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1.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Panu Raatikainen
McCall’s Gödelian Argument is Invalid
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2.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Susan Haack
Realisms and Their Rivals: Recovering Our Innocence
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3.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Peter van Inwagen
Can Variables Be Explained Away?
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4.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Rowland Stout
The Right Structure for a Causal Theory of Action
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5.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Uwe Meixner
Über das zentrale Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus
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6.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Gerhard Schurz
McCall and Raatikainen on Mechanism and Incompleteness
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7.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Michael Ayers
Mehmet on Substances: A Reply
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8.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Dale Jacquette
Searle’s Antireductionism
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9.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Joseph Margolis
Anticipation of a Final Reckoning: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century
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10.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Naci Mehmet
Ayers on Substances
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11.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 1
Pascal Engel
Intentionality, Normativity and Community
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12.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Daniel Laurier
Quatorze observations topographiques sur les contenus et les normes
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13.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Patrick Rysiew
'Encouragement in Darwin'?
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14.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Ari Maunu
Frege’s Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions
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15.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
André Fuhrmann,
Wilson P. Mendonça
Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Relevance
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16.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Mitchell S. Green
The Inferential Significance of Frege’s Assertion Sign
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17.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
John Tienson
Questions for Blobjectivism
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18.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Olaf L. Müller
Holistische Stolpersteine in der Bedeutungstheorie. Plädoyer für einen empiristischen Neuanfang
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19.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
4 >
Issue: 2
Terry Horgan,
Matjaž Potrč
Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism
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20.
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Facta Philosophica:
Volume >
5 >
Issue: 1
Charles Sayward
Does Scientific Realism Entail Mathematical Realism?
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