political, economic and civilizationalrelations. Global civilization, which appears as a result of historical development of humanity, the evolution of philosophical idea of world unity, interaction of globalizational and civilizational processes and other specific development conditions, defines itself as a new stage of our planet. Through forming the organics of national cultures and local civilizations global civilization begins to create its own complex of common-universal behaviors and values. The historical and international importance of the globalization era is that it opens its very successful perspectives having rational basis of world development towards global civilization not in a spontaneous, but in a naturally determined movement. Global civilization comprising humanity’s potential harmonically is and will continue to be the principal project of world-building.
99. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Eui-Soo Kim

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Modern civilization, which is proud of its material richness and high intellectual level, is in crisis, so that the new value “sustainability” becomes the basic philosophical principle. Introducing what we Korean philosophers think on philosophy today, I want to suggest to the Asian and the world philosophers that we should reflect together and declare solidarity upon the problems of both Asia and the world.
100. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 50
Heup Young Kim

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I have been proposing for ‘christo‐dao’ rather than traditional christo-logy or modern christo‐praxis as a more appropriate paradigm for the understanding of Jesus Christ in the new millennium. This christological paradigm shift solicits a radical change of its root-metaphor, from logos (Christ as the incarnate logos) or praxis (Christ as the praxis of God’s reign) to ‘dao’ (Christ as the embodiment of the Dao, the “theanthropocosmic” Way) with a critical new interpretation. For EastAsian Christians, the christological adoption of dao is as inevitable and legitimate as that of logos for the Western church at the fourth century. This adoption has been operative since the beginning of Korean Christianity. As an example, in this paper, I introduce the intriguing thoughts of Dasŏk Ryu Young-mo 柳永模 (1890-1981). According to John 14:6, Ryu comprehended Jesus as the Dao, the way of the truth toward the life in God. Christ is the brightest way on which we can walk safely (the truth) to attain the unity with God (the life). It coincides with the goal of Confucianism, the anthropocosmic unity of Heaven and humanity. Fromthis vantage point, he further expressed a nobel East Asian definition of God; namely, God is the One who is ‘the Being in Non-Being’ (Ŏpshigyeshin-nim): He believed that this event of Being-in-Non-Being has been historically manifested in the crucifixion (the Non-Being) and the resurrection (Being) of Jesus Christ. Christ is both the Non-Being (the Non-Ultimate, Vacuity) and Being (Great Ultimate, Form). Finally, confessing Jesus as the embodiment of the Dao is none other than Ryu’s East Asian way of saying “the Word made flesh.”