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101. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Xavier Pavie Ancient Spiritual Exercises in Contemporary Philosophy: Actualization of Philosophy as a Way of Life
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The goal of this paper is to understand in what way contemporary philosophy apprehends spiritual exercises as they were conceived, shared and practiced by ancient philosophers. Aimed at self-improvement and self-trans-formation, spiritual exercises were intended to enable one to live a philosophical life. As such they represented an essential element in the main concerns of antique schools. Thus philosophers elaborated doctrines and theories, while maintaining a real and daily practice of these views. Indeed, the axis theôria/praxis is one the most important of spiritual exercises and is also a connecting thread in this paper leading to a better understanding of the notion of “spiritual exercise” itself. Pierre Hadot is the one who discovered traces of spiritual exer-cises - their construction and implementation in ancient philosophy. However, philosophy goes far beyond the antique philosophers, to our contemporary era. As a result, for more than 2,500 years spiritual exercises have been ques-tioned, reorganized by their environment, notably the religious environment. Consequently, the aim here is to determine the very essence of the antique spiritual exercises in the evolution of philosophy in a general sense, and more particularly in contemporary philosophy. Keeping in mind both theory and daily practices we can notice that there has been a certain re-introduction and actualization of ancient philosophy. First, in America through Pierce’s pragmatism, which tends towards melioration and self-transformation, and through Stanley Cavell’s thoughts - notably his “ordinary” theory - which questioning the very existence of contemporary popular spiritual exercise. And then in the old continent through Nietzsche, Wittgenstein or even Foucault, who seems to have defined spiritual exercises with his aesthetics of existence.
102. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kasem Phenpinant Lévinas, the Lapse of Time and the Clamor of the Other: Re-Opening Totality and Infinity
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How does Being justify itself? Emmanuel Lévinas poses this question in order to claim that ethics is the first philosophy. The answer is not only an attempt to search for the right to do justice with a human existence, but it also leads us to consider the relation of the one to the other. Subsequently, the question directs us towards the clamor of the other. In this paper I argue that, in Totality and Infinity, Lévinas still locates his philosophical demonstration in the shadow of Heidegger’s Being and Time. He transcendentally demonstrates the other by requiring ontology to facilitate the one-for-the-oth-er as significantly as the understanding of Being. By doing so, Lévinas uses the lapse of time to designate the ontology of the present as a revelation of the other. Although Heidegger demonstrates that Being discloses itself in its presence, Lévinas claims that Being is passively preceded by the relation to the other. He later insists on this procedure by making a polemic against the Hedeggerian notion of death. Heidegger examines death as the possibility of the impossibility of Being, whereas Lévinas disputes that death is the impossibility of possibility. Lévinas seizes death as the presence of Being’s virility, while turning Being around the passivity of the present. Consequently, time becomes the horizon in which the invasion of the other ruptures the existential meaning of Being. It pulls Being back to justify its own existence in relation to the other. Lévinas considers this justification as self-assurance of human existence in the face of the other, while the lapse of time makes the relation to the other as living.
103. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Derya Aybakan Saliya Feminism, Gender and Representation
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Judith Butler criticizes the feminism for it assume universal category of women. According to her category women don’t have coherent and stable meaning. Therefore she thinks that idea of political representation in feminist policy should be discussed. Besides she opens the concepts of identity and gender up for discussion for according to her the categories of gender and identity don’t say about our inherent coherent. In terms of Butler gender is a norm so it serves to regulate and normalize to subjects. In this context she thinks that gender categories create abnormal and unintelligible fields. So she warns feminism about exclusionary policies because for her if feminism accept universal category of women it may ignore different expe-riences of women.
104. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Karla Pinhel Ribeiro Law and Violence in Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin
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The paper investigates concepts of law and violence in Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin, especially in their works On violence and Critique of violence. The main objective of the research is to find similarities and differences between the definitions of these concepts in the thought of these philosophers. The main thesis of the research is the understanding that concepts of law and violence for Hannah Arendt are very different and the other hand, concepts of law and violence for Walter Benjamin apparently are the same.
105. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Zhenlin Wang Contemporary Practical Philosophy and Life-World Theory
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Life-world is a basic fact concerning our life. By inventing the concept of life-world, the importance of the problem of practice was distinguished and the traditional understanding that theory overweighs practice was reversed. Thereupon, the rational agent is charged, and philosophy of practice revived. The revival of philosophy of practice demonstrates the transformation of the mode of philosophical thinking and the changing of philosophical problematic. The mode of practical thinking means reflecting the human behavior and all the relevant basic problems from the perspective of human practice and the understanding of this practice. This is the inevitable tendency in the development of philosophy in the process of self-critique, self-transcendence, and self-renewal.
106. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
William Schultz Progress in Contemporary Continental or Speculative Philosophy: Lyotard’s Criticism and Development of Derrida’s Philosophy
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Contemporary French philosopher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, claims to have developed a new system based on the ideas of Jacques Derrida. I present Derrida’s three main dialectical a priori concepts structuring his phi-losophy, following the patterns that I call canonical, classical, or traditional.” Each of these three concepts is a model for any object of knowledge, and they are related in an increasing development of his theory of knowledge. Although the third dialectical a priori concept (the supplement) does guarantee the con-sistency of his previous concepts, it leads to a dilemma that is unsolvable on the basis of an implicit faulty presupposition. The only way for philosophy to progress, in Lyotard’s view, is to transform the faulty presupposition into a new hypothesis about knowledge. I present all three of Derrida’s dialectical a priori concepts because the new start by Lyotard is a change of Derrida’s philosophy as a whole, and even of all of the history of philosophy. I present the passage in which Lyotard claims that epistemology should be based on the idea of figurality in discourse; in Discourse, Figure (1971) he also calls this the “figure image,” which in a general way is analogous to the start of Derrida’s philosophy: both (Derrida’s difference and Lyotard’s figurality in discourse) are new beginnings in philosophy; both are dialectical a priori concepts; and both lead to a philosophical system having a tripartite structure. This paper, thus, focuses on Lyotard’s new idea of figurality in discourse as a transforma-tion of Derrida’s supplement.
107. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Alexander Ch. Zistakis Paul Virilio’s Phenomenology of Perception
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In this paper I examine some aspects and elements of the work of Paul Virilio that specifically concern the changes in perceptual and representational practices and structures in contemporary western societies. To that effect, I situate his thought in relation to his most immediate and direct predecessors, e.g. some elements of Kant’s philosophy and of the work of earlier phenomenologists, most notably Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In addition to that, throughout the text references are being made to certain key concepts of Virilio’s theory of perception, reproduction and representation, such as: the logistics of perception, the vision machine and the aesthetic of disappearance, then also the concepts of critical space and the lost dimension, as well as the key themes and concepts of speed and acceleration. These concepts establish Virilio’s general position with regard to contemporary communication and information technologies, providing a path for his general understanding of time as the main (and the only remaining) dimension of consciousness and perception.
108. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Shoji Ishitsuka Le tournant ontologique et l’éthique
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Dans cette communication, je voudrais montrer qu’un grand tournant ontologique a traversé toute la philosophie occidentale du 20 ème siècle à partir de l’oeuvre de Gyôrgy Lukacs (1885-1971) Histoire et conscience de classe (Berlin, 1923) via Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) avec son oeuvre principale L’être et le temps (1927) jusqu’aux ontologistes Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) Louis Lavelle (1883-1951 ) et d’autres le tournant ontologique dans la philosophie contemporaine. Une deuxième thèse que je voudrais éga-lement avancer dans cette communication est que ce motif du tournant ontolo-gique prend cette orientation caractéristique dans le dernier livre principal de G. Lukacs L’ontologie de l’être social (1964-1971) publié en deux volumes en 1984 et 1986 par monsieur le professeur Frank Benseler aux Editions Luchte-rhand, bien que l’oeuvre principale d’Emmanuel Lévinas (1904/5-1995) Tota-lité et infini (1960) nous ait très bien montré cette marche vers l’éthique.
109. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Constança Marcondes Cesar La recherche d’une nouvelle voie pour l’éthique: Ricoeur, Lévinas, Jonas
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Ricoeur déinit les contradictions de la société contemporaine: le progrès dans la direction de la rationalité est accompagné d’un progrès dans le sens inverse; les bénéices de la planétarisation de la technique portent des risques pour la survie de l’humanité. Il propose une nouvelle perspective de l’éthique, à partir de son dialogue avec Jonas et Lévinas, pour surmonter cette menace.
110. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Louis Perron La philosophie comme “forme de vie” selon Jean Ladrière
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The paper examines Jean Ladrière’s (1921-2007) understanding of philosophy as a “form of life”. Drawing from various sources (Kant, Husserlian phenomenology, Wiitgenstein, Blondel, Weil), the Belgian philosopher understands philosophy as a “form of life according to reason” and as a process in which existence constructs itself as a destiny of its own. In his own way then, Ladrière participates in today’s recovery of philosophy as a “way of life”.
111. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Cristina Bosso Wittgenstein, más allá de la clarificación del lenguaje: la filosofía como forma de vida
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La idea de la filosofía como crítica del lenguaje representa la gran novedad que Wittgenstein introduce y el hilo vertebrador que se mantiene a lo largo de toda su obra. Que la filosofía sea para él análisis del lenguaje y que su finalidad es la clarificación de enredos lingüísticos se encuentran fuera de toda duda; tal vez sea éste el único punto del corpus wittgensteiniano sobre el cual hay, en general, acuerdo entre los diferentes intérpretes. Encontramos en su obra una concepción de la filosofía mucho más compleja, plagada de matices sugerentes, de una densidad mucho mayor de lo que podemos sospechar si la reducimos a la disolución de los problemas filosóficos. Por ello me propongo mostrar que Wittgenstein nos da pie para pensar la filosofía como un camino para conocer el mundo y como una forma de vida. Si imaginar un lenguaje es imaginar una forma de vida (IF, 19), y hablar un lenguaje forma parte de una actividad o de una forma de vida (IF, 23) - como afirma Wittgens-tein -, podemos decir, entonces, que el análisis del lenguaje no se agota en la descripción del lenguaje mismo; constituye el hilo conductor que nos permite conocer algo que está más allá de él, pero que se encuentra en inextricable trabazón: el mundo humano, el mundo de las praxis, la vida en sociedad, las reglas compartidas. La elucidación de las condiciones de posibilidad del significado conduce a conocer el mundo humano.
112. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jacques-Bernard Roumanes Diathèse des questionnements philosophiques du «moi»: de la promesse socratique à la promesse cartésienne (complément à la Logique des fragments)
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Poursuivant la conceptualisation de la Logique des fragments (cf. Actes du XXXIII e Congrès de l’ASPLF, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2012) par l’examen d’une impasse: la fragmentation de l’Unité irréductiblement opposée à l’unification des fragments, ce texte cherche à en dégager la diathèse. L’usage de ce dernier concept déplace alors la recherche vers la compréhension de deux notions: l’irréductibilité des termes en présence et le recours à un principe d’alternance simultanée; notions paradoxales mais qui, en relativisant le principe d’identité, permettent de conjuguer les termes, tout simplement en les altérisant. L’irréductibilité, tant de l’Unité que de la multiplicité produit alors, en diathèse, cette altérisation de l’Unité au sein même du processus d’unification de la multitude. De là, le questionnement se resserre autour du rôle du «moi» passant de l’inconscience à la conscience, dans la perspective développementale de l’épistémologie génétique.
113. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Clélia Aparecida Martins Habermas: Erkenntniskritik und Sprache
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Für den frühen Habermas ist die Erkenntniskritik nur als Gesellschaftstheorie möglich. Die Erkenntnisprozesse werden geregelt von den Interessen (das Technische, das Praktische, das Emanzipatorische), die anthropologisch verwurzelt und durch die Naturgeschichte der menschlichen Spezies erklärbar sind, und –im Falle des Emanzipatorischen– auch durch die Sozialgeschichte. In den Werken vor Erkenntnis und Interesse diskutiert Habermas, obwohl er in Texten hier und da die Wissenschaftskritik aufrechterhält, viele andere Aspekte der heutigen Epistemologie, sodass er die Interessentheorie aufgibt. Er beabsichtigte dann eine Ausarbeitung der Diskurstheorie und entwickelt dazu in den siebziger Jahren eine auf der universellen Pragmatik beruhende Theorie der Wahrheit als Konsens. In Bezug auf das Thema „Spra-che und Erkenntnis“ befinden wir uns nicht vor einem linearen Denken, und die zu beantwortende Frage ist, warum Habermas die anfänglichen Formulierungen aufgegeben hat, um eine erste Theorie der Wahrheit als Konsens zu errichten, und schließlich in neueren Texten –ausgehend von den Diskussionen zur rationalen Annehmbarkeit– die wissenschaftliche Wahrheit mit der Problematik des „Naturalismus“ behandelt sowie die Frage nach seiner Bedeutung, um das Problem der Objektivität der Erkenntnis und der Rationalität selbst, welche die menschliche Spezies kennzeichnet, zu verstehen.
114. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
María Mercedes del Valle Risco Significado y posibilidad: Un diálogo entre fenomenología y filosofía analítica
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En la reflexión contemporánea sobre el lenguaje el problema del significado se ha presentado como un lugar común para diversas perspectivas filosóficas. Su interés se ha suscitado en el marco de propuestas que no se limitan a la filosofía del lenguaje como disciplina y, por tanto, la variedad de cuestiones que suscita se entrelazan y tejen las más complejas combinaciones. Ocuparnos del significado de las palabras es aventurarnos a abrirnos paso en diferentes mundos animándonos por un momento a dejar de lado la cuestión de su efectividad. En el marco de esta aventura, el presente trabajo pretende indagar el entrelazamiento, y sus límites, de dos de las propuestas filosóficas que han impacto de un modo decisivo en el desenvolvimiento del pensamiento filosófico del siglo XX. Me refiero concretamente a las filosofías de Husserl y Wittgenstein.
115. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Elba Marta Coleclough El ardid de la filosofía: el retorno a sí de Michel Foucault
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Se intentará describir brevemente algunas de las ideas expuestas por M. Foucault en su curso “La hermenéutica del sujeto” (1982). Se advierte un profundo cambio en la temática abordada por el filósofo, ya que emerge la problemática de la autoconstitución del sujeto por medio de las “técnicas de sí”, propuestas desde la tradición pitagórica, encarnadas en la vida y obra de Sócrates y Platón, y que alcanzan singular importancia en la filosofía occidental de los siglos I y II. Así, se manifiesta un nuevo pensamiento sobre la verdad y la posibilidad de autoconstitución del sujeto por medio del empleo de las técnicas del yo, que implican una elección irreductible de un modo de vida. El hombre es responsable de su autoconstitución, de la elaboración de su existencia, buscando el equilibrio necesario, la ataraxia y la autarquía que le permitirán llegar a la felicidad. Esta unidad entre teoría y conducta propuesta por los antiguos se escinde en el “momento cartesiano”, privilegiando la auto-constitución del sujeto por medio del conocimiento. Sin embargo, se asiste en la filosofía contemporánea a un regreso a la unidad concreta del ser humano, integrando tanto los aspectos cognitivos, éticos como emocionales en un mar-co sociopolítico y cultural.
116. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Carmen Segura-Peraita Ontología dinámica en Heidegger: physis, dynamis, enérgeia y Ereignis
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A partir de mediados de los años treinta Heidegger concibe el ser como Ereignis. El sentido de lo que es como dynamis y enérgeia se encuentra en estrecha relación con él. Aquí estudiaremos la interpretación heideggeriana de estas nociones aristotélicas por la vinculación que cabe establecer entre ellas y el Ereignis. Heidegger no se limita a “trasladar” las nociones aristotélicas a su pensamiento, más bien opera una transformación de las mismas, pero también es cierto que cabe entender la Metafísica como una “ontología dinámica”, del acto, comprendido como un “Am-Werk-Sein”, que Heidegger habría modalizado como Geschehen. En efecto, la enérgeia, tal como la entiende Aristóteles, contiene en sí todo lo necesario para proporcionar una tal “ontología dinámica”, aunque para lograrlo se haya de desvincular de una concepción presencialista de lo que es (del primado de la ousía como sentido directivo de lo que es). Por lo que respecta a la physis-dynamis, Heidegger se remitió siempre a la physis como a aquello en lo que todavía latía la presencia oculta del origen que se retrae: del ser.
117. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
María del Mar Villanueva Martín El olvido de los filósofos clásicos en el mundo actual
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Hay una tendencia en la actualidad de tipo utilitario y materialista que tiende a menospreciar los aspectos culturales de nuestra civilización, especialmente los relativos a las ciencias humanísticas, con una incidencia especial en lo que atañe a la filosofía. Esto ha conducido al olvido intencional de los filósofos del periodo clásico de la filosofía griega antigua, que son Sócrates, Platón y Aristóteles, junto con sus seguidores, pertenecientes a los siglos V y IV a. de J.C. Dicho olvido, lejos de repararse, parece hacerse más grande por días, pues, se dictan disposiciones para erradicar la filosofía de los programas de enseñanza, reduciendo el núme-ro de horas lectivas para esta asignatura y disminuyendo la cantidad de cursos en que se imparta. Otro desacierto del actual sistema de enseñanza es que, lo poco que incluye de filosofía, se centra en los filósofos contemporáneos, con lo cual los clásicos griegos quedan malparados y en peligro de verse forzados al sueño del olvido. Claro, con un panorama así, cada vez se sentirán motivadas menos personas a seguir los estudios de filosofía, pudiendo llegar el día en que no se pueda impartir esta materia por carencia de profesorado. La situación que se perfila para los filósofos clásicos griegos, relegados al cuarto de los objetos en desuso, es lamentable, ante lo cual se impone la llamada urgente, para ir a rescatarlos de ese olvido en que se encuentran y hacer que vuelvan a brillar en las moradas del pensamiento con la luz propia que siempre les ha acompañado. De no ser así, puede que el edificio filosófico se derrumbase al faltarle sus cimientos.
118. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Amalia Quevedo Esbozo del pensamiento de Nicolás Gómez Dávila, “el Nietzsche colombiano”
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Breve esbozo de la vida y obra del pensador colombiano Nicolás Gómez Dávila, que nace en Bogotá en 1913 y muere en 1994. Se exponen algunas de sus ideas sobre el pensar, la modernidad, la filosofía, la civilización, la democracia y el periodismo, a la vez que se examina su concepción del pensador reaccionario, desde Platón hasta el propio Gómez Dávila. De igual modo se analizan suscintamente las semejanzas y diferencias entre Nietzsche y Gómez Dávila, apodado como “el Nietzsche colombiano”.
119. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Владимир Александрович Кутырёв Бытие под знаком “транс”
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The end of the twentieth century is commonly defined as the postmodern era. Now, it is claimed that this era was replaced by the post-post-modern era. Due to the ambiguity of this concept, the features of the era remain unclear. A more adequate term could be “trans-modern”. Everything becomes “trans”: transnational economy, transdisciplinary science, trans(uni) versal philosophy, transcendentalism, transgression, transhumanism, transnomonism and transvestism. “Post” meant the negation of the former state of the world: God, man, its history, culture, metaphysics, their deconstruction, and death. “Trans” is a passage through them into something new, “other” – the positive construction of the otherness. This is realized on a new substrate, which is no longer commensurate to the person, even materially or physically. It is informative, virtual-digital, either directly in the technologies, or determines decisively people’s way of live. The first ideologues of trans-modernism can be considered the “junior postmodernists”, primarily A. Badiou with his “Manifesto of Philosophy” (1989). Trans-modernism abstains from concerns about the stability of what is being developed. It focuses on the continuous innovation. Everything exists for the sake of as fast as possible change to something else. In theoretical studies, trans-modernism manifests itself in the expansion of transcendental ontology and cognitivism. Being termed as “trans” under crisis is chaotic by definition. The purpose of human activity in a trans-modern situation should be no progressive development, but the maintenance of homeostatic balance of his life world. At the heart of the philosophy of survival lies at the aesthetic worldview of multiontism and co-evolution, phenomenological realism and conservatism, coinciding in content with the perennial philosophy. We have no other option, but to choose the Being termed “humanism”.
120. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Закир Курбан оглы Мамедалиев К постмодернистскому игнорированию и коммуникативному утверждению истины
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In this paper, based on the writings of the French philosophers Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault, I consider, on the one hand, the arguments of the representatives of postmodern philosophy, that neutralize, in fact, the pretension of truth by science, and, on the other hand, Jürgen Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality that defends the right of reason on the truth. The main reason that stands behind Lyotard’s actual negation of truth in science lies in the concealed replacement of the consideration of the internal factors of production and development of scientific knowledge by an analysis in non-scientific terms of the legitimacy of science as a social institution. Michel Foucault, like Lyotard, in favor of externalism ignores completely the internal determinants of the organization and development of science. Foucault’s position is vulnerable in an essential point: if one to implement his program, then it has to reproduce objectively the subject, which he (Foucault) subjectively intends to wipe out. In order to restore the solidarity in society, J. Habermas lays all hopes on the reconciliation of reason’s potential, focusing on the communicative rationality. However, cultural problems arise when people’s actions are not commensurate with the Truth, do not serve the Good and deviate from the Beautiful. These problems have spiritual content proper. The spiritual can never be exhausted by rational judgment, in whatever form the rational might appear.