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101. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Heisook Kim Yin and Yang: the Nature of Scientific Explanation in a Culture
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I explore the nature of scientific explanation in a culture centering on the doctrine of yin and yang combined with that of five phrases, wu-hsing (YYFP). I note how YYFP functions as an alternative to the causal way of thinking, as well as the meaning of scientific explanation in a culture. I also consider whether a scientific concept becomes metaphorical when it is superseded by an alternative organizing concept.
102. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Imre Hronszky Technological “Paradigms”: Cognitive Traditions and Communities in Technological Change
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Many efforts have been made to discover some paradigm-like changes in mathematics, the social sciences, arts, history, etc. Gary Gutting forcefully criticizes the tendency of over-constraining the original conception that mostly led to insignificant analogies. But some applications may fall between correct isomorphic utilization and insignificant analogizing. The paradigm conception of technological change emerged in the early 1980's. This paper shows how fruitful the analogy has been for developing the idea of technological 'paradigms.' But a technological paradigm shows decisive differences which concern the values (which are not only cognitive ones) of technologies, the hierarchical systemic communities, the partly different nature of crises (through 'presumptive anomalies,' by Constant), and the necessarily integrated nature of technological knowledge leading to successful artifacts linked to goal-oriented research. Technological-paradigms-thinking became an established part of evolutionary economics also. According to this, paradigms rival conceptions that show further changes in comparison to the original Kuhnian approach. I conclude by discussing the nature of scientific change from the viewpoint of technological paradigms.
103. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Jagdish Hattiangadi Algebra As Thought Experiment
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This paper addresses the problem of understanding what mathematics contributes to the exceptional success of modern mathematical physics. I urge that we give up the Kantian construal of the division between mathematics (synthetic a priori) and physics (experimental), and that we ask instead how algebra helps synthetic a posteriori mathematics improve our ability to study the world. The theses suggested are: 1) Mathematical theories are about the empirical world, and are true or false just like other theories of empirical science. 2) The air of artificiality in mathematics lies exclusively in the use of algebraic method. 3) This method is constructive much like all fiction is, but this construction is for the purpose of experimental investigation of the physical world to the extent that anything in the world has objects like those in the fictional world of a particular algebra. 4) This is why algebraic techniques are successful even when the assumptions of the system are false: they may still be applicable to some things considered from some perspective. 5) The success of mathematical physics is also due to Descartes' discovery of a remarkable truth: we live in space and time which can be described as a whole. 6) Therefore, what distinguishes modern science from earlier and later philosophy is not a general method of science, but the fact that it happened to find a truth, and a particular way of studying reality which bore fruit.
104. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Theo A. F. Kuipers Epistemological Positions in the Light of Truth Approximation
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I discuss in a systematic order the most important epistemological positions in the instrumentalism-realism debate, viz., instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, referential realism, and theory realism. My conclusions are as follows. There are good reasons for the instrumentalist to become a constructive empiricist. In turn, the constructive empiricist is forced to become a referential realist in order to give deeper explanations of success differences. Consequently, there are further good reasons for the referential realist to become a theory realist.
105. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Yury I. Kulakov The Search for Scientific Truth Leads to God
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At the dawn of the twenty-first century, many now realize that the opposition of science and religion has been exhausted. Today, unification of the two is imperative. The first step in this direction is recognizing that science is not the only source of knowledge; experience, spiritual discernment and spiritual experience constitute the unified process of cognizing the world.
106. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Manuel Liz New Physical Properties
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Discussions about physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, etc., typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. The domain of physical properties would thus have been established once and for all. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be, and that in fact there are, new physical properties. In the first section, I propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In the second section, I present four general situations in which it would be plausible to speak of the existence of new physical properties. All of this is used to evaluate the content and scope of the hypothesis of physical novelty. Lastly, I examine certain interesting consequences of such a physical novelty in relation to some of the above mentioned topics.
107. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Christoph Luetge Naturalized Philosophy of Science and Economic Method
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This paper draws a connection between recent developments in naturalized philosophy of science and in economics. Social epistemology is one part of the naturalistic enterprise that has become especially important. Some approaches in this field use methods borrowed from economics, a fact that has often been overlooked. But there are also genuinely economic approaches to the problems of science and knowledge. Some of these approaches can be seen as contributions to an "economic epistemology." While these contributions are certainly fruitful, they have also raised criticism from economists. I overview of these points of criticism and outline possibilities to deal with these problems. In particular, the Buchanan research program offers some help.
108. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Anthony Mansueto Cosmic Teleology and the Crisis of the Sciences
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This paper analyzes recent work from within the physical sciences which argue for the emergence of a new paradigm capable of unifying the sciences and demonstrating the ultimate meaningfulness of the universe. I argue that while there is powerful evidence for cosmic teleology, the works in question do not represent a new paradigm and neither unify science nor adequately accommodate the evidence in question, but rather attempt to "put new wine in old skins." As Aristotle demonstrated, only teleological argumentation offers a complete scientific explanation, and authentic teleology is effectively ruled out by the hegemonic scientific paradigm which gives first place to mathematical formalism-something which makes possible rigorous description but not authentic explanation. This does not mean returning to Aristotelian science, but rather exploring the "road not taken" when Aristotelian science entered a crisis at the end of the medieval period: generalizing the concept of teleology so that it can accommodate both the physical (especially astronomical) evidence which created problems for Aristotelian science long before Galileo and Kepler, and account teleologically for such phenomena as chaos and disintegration. The work of scientists like Gal-Or, Bohm, and Prigogine provides important resources for moving in this direction, but a more explicit option for teleology is necessary if the evidence is to be accommodated and the internal contradictions of the existing paradigm to be resolved.
109. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Lorenzo Magnani Abduction and Hypothesis Withdrawal in Science
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This paper introduces an epistemological model of scientific reasoning which can be described in terms of abduction, deduction and induction. The aim is to emphasize the significance of abduction in order to illustrate the problem-solving process and to propose a unified epistemological model of scientific discovery. The model first describes the different meanings of the word abduction (creative, selective, to the best explanation, visual) in order to clarify their significance for epistemology and artificial intelligence. In different theoretical changes in theoretical systems we witness different kinds of discovery processes operating. Discovery methods are "data-driven," "explanation-driven" (abductive), and "coherence-driven" (formed to overwhelm contradictions). Sometimes there is a mixture of such methods: for example, an hypothesis devoted to overcome a contradiction is found by abduction. Contradiction, far from damaging a system, help to indicate regions in which it can be changed and improved. I will also consider a kind of "weak" hypothesis that is hard to negate and the ways for making it easy. In these cases the subject can "rationally" decide to withdraw his or her hypotheses even in contexts where it is "impossible" to find "explicit" contradictions and anomalies. Here, the use of negation as failure (an interesting technique for negating hypotheses and accessing new ones suggested by artificial intelligence and cognitive scientists) is illuminating
110. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
V. Mantatov, I. Lambaeva Science, Development and Humanity
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The formation of a new scientific picture of the world is connected with the necessity of subjectivity. This subjectivity posits no limits for the scientific aspects of cognitive processes, but embraces a comprehensive world of spiritual activity. To choose the most effective model of social behavior, it is important to have an adequate knowledge of reality (i.e., the objective regularities of the surrounding world). Modern science reflects the vagueness of reality and, in consequence, the impossibility of using classical approaches. Increasingly, the negative phenomena of the surrounding world reflects the complexity of natural and socio-natural systems, especially on the global scale. Restrictions of the classical approaches to this complexity can be overcome within the synergistic theories or hierarchical systems theory that are becoming more and more popular. The necessity of appeal to modern theories, initiated as the result of ecological crises, stimulates the processes of new paradigm formation in science, acting often in spite of the needs and motives of society.
111. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
John Losee Philosophy of Science and the Theory of Natural Selection
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Toulmin, Hull, Campbell, and Popper have defended an "Evolutionary-Analogy" view of scientific evaluative practice. In this view, competing concepts, theories and methods of inquiry engage in a competitive struggle from which the "best adapted" emerge victorious. Whether applications of this analogy contribute to our understanding of science depends on the importance accorded the disanalogies between natural selection theory and scientific inquiry. Michael Ruse has suggested instead an "Evolutionary-Origins" view of scientific evaluative practices in which scientific inquiry is directed by application of epigenetic rules that have become encoded in homo sapiens in the course of evolutionary adaptation. Among these rules are "formulative theories that are internally consistent," "seek severe tests of theories," (Popper) and "achieve a consilience of inductions" (Whewell). As a descriptive theory of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is prima facie inconsistent with evidence that human beings often make decisions that violate the "genetically-hard-wired rules." As a normative-prescriptive philosophy of science, the "Evolutionary-Origins" view is limited by the fact that in biological evolution, adaptation to present pressures may be achieved at the expense of a loss of adaptability (the capacity to respond creatively to future changes in environmental conditions).
112. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Hernán Miguel First Revelation: When Theoretical Becomes Visible
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En las teorías científicas se postulan entidades teóricas que de alguna manera se relacionan con lo observable. Sin embargo con el avance científico y tecnológico, los científicos a menudo sostienen poder observar, co ayuda de algún artefacto, las entidades que tiempo atrás habían sido postuladas por la teoría. Esta transición de algunas entidades del reino de lo teórico al de lo observable con carga teórica presenta características interesantes para un análisis sobre la articulación de las teorías. En este trabajo se presenta una descripción de tal transición en la que se pone en evidencia que además de la aceptación de la teoría involucrada en garantizar el funcionamiento y construcción del artefacto, la carga teórica asociada a la observación con instrumentos, también se debe aceptar un postulado de reducción que establece una relación entre entidades pertenecientes a distintas teorías. También se sugiere una dificultad intuitiva en sostener una postura antirealista de entidades teóricas frente a la posibilidad de que tales entidades puedan revelarse como ‘visibles’ con la ayuda de algún desarrollo tecnológico aceptado por la comunidad científica.
113. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Khristos Nizamis A DNA Account of Propositions as Events: Dummett, Någårjuna, Aristotle
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Michael Dummett has argued that antirealism requires a rejection of bivalence. However, his version of antirealism is not the only available one. In fact, it is arguable that his antirealism is not sufficiently antirealist and falls short of his intentions. On the basis of a study of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Nāgārjuna, I think that a more complete and coherent kind of antirealism is possible, one that respects the phenomena of conventional ontology and retains the principles of classical logic, but reinterprets both in a radical way.
114. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Robert Miner Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-change
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Imre Lakatos' "methodology of scientific research programs" and Alasdair MacIntyre's "tradition-constituted enquiry" are two sustained attempts to overcome the assumptions of logical empiricism, while saving the appearance that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the issue of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This divergence generates other areas of disagreement; the most important are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of decision criteria that are common to rival programs. I show that Lakatos' rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of actual history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the rationality of theory-change. If MacIntyre can deny the necessity of dispensing with the historical record, and show that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decision criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos' argument will lose its force, and MacIntyre will better honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science. I argue that MacIntyre can dissolve tensions between incommensurability and rationality in theory-change if he is able, first, to distinguish a sense of the incommensurability thesis that preserves genuine rivalry between theories, and second, to show that the possibility of rationality in theory-change depends not on the presence of common decision criteria, but on the fact that traditions can fail by their own standards. After reconstructing and examining the argument, I conclude that the notion of a tradition's "internal failure" is coherent, but that it leaves crucial questions about the epistemology and ontology of traditions that must be answered if MacIntyre's proposal is to constitute a genuine improvement on Lakatos.
115. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Volker Peckhaus The Heuristic Function of the Axiomatic Method
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This lecture will deal with the heuristic power of the deductive method and its contributions to the scientific task of finding new knowledge. I will argue for a new reading of the term 'deductive method.' It will be presented as an architectural scheme for the reconstruction of the processes of gaining reliable scientific knowledge. This scheme combines the activities of doing science ('context of discovery') with the activities of presenting scientific results ('context of justification'). It combines the heuristic and the deductive side of science. The heuristic side is represented, e.g., by the creative methods to find the 'best' hypotheses (abduction), to design experimental systems for empirical research in order to formulate general laws (induction), or to create axiomatic systems. The other side consists of the production of deductive knowledge. This combination leads to a clear hierarchy: the heuristic side provides the basic presuppositions from which the deductive side takes off. The former is used to make deductions possible. The deductive method can be presented as an analysis-synthesis scheme as it can be found, e.g., in the tradition of Kant, Jakob Friedrich Fries, and Leonard Nelson. Nelson's critical philosophy can be seen as a key for understanding the philosophy behind David Hilbert's early axiomatic method. This axiomatic method is usually restricted to a non-philosophical approach to pure mathematics ('formalism'). But Hilbert was not an exclusive formalist; he proposed a mathesis universalis in the Cartesian-Leibnizian sense according to which mathematics is the syntactical tool for a general philosophy of science, applicable to all scientific disciplines. In this function, mathematics takes its problems from the sciences. Hilbert did not deny that mathematics should play a role in explaining the world. The analysis-synthesis scheme helps to provide a consistent interpretation of these two sides of Hilbert's attitude towards his working field.
116. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Andrew N. Pavlenko Epistemological Turn in European Scientific Rationality
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If the 17th century could be considered the century of the reformation of science, the present century is one of counterreformation in every sense of the word. The ideology of this century can be seen in the titanic efforts to complete the development of science which foundation was laid in the 17th and 18th centuries, in the outright failures, and in attempts at reconstructing the foundation (e.g., Hilbert's formalization program, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Charlier's theory of a hierarchic universe, Fridman's evolutionary cosmology, Newton's mechanics, relativistic and/or quantum mechanics in physics, the logical turn of the Vienna circle and epistemological anarchism in methodology). Our task is to reveal the essence of the turning points in 20th century science and to determine at least the general outlines, if not the cause, of the new type of rationality that is replacing the old one. I will focus on the history of cosmology, or rather on its three paradigms that have succeeded each other in this century: Newtonian, Fridmanian and the inflationary paradigms. By outlining the problem, I will pose a possible solution from clarifying changes in the value orientations, ideals and norms of scientific research to their possible generalization.
117. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Sheldon Richmond The Two Cultures Problem
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Many post World War II thinkers have been perplexed by the problem of how or even whether people from different cultures can understand each other. The problem arose when we started to think of culture as formative of language and thought. The common assumptions of most theorists of language are that language is fundamental to thinking and culture; and language, thought, culture or humanity is a natural product of biological evolution. Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi-seen as diametrically opposed-both independently criticize these assumptions and provide alternative theories of humanity (i.e. culture, thinking, and language) whereby cross-cultural understanding is a real problem that can be broached through engaging in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. So, though language and culture creates hurdles for achieving cross-cultural understanding, the pursuit of science transcends the limitations of culture.
118. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Erdinç Sayan The Bayesian Theory of Confirmation, Idealizations and Approximations in Science
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My focus in this paper is on how the basic Bayesian model can be amended to reflect the role of idealizations and approximations in the confirmation or disconfirmation of any hypothesis. I suggest the following as a plausible way of incorporating idealizations and approximations into the Bayesian condition for incremental confirmation: Theory T is confirmed by observation P relative to background knowledge B iff Pr(PΔ│T&(T&I ├ PT)&B) > Pr(PΔ│~T&(T&I├PT)andB), where I is the conjunction of idealizations and approximations used in deriving the prediction PT from T, P􀀧 expresses the discrepancy between the prediction PT and the actual observation P, and ├ stands for logical entailment. This formulation has the virtue of explicitly taking into account the essential use made of idealizations and approximations as well as the fact that theoretically based predictions that utilize such assumptions will not, in general, exactly fit the data. A non-probabilistic analogue of the confirmation condition above that I offer avoids the 'old evidence problem,' which has been a headache for classical Bayesianism.
119. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Leonid G. Kreidik, George P. Shpenkov Philosophy of Contents: Form and Coulomb’s Law
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In this paper I conduct a philosophical-physical analysis leading to the development of a philosophically justified form of Coulomb's law on the basis of contents-form philosophy.. From this it follows that dimensionality of "electric charge" at the subatomic level of matter is g/s, i.e., the charge in fact represents the mass speed of exchange at the field level. Thus, the philosophiclogical solution to Coulomb's law on the basis of contents-form philosophy radically changes our conventional concepts about the microworld, the consequences of which will be considered in greater detail.
120. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 37
Lawrence H. Starkey Particle and Astro-physics Challenge Kant’s Phenomenolism
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For two centuries Kant's first Critique has nourished various turns against transcendent metaphysics and realism. Kant was scandalized by reason's impotence in confronting infinity (or finitude) as seen in the divisibility of particles and in spatial extension and time. Therefore, he had to regard the latter as subjective and reality as imponderable. In what follows, I review various efforts to rationalize Kant's antinomies-efforts that could only flounder before the rise of Einstein's general relativity and Hawking's blackhole cosmology. Both have undercut the entire Kantian tradition by spawning highly probable theories for suppressing infinities and actually resolving these perplexities on a purely physical basis by positing curvatures of space and even of time that make them reëntrant to themselves. Heavily documented from primary sources in physics, this paper displays time’s curvature as its slowing down near very massive bodies and even freezing in a black hole from which it can reëmerge on the far side, where a new universe can open up. I argue that space curves into a double Möbius strip until it loses one dimension in exchange for another in the twin universe. It shows how 10-dimensional GUTs and the triple Universe, time/charge/parity conservation, and strange and bottom particle families and antiparticle universes, all fit together.