Η περιβαλλοντική ηθική μελετά την ηθική σχέση των κοινωνικών ομάδων σε σχέση με το περιβάλλον στο οποίο διαβιούν. Μελετά δηλαδή την ηθική θέση των ανθρώπων, προς το περιβάλλον και προς όλα τα όντα και τα στοιχεία τα οποία το αποτελούν. Μέσα στο πλαίσιο αυτό γίνεται ιδιαίτερη συζήτηση για το παλαιό φιλοσοφικό πρόβλημα, ποια είναι η σχέση ανθρώπων και ζώων και αν είναι σωστό να αποδίδουμε στα τελευταία δικαιώματα. Ο Tom Regan, υπέρμαχος των δικαιωμάτων των ζώων, θεωρεί πως η εφαρμογή των ηθικών δικαιωμάτων δεν περιορίζεται μόνο στα έλλογα όντα, αφού ο άνθρωπος θεωρεί φορείς δικαιωμάτων τα βρέφη ή τους νοητικά ανάπηρους. Το κοινό γνώρισμα όλων των όντων που έχουν δικαιώματα, συνεπώς και των ζώων, αποτελεί το γεγονός πως είναι φορείς ζωής που έχει αξία για το κάθε όν και ως υποκείμενα ζωής φέρουν το κεφαλαιώδες δικαίωμα να μην αντιμετωπίζονται ποτέ από τους άλλους μόνο ως μέσον για την επίτευξη οποιωνδήποτε στόχων.

Η παρούσα ανακοίνωση αναφέρεται στο πλαίσιο ιδεών που κληρονόμησε η περιβαλλοντική εκπαίδευση από την περιβαλλοντική ηθική. Οι ιδέες αυτές προσδιορίζουν τον τρόπο σκέψης και δράσης του ανθρώπου. Η αλλαγή στον τρόπο σκέψης συνίσταται στην ανάγκη για αναθεώρηση του νοήματος της ανάπτυξης και της ευδαιμονίας όπως την εννοεί ο παραδοσιακός βιομηχανικός πολιτισμός. Δηλαδή αυτό που οφείλει να επιδιώκει ο σύγχρονος άνθρωπος είναι η συνολική ευδαιμονία (ψυχολογική, κοινωνική κ.ά.) και όχι η στενή ατομική οικονομική ευμάρεια. Επίσης ζητούμενο είναι η καλλιέργεια της ολιστικής σκέψης αντί της προσκόλλησης στη λογική, ώστε να αναπτυχθούν η σφαιρικότητα και η πληρότητα στη σκέψη. Μέσω της διεπιστημονικότητας, του συνδυασμού των γνώσεων, θα προσεγγίσουμε καλύτερα και σοφότερα το φυσικό περιβάλλον. Η αλλαγή στον τρόπο δράσης προβάλλει την αποφυγή της βίας σε συνδυασμό με την συνεργατική δράση μέσα στα όρια της τοπικής κοινότητας ως αντίδοτο στην κρατική πρωτοκαθεδρία και την παθητικότητα του πολίτη. Τέλος παρατίθενται τα συμπεράσματα, τα οποία αφορούν στο συνολικό μετασχηματισμό της προσωπικότητας στον οποίο συμβάλλουν τα διδάγματα της περιβαλλοντικής εκπαίδευσης.

The ancient saying Nosce te ipsum (“Know thyself”), inscribed on the pediment of Apollo’s Temple in Delphi, has been stirring mankind for centuries. Even in the third millennium, who could claim to know themselves or to have understood what human being or his mind is? If human conscious-ness could be explored, the secret of human nature may have the chance to be revealed as well as the human controversial acts. Many philosophers, scien-tists and writers call the human being a genius, a unique creature in the Uni-verse. Indeed, humanity did create a new world, a new civilization on Earth. But philosophers, scientists and writers devote no less attention to the cur-rent environmental and anthropological crises, stating that civilization itself is becoming an increasing threat to people and nature. In this situation, the anthropological issue becomes critical. What the human being is? What are we all? Where did we come from? Where we are going? The great ancient Greek philosopher Socrates would reply, “I know that I know nothing.” In this paper I express the concerns I share especially with two eco-philosophers from the US and Russia, about mankind destroying itself and nature, its own world, for false and unworthy causes.

Η κλιματική αλλαγή, πέραν των ευρύτατων πρακτικών της συνεπειών, αποτελεί μείζον ηθικό ζήτημα το οποίο αφορά τόσο στη λεγόμενη διαγενεακή κοινωνική δικαιοσύνη όσο και στα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, αφού οι όποιες αλλαγές αναμένονται να επηρεάσουν τις μελλοντικές γενιές σε μεγαλύτερο βαθμό από ό, τι επηρεάζουν τις παρούσες. Στόχος του ανά χείρας δοκιμίου είναι η διερεύνηση του κύρους της επίκλησης δικαιωμάτων χάριν των μελλοντικών γενεών, και η εξέταση του βαθμού στον οποίο υφίστανται αντίστοιχα καθήκοντα ή ευθύνες των υπαρχουσών γενεών προς αυτές. Συγκεκριμένα θα υποστηρίξω ότι σε ό, τι τουλάχιστον αφορά στην κλιματική αλλαγή, επίκληση των σχετικών δικαιωμάτων φαίνεται ανυπόστατη και σε κάθε περίπτωση είναι ατελέσφορη.

Η σύγχρονη γενετική και οι νευροεπιστήμες τείνουν να υποκαταστήσουν τον ανθρωποκεντρικό κόσμο, με έναν κόσμο μεγαλύτερης βιολογικής πολυπλοκότητας, θέτοντας σε αμφισβήτηση το ανθρώπινο δικαίωμα να νομοθετεί μονομερώς και με σχετικιστική ηθική για τα ζώα και τη φύση. Η δυνατότητα των παράπλευρων διαχειριστικών μηχανισμών πολιτικής να εξομαλύνουν αυτού του είδους τις νομοθεσίες εκπίπτει σταδιακά, καθώς η πολιτική φιλοσοφία παύει να είναι προϋποτιθέμενο υπόβαθρο των οικονομικών συστημάτων. Ως αποτέλεσμα, η αντιμετώπιση του ζώου γίνεται με τρόπο αντιφατικό σε σχέση με την αδήριτη σημερινή ανάγκη να ορίσουμε ξανά τί είναι ένας άνθρωπος.

In the Spinozist universe man is free from the moral dogma of good and bad imposed from outside, but with a responsibility to understand the natural laws with which his own body encounters with other bodies in nature, as well as the nature of affections such encounters produce. Freedom here is understood not as acting freely but having ‘adequate ideas’ of how one body in nature encounters other body. For Spinoza, a free man knows how to act according to the nature of laws of his own body. This knowing makes him a free man. By knowing the laws of nature, he acts to maximize his pleasure. Spinozist universe is not free and man’s action is not free. Everything works with the necessity. But in knowing that he is determined in a way he is determined makes man free. It is because this understanding makes him active. And the more one becomes active, the more free man one becomes.

I presuppose that morality meets fundamental needs of human being as such. Its domain is interpersonal relationships. It uses particular values and norms in order to orient a person towards achieving personal perfection and fostering perfect relationships with other people. Moral perfectionism differs from all the other kinds (creative, religious, etc.) in the efforts aimed at attaining moral perfection that are made within the space of human relationships, relevant to them and, ultimately, for their sake. To a large extent these two orientations (towards personal perfection and perfect interpersonal relationships) are mutually dependant — one is a pre-requisite of the other. My aim is to demonstrate that undue emphasis on one of them in moral theory, at the expense of the other, results in irresolvable contradictions in the idea of morality and deformations in moral practice as well.

The concept of morality proposed herein is an aggregated one – hence it is represented in sequential manner. At individual level, morality is shown up in values, which directs towards the good of others (individuals, groups, society in general, and all of humankind, potentially). The main values are: non-harming, recognition, solidarity, care. These values exist within a culture, and are recorded in texts of various kinds, in the form of abstract preferences or in the form of corresponding demands: cause no harm to others, recognize others, help others, care for others. The very existence of these demands determines the necessity of another type of values – the ones that would reflect an individual’s adherence to these demands. In other words, virtues understood as human qualities that enable an individual to fulfil these demands and reach the ideal of moral excellence, or perfection, expressed in corresponding demands, namely, to be virtuous and perfect. Moral demands have a number of traits which manifest the specific nature of moral imperatives (non-institutionalised, ideal character of sanctions, presumed independence and reflective autonomy of the moral agent, etc.) Morality manifests differently at individual and public levels, and, in this paper I will try to briefly describe these differences.

Moral motivation has been variously conceived and explained. The main theses maintain that moral motivation springs directly from moral judgments and beliefs (internalism) or that it is due to factors external to moral judgments and beliefs, such as desires (externalism). In this paper, I defend the thesis that moral motivation is contributed by several factors, so that it can be defined as “multifactorial”. I refer to my previously proposed conception according to which mind exerts three kinds of activity, each of which, in turn, creates outward/selfish and inward/moral products. Thus, mind rational activity creates outward/selfish ideas and beliefs and in ward/moral thoughts or beliefs; mind emotional activity creates outward/selfish sentiments (desires/aversions) and inward/moral feelings; and mind practical activity creates outward/selfish actions and inward/moral acts. The inward/moral activity is directed to mind itself, under stood and felt as an evolving entity, whose evolution is the moral good. I attempt to show that moral motivation does not spring only from ideas, thoughts, and beliefs (internalism) but is also contributed by moral feelings and selfish desires (as externalism holds) as well as by the cost of moral acts and selfish actions. Thus, moral motivation is contributed by all six mind products and, therefore, is multifactorial.

While climate change mitigation remains indispensable, together with adaptation to such climate change as cannot be prevented, current slowness of progress towards attaining an international agreement on these matters has fostered suggestions about climate engineering, originally proposed as supplementary to adaptation and mitigation. These suggestions take the forms of Solar Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal. This paper discusses the ethics of researching and of deploying them. Solar Radiation Management ranges from harmless but inadequate measures such as making roofs reflect sunlight to ambitious ones such as projecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere to reduce incoming radiation. Some favor this measure as a quick and inexpensive replacement for mitigation; but its possible side-effects and lack of an exit-strategy mean that its deployment would be misguided, and that researching it might undermine determination to reach a mitigation agreement. Some forms of Carbon Dioxide Removal (seeding the oceans with iron filings to grow carbon-reducing algae) face similar objections, but others, like afforestation and Carbon Capture and Storage (itself not yet operative), comprise acceptable enhancements of current technology. Even if they do not buy time, these measures could beneficially supplement a global Climate Change agreement.

Human rights have increasingly come to the center of political and social philosophy since 1945. The have been widely discussed in publications on topical human rights issues, in the work of some of the most notable philosophers of the time like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, and in volumes on global justice. But, despite Habermas work in Diskurs Ethik, discussion ethics (what I call ‘Human Rights Ethics’) has never clearly been presented as a normative ethical theory in competition with the classical rivals such as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. This paper makes a clear, concise case recognition of human rights ethics as a contemporary normative ethical theory, and for its inclusion in future elementary textbooks. Universal legal human rights protect the central ethical human right to freedom of expression (as integral to a cooperative search for the truth, including the truth as to the correct normative ethical theory). Human Rights Ethics supersedes classical theories based on evident first principles because these principles are either merely asserted without justification (once the appeal to self-evidence has been has been dropped) or are justified (or refuted) by being superseded by the final self-justifying standard of definable ethical discussion. The very refutation of human rights ethics could be sound only through ethical discussion, with all parties exercising the ethical, but not yet universally legal, right to freedom of expression. Hence the refutation of the ethical right to freedom of expression cannot be sound.

The paper describes the modern morality as conditional morality, represented by theories of social contract and utilitarianism. They conditionally impose the moral duties on people, if the other people fulfil moral duties, too. As a result they justify the use of the political power to compel the citizens to public morality, leaving a certain margin of freedom to individual morality in the private domain which is fairly inconsequential for collective life. Public morality, on the other hand, is rigorously regulated and precisely defined by statutory laws and political authority. An individual citizen thus becomes incapacitated in the public domain: reduced to accepting decisions adopted by the ruling group, perhaps also electing them once per several years. Unconditional morality, as represented by evangelical or Kant’s ethics, imposes rights, obligations and moral duties on individuals, requires compliance with them regardless of other individuals or groups. It may never constitute a foundation justifying violence, use of force, abuse of power, deception or restriction of liberty. Within this framework, such actions are considered immoral, irrespective of whether they occur in the institutionalized form or otherwise.

For the past thirty years postmodernism has been the major philosophical trend. Starting as a potentially emancipatory tool, though, it has virtually resolved into an acceptance of any kind of (epistemological, ethical) position, in the name of a very politically correct relativism. The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism (Ferraris 2012) in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism, showing that it does not imply a return to a ‘traditional’ or ‘strong’ realism but that, on the contrary, it involves a kind of ‘weak realism’: a blend between realism and constructivism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Where postmodern epistemological claims will be proved to be quite easily confutable, its ethical implications will be faced more carefully. Ethical new realism will, therefore, be presented as particularly challenging (Caffo, De Sanctis 2012), but also promising and important to the future of philosophy.

In Oneself as Another Paul Ricoeur develops a practical philosophy that articulates the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions, the pursuit of the “good life” and the moral imperative. What he proposes is a critical reconstruction of Aristotle’s ethics. Ricoeur does not merely seek to give a faithful rendering of Aristotle’s theory. Rather, he is interested in discussing the problems that are posed by this theory. In particular, there are two problems that deserve attention: The distinction between praxis and poiesis and the concept of happiness. On the one hand, Ricoeur gives an interesting account of the distinction between praxis and poiesis. However, he concludes by questioning the philosophical relevance of this distinction. On the other hand, Ricoeur interprets the human ergon – in the effectuation of which happiness consists – as the realization of a personal life project. In this paper, I discuss Ricoeur’s interpretation of Aristotle on both points. Firstly, I envisage a reformulation of Ricoeur’s solution to the problem of praxis that preserves the relevance of the distinction between praxis and poiesis. Secondly, I propose an alternative interpretation of the human ergon that relates happiness to a sort of “practical presence” rather than to the temporality of a life project.

The world is a statuette of realism where everything is an element or aspect of reality. In ancient times, need and situations made the man to progress towards a definite evolution. Thoughts gave way to human demeanor which was later regarded as ethics. Thus, ethics is an integral branch of philosophy which determines its rules by taking into consideration both, necessity for a human being to survive gracefully and reasons propelling a human being to commit inhuman acts. Moral consciousness cannot exist since birth, as archaeological explorations have already established that the early peoples did not have any ethical knowledge. It was the experience of nature that helped them to discover an abstract of moral consciousness. However, in today’s scenario, people seem to have forgotten the significance of ethics and are excessively concerned over materialistic behoove. The current scenario does not require mere ethical theories, but learning and practical application, which, actually, are now getting dormant. It does not matter if we discover our moral consciousness from within or from something or someone else. The point is to start practicing and not wait and ponder as to when morality will knock the doors within.

Acknowledged as one of the major trends in the post-Husserlian philosophy, phenomenology of life of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka offers a richness of inspiring conceptual and interpretative articulations for an ethics that stems from the original thesis about the “Ontopoiesis of Life”. Unfolding basic issues regarding the virtue(s) and the universal call for measure, the moral sense with its benevolent sentiment, the ethical responsible status of man within the entire web of life in the openness of human transcending and positioning in the cosmos, the Tymienieckan phenomenology circumscribes an ethics of life in the horizon of an enlarged valuation of creativity. According to the phenomenologist of life, creativity represents the most important potential to be activated for a constructive, enlightening and elevated human becoming(ness). In this paper, I aim to emphasize a part of a great learning of wisdom (in life) focused on the moral reference. I will especially explore so much needed orientation for well-being and progress in our nowadays bewildered reality, for the life’s continuous affirmation in its meaningfulness.

In recent years there have been many debates about the care ethics. Although there are some philosophers who claim that ethics of care should be separated from ethics of justice, some philosophers insist that care and justice are closely related with each other and they both should be taken into consideration. In this paper Socrates’ apology will be taken as an example of the junction point of ethics and justice, and the connection of care and justice will be examined in the light of the viewpoints of some philosophers who are interested in this subject.

Marcuse critiques the positions of Kant and Freud regarding the emancipation of reason. According to Kant and Freud, the individual attains autonomy via reason and consciousness. Marcuse claims that the concept of rationalism is rooted in the same social order that created the oppression! Thus, we must re-examine that concept in order to establish freedom and happiness. Marcuse believes that reason, in its accepted sense in Western philosophy, does not confer immunity from manipulation of consciousness. Reason’s advanced achievements do not lead to liberation; in fact, they lead to unnecessary oppression and suffering. Thus, we must establish freedom in a completely different dimension – one that will be the foundation for the reorganization of society. In this paper I will argue that Marcuse’s ideas regarding a new social order are not necessarily utopian. According to Marcuse, a change in the conception of a rational life style is necessary for the achievement of a true, free consciousness. Thus, a new social order, that aspires to reducing the time spent on alienating work alongside enlarging leisure time and deepening interpersonal relations, will create possible conditions to proceeds towards freedom and peace.

The point of departure for this paper is an argument for global rectificatory justice. The paper discusses conceptual questions and elaborates a model for rectificatory justice: X (the agent: person, state, etc.), did A (an injury or harm; stealing, killing, exploiting, etc.), to Y (the victim: a person, group, nation, etc.), at t (time). Given Case P, rectificatory justice requires; X’ acknowledges the harm done to Y’ and X’ apologizes for A, X’ compensates Y´ with B (something valuable; money etc.), andX’ assures that the harmful acts should not be repeated and a new relation between X’ and Y’ is established.The model is applied to the legacy of colonialism. Global rectificatory justice implies that there is a history of domination and exploitation behind the present unjust global relations and that colonial subjection is behind the present conditions for the global poor. Subsequently, the former colonial powers have a duty to rectify former colonies based on the premise that if you have harmed someone you are obliged to rectify.

This paper approaches the old question of what, if anything, we should do with our moral practice if we believe that moral nihilism is true and that there are no objective moral facts. Four responses to nihilism are discussed: abolitionism, conservationism, fictionalism and propagandism. They are all found to have their respective problems. Most of these problems stem from the complexity and variability of our actual moral practices which are curiously overlooked in previous discussions of this issue. These problems, however, point towards a solution. By combining some of the elements from the four discussed views, a fifth response to nihilism, that retains their virtues without their drawbacks, is proposed. This response I call ‘negotiationism’ and I defend it as the hitherto best answer to the question of how to deal with our moral practice in case we think nihilism is true.