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181. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Lorenz Moises J. Festin Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian ‘eudaimonia
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Happiness is essentially an actualization [energeia], whereby a potentiality comes to be realized. Such a process of actualization is then viewed not simply as a means to an end but as instantiating the end itself. In this regard, the exercise of moral virtue may be viewed as forming part of what could be considered happiness. Consequently, a neat differentiation can hardly be made between what constitutes the means and what pertains to the end. As a moral virtue, friendship is an essential element of a happy life. “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods.” [Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a 5-6] How essential is friendship in happiness? What role does it play in the experience and realization of human ultimate good? And in what way can friendship help us understand the nature of happiness? The paper first argues why it is essential to view eudaimonia as actualization. It then takes into account the nature of friendship, pointing out its parallelism with happiness. And it aims to explain how friendship, insofar as it is paradigmatic of eudaimonia, can clarify the Aristotelian notion of happiness.
182. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Javier Echeñique Human Life as a Grounding Basic Good in the New Natural Law Ethics
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In this paper I critically examine the key normative claim of the so-called ‘new Natural Law ethics’, namely, the claim that being alive, in the biological sense of the word, has an intrinsically valuable standing. This claim is at the basis of the absolute condemnation of all acts aiming at destroying such a good. After explaining the meaning of this fundamental normative claim, I engage in a dialectical argument between the suicidal person and the new Natural Law ethicists in order to show that, despite the reluctance of new Natural Law ethicists to argue in favour of the intrinsically valuable standing of life, such argument is absolutely necessary. Finally, I critically examine the arguments that have been adduced to support it and reject them.
183. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Edgard José Jorge Filho Concerning the Proof of Freedom in Kant
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In the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason Kant claims to afford a proof of the objective reality of transcendental freedom, which can be found in the Analytic of this work. However, the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason had already established the impossibility of a legitimate theoretical proof of that reality. So, in this study I attempt to interpret the proof developed in the second Critique as a practical one. I consider, first, that this proof would not be a theoretical transcendental deduction. Then, I investigate what might be a practical proof, by means of inquiring into its conditions and their fulfillment. One of these conditions would require the reference of the Idea of freedom to an object not as a possible datum, but as a possible accomplishment of pure practical reason. A strong candidate for this object would be the feeling of respect for the law, whose origin is pure. Finally, I argue that the supposed practical proof of freedom is inconclusive.
184. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Jesus Adrian Escudero Heidegger: Being and Time as a Way of Life
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The secret of Being and Time and of its constant cultural and philosophical presence lies in its unusual hermeneutical richness. It becomes, so to speak, a precise seismometer capable of detecting, with surprising accuracy, the slips and falls of the contemporary era, offering us an exact scan of the ethical and moral conscience of our time. Being and Time does not develop a philosophical theory among others, but rather it faces the challenge of thoroughly reflecting upon the dilemma that is constantly present in philosophy, namely the question of human being and its relation to being in general. From this point of view I would like to consider the possibility of reading this Heidegger’s fundamental work as an ethics of existence, that is, as a book that promotes a cultivation of the self.
185. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Vasil Gluchman Theories of Professional Ethics
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Professional ethics is most frequently associated with deontological ethics; however, lately it has been developed in the context of virtue ethics. A great number of authors have criticised the possible alignment of professional ethics with consequentialist ethics. Author defines the structure of professional ethics that would correspond to the needs of forming a professional ethical framework as well as the value tendencies of consequentialist ethics in its non-utilitarian form. There is an emphasis on the values of humanity, human dignity and moral right of man, also taking into regard values of justice, liability, tolerance and responsibility (all that in an effort to achieve a prevalence of positive over negative consequences.
186. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Lixin Hao Goodness: The Ultimate Integration of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in China
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Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism were regarded as the ‘Three Teachings’ of China, and they were highly influential to Chinese people. In spite of the obvious differences among these three teachings, the ultimate integration of them manifests in exhorting people to pursuing Goodness (shan 善) in this life. They all believe in the good nature of human beings, and therefore Despite divergent approaches to the actual process of moral and spiritual self-development, the three teachings all share the same fundamental belief that human beings can be perfected and reach the ultimate goodness through self-cultivation.
187. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Letian Gao Concerning Yourself: Foucault’s Skill Ethics of Self
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The concept of the self is at the core of Foucault’s ethics. The Self is a reflective concept. How are we to know ‘self’? The answer to this question has a long history in Western philosophical tradition, and Foucault’s ethics attempts to answer it. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the concept of the self through the history of Western Philosophy first, and examine Foucault’s ethics under this light.
188. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Stylianos Giamarelos Contemporary Pursuits of Philosophy as a Way of Life: Cooper, Hadot, Nehamas
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The recent (2012) publication of John M. Cooper’s latest work, Pursuits of Wisdom. Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus proves to be the ideal occasion to initiate a dialogue between the three major philosophers of the art of living of our age (John M. Cooper, Pierre Hadot and Alexander Nehamas). By serially addressing the same question to all three of them, this paper retraces and explores their respective (possible) replies on the contemporary relevance of the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life. Thus, the intellectualism stemming from Cooper’s conception of philosophy as a way of life might imply a challenging reconsideration of our prevalent models of psychological motivation, as well as a radical re-placement of philosophy at the zenith of human knowledge. By granting autonomy to the existential stances, practices and spiritual exercises that originally stemmed from the ancient philosophical schools and their specific discourses, Hadot manages to assert the perpetual relevance of philosophy as an ethical way of life. This serves as a counterpoint to a philosophical art of living that is more akin to a (post-) Nietzschean aesthetics of existence, as exemplified by the last reply offered by Nehamas.
189. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Scott Forschler The “Necessity” Fallacy in Kantian Ethics
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A common strategy in ethical argumentation tries to derive ethical obligations from the rational necessity of not acting against certain “necessary” conditions for satisfying some good end. This strategy is very often fallacious, and works by equivocating over what counts as a “necessary” condition. Very often, what is counted as a necessary condition is not logically necessary for the end in question, but is at most related to it by affecting the probability of the end’s satisfaction. If other conditions affecting the probability of satisfying this (or similar) ends are then discounted as merely “instrumental” or “probabilistic” (in contrast to others imagined as being “necessary”), this strategy has the function of hypocritically privileging some of the arguer’s preferred values over others. We should instead recognize that nearly all conditions affecting the probability of satisfying some good end borrow some value from the value of the end, in proportion to how much they tend to affect its probability of satisfaction. The fallacy tends to support rigid deontological norms; once we abandon it, many arguments against consequentialism are revealed merely as special pleading. Many ethical arguments use this fallacy, but I focus here on its use by Immanuel Kant.
190. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Gerasimos Kakoliris Some Problems with Jacques Derrida’s Concept of Hospitality
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My text focuses on Derrida’s ethics of hospitality. For Derrida, the logic of the concept of hospitality is governed by an absolute antinomy or aporia. On the one hand, there is the law of unlimited hospitality that ordains the unconditional reception of the stranger. On the other, there are the conditional laws of hospitality, which relate to the unconditional law through the imposition of terms and conditions (political, juridical, and moral) upon it. For Derrida, the responsible political action and decision consists of the need to continuously negotiate between these two heterogeneous requirements. One of the problems I trace in Derrida’s aforementioned position is that it resorts to the use of terms such as “pure”, “real”, “genuine” or “absolute”, in order to describe unconditional hospitality and to differentiate it from conditional hospitality. Yet, such terms have been placed into question by deconstruction itself. Moreover, the disjunctive distinction that Derrida installs, at an initial level, between “unconditional” and “conditional” hospitality contradicts the work which he had undertaken during the 1960s and the 1970s of deconstructing basic conceptual hierarchical binary oppositions that govern Western metaphysical thought. Against the rather problematic guiding concept of “unconditional” hospitality, I counter-propose a continuous, incessant effort of limiting violence towards the arriving stranger. My argument draws from the particularly insightful remarks of Derrida regarding the violence that inescapably resides in every act of hospitality as a result of the host’s exercise of sovereignty over his/her home.
191. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Kathie Jenni Bearing Witness for the Animal Dead
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Images of human violence to animals challenge us both psychologically and morally. Sometimes images are so graphic, the treatment they capture so degrading and cruel, that they approach the pornographic. How can we responsibly approach them? Is it more respectful to witness such suffering, or to look away? I explore the notion of bearing witness to animal suffering as a manifestation of respect. I begin by asking why it is important to bear witness to human atrocities such as the Holocaust. Some rationales are forward-looking and consequentialist. We bear witness in the spirit of “never again”: to stir moral motivation and preventive action. But there are also backward-looking and expressive reasons: to show respect for the dead, to express our solidarity and grief, to affirm the moral value of both the lost and the saved. Some might argue that differences between human and nonhuman victims of violence make the latter rationales irrelevant when animal victims are in question. The animal dead did not value being remembered; animal survivors do not share a degrading collective memory of horror and do not care if we acknowledge it. Yet obligations of memory do find a foothold here. Bearing witness to human-animal violence affirms the moral status of animals; it expresses respect and is part of constitutive justice. Bearing witness, however, carries moral risks, so that it matters greatly how one does so. One problem is that witnesses’ “testimony” - usually visual documentation of animal abuse - does not find its way only to compassionate audiences, but also to others who will use it in pernicious ways and some who are simply voyeurs. In this way, the witness can unwillingly become “a pornographer of pain.” Given the motive of paying respect to the animal dead, this is the last outcome a moral witness desires. Yet showing atrocities done to animals in all their horrific detail is among the most powerful ways of gaining allies in the struggle to end animal abuse. In light of such dilemmas, I explore the importance of bearing witness in private and as communal activity, of who attends to animal suffering, and of how and through what media we do so.
192. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Toshihiko Ise Generality and Partiality from a Humean Point of View
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Hume offers two ways of reconciling the partiality of people’s feelings with the generality of moral thinking. First, the general point of view in moral evaluation is not that of a disinterested observer, but of another person who has a close relationship with the person to be judged. Here I find something analogous to the idea of Nel Noddings, who attempts to build an ethical theory on the basis of caring relationships. Second, according to Hume, the generality of the rules of justice is also compatible with partial feelings. Such rules allow everyone to pursue his or her goals without fear of violent intervention from others. My idea is that these rules are comparable to those of a competitive game. The idea of fair competition is not necessarily alien to Noddings’ type of ethical theory. As children, human beings normally learn to be fair in competitive games, along with caring for family members and friends. An ethical ideal of fairness may develop through competitions and help people get along with others beyond narrow circles. Taking into account of the competitive elements in relationship between people will be helpful in giving a fuller picture of a broadly Humean, sentimentalist ethical theory.
193. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Sebastián Álvarez Toledo Tenseless Time and Fatalism
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Tenseless time is the series of all moments and events ordered by the relationships before and after. According to this conception, although there is a time order, there is no present and therefore no past nor future. It is what McTaggart called the B-series. For most philosophers, tenseless time is more basic, objective and consistent with science than the tensed time used in our everyday language. However, that conception of time is the subject of several criticisms. One of them states that, given that it admits the existence of events that now we call future, the tenseless time has unavoidable fatalist consequences; because if it is already true today that tomorrow a certain event will occur, we now can in fact do nothing to avoid it. This paper analyses the specific sense of tenseless existence and tenseless truth and concludes that, if we properly understand these concepts, there is no reason to attribute fatalist connotations to tenseless time, and that the aforementioned criticism is based on the mistake of introducing in this conception of time some tensed notions of existence and truth, which are alien to it.
194. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Thomas Bonk Measures of Simplicity
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There is a broad consensus that the proper measure of simplicity of phenomenological laws (models) is the number of its free parameters. I argue that the “measure” is specious without a prior understanding of what simplicity is. To this end I propose an empirical interpretation of simplicity. Next, I sketch a general method for assigning degrees of simplicity to the elements of a given function space that complements the empirical characterization. It is shown that a “function space” approach can help overcome difficulties of Bayesian accounts of the curve fitting problem.
195. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Vera Danilova Transdisciplinary Research into New Patterns of Reality
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Representation of the concept of noobiogeosphere previously developed by the author is given. Concepts “noobiogeosphere”, “noobiogeocenosis”, “noobiogeospheric personality” are interpreted in terms of the transdisciplinary methodology. These are the attributes of a new model of reality, which are complemented by subjective structures. According to this methodology, “noobiogeospheric personality” should be understood as a subjective structure of the new reality, because of which value reference points penetrate in this reality. The concept of noobiogeosphere is based on the study of planetary-civilizational shells that help to create new planetary integrity and the formation of synthetic worldview universals. Noobiogeosphere is an ontological foundation of modern universalism, which is caused by planetary scale studies of the phenomena connected with nature, man and society. It is the composite human-dimensional complex of the biosphere, civilization, socio-cultural and planetary shells, and it is an example of a new model of reality, which can be studied only by transdisciplinary approach. The proposed concept involves the formation of noobiogeospheric class of sciences, which contain principles of biospheric class of sciences and axioms of humanitarian sphere. Disciplinary matrixes in noobiogeospheric class of sciences transform into transdisciplinary matrix. unit of self-organization processes are based on different laws (physical, chemical, biological, social).
196. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Naira Danielyan Considerations on the Modern Scientific Picture of the World as a Unity of Objective and Subjective Characters
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Unlike the classic science which was directed to ascertaining some fact, the modern science is oriented an act of project and constructive thinking being opened for further critics. Such kind of activity supposes freedom and creative work. The scientific and technical development as a rational activity has brought a lot of positive aspects in the enlargement of personal freedom. It should be recognized that some new rationality appears in the course of the scientific and technological progress. The object sphere is expanded in the new scientific picture of the world due to including such systems in it as ‘artificial intellect’, ‘virtual reality’, etc. which are the results of the scientific and technological progress. Such radical extension of the object sphere takes place in parallel with its radical ‘humanization’. And a person is included in the picture of the world not only as its active participant, but as its constituent principle. An Individual must be not only the centre of the world, but an incentive to its growing perfection
197. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
In-Rae Cho Toward a Co-evolutionary Model of Scientific Change
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In this work, I attempt to develop what I call a co-evolutionary model of scientific change, which I expect to afford a more balanced view on both the continuous and discontinuous aspects of scientific change. Supposing that scientific goals, methods and theories constitute the main components of scientific inquiry, I focus on the relationships among these components and their changing patterns. First of all, I identify explanatory power and empirical adequacy as primary goals of science and explore the possibility of evaluating scientific goals. Then I try to bring out the major features of how the main components of science are related to each other. One major feature is that they mutually constrain each other, and as such each main component operates as a selective force on the other components. Another major feature is that the main components of science induce changes reciprocally, but with certain intervals. Other important features are the modes and tempos of changes in the main components of scientific inquiry. All these features together, I conclude, suggest that scientific change is evolutionary (rather than revolutionary), as well as co-evolutionary. Finally I argue that this co-evolutionary model of scientific change does not yield to what I call the problems of circularity and scientific progress.
198. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Mikel Henda Gomez de Segura Time as an Evolutive Idealization
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I am going to argue that time is an idealization and its origins are in our perception of reality. I will also maintain that it comes from an excessive realism when interpreting the concept of time in physics. I will maintain that time is just the measure of changes of systems in relation with other changing systems. Time is a quantity we use to order events, a relation between changes, however, it is not a substance. I will assume that there are two main conceptions of time: a) the time of our everyday knowledge, which is mainly a construction of our perception; and b) the concept of time provided by the physical sciences. Nevertheless, both concepts of time have little in common. I will argue that the concept of time of our perception has evolutionary bases.
199. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Rodolfo Gaeta, Nélida Gentile, Susana Lucero On The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science
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The philosophy of science developed since the second half of the 20th century has included naturalized perspectives. Kuhn, Feyerabend and followers of the Strong Programme have claimed a role for History and Sociology. But to privilege the historical and sociological issues could precipitate the philosophy of science into a self-destructive relativism. Kuhn’s ideas on the relationship between philosophy and history of science have produced lasting effects in discrediting traditional philosophies of science. In this paper we focus on the tensions shown in the evolution of Kuhn’s thinking and we point out, among other difficulties, some fundamental inconsistencies at a metahistorical and meta-philosophical level.
200. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 62
Manuela Fernandez Pinto Commercialization and the Limits of Critical Contextual Empiricism
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Philosophers of science have become increasingly concerned with the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. The general aim of the paper is to show that approaches in social epistemology of science fail to take into account important changes that the organization of science has undergone in the past decades. I argue that the social organization of science is an important “social dimension” of scientific knowledge that philosophers need to consider. In order to do so, I focus on Helen Longino’s social epistemology of science as portrayed in her critical contextual empiricism. I show that Longino’s approach has important limitations when trying to implement it as a guide for current research through an evaluation of two of her norms of effective criticism.